A peace in the shape of a durian, or the state of self in Bali

by

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A PEACE IN THE SHAPE OF A DURIAN,

OR THE STATE OF THE SELF IN BALI.

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'Isn't power a sort of generalized war which assumes at particular moments the forms of peace and the State? Peace would then be a form of war, and the State a mode of waging it.' (Foucault 1979a: 39)

Something is rotten in the state of Bali, or at least in the state of the state in Bali. What follows is an attempt to elucidate this odd opening remark, designed in part to jolt me from dogmatic slumbers. For, on being asked to write about contemporary Balinese perceptions of the state and politics, I found myself faced with a morass of material which made little sense in conventional terms. The present workshop offers too interesting an opportunity to reflect on what – or how little – we know about Bali to be wasted on purveying professional platitudes. So may I attempt to exorcise a few ghosts and hope there is more than madness in my method? My worry is that, unless we eschew many of our ideas about society, the state and power, we shall end up, with Fortinbras, finding ourselves saddled with the corpse of Bali and that the rest is, indeed, silence.

There are grave problems in approaching Balinese politics, past or present. For a start our notions of 'state', 'power' and the whole paraphernalia of the polity are the legacy of an ancient argument which can only regurgitate predictable and positivist answers. The state and political institutions become things, to be dug up or discovered, measured and weighed and involve us in all sorts of fallacies (some of which I outline in an appendix well out of harm's way). So, perhaps we need to consider the preconditions of speech and action, and not assume the state to be a positive essential object of study. Exporting our prejudices, under the guise of comparison, merely makes the Balinese appear remote, ridiculous and ineffective.

In other words, positing 'the state' and its institutions may hypostatize a subject which is open to different kinds of representation, assertion and challenge. The difficulties of saying what the state 'really' was become the more difficult as the ostensible referent was massively and irreversibly transformed early this century when Bali was colonized. (1) So, rather than amalgamate memories, claims and counter-claims with wistful thinking into some outlandish Frankensteinian monster, I would like to consider how Balinese, in the part of the island with which I am familiar, argue about kingship and 'the Indonesian State', and reflect on the contexts in which they are set, to see how kings, states and power are portrayed.

Epistemological states

'There is a mystery - with whom relation
Durst never meddle - in the soul of state;
Which hath an operation more divine
Than breath or pen can ever give expressure to.'
Troilus and Cressida iii, 3.

What is so wrong in talking about 'the state'? Briefly, it assumes a metaphysics which has yet to be shown to hold for Bali. Recourse to the state involves ontological presuppositions about functions, human nature, the distribution of power and complex agencies; and epistemological questions of
how continuity and change are understood. It is easy to gloss over real differences and discontinuities, partly through dubious translations, but this merely begs the question.

In Western political philosophy the state is generally represented as necessary, even logical. It may be a convenient means of resolving plural demands and interests (Hendel 1958), an umpire which ensures the rules of the game are followed (Benn and Peters 1959: 329), its laws entailed by logic (Lucas 1966: 14-15), the guarantor of civil liberty and happiness (Rawls 1971: 545-6). By identifying politics as a system with the state (e.g. Baston 1966), the extent to which authority and legitimacy are contested is easily obscured.

Assertions about the proper functions of the state become conflated with fact.

Definitions of the state presuppose, in different ways, notions of agency and human nature. In the Republic, Plato models the self on the state, but more commonly it is the defects in human nature for which the state must compensate. So the state emerges

'as the sacred light in a profane society, as a kind of transcendental ego of society, uniting and regulating the chaotic impulses of society’s empirical self, as if it operated at a different level of causality from what it oversees. Such statism, of course, nurtures itself on an equally a priori individualism, a view of human beings as fundamentally private, selfish, infinitely demanding and rather unreasonable. Lacking internal principles of mutual organization, human passions and human individuals require the organization they need to come from outside and above - hence the need for that holy trinity: Morality, Religion and the State.’ (Skillen 1977: 18)

The parallels between the observance of morality, accordance with Divine Will and successful kingship in Bali implied, for instance, in the Babad Buleleng and the Ramayana may be more apparent than substantive (Worsley 1972: 43-82). (In what follows I shall draw on Peter Worsley’s work, both because his account largely fits my understanding of Balinese society and because, being here, if need be, he can dispute my interpretations on the spot!) In the Babad Buleleng Divinity is not remote.

"In the babad’s view of the divine as both a transcendental force beyond the natural world and as a force immanent in that world, we recognize an attitude more widely held amongst Balinese, who distinguish between "the transcendental world hereafter (niskala)" and "the material world here (sakala)". This dual aspect of the divine, at once transcendental and immanent, is also one of the fundamental doctrines found in Balinese tutur literature.” (1972: 79)

(One might add the distinction seems as important in popular thought.) The causal connexions also differ. For the babad

'presumes a causal relationship between the character of the king and his realm...(which) amounts to a causal connection between the legitimacy of the ruler and the character of his realm.’ (1972: 77)

and indeed between a king ‘and the natural world which surrounds him’ (1972:}
63). Under what conditions then do notions of kingship fit, or fail to fit, interpretations of such 'fundamental doctrines'?

If politics is not just about the state, what is it about? Perhaps we should

'think in terms of more or less coherently intersecting and interlocking networks, relations implying more or less stable structures of power and conflict.' (Skillen 1985: 23) (3)

For Bali, this view has the advantage that, rather than decentre networks of patronage, local groups and social practices, it brings them into the same field as kingship. It also suggests that we are not confined to seeing the symbols of authority as ideals (Geertz 1980) or mystification (Berg 1965: esp. 89-91) – whether kings reigned, or only sprinkled – but as part of the manifestation, control and propriety of powers.

Questioning the centrality of the state also enables us to ask what kind of agency kingship and the representation of royalty involve. Writing of the Vijnudharmottara, a work justifying the Pâñcarâtra Vaisnava vision of kingship in eighth-century India, Inden has suggested it

'was produced by and for a complex agency consisting of Pâñcarâtra adepts and of an imperial king and his court... The formal agent of the text was a Pâñcarâtra adept and his acolytes... But they did not act alone. They compiled the text in a dialectical relationship with an imaginary Agent, the god Viṣṇu... At the same time, however, they were engaged in a series of dialectical relations with a king and the persons of his court... ’ (n.d.: 15, 53.)

These remarks shed interesting light on the conditions under which babad were produced in Bali and the field of agency, divine, human and complex in which the role of king is part.

There is another problem. How are complex notions like 'state', 'kingship' and 'power' represented? Our images and language for discussing statecraft and power are largely substantive. This is a curiously old-fashioned view granted that anthropological approaches generally stress the study of relations (or relations of relations). It is perhaps no accident that the word 'state' itself is linked etymologically, as are 'to state', 'status', 'estate' and 'statute', to 'stasis' and measurement through common roots for standing or weighing (Onions 1969; Partridge 1966). Not only is power often conflated with the state but we tend to hypostatize and portray it metaphorically: as something one has, exercises, uses, seizes, but cannot ignore.

Contemporary Balinese epistemology (I cannot speak of the past) shows some distinctive tendencies. For a start, what exists may always transform (menerahkan) into its opposite (tungkalik, especially under conditions of excess), between which relations are logically contrary (kelawan) and in practice liable to conflict (ngelawan). (4) From different points of view there may be more than one opposite. So the tungkalik of king (here prabu rather than raja) and subjects may be:
The tungkalik of raja, interestingly, were always given as:

raja : ra'ayat (n.b. Bahasa Indonesia)
raja : dayang

The idea of tungkalik implies a potentially unstable world where, without due care, kings may become subjects and subjects kings. (5)

In passing, I wonder how much the purported parallel between the Balinese state and Western monarchical systems is abetted by naive translation. Why gloss Balinese potentates as 'kings'? And what corresponds to 'power'? Kuasa? Sakti? Bawa? Or, given the important role of causation as the power to determine effects, should it perhaps be kerana? (6) If Balinese villagers are not to be dismissed simply as ignorant peasants, perhaps we have been lax in our treatment of their semantic usages, as our glosses of 'king' are not substitutable synonyms.

In so far as Balinese draw upon metaphor for their images of modes of existence, these are not so much about states, substance or structure as about processes, like flow (in water and semen properly flowing downwards, an effective image of the necessary asymmetry of human relations), manifestation or instantiation (in revelation, rebirth or theatre) and localization (in the tying of powers to temples and places). The stress on events and transformations militates against the construction of monolithic coherent systems and allows a recognition of contradiction and conflict. (If Modernism stresses systems and coherence of relations and Post-Modernism inherent contradiction (Lyotard 1984), the Balinese may have anticipated us in being Post-Modern!) Representing the distribution of powers as encapsulated within a continuing 'state' leaves the nature of change problematic. For Balinese, I suspect the problem is close to the reverse. If everything changes, continuity requires the control of potentially unpredictable processes. If this be so, then concern with dynastic genealogy and legitimacy (see Worsley 1972: 78-82) may be as much about ways of ensuring mastery over disorder, contradictions and maintaining relations with Divinity in its confusing manifestations, as about the imposition of sovereignty, or the perpetuation of status, power and wealth.

