A Balinese village
and its field of social relations

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A BALINESE VILLAGE AND ITS FIELD OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The thesis has both ethnographic and theoretical aims. It sets out to provide the first detailed ethnographic study of a lowland Balinese village and its field of social relations. Villagers belong to a range of jurally discrete corporate groups; but these overlap extensively in personnel. This permits the conversion of assets or credit between them informally for a variety of ends. It emerges that differences in land-ownership are transformed through socially approved exchange relationships into ties of patronage, often reinforced through common membership of voluntary associations. Cooperation in this, and other forms of work, is often based on, or expressed in terms of, kinship and marriage ties. These relationships are also open for use to political ends. For villagers, this tends to be the local council, which has extensive authority; this is increasingly so for the aristocracy which traditionally vied for control over a larger region. The economic and political prizes within the village are sufficient to induce competition for control over decision-making between factions led by patrons. Their influence is limited, however, by constitutional rules and social values invoked by public speakers. So the representation of sectional interests must be translated into cultural argument. Conflict is, in theory, constrained by religious belief. This must, however, be interpreted and applied; so that the meaning of events and actions is effectively determined by the participants working within a broader framework of cultural values which undergo reinterpretation in the process.

The ethnography points to the co-existence of formal jural rules and informal ties between villagers. These are often represented anthropologically in terms of contrasting models of exchange, as moral and transactional respectively. Pragmatic behaviour is, however, constrained by the wider system of values; while this latter may itself be turned to serve particular ends. So social action tends to have both symbolic and practical aspects. A further axis of variability exists because of the

ambiguity, and logical inconsistency, of cultural concepts. As a result the definition of social values is open to negotiation. This approach, which stresses the choice of action and interpretation open to members of a society, provides a model of Balinese society which avoids the dangers of reification and failing to allow for change.

Mark Hobart.

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Preface

This thesis is about a Balinese community and the field of social relationships of its members. Granted the degree of local variation, it cannot be said in any sense to represent a 'typical village', and indeed it will be argued that in different ways neither of these terms is as straightforward as might appear. Several factors influenced the choice of area of study however. The majority of the population of Bali live in the southern plains and have a culture which is distinct to a disputed degree from a far smaller number of mountain villages. The documentation on the latter is, if anything, better than on the lowland peoples on whom no full village monograph has been published. So my selection of a research site was intended to reflect in its social composition and pattern of social relationships something of the influence of the great aristocratic court centres of the south. The settlement finally chosen lay a little inland from these and the commercial, and increasingly also tourist, routes towards the coast. It was a small court and administrative centre with a dirt road connecting it with the interior and a main road some eight kilometres to the south. Like most of the main villages in the region it was a large settlement divided into wards, one of which was chosen for intensive study. The relationship between the ward and the settlement as a whole forms one of the topics of the thesis. These will be referred to here by the pseudonyms of Pisangkaja and Tengahpadang respectively. This is at the request of the villagers, who insisted however that they would prefer to be known by their real names or titles. A note on the form of these is given in an Appendix.

My fieldwork is based upon a stay in Tengahpadang from early December 1970 until August 1972. I spent almost all my time in the village or its neighbouring region apart from making a number of expeditions to different parts of the island in order to make as far as possible an organized survey of village structure. I also visited sites of particular cultural importance or of relevance to the villagers as part of their network of social ties of different kinds. I made a brief visit to the

village again for three weeks in the summer of 1973. Research was carried out without the aid of an interpreter and largely in Balinese which I had studied for two years previously with Dr. Hooykaas. My knowledge of this was stretched to the limit at the start by the villagers' apparent ignorance of Indonesian, the national language. Only after about a year did it emerge that most of them spoke it fluently. It transpired that they felt that if I wished to understand their culture I should start by understanding their language. Granted the complexity of internal divisions within village society I did not have equal access to all the villagers, especially at the beginning. I have tried to take possible differences in views into account and indeed they are a major theme of the thesis. Where a particular version of a period in history, the events in a dispute and so forth are referred to, as should become plain, I do not hold that this has any necessary superiority to other views which I may not have given for various reasons, such as space or my ignorance of them. This is particularly important when discussing matters like the histories of royal families or claims which villagers might make about one another. My concern here is not so much with the complex question of what actually was the case, as with the cultural language and categories in which this was expressed.

The help which I have received in the course of carrying out this research is from sources too numerous for all to be mentioned individually. My fieldwork was financed mainly by the Leverhulme Trust Fund with supplementary grants from the London-Cornell Project and the Horniman Anthropological Scholarship Fund. In Bali I would like to thank the post-graduate students in the Department of Anthropology of the Universitas Udayana in Denpasar for their help and for allowing me to try out ideas on them. In particular I am grateful for the late I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa for his attempts over two years to improve my Balinese and to I Gusti Ngurah Bagus, the head of the Department of Anthropology for his warm friendship over the years. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Cokorda Gedé Agung Suyasa and above all to Cokorda Gedé Agung Sukawati without whose kindness this research would never have been possible. In Tengahpadang I am particularly grateful to the sub-district officer, I Madé Runarta, for his generous help and advice, and the administrative village head Anak Agung

Gedé Ngurah for answering my questions. The number of people locally who helped me in various ways is too great to be listed. The villagers of Pisangkaja must be singled out however for putting up with my inexhaustible questions and ignorance with such good nature and for accepting me as a (rather incompetent) member of the ward. In particular I would like to thank the following: Cokorda Putera for offering me hospitality in his home; Kt. Gendul and the Jèro Mangku Désa for the time which they took in explaining the traditions of the village; and Kt. Tagen and Kt. Mara who spent so many months in recounting and discussing the history of events in the ward. A special place must be given however to I Suradnya and the Jèro Mangku Dalem and above all to Kt. Kacir for the time which they spent trying to teach me about their culture. Outside Bali I would like to record my particular gratitude to Dr. Hooykaas who taught me almost everything about Bali that I know, and I apologize to him in advance for the many lessons which I failed to learn. I must also thank Barbara Ward for starting me on the study of Bali and Professor Adrian Mayer for guiding me through its later stages and for constructive criticisms of the original draft of this thesis. The mistakes are of course my own. Finally I would like to thank my wife Angela who has helped me in ways too innumerable to mention both in the field and in the suggestions and criticisms out of which this thesis grew.