An excessive fondness for the love of women

Hamlet. 'Lady, shall I lie in your lap?'
Ophelia. 'No, my lord.'
Hamlet. 'I mean, my head upon your lap?'
Ophelia. 'Ay, my lord.'
Hamlet. 'Do you think, I meant country matters?'
Ophelia. 'I think nothing, my lord.'
Hamlet. 'That's a fair thought to lie between maids' legs.'

Hamlet iii, 2.

Popular perceptions and stories of kings, princes, their agents and modern successors contrast rather strikingly with the babads' image of authority and power. Each stressed certain kinds of agency, Balinese or Indonesian, and
minimized others. While the 'facts' might remain the same, the context and presuppositions varied. In both, evaluation tends to be in terms of the personal qualities, as Koentjaraningrat observed for Java (1980). But where royal accounts and theatre stress the degree to which the polity, indeed the whole world, depended on the conduct of kings, villagers stressed their failings and were inclined to Pepys's position when he wrote

'But methought it lessened my esteem of a king, that he should not be able to command the rain.' (Diary, 19th July 1662)

It is not easy to assess quite what impact dynastic politics had on people in Tegallalang, the only Balinese about whom I am qualified to talk. As the village lies towards the northern reaches of Gianyar, direct experience of the royal court was limited to the few low caste people who were its clients and to the local cadet lines of Pradéwa who maintained small courts there. The region was crucial to the protection of water sources for the southerly seats of the powerful Cokordas of Sukawati, especially the branches in Ubud and Peliatan of which the local Cokordas are off-shoots, so there seems to have long been a contest between Pradéwa and Cokorda for influence in the area. Part was focussed on the post of the local punggawa, but much hinged on extended networks of retainers and courtiers, working on or maintained by, large estates of land upon which much aristocratic influence depended. It is, of course, hard to be certain but ties to particular Pedanda seem not to have bulked large, people preferring to shop around. Pejengaji, the largest ward, for instance remains proud of its reputation that no Brahmana can stay there and remain sane (the last who tried, early this century, was known as Pedanda Melalung because he ran around only part-dressed before his premature death). Running counter to aristocratic claims, many villagers assert there to have been complex ties of patronage and influence between ordinary villagers and pride in the independence and effectiveness of local corporate groups.

Representations of royal rule vary. Old men, still alive in 1970, spoke of the pre-conquest punggawa (a local Pradéwa and Cokorda) as stern, if not harsh, but not entirely unreasonable. People talk of royal agents as being very frightening, the deeds and families of past sedahan still being singled out. Others stress the arbitrary nature of rule, especially over matters of dress, deference and desire for local girls. This last is of some importance. The sexual excesses of princes, the enumeration of the number of kept concubines, the right to sleep with all new brides and the practice of fathers scarifying their daughters to make them cacad - so safe from randy royals - are popular remenances of things past. Wars, as distinct from armed peasant clashes, epitomize the importance of terror: Pansji Sakti is passed down in local memory as wreaking devastation during his expeditions through the area. Such matters as the punishment of ordinary villagers on the birth of kembar buncing, as well as the ban on their marriage, is seen as droit de seigneur. Retrospective statements must, of course, be treated in their discursive context but, taken together with other evidence of countervailing views (Hobart 1978; Vickers 1983, 1984; Worsley 1984), it suggests the dynastic model was not uncontested.

In stark contrast to the idea of decline from a Golden Age (embraced by some senior Cokordas in Ubud), villagers of all castes, and even the well-known balian, Cokorda Payangan, speak of re-entering the Adiyuga, after a transitional phase under the Dutch and Japanese, as the rule of law depends less on personal whim and people have become wealthier. Such views may be convenient ways of evaluating change, but they also bear on the definition of
powers. For the image of decline at once excludes the possibility of achieving an ideal in the future and cuts out the possible legitimacy of pretenders.

Perhaps the paper should have concentrated more on the changes which formal incorporation into the Indonesian state has brought. Apart from my having run dry on the subject, this also reifies the representation and use of complex networks of power into questionable systems. Villagers in Tegallalang are subject to the orders, and sometimes coercion, of appointed agents of the state, and the vicissitudes of national politics as they learned to their cost in 1965 (when twenty adult men died in Pejengaji alone). They are perhaps less clear on the implications of such things as changing laws or the influence of television. Narrow views of power, however, decentre the importance of social practice. For even where Indonesian law and Balinese practice conflict, until recently villagers have quite successfully ignored the dictates of the former. Leaving aside violent incidents of melegandang, I Sirig of Br. Gunaksa in Manu Aba and I Lingkuh from Br. Kutuh in Ubud were both executed by co-villagers against police orders for insulting the banjar (ngerugada, i.e. kereng merusak ring jagat) and stealing a sewing machine respectively. In the latter case, the man was taken from the police station under the noses of armed officers and torn to pieces on the road (where it turns from Peliatan sharp West towards Ubud and tourists sometimes stop to photograph the beauty of Bali).

More often clear distinctions between what is Balinese and Indonesian are meaningless. Officials are judged by their personal attributes (a tendency which made it hard to assess 'the system' in recollections of pre-colonial days). One low caste carat was invested with attributes of royalty; and accounts of past royal doings are inevitably evaluated in terms of more recent experience. Some of the complexities emerge from the following summary of a meeting in Tegallalang in 1980 to decide the criteria for the new bendesa.

A meeting of all klian dinas, klian desa and pemangku was called by the perbekel to discuss the resignation of the previous bendesa who had held the position for 31 years. The perbekel (a local ex-army officer) noted that, under a new system, Tegallalang had become a desa suasEmpada (the highest of three new classes, with suitably Old Javanese-sounding names suadaya, suakarya, suasEmpada.). Banjar had been asked before to list the criteria they thought relevant for the office. The klian dinas or desa of each spoke in turn, the accumulated results being written down as:

**TATA TERTIB PENCALONAN:**

1. Tahu membaca dan menulis latin dan bali.
2. Berbadan sehat/keterangan dokter.
4. Tidak cacat sekala.
5. Umur dari 21 sampai 50 tahun.
7. Mempunyai kesanggupan/surat pernyataan.
8. Memberi nafkah bagi aparat bendesa/klian adat (i.e. klian desa) supaya diatur.
9. Calon kalau menolak perlu diadakan sangsi.
10. Pencalonan stap bendesa jangan berkumpul,
berkumpul dalam satu banjar.

11. Supaya tidak cacat nama dalam banjar/ mempunyai kejujuran.

12. Yang mecalonkan apakah banjar secara umum/ desa adat?

13. Tahu dibidang agama/adat istiadat agama hindu.


15. Perlu ada seorang wakil, diluar sekretaris dan bendesa?

The first problem arose over what constituted cacat (some confusion arose over whether Balinese cacat had the same reference as the Indonesian word). The Jero Mangku Dalem from Br. Pejengaji, the most influential of the priests explained its significance in Balinese, the sense which he said mattered. A more serious difficulty arose over whether the candidate should own a karang desa, a portion of traditional compound land, and so be a member of the desa himself. The klian desa of Br. Triwangsa suggested that if they were to be maju, the office should be open to everyone. This caused some concern and the matter was referred to I Suberatha from Br. Pejengaji, a fairly senior local policeman. He referred to various government ordinances not particularly on the point, before launching into a forceful speech about the impossibility of a non-member knowing about, taking an active part in, or being listened to by desa members on, matters to do with pidadal or adat. He was greeted with respectful silence and the meeting moved immediately to the next item.

The question of a stipend was referred to the desa as not being a matter of dinas. Then the question of sanctions in case the candidate withdrew before his term was up. There was general agreement that, if this occurred, the bendesa would be fined Rp. 10,000 and for hukuman badan diserahkan pada kepolisian selama satu bulan, until I Suberatha pointed out the latter would involve problems (in part over who would pay for his food!). Upon which it was agreed that non-financial punishment should be left to the candidate’s own banjar as it saw fit.

The example brings out several interesting points. As a desa matter, strictly it was not the perbekel’s job to organize the meeting; but distinctions between dinas and desa matters is often confused. However, on the question of funding the distinction was clearly drawn! An interesting, and it seems deliberate, ambiguity in item 8 opened the way for possible remuneration of desa officials who are traditionally unpaid. If anything this suggests a strengthening of the desa relative to government-recognized banjar. Several deputies, irrigation officials and others, including a policeman, attended because they were important locals, rather than because they were properly included. Third, the discussion was largely in Indonesian, mixed with Balinese, while a few speakers kept to Balinese or switched into it, if they wanted to contest an important point (note items 4 & 6 for instance were in whole or part in Balinese). The severity of sanctions for a retiring incumbent reflect Tegallalang, rather than Indonesian, standards; with an interesting attempt to involve the police as an extra source of punishment. (It makes the point that, in local terms, leaders are as much the servants as masters, which stands in stark contrast to images of kings unanswerable to their subjects.) The banjar (in this case including only desa
members) was recognized as the appropriate agent to decide, and administer, sanctions. In view of the overlap, if that it be, I think it would be pretty pointless to try and establish how Balinese or Indonesian the proceedings were. The interesting question is not if Balinese are Indonesian or Balinese but how social practices are construed.

The account brings out one more point, the significance of which I hope to develop later. At two crucial moments, decisions were referred to specific people. The first was exactly what conditions should constitute cacat. The second, and more interesting, was the immediate inclusion of the policeman to arbitrate on the rival virtues of modernity as against traditional knowledge and participation in the group. His pronouncement, unlike most other statements, was adopted without discussion. If villagers ran into trouble, I was told afterwards, they were not to blame. Responsibility had been deferred onto the policeman.

Three themes are worth noting, as their broader implications will be taken up below. Balinese and Indonesian spheres of interest are elided discursively into a single frame of reference and action (a step validated by the widely used injunction that everything should be manut ring desa, kala, patra, appropriate to the place, occasion and circumstance). At key moments responsibility for decisions and their consequences was deferred onto important personages and the buck effectively passed. If villagers sometimes deflect dangers, they were not always so fortunate, as in the distress they say they suffered owing to the excessive fondness of princes for local women.

Deferred orders

'The heavens themselves, the planets, and this centre, 
Observe degree, priority, and place, 
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form, 
Office, and custom, in all line of order,'

Troylus and Cressida 1, 3.

What kind of agencies were recognized in the dynastic model of the world? A grave drawback in most accounts which focus on kingship and the state is the way in which Divinity is decentred. Whether it is partly a reflection of recent pressures on Hindu Balinese to stress a single Godhead or not, everything in sekala and niskala is said to stem from Divinity, often referred to as Ida Sang Hyang Wid(h)i (Wasa) to whom all regularity, custom (tata) and the possibility of good and evil is due and which alone knows everything. (8) Processually this is often expressed as coming into existence, continuance and dissolution, upetiti (utpatti), setiti (sthiti), pralina, which may be identified with three more immediate aspects of Divinity, the tripurasas, Brahma, Wisnu, Iswara (see Hinzler 1981: 248, for a fuller formulation).

Villagers would say they had heard there was only one spirit or batara, Sang Hyang Widi or Sang Hyang Atma from whom all existing forms and souls come by the process of ngeredan(ay)ang, creation. It is not clear though whether each person has one soul or whether these are refractions of sinah Sang Hyang Widi. The means by which the transcendent can affect the immanent was expressed, not untypically, by one old man as a pun: kayun ngeredanang kayu. In the beginning if there were no trees, Sang Hyang Widi created trees. Seantukan 'kayun Sang Hyang Widi ngeredanang kayu' dados 'kayun Sang Hyang
Widi ngeredanang kayu. 'The thought of Sang Hyang Widi causes trees' becomes 'the thought of Sang Hyang Widi creates trees'. (9)

So Divinity created the conditions for existence of immaterial and living forms, such as batara, kala, tonyo, manusa, beburon. They, in another sense, provide the conditions for the existence or re-creation of Divinity. They also constitute what one might call 'derived agents' because Divinity created and, as it was sometimes put, participates in them (kedulurin antuk Sang Hyang Widi). In Tegallalang the relation of Sang Hyang Widi to its creation is often expressed in a metaphor of light. Souls are its sinah. Good thoughts and expressions are ening. One of the more complicated words is caya which may be used to refer to anything from the first emanations of Divinity or the reflection of the soul in sekala (cf. Gonda 1952: 159, 161) to indicating something is well within itself, radiant (cf. Zoetmulder 1982: 318; Balinese sometimes make an etymological link with praça). More prosaically the products of human agency mecaya if the rite of ngulapin and then regular ngodalin have been performed. (10)

Interestingly kingship is also represented in terms of visual attributes and events, just as is its recreation in ceremony and theatre. One of the most important and elusive, expressions villagers use to describe the proper attribute of those with authority is mebawa. (Part of its complexity may be due to two Old Javanese words combining in a more or less single notion: bhawa 'manner of being', 'manner of acting', 'state of mind or body' and wibhawa 'power, majesty' (Zoetmulder 1982: 226, 2257).) Bawa is reflected in speech, in facial expression and in the eyes in different degrees. In acting, villagers say, raja pasti mebawa pisan, patih pasti aeng. Speaking of well known figures on the island, the Pedanda Dawan and Belangsinga were thought to have the most bawa among pedanda; among satriya Cokorda Payangan, if encountered in the street, but Cokorda Agung Sukawati in speech. (The first and third were also thought sakti, the last not, so the qualities are not coterminous.) The signs of the death of a ratu adil who is tanpa dosa or mebawa include hujan raja (light rain shot through with sunlight), surya mekalangan (sun surrounded by halo of light), teja guling (a single ray of sunlight travelling horizontally in any direction), kilap tatit (lightning flashing in all directions) and kuwang-kuwung (the shape of a three quarters moon somewhere in the sky not too far from the sun, the least common sign). (11) Creation, welfare, power and goodness are portrayed in terms of the play of visual metaphors in Tegallalang in a way, as far as I know, villagers never do in matters Indonesian.

In a familiar scheme of Divine orders, everything has its proper place, kind of actions and limitations. Wild animals occupy forest, humans villages and fields, tonyo gorges, manusa sakti the night and so on. Even Sang Hyang Widi is popularly held to be bound to think and learn in perpetuity, if it stops it dies. Order, however, is contingent in the sense that it must needs adapt to circumstance, so the appropriate forms of derived agency are not unchanging: punggawa have given way to camat.

In the dynastic order Divinity, humans and more complex derived agencies play particularly important parts. Not every human, however, is necessarily recognized as an agent of equal significance, or indeed an agent at all. The mad and children in many contexts are not responsible for their actions, nor are women always treated as full agents. It is the unit of man and woman who are recognized as the constituents of common village complex agencies, like the banjar. Other corporate groups, such as the desa, subak and dadiya, constitute complex agencies to the extent that it is the group
rather than its members, however defined, who are responsible for deciding a course of action.

'A multitude of men are made One Person, when they are by one man or one Person Represented; so that it be done with the consent of everyone of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One.' (Hobbes 1914: 85) (12)

All such agencies (except possibly the desa) are generally regarded in Tegallalang as deriving from human choice. (I am tempted to suggest that what appear as person designators, I, Ni, Ida may equally be regarded as prefixed of agents, or Persons. It is not uncommon to speak of I desa in contexts where it acts as an agent, c.f. Bateson 1973: 90-91.)

In these terms kingship is a complex agency, as is priesthood. The role of king involves relations with ministers, courtiers and subjects; pedanda mediate between Divinity and sisiya (or rancang for pemangku). The more difficult issue is: do kings and priests derive their status as agents from humans and so are kekaryan manusa, or from Divinity and so are kekaryan Widi? If the latter, are they agents of the same aspect of Godhead? If Divinity is niskala, how does it work in sekala? Upon the possible answers to these questions hinges part of the ambiguity and complexity of kingship.

Behind dynastic models lies a singular representation of the connexion between cosmic and social orders. Where an agent is transcendent or immaterial, it may have an immanent presence by which it thinks and acts. What sort of person, or institution, represents such an agent, and in what way? (13) In a sense, high priests are, however imperfectly, the intelligence of Divinity operating on earth, and kings, or princes, are Its Will. The way Divinity works is understandable not through reason, but by a knowledge of the texts where Its workings are enshrined and partly revealed. This sheds an interesting light not only on Dumont's insistence on the link of religion and power in Hindu societies as well as the connexion of bhuwana agung and bhuwana alit, but also on the nature of the complementarity of priests and kings, the difference in the way they represent Divinity and the consequences.

It is not possible to explore the ramifications of the argument in full here. It does, I think, make sense of some otherwise puzzling aspects of the dialectic between kings and priests (or, more narrowly, Bagawan Purohito, and now the latter have flourished despite the decline of the former). Whereas the transcendent nature of Divinity implies the necessary inadequacy of priestly knowledge (for what is manifest (wiakti) in niskala appears by pratiwilma (example, analogy) in sekala), the possibilities of extending the immanent agent's will or powers are less constrained and, in so far as the Balinese may be labelled Saivite, include ferocity and destruction (Worsley 1972: 40-42, 44-5). (With this, of course, goes the danger of endless replication we find in local princes aping kings as well as a possible justification for the emergence of patih.) Where priests claim to mediate or understand the workings of Divinity, kings exemplify or instantiate the Will of Divinity and the scale of their claims to embody it is limited largely by manifest failure (Worsley 1972: 43).

This hierarchical universe is expressed in terms of multiple senses of 'order'. So far I have been content to gloss Divinity as Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Waśa. In Old Javanese usage widhi connotes 'rule, law, ordering, regulation'; kawidhi 'to command, order'; waśa 'power, force, dominion'; and widhiwaśa 'the
power of fate or destiny' (Zoetmulder 1982: 2262-3, 2213-4). So Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa is arguably Divinity as order, what orders, the power of order(s) or of fate; kings being both the patients and agents of order and orders. As orders it is experienced by the populace as royal power; as order, or dharm ("the rule of life and conduct, as established by divine disposition" Zoetmulder 1982: 367), it is the norms, ideals and principles expressed as suśila (morals or good conduct) and inscribed in part in sāsana (codes of conduct). Kings are subject to its dictates (as are other humans, or are other beings, depending on the interpretation of dharma).

'The king had to model himself upon the behaviour of noble people (sadhu) who sought no material advantage, pleasure or fame in what they did but strove only to protect the religious and moral law (dharma). Knowledge of the precepts of the dharma was the only reliable foundation for a successful reign for from such a knowledge flowed the discretion (nitijñācāra) in the conduct of affairs which was so critical for the harmony and prosperity of the realm.' (Worsley 1972: 43-44)

This passage also introduces a third representation of Divinity, the sadhu, perhaps the one closest to embodying its material detachment.

'The king had to model himself upon the behaviour of noble people (sadhu) who sought no material advantage, pleasure or fame in what they did but strove only to protect the religious and moral law (dharma). Knowledge of the precepts of the dharma was the only reliable foundation for a successful reign for from such a knowledge flowed the discretion (nitijñācāra) in the conduct of affairs which was so critical for the harmony and prosperity of the realm.' (Worsley 1972: 43-44)

The extent to which the king was agent or patient in the workings of Divinity is an intriguing issue. The problem is summed up by Worsley in his discussion of Panji Sakti. For

'...the power latent within him appears representative of a legitimating authority which has pervaded his being from outside himself.' (1972: 37)

Yet this power and the dictates of dharma may be in conflict. At this point a fascinating resolution is suggested: Panji Sakti becomes the patient and his sword the agent.

'It is upon the initiative of the kris and by means of its power that Panji Sakti murders Pungakan Gendis. Indeed, the kris instructs Panji Sakti that all he has to do is to point the kris in the direction of Pungakan Gendis and that the kris will see to his death.' (1972: 24) (14)

This is not, I submit, just an appeal to a deus ex machina to get round the implications of the murder of a good and respected figure, but a pervasive theme of deferment by derived agents. Consider, for instance, the use of sasepan before the slaughter of animals for ritual (but not otherwise), by which blame is deflected from the butcher. The inclusion of mantra to anticipate shortcomings, or mistakes, in ritual reflects the ambiguity by which pedanda or pemangku may be agent to the congregation, but is the mere instrument to Divinity. When it became obvious that different pemangku offered different advice on propitious dates, I asked villagers in Tegallalang whether it mattered. The universal reply was that, had they inquired in the proper manner, then the blame (and the consequent karma pala) fell exclusively on the pemangku, so the diversions in advice were their problem!

'When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of the Author...not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature' (Hobbes 1914: 84).
This theme may have some bearing on what would otherwise seem the rather surprising finale to a very serious matter.

According to various sources, two or three years prior to the happenings discussed below, a curious event occurred in one of Tegallalang's temples, Pura Duur Bingin, which is quite well known because of its Barong Landungs' reputation for curing human infertility. Water was seen coming out of a fissure in the tiles in the Pelengghihan Batara Ratu Teruna Gedé. After a meeting the officials of Tegallalang sought the advice of the Mangku Tirta Arum, whom they often consulted as a medium on serious matters. They were told this was a gift for the devotion of the Batara's panjak (upon which another long story hinges) and they should perform kekaryanan aci pengenteg. This was duly done. A year or so later during the piadalana mirah bolong was discovered in the shrine, those who slept overnight there heard a voice calling, were unable to sleep and felt hot. The penangku had a dream in which a small child dressed in white came into the temple. After discussion it was felt that upakara pengenteg alit should be offered again. The matter rested there.

Just before Êka Dasa Rudra, the mangku's wife fell very ill and desa officials went to nunas raos from a medium in Gadungan, a nearby village, who said that she would die but, if she nunas ica in Pura Duur Bingin, it would be delayed till after the ceremony. Unfortunately she died ten days later (on instructions from Besakih, she was not cremated till after Êka Dasa Rudra). Following this there was a long period of discussion over what to do, as it was thought some major action was needed. It was decided to ask the penangku from Tirta Arum to come to the temple to nadi; the villagers also went to ask the Cokordes in Ubud if they would permit a reading of the Babad Dalem Sukawati in Pura Duur Bingin, as parts of it related to the founding of Tegallalang and to the building of the temple. The penangku refused on the grounds he was sing bani, so the desa decided to await the reading of the babad and take further action in the light of the results.

On 16th. December 1979, several thousand people gathered in Pura Duur Bingin for the reading (the ngewacen was to be by a local man and the masean by I Rinda from Belahbatuh). Everyone waited for some hours as the member of the Cokorda family who was to be present as a witness had gone fishing. (I heard several people remark that he was probably using a short rod in a very small pond!) Eventually he turned up with an entourage and the reading began. The arrival of the first Cokorda in Tegallalang was detailed and how the Pura Duur Bingin was built on royal orders after Ida Batari Danu (Batur) and Ida Batari Sri (also referred to as Ida Batara Sri Catur Dewi) wished a temple for their worship. The soroh (kin groups) who should support Pura Duur Bingin were noted (one included the word bolong). After brief consultation with the Cokorda the reading abruptly stopped as the scene in the babad moved away from Tegallalang. The meeting broke up and nothing further was said, nor done, about the extraordinary events.
What was odd to the outside observer was the contrast between the depth
and generality of expressed concern over the proper steps to ensure the wishes
of the deities in Pura Duur Bingin were carried out and the dismissal of the
whole question after the reading. There seems to have been no discussion
between the Cokordas, village officials or anyone else at any point. It was
as if the reading were the fulfilment of villagers’ duties, although they
denied it. Instead I was given the following comments. The Pemangku Tirta
Arum was not brave enough to come to a temple so noted for the kesaktian
of its gods but Cokorda Agung Suyasa was, in part perhaps because he had a
reputation for being sakti enough to make and ngepasupatinin barong. By his
presence, and in agreeing to witness the reading, responsibility for what
transpired in the future had been removed from villagers’ shoulders onto his.
So why should they be concerned any more? It seemed as if responsibility for
dealing with divine agency had been deferred onto someone willing to accept
it.

'It is much safer to obey than to govern.'
Thomas A Kempis
The imitation of Christ Ch. 9.

The notion of deferment may have broader implications. Hughes-Freeland
has argued it to be a central theme in understanding Javanese dance and
theatre, which may be not so much a matter of realization of ideals as
immanence and deferral, a metaphysics of possibility and a play upon irony.
So dance gains importance by the subtlety of how it defers, rather as the
concept

‘of the “Just King” (Ratu Adil) gains value by virtue of its
absence, rather than imminent fulfillment. It serves instead as a
countervailing shadow, an exemplification of itself, which helps
to make the present bearable, although it is as a precondition
itself very much in absentia. (1986: ch. 7)

Were Balinese to make similar use of irony it would raise interesting
questions about the style of interpretations we tend to impose on them. Our
‘metaphysics of presence’ and its focus on the essential attributes of things
certainly predisposes us against recognizing the extent to which deferral
happens. (16)

Whatever the epistemological implications, the theme of ‘putting off’
makes sense of certain aspects of agency in Bali. Deference to superiors
(ngesor) is, in a way, public passion (in its older sense) in recognition of
another’s capacity for action by which agency is redefined or transferred.
Something is going on, I suspect, which we have hardly begun to understand.

The state of the self

‘There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.’
Hamlet i, 5.

The view I have briefly outlined is of a world of hierarchical order in which
beings are classified in various, sometimes incommensurable, ways. This order
may be expressed in terms of ‘caste’ (wangsa), ‘purity’ (kesucian), ‘morality’
susila, or ‘duty’ (darma), each of which picks up a different aspect of the
workings of what I have called ‘agency’. It promises peace and harmony, despite potentially prickly contraries, if everything observes its proper place according to Divinity in its aspect as order, Ida Sang Hyang Widi Wasa. There is another view, however, about which much is written but rarely as a more or less coherent vision. The neglect, I suspect, is due as much to our own difficulties in admitting it, as to its being decentred in dynastic accounts. Here the world is one of unstable competition between beings interacting in different arenas which are, ultimately, all too commensurable. (A fascinating account of a similar difference between classificatory and interactional worlds is suggested in Karim 1981.) We speak of this in Bali as ‘magic’ (pengiwa, pengenen), ‘witchcraft’ (Balinese use verb forms like ngeléyak more than abstract noun like pendestian) or ‘mystical power’ (kesaktian), in which chance, contingency and fate are central and which I shall suggest is another way agency may be understood. It is a world of war and perpetual struggle between more or less equals, over which Divinity, perhaps most commonly in its aspect as Siwa, presides by the sheer superiority of means. The two are, of course, related, because being overlapping classes, if heuristic opposites, they entail one another and may be blended in all sorts of different ways.

These two visions of agency may be combined into a seemingly coherent picture or stand as uneasy contraries. In the Babad Bulèlèng, for instance, the clear incompatibility between the unwarranted killing of a rival, Pungakan Gèngís, and the insistence on the moral foundation of the realm is narratively resolved in terms of the king’s dharma to be good and generous to his people (1972: 43-45), while extolling the unleashing of sakti against enemies (1972: 40-42). Whether kings are the instantiation of divine will or not, they are also human, embodying human strengths and failings, who bleed and die - as cynics in Pejènqají say - just as easily, and often more noisily than (if not at the hand of) lesser mortals.

‘I think the king is but a man, as I am:
the violet smells to him as it doth to me.’

Henry V, iv, 1.

Dynastic accounts tend to tread lightly round the implications of the king’s human nature; while villagers cast royal representations in a far less kindly light.

What is the connexion of the state, or king, and the self? If kingly claims are projected not against the backdrop of the differential morality of Divine order but against ideas of human nature, inconsistencies or paradoxes emerge. (17) The link needs brief consideration if we are to understand the degree to which villagers’ ideas are more than a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. The relations between Divinity, kingship and human nature are complex. Plato, it will be recalled, drew a connexion between the tripartite division of classes in the state - philosopher-kings, warriors and workers - and aspects of human nature (the psyche) - the rational (logistikón), the ‘spirited’ (thýmoeides) and appetites or desires (epithymetikón, Republic IV, 435e-444e). The differentiation of human estates is underwritten by differential stress on human predispositions.

Without taking comparison too seriously, there are interesting parallels in Bali with the triguna and triwarga, which may for present purposes be crudely glossed as three constituents of human nature and three paths or goals of human life. These are:
Triguna: purity passion desire
knowledge emotion ignorance

Triwarga: disposition to do good or one's duty
material utility
enjoyment of sensual pleasure

As we might expect the classes are typically treated as overlapping, but the more educated in Tegallalang often drew connexions between sattwa and dharma as befitting pedanda, raja(h) and artha as the concern of kings and princes (play being made on the homonymy of sattwa as knowledge, but also stories, history which contain truth (tattwa), and of rajah and raja), and the difficulty of the ordinary populace in escaping from tamas and kama. Such predispositions, being niskala, are knowable through character traits (perah) manifest in behaviour, laksana (cf. the complex relation of batin and lair in Java) and so link with the question of agency.

The Indian cast of these categories is mitigated by villagers' insistence on the importance of keeping the elements in balance. Too much stress on baser pursuits is perhaps less dangerous, if more likely to incur karma pala, than the reverse which threatens to change into its tungkalik. (18) The more single-minded the pursuit of dharma, the greater the risk of disastrous reversal. There is nothing intrinsic to the classification which requires the introduction of the state. Humans contain within themselves the potential ingredients for a balanced existence. At this point, however, the relevance of the political estates becomes clear. Almost everyone I asked in Tegallalang argued that attaining such a balance was beyond most humans' ability without the aid of institutions and groups which threatened punishment (a role kings had enthusiastically carried out in the past). The banjar was generally seen, for instance, not as an expression of group solidarity, bubbling in a gentle Durkheimian way, so much as an necessary prop against human frailty. Did those in high office find it easier? The answer to this was usually Napi malih!, because the temptations were much greater and the restraints much less.

If pedanda were generally better behaved than princes, it was because occasions were confined to obtaining money from services. Far from the sexual promiscuity of princes being a sign of their bursting with sakti, it was just lack of self-control. The greater their power (here kuasa or paraphrasis using expressions like megamel jagat), the greater the opportunities open to royalty and in general the greater the abuse. The noble assertions of royal dharma were held widely to disguise an avarice, arrogance, envy and lasciviousness for which villagers would be lucky to get away with their lives. P. G. Wodehouse once wrote that the English were a truly civilized nation because they maintained a public dossier of major criminals - titled Burke's Peerage. Many Balinese in Tegallalang held similar ideas but on grounds of opportunity and human weakness. If babads portray kings as agents of Divinity elevated above the common herd, villagers understand this as implying the tungkalik that, with rare exceptions, they are (or were when they had more power) lesser than other mortals. By ritual and babad they were elevated to Raja Batara, by the workings of agency and human nature they were gilded victims. The consequences of deference are more than deference.
'Upon the king! let us our lives, our souls,
Our debts, our careful wives,
Our children, and our sins lay on the king!
We must bear all. O hard condition!'

Henry V, iv, 2.

If kings were frail beings in one sense, their position was perhaps less insecure in another. For, beside the world of order runs another. Whether we choose to view it as explaining what dharma cannot, or as an alternative way of arranging affairs, it is concerned with chance, the unexpected, the unusual. If a healthy person dies suddenly, a person survives a fatal fall, a small army defeats a far larger one, it is widely, but not universally, attributed to fate (ganti) or mystical power (kesaktian). Balinese in Tegallalang recognize immediate, if partly occluded, influences centred about an array of practices by which they interfere with one another's lives. It is a world of intense competition, of temporary and challenged ascendancy, fought out in combat where the weak are defeated and die. They also recognize the existence of coincidence (sedeng luwung) and the mysterious workings of fate to which it is thought the gods and perhaps even Divinity in some aspects are subject. Quite how the two themes are connected is unclear, because the former is shrouded in secrecy and the latter beyond comprehension.

So, while humans may understand and act upon dharma, they can equally pursue wealth, power and self-aggrandizement. These possibilities are underwritten by Divinity, not as Sang Hyang Widi manifest in persons, but through gods who may communicate to humans, for instance, on supplication (nakti) or unexpectedly by revelation (wahyu). Here such powers come from Divinity, but the beneficiaries as derived agents are held responsible for their actions and the prickly peace of deferment and deference gives way to open hostility. Here knowledge is practical and links power and anatomy, such that humans cannot escape involvement. For, by their physical constitution, they are linked mystically with the four concomitants of their birth, the Kanda Mpat. (19) Elaborate accounts, of which people in Tegallalang know little however, link the workings of the body with energy and available powers (Weck 1937: 67-99, 182-215). If dharma is about balance, sakti is about excess and the limits of human potentialities.

In Tegallalang this world of competition often impinges upon normal life. In Pejengaji alone there were seventeen families known to be more or less active as levak; the Mangku Dalem among others had spent years trying to obtain kesaktian by various means; and recourse to balian to attack others with, or protect oneself from, pekaakas, guna and other means of influence or destruction. Initiation is through secret writings or direct contact, often combined. So one may learn through nontal, have natal blood smeared on one's tongue or be inscribed with potent signs (see below). Witches attack by weakening defences; they are kept away by protective screens (penyengker) or counter-attacked by balian in ferocious wars at night. The language is starkly military.

Three temples are known for the sakti of their resident deities, proven by the number of people who have received gifts (penugrahan) there. Stories are still told of how last century a villager, I Baret, nakti in Pura Bolo and encountered a corpse which he took away enabling him to become sakti and cure the king of Gianyar, despite his ragged appearance, when all the more famous balian had failed. Also Dèwa Ktut Belog (so called because although he was diligent, he was stupid and illiterate), a poor village Pradèwa was walking
back past Pura Bolo in tears because people had been making fun of him by
making him read a rental. A voice asked why he was crying. He went close to
see two giant men, one of whom inscribed something three times on his tongue.
When he returned the villagers teased him as before, but he astonished
everyone by now reading kawi fluently. Such gifts (pica) are more valued than
if deliberately sought and come if one is utama-sor, for instance if one is
kelintang suci or sebet pisan, sor pisan. The latter is a good instance of
how one state transforms (metemahan) into its tungkalik. Both, however,
villagers linked with excess, being too much (bes) something. Double excess,
however, is extremely dangerous and seeking kesaktian too uncontrolledly leads
easily to madness.

Textually kesaktian is often represented as an essential attribute of
successful kings, as Worsley makes clear from the Babad Bulèlèng. It is
closely linked to violence and, in many ways, kings are portrayed as masters
of violence, and the extraordinary, which they assimilate to their persons.
Villagers, however, treat kesaktian as something kings used, or claimed to
possess, to bolster their fragile authority over their underlings. Be that as
it may, such effects are generally inferred retrospectively from pikolih to
kerana as evidence of special qualities. Where we might leave chance vague
and unaccountable, Balinese prefer to argue this as (cum hoc ergo propter
hoc). Actually being sakti does not account for all royal successes, not is
it by any means exclusive to kings and princes. For instance the ancestor of
the present Cokordas of Ubud, Cokorda Rai Batur is known for his military
victories but these are often attributed to his heroic feats in battle rather
than to any unusual sakti. Similarly the father of the present prince in
Péjengaji is held to have engaged in night time shows of his kesaktian to
impress his subjects, but to have died efeebled after losing to various local
low caste men who turned out to be more adept than he. Whether the latter
reflects changing patterns of political power or not, I cannot say, but
examples below suggest the explanatory power of kesaktian is a theme of long
standing. Ironically, in embracing the notion of kesaktian, kings and princes
were opening the way for their own potential defeat.

Not everyone gives the same credit to claims of sakti. There are
several instances of balian having died, or becoming paralysed, suddenly after
night battles but the more cautious insist there is inadequate proof. Several
people in Péjengaji simply did not believe in the efficacy of local manusasakti and would wander, if need be, at night through such places as the
graveyard. One of my favourite characters, Ktut Mara, not only dismissed most
accounts of royal sakti in the past, but delightfully debunked an attack on
himself. Some time ago he had gone with his family to visit a balian known
for his kesaktian, but had been disappointed in the diagnosis and refused to
pay, saying the man was a fraud. He was promptly cursed (kepastu) by the
balian who announced he would be unable to get through the compound gate. On
hearing this, Ktut Mara calmly proceeded to knock down the wall to the
compound and walk out!

In the Babad Bulèlèng, kesaktian is represented as compatible with the
observance of dharma. In the same tradition the figure of Pedanda Wauh Rauh is
interesting for he was noted for his purity, but villagers attribute his moksa
to his being sakti. Significantly he is claimed as the ancestor of both
Brahmana and Cokorda, his other title, according to the Babad Dalem Sukawati,
being Dang Hyang Empu Senaranata (samara, battle, nata, refuge, protector).
In other accounts, however, being sakti is incompatible with (ngelawan) being
suci, which commonly derives from observing dharma. Lýak can be caught by an
innocent person (anak matah; c.f. tasak, adept at pengiwa), unfortunately as
rare in Bali as virgins are in Aberdeen (according to a famous epitaph). Anak darma however are safe from manusa sakti. It is said when Sang Darma (Darmawangsa) encountered one it just meet ulap, sinah sakeng ragan Ida. Kesucian is immune to the effects of kesaktian but is harder to achieve because of human weakness, which is indeed celebrated in the notion of kesaktian.

Purity and mystical power are then widely thought to be opposed (ngelawanan). In many ways they articulate different, partly incommensurable, partly overlapping, visions of the world. In another framework, they are two of the multiple worlds in which the Balinese live (Goodman 1978: 2-22; c.f. Overing 1985). So far I have used terms like 'king' and 'prince' loosely and have refrained from Balinese glosses. More misunderstanding has been caused, I suspect, by our attempts to mould Balinese practice to our own history of usage. So, slightly tongue in cheek, I offer two alternative ways agency is represented in Tegallalang and possible translations.

The first is a classificatory model of hierarchic order in which oppositions are encompassed and agency is seen as flowing gently from top to bottom. Divinity is manifest as Ida Sang Hyang Widi Wasa, the source of order, regularity and law. Hooykaas used to stress that the best translation of batara in Bali was 'protector' which fits with the image of mediary aspects of Divinity taking care of their faithful followers (pengiring, panjak). Pedanda, as the interpreters of Divine intelligence, are here mediators between Gods and men (the postulated etymology, pada + anga foot of the ladder fits neatly). The king, as instantiation of Divine Will is represented in imitation of batara as the protector, Sang Nata Rata (natha, protector, rata visible world) of his subjects (of the many words, kaula, panjak, semut barak, servants, slaves, red ants were the most used). Everything has its proper place and duties dharma; power is represented as control, of oneself or the body as in dance; and is instantiated in the king who is power. Contradictions are minimized, between different duties or rival organic analogies of the king as opposed to the pedanda (in formal caste ideology) as head prabu; and conflict redirected through deferment in a 'regime of truth' (Foucault 1979a: 47).

The second is a more fluid interactional model, which stresses competition and conflict. Divinity is manifest as Siwa or Durga. Batara in localized forms, such as Batara Dalem, interfere through revelation and gifts especially kesaktian. In this form, the Batara Desa is the traditional patron and protector of thieves, Batara Dalem of manusa sakti. The king here emulates Divinity in its sakti forms, hence the inclusion of 'Sakti' in titles. (Whether the term raja is appropriate here I do not know.) Unless they are sakti, pedanda normally play little part in this model, their role being assumed by balian whose knowledge of this aspect of Divinity derives from direct encounters or esoteric knowledge and who are largely responsible for the social construction of the strategies of power. Those who do not take part are the subjects as victims in a system where relations are not leader and follower (except perhaps within the echelons of manusa sakti), but of friends (timpal) and enemies (musuh). Synthesis is marginal, agency atomized and contradictions stressed. The image is power not just as warlike but of war as its telos, its way of being; as appropriated by persons; localized in places and bodies as part of an economy of war.

Put so baldly and dichotomously, these models look suitably trivial. However they overlap in complex combinations, interpretable in different epistemological fashions (Hobart 1986), which may give them an explanatory
elegance lacking in Balinese ideas of how Indonesia works. At least it offers a potentially falsifiable account of the link of agency and terminology in common usage. Such models are intrinsically inadequate, however, insofar as they omit social practices like the mobilization of labour, slavery and sequestration on which babad seem not to dwell, if *peswara* do (e.g. Liefrinck 1917). (20) For instance, kings required knowledge of what is going on in their realms (see Worsley 1972: 44); and the networks of information between villages and local princes in the region round Tegallalang are remarkably efficient.

What makes such accounts look even more alien to village life is that there exists a world apart from both of them, of ordinary doings, misfortunes and pleasures which goes largely unrecorded in Balinese literature. This condition of normality, what is biasa, is focused more about practice than explanation (cf. Cavell on the normal in language, 1969: 20ff.). One does not ask the cause (kerana) of routine processes, of things continuing as they are, people growing up, marrying, joining groups, going to play in or watch theatre, any more than inquiring why one’s teeth are not hurting. One becomes interested when something goes wrong, as one considers the cause of toothache. Explanation is largely about the extra-ordinary. So what constitutes the normal is important and requires more consideration than it has received. Equally constituting something as normal, and beyond explanation, leaves it, in a sense, beyond knowledge and so power.

A peace in the shape of a durian

What, if anything, has this discussion achieved? For example what relevance do ideas of kingship and power have for the social conditions of domination or hegemony by Balinese monarchs and their Indonesian successors? Unfortunately it is hard enough to determine the local importance of the ‘Indonesian State’ in present village affairs, let alone how to read the disputed accounts about *patih* and pecatu systems in the past. That kings had large estates, could execute people by law or whim, engaged in largescale slavery, prosecuted violent wars tells us little about the ways in which such events were represented and affected action.

What light does study of the state shed on Balinese notions of power? From one perspective, these are simplistic. A focus on persons, not relations, is arguably a ‘mystification’ of ‘real’ relations (whatever those are), and part of an essentialized view of power not as a dispersed field, but as localized, embodied and restricted to the king and his agents. From another, the Balinese seem sensitive to questions we tend to ignore. A substantive model copes poorly with how people argue, use and understand powers; as a relational one does in accounting for the importance of texts, oratory or a sense of authority. Consensual models ignore serious disagreements both between participants and rival accounts. Insofar as power is understood as part of a field of agency, it focuses on issues which a stress on ‘the state’ by-passes.

If Bali is opaque to crudely comparative models, will a literary or dramatic idiom do better? It is perfectly possible to view *kesaktian* as metonymy, the reduction of an abstract quality to tangible manifestations and the king’s representation both of his people and the macrocosm in the babad model as synecdoche (Burke 1969: 508), the plurality of points of view constituting a ‘poetic realism’ whereby
'characters possess degrees of being in proportion to the variety of perspectives from which they can with justice be perceived.'
(1969: 504)

A dramatic approach such as Geertz's 'theatre state' would be the obverse of the present stress if ideas in action are drama, and agents treated in ideation, dialectic (1969: 512). To the extent that dialectic is an irony of contrasting perspectives, behind the superiority of Balinese kings lies the 'humble irony' that kings require subjects to be kings and are identified with them through the deferment by which the king's human predicament is recognized; just as kings cannot exist without evil enemies through whom their good actions are definable (Hobart 1985: 186-9).

While this may cast an interesting light on our own ideas about the nature of the world, power and the State, I am not sure it tells us very much about Bali. Recourse to mystification presupposes a naive, and often utilitarian, theory of the real (here 'real interests') which Burke's 'poetic realism' avoids. The link of powers with relations, agents and their attributes presupposes an ontology, just as invocation of tropes does an epistemology, which we have no evidence the Balinese share. Burke's scheme of overlapping classes, intellectual processes and styles seem to have rough parallels in Bali. But a search for correspondences omits the ways and contexts in which Balinese understand and use such ideas. In brief, we are short of a metaphysics.

If analysis requires parallels, given Balinese interest in the nature of action, agency may be a better candidate than most. It makes sense, for instance, of why theatre and dance are so important. Actors re-creating royal doings to a village audience create a new complex agent, combining previous texts, the narrative and representations of royalty, with the participation of an audience which is now an active and willing patient. Kings, regarded by most villagers as alien impositions, become part of village life in a way they weren't before. Something similar may hold in ritual where Divinity in various aspects is re-created as the agent by patient villagers.

Even these parallels are partly spurious. The past, apart from its visible traces (laad), is niskala, so theatre instantiates the past as much as clothing ideas in reality. Tropes may be quite alien to a metaphysics where truth is often niskala and its manifestations inaccurate analogies (praimba), just as the sheer consistency of our analyses may be out of place where antinomies are recognized. Indeed, to what extent are Balinese concerns with lawan incompatible with the kind of stable universe presumed in the State? The consistency of Divinity is one embracing lawan and tungkalik and is, I suspect, of a kind largely undreamt of in our philosophy.

If we are caught in the toils of metaphor, with war and peace ways in which power is represented, then perhaps we would do as well to adopt Balinese images. The grand claims and denials of Balinese politics have something in common with the durian, its smell is unmistakable - rotten to some, fascinating to others - but it is ignored at one's cost when walking about lest something large and thorny land by chance on one's head. Its charms are much more obvious than the subtle mangosteen of metaphysics. All of which gives a new flavour to that old Balinese proverb

"Nasak duren, nasak manggis."
APPENDIX: SOME FALLACIES.

‘Our state to be disjoint and out of frame.’

Hamlet, I, ii, 20.

Existing ideas about the nature of kingship and the state in Bali — in the words of Peter Sellars’ politician — are unlikely. In a sense the state is long dead and unretrievable; yet its re-presentation in theatre and ritual lives on seemingly ever more out of touch with the contemporary ‘realities’ of Bali’s place in modern Indonesia. What would any answer to the question ‘what is the Balinese state?’ tell us? To fight my way out of this intellectual paper bag, let me briefly run over my reasons for concern.

On what grounds can we accurately represent the ‘traditional Balinese state’ from the muddled and unreliable materials available? How do we know how to understand what is written in babad and other texts, or redress what Jim Boon has shown as the biases in observers’ accounts of the island (1977: 1-69)? For

Past events cannot be viewed in their former realities unless we know the totality of which they were once part... The task in clear, and it is the task of historiography in general: attempt to penetrate into the heart of a culture in order to understand its outward manifestations... From realizing this task to realizing the difficulties connected with it, however, is but a small step. To mention but one: we should read the sources using our knowledge of the culture pattern, yet how can one comprehend that pattern if not from the sources? (Zoetmulder 1965: 326 & 329).

The traditional way out of this hermeneutic circle is dialectical; but how sure can we be of the correct translational manual when the events are irretrievable except in terms of contemporary Balinese ideas? Rather than divine some unfalsifiable model of the past perhaps it would be better to consider a narrower, but more realistic, problem: the nature of Balinese representations of their past?

A respectable argument holds that history is not a matter of pasting facts cut out of accounts together, but is about the unfolding forms of consciousness of human agency (Collingwood 1946). This may have much merit, but will it work in Bali where divine agency is often represented as more important than human? A serious objection to existing accounts of Balinese history, it is that a widespread Western displacement of the role of Divinity creeps into our accounts of the Balinese.

A Balinese historiographical model of the state depends largely on written accounts, and presupposes a Correspondence Theory of meaning. In other words the texts must be treated in no small measure as descriptive. (Such an assumption clearly underlies Pigeaud’s and de Graaf’s views and, while it may be simple, it is also simple-minded.) Language has many functions (Jakobson 1960) and Siegel has gone as far as to question whether written texts serve to communicate or to block its possibility (1979). In fact, all sorts of functions have been attributed to texts by scholars on Java
and Bali. They fix or inscribe reality (Ricoeur and Geertz); they invert the
truth (Berg); they make claims in the absence of evidence (Ricklefs); they
supplement or comment on the state of affairs; they may serve as a mnemonic —
a very important function of Anglo-Saxon texts; they provide a Gestalt; they
provide a core for elaboration. Whatever they do, they do not simply
describe. Nor is there any reason in contemporary Balinese epistemology that
they should. Raos nguda is plain speech and suited to the young and everyday
description; raos wayah is intended to enfold (mekulit) the point and requires
knowledge of Balinese styles of interpretation to understand. Texts are
commonly conceived as hiding the point (tetuwak) from the uninforme, sadly
here mostly Western scholars.

Texts do not contain the rules for their reading (in McLuhan’s terms, they are ‘cold’); nor are their referents always obvious. To read such texts
one requires context (in post-structuralist jargon, ‘inter-text’ or
‘pre-text’). Prior to a grasp of Balinese stylistics and possible contexts, we have little clue how to understand what we read. There is another problem: text-meaning and hearer’s meaning differ. When a section of the Babad Dalem Sukawati was read in Tegallalang (see above), the relationship between the
original kawi version which was read out (kebasaan), the translation
(ngartiang, suitably the term also used of interpretation) and villagers’
various renditions were all different. This did not disquieten the Balinese
who expect such accounts to be made fitting according to desa, kala, patra,
but it makes scholarly readings hard.

It has also been argued that there are two trends within Orientalism in
the interpretation of how Indian texts represent ‘reality’ which have a
bearing on how we approach Balinese representations.

‘The positivist believes that there was a social and political
(hercic) reality that becomes distorted in the Epics and Puranas
(as a result of elite manipulation), while the idealist believes
that there is an unchanging Indian religious essence that becomes
distorted in those texts (as a result of sectarian bickering and
vulgarization). Both also have an empowered view of human
agency. The positivist sees its knowing subject as merely making
a copy of external reality, while the idealist sees the human
actor as simply the instrument of a transcendent Mind. Neither is
prepared to see the Puranas as discursive, narrative texts that
both constructed reality and were shaped by an ongoing reality in
a recursive process.’

This is linked to the epistemological fallacy that other peoples’
historiography, discourse and metaphysics starts from the same presuppositions
as ours. We would need to know more about Balinese ideas of agency, process,
cause or determinacy, and chance in this instance. By way of a simple
example, we impute ‘the state’ to the Balinese only, in effect, to take it
away again because if they had states in our sense then they were dreadfully
bad at organizing them. The unacceptable face of Western liberal assumptions
that others ‘are just like us’ is that, in that case, they are very bad at
being us, or are like us but much more backward, primitive, inefficient,
vicious and cruel. (Incidentally, both Pigeaud and Berg impale themselves
upon this dilemma.) If, however, the Balinese are in some sense to be
discussed, not quite ‘like us’ then why should we speak of kings, ministers
and the entire panoply of the re-created European monarchy? Methodologically,
if not just for amusement’s sake, it might be wise to dispense with notion like ‘state’, ‘kingship’, ‘corveé labour’ and the like and start afresh.

Unpalatable and unjustified presuppositions crawl into the questions we often ask. For instance: what is the state? Now what would any conceivable answer to the question look like? Is it a thing, a set of relations, a concept, a proposition, a universal, a particular, a shared understanding (if so how many have to share it for it to work, cf. Sperber 1985), an institution, a corporate group, a network? Is it symbolic or instrumental, a frame of reference or a word? Typically the question is not answered straight but is deferred. ‘We cannot say what the state is, but we can say what functions it fulfils and what symbols it expresses.’ Behind this lurks curiously methodological individualist assumptions. (21) Such an ‘essentialist fallacy’ (things, including abstractions, have essences) also begs questions of representation. Who represented the state as such-and-such to whom on what occasion?

A second deferral (recourse to ‘the instrumental’) invokes false substantives. The state is about the use of power, or force, in resolving social tensions. This leads to absurd questions like: how much power did the king, or princes, really have in Bali? The more precise the answer in fact the less informative it is. (The question, significantly, is quantitative. Suppose one replied by giving percentages? Falsely scientific notions like social tension, forces and power invite one to weigh or measure phenomena. One visualizes instruments - tensimeters, potentiometers - to be inserted into the situation or the personages involved!) A third deferral (from ‘the instrumental’ to ‘the expressive’) redefines the problem in terms of symbols: the existence of symbols of kingship, or of the king himself is enough (reminiscent oddly of van Woudenes arguments for Eastern Indonesia).

Other fallacies abound. An example of the ‘fallacy of false predication’ is the statement that kings were gods to their subjects or themselves (so overlooking that they might be considered, in Bagehot’s words, a ‘consecrated obstruction’, have feet of clay and their pretensions be laughed at or denied in daily talk, theatre and painting, Vickers 1983, 1984; Worsley 1984.) Leaving aside the problems of the copula (cf. Derrida 1979), is the statement one of predication, identity or analogy? Is divinity a property of kings? Are kings in the class of gods (and so presumably share their essence)? Or are kings merely treated analogously to gods, in which case by Balinese criteria the connexion is false. The fallacy of kings being divine depends on an imported notion of essence and property. (22)

Another popular mistake is the ‘fallacy of hypostatized metaphors’. Consider the question: did the Balinese state stop with colonization and incorporation into the Indonesian nation or does it still mould Balinese perceptions of politics? As states are not material objects they do not stop, engulf, fight back, seep in or any other of the metaphors used to express the relation of ‘encapsulation’ of a smaller culture by a nation state.

A parallel, and common, error is the ‘fallacy of correspondence’. This holds that words - state, power, order, development, change - correspond to states or processes in the world. Consider, for instance, the question: did the unfolding pattern portrayed in Balinese literature mark the emergence of a political order, or was it a vain attempt to structure chaos through the flow of words? It will be obvious that any such formulation depends on a very odd
set of ideas about how language works and what is the relation of objects to ideas or words.

All these pale beside, and indeed often depend upon, a most pernicious tendency - 'the fallacy of false dichotomy'. We have encountered it already in the instrumental versus the symbolic (either it is one or the other, or measurable amounts of each). Again either the state continued or it stopped. Either there was order or there was chaos, or there was order in certain parts and chaos in others, or there was so much chaos and so much order. The tendency to dichotomize comes out in the kinds of question which are often asked about Balinese states. For example: were traditional Balinese kingdoms models of symbolic order and efficacy or was the condition of man a condition of war of everyone against everyone? Or were wars ritual displays of royal mystical power, or were they occasions for slaughter, sack and enslavement? It will be clear that it most of the questions I have posed above the answers are largely meaningless and yet, despite our most cautious attempts to avoid doing so, we tend implicitly to operate with such distinctions and ideas.

1. If this view has any validity, it would presumably make an historian's task peculiarly difficult and I look forward with interest to how my colleagues at the workshop handle the problem. The issue in various garbs has, of course, been around a long time, for instance in the debate on historiographical problems in the interpretation of the past in Java (e.g. Soedjatmoko 1965; c.f. the comments by Zoetmulder discussed briefly in the appendix).

2. On the powers of the state, consider also:

'The state's authority, its "legitimate monopoly", is limited, partial and a matter of perpetual contestation...Despite our states, and in many respects because of them, social life is much more "anarchic" than political philosophy conceives. Yet our theorists continue to write as if the state is that-which-keeps-order-in-the-world. The Argument from Design lives on.' (Skillen 1977: 21 & 23)

'One empowers the question of power when one poses it uniquely in terms of legislation, or of the constitution, or only in terms of the State or State apparatus. Power is much more complicated, more dense and diffused than a set of laws or an apparatus of the State.' (Foucault 1977: 23; cited in Patton 1979: 125)

3. The argument is reminiscent of Foucault's that it is useful to think in terms, not of Power, but of powers which may be created or challenged, and are always distributed in complex ways. Nor should power be regarded, metaphorically, as something which is appropriated or possessed; nor as localized in the State or political structures; nor necessarily subordinate to
a mode of production (Foucault 1979b: 59-66). The conjuction of power with such essentialized entities is arguably part of discursive practice to be investigated, not assumed.

4. Villagers attached some importance to distinguishing lawan and kelawan from ngelawan, mebading, mewali, meimpas, metiosan and mejugjag, which suggests recognized forms of opposition, conflict and difference are more complex than often allowed. The use of what we call ‘passive’ and ‘active’ prefixes to lawan may be an inadequate rendition of what is involved. Tungkalik may also be glossed as ‘punishment’ which links it to powers in an intriguing way. Incidentally my spelling of Balinese words throughout follows local usage. When I refer to ‘villagers’, this includes everyone in Tegallalang other than the families and close relations of the local princes, because the more remote high caste families jajaran largely shared the views of villagers.

5. The point was stressed to me by village informants using the sattwa of a king who, failing his followers, was killed by them but obtained revenge by being transformed into ketewel and so, to this day, is carried about by the populace in the form of pratima. I suspect the notion of tungkalik may be a more germane to the decline (and rise) of dadiya so often recalled in babad than some postulated principle like ‘sinking status’.

6. Consider the role Padjji Sakti’s k(e)ris, the source (kawit?), of his power, and the means by which Pahang’s incestuous relationship leads to gumi ewug (Worsley 1972: 24, 37, 65). One might also note the terms in the original text which Worsley translates by ‘king’.

7. He has argued that traditionally oriented Javanese ‘think of power in terms of an abstract quality, or an aggregate of abstract qualities, just as Europeans do. The difference lies in the fact that, unlike the Europeans, they attribute these qualities, which they call kawibawan, not to particular types of human relationship, but to specific persons. These qualities are the human qualities which are idealized by the majority of the members of society and which therefore have deep moral implications.’ (such moral values differing, of course, from Western conceptions, 1980: 133, 138]

If he is correct (and it is a timely reminder of the perils of simplistic comparison), we have prima facie grounds to question whether a focus on political relations is appropriate instead, say, of looking at how qualities are attributed, to whom and by whom.

8. As we shall see, it is simplistic to treat Sang Hyang Widi as the autonym for ‘the high god of the Balinese’ (Duff-Cooper 1985a: 71; 1985b: 123) because Balinese naming is a complex matter. Divinity has different aspects with which Balinese villagers are concerned. It orders all aspects of the human condition as well as the non-social world. So the dichotomy of nature and culture (phusis and nomos), each working according to different laws, is largely absent. Sekala and niskala do not constitute a dichotomy because the classes overlap in various ways which raise interesting epistemological questions, not least how to translate a relatively ‘unbounded’ metaphysics in terms of a rigidly structured one.
9. The reverse possibility was quite often mooted. One creates Sang Hyang Widi in one's thoughts, during piyndalan, nyepi and on other occasions of meditation or reflection. Villagers excogitations on such matters, hedged around as they were with apologies of ignorance, tended to be far more speculative plays on possibility than were the more learned temangku and dalang who treated collective representations about gods as subject to truth conditions. So I was often faced with a reversal of the usual expectation that villagers are narrowly factual and the cognoscenti given to flights of elegant fancy.

10. One man in Pèjèngaji was notorious for laxity in performing rites in his sanggah and his house was often pointed out as mamung - satmaka ngeranjing bebutan, umah punika ten mecaya, resem.

11. Hujan raja, surya mekalangan, téja guling, kilap tatit, kwung-kwung - punika prebawan Sang Nata Ratu lwih ritatkalaning séda. This was said to have happened for instance on the death of Jaya Prana. Note also the terms used for 'king'.

12. By a complex agent, I mean simply a socially recognized arrangement of people where the locus of decision and responsibility for action involves more than one person. Collingwood, in his critique of Leviathan, offers a simple example in discussing the agency concerned in the decision to remove, say, someone's appendix (1942: 141-2). It is not the consultant's decision alone (he could be sued for so doing), but the agent consisting of consultant and invalid. The consultant, or a proxy, who carries out the operation is the instrument of the agency. If the ill person is a child, it is a patient of the agency, not being actively involved in the decision at all. To the patient, the surgeon may appear as the agent. One of the advantages of the terminology is that agency and patiency are not exclusive, a person may be part agent, part patient in any relationship.

A more sophisticated analysis would have to consider how far notions like 'contract' could be applied to Balinese society without use of a Procrustean bed. If groups like sekaha allow a large measure of volition in joining, others such as the banjar offer little choice, being the habitual way of organizing certain parts of one's life. Traditional ties of parekan may be an instance and are reminiscent of Foucault's remark that

' Habit is the complement of the contract for those who are not bound through possessions.' (1979b: 65)

13. The problems of interpreting how transcendent agents, whether Godhead, the Market or Society, act in the world is a theme on which Ron Inden is working at present and I am indebted to him in the present discussion.

14. Compare with the following passage

'Because of the excellence of the sword Ki Sémang, in an instant the realm of Jaranbana collapsed...' (1972: 161-63)

15. The reading was also striking for the differences between the text as read and the interpretation in Balinese. The latter added much detail and attempted to contextualize the text, the accuracy of which the more knowledgeable locals questioned. Such divergences may have a bearing on the

16. I am not attempting to apply the pun on 'deferment' and 'deference', which is etymologically dubious anyway, to the Balinese. The connotations are, however, provocative, as are those of 'defecation'—villagers would often express their distaste at the common concomitant of ngesor, being spoken to in very low Balinese by superiors, saying it was like being defecated on.

17. The difference links to two ways of reading the distinction between buwana agung and buwana alit. Is this the parallel between the order of the cosmos and the king and the state? Or is it between the cosmos and each human being?

18. The same applies to evil-doers whose excesses are said often to be followed by generous acts. I have sometimes wondered whether the wretched Luhdaka's rescue through the observance of Siwarârikalpa does not make equal sense in terms of tungkalik (cf. Tceuw et al. 1969).

19. These are yeh nyom, getih, luhu-luhu, banah (Hooykaas 1973: 3-4; 1974: 93-128). So, while the world of order, the embodiment of the abstract, is based (metaphorically?) on appearance (rupa, sané ngenah); the world of competition is phrased (metonymically?) in terms of physio-anatomical features and the gift.

20. This is not to imply that a full analysis should make labour central any more than ignore it.

'we can no longer comprehend power as the guarantee of a mode of production; in fact power is one of the constituent elements of the mode of production...It is false to say, "with that famous post-Hegelian", that the concrete existence of man is labour. For the life and the time of man are not by nature labour, but pleasure, restlessness, merry-making, rest, needs, accidents, desires, violent acts, robberies, etc.' (Foucault 1979b: 61-62)

21. If we cannot talk about an abstraction, let us talk about roles or symbols. This is merely an oblique way of introducing that most pernicious dichotomy: individual and society. One merely predicates Kant's distinction of hypothetical and categorical imperatives of an unknown subject and focuses on the predicates in the hope the former will go away.

22. One might note that we tend to allow our language to slip where the Balinese would not. I have never heard Balinese say 'I believe the king is (was) (a) God', but they do say 'I have heard it said that the king is (was) (a) God'. Between the Balinese 'believe' (ngega or pracaya which impose strong and weak truth conditions respectively) and 'heard say' (wente orti, kocap) is an important difference.
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