A Note on Standards of Value and spelling in 1972.

£. 1. = Rp. 1,000 (Rupiah)
$. 1. = Rp. 420

1 Kg. of rice in the sheaf = Rp. 13-14.
1 Kg. of milled rice = Rp. 28-32.

The spelling of Balinese follows the official Indonesian system introduced in 1972. Pronunciation is straightforward apart from (c), which is (ch) in 'child'. In addition, it is convenient to distinguish (è) and (é), as in French, from (e) the central vowel. The Balinese language possesses a number of speech levels (Kersten 1970: 13-25). Where relevant the different levels are distinguished but otherwise the forms given are those in general use in daily life in Tengahpadang among ordinary villagers.

Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis has three aims. My first concern is to provide a detailed ethnographic account of the field of social relations of a peasant village community in Bali; to examine the observable regularities in these; and to consider their significance for the villagers. The second is to consider some of the arguments which have been put forward in the analysis of Balinese society by previous scholars in the light of this material and to suggest where these views may require modification. Finally, there are broader theoretical implications in the discussion and evaluation of these arguments and also of what constitutes the raw material of ethnographic investigation. The results are intended primarily to add to our understanding of Balinese social structure and culture and the variation in the forms which this may take It is also hoped that some of these may prove useful hypotheses for further consideration in the future. The more general issues raised are intended as a humble contribution to some of the recent theoretical discussion in anthropology.

The nature of this project places certain constraints upon its presentation. In particular, the necessity of providing detailed ethnography on subjects on which relative little has appeared in print has the consequence that the thesis is of a far greater length than would otherwise be the case. To date, however, there has been no full ethnographic account of a southern Balinese village and the complexity of its social institutions requires fairly detailed description, either because they deal with largely unrecorded materials, or where previous documentation is available the ethnography is sufficiently different as to require elucidation of its particulars and the apparent reasons for the divergence. The research included a full survey of all the households in the unit of study and the relationships in which their members were involved. Where relevant the appropriate data have been introduced and discussed. As my argument, in brief,

is that attention has generally been directed at either formal institutional relationships or informal exchanges rather than at the relationship between these, it has been necessary in many areas to include material relevant to both. This has taken up space. Finally, I shall argue that exchanges at whatever level have both instrumental and symbolic significance so that it has proved important to describe those aspects of culture on which these activities have bearing. For these reasons, the discussion on the main foci of the research has been more protracted than would otherwise have been necessary.

A vast literature has been published on the island of Bali since its discovery by the west in 1597 (Boon 1977a: 10). The bulk of this work has been carried out by Dutch scholars who extended their research into village society, of which the island is overwhelmingly composed. In this, and subsequent work mainly by American authors, particular institutions in various parts of the island have been described or discussed in varying detail. From this it has emerged that the majority of the population lives on the southern plateau of the island and has a somewhat distinct culture and social structure from a relatively small number of more remote mountain villages. This difference was widely construed as representing two stages of Balinese civilization (for a discussion on the problems in this view, see Geertz 1961) and the fuller monographs on social systems were accordingly confined to these unusual communities. As a result to date there has been no village monograph written for the main lowland culture to which more than 90 % of the Balinese belong. It is difficult to draw a detailed picture of Balinese society from the sources on the latter, as they consist of accounts of particular institutions in different places and at different times. Further, the vast majority of these works deal largely with the formal jural framework of Balinese society and pay relatively little attention to the study of social process. So the central purpose of this thesis is to provide detailed documentation on a single community and the field of social relationships through which its members are linked to one another and to persons and groups beyond its immediate boundaries.

The decision to describe in detail a particular village community raises a number of problems. As Geertz has noted (1959a), there is evidence that Balinese village society varies in its morphology - that is the form of its main corporate groups and social institutions and the ways in which these are articulated - from place to place. There are grounds for thinking that such variation is not peculiar to the Balinese. Nonetheless it raises questions about the representativeness of any single study. The village selected for research lies in the heartland of south central Bali, which historical research suggests is the centre of traditional culture. From surveys conducted during fieldwork, it is clear that the settlement in question is similar to those in the region around it. In view of the extensive ecological and historical variation in the island, the range of factors which may contribute to this variation are large. So rather than attempt to select different communities, where incomparable differences are involved, fieldwork was carried out instead in a large village, itself a common form of settlement, divided into wards which comprise the basic communities. In order critically to examine the extent of variation where external factors are relatively constant, the study focused on one of these wards and the features in which it differed from the others. This problem is discussed at length, and the differences described in Chapter 3 of the present work. My concern, however, is not primarily with trying to locate a "typical" village, which is a questionable enterprise, but rather to examine the social processes within a single community and its relationships with the outside. It should be noted, however, that variation is built into the core Balinese concept of custom, <u>adat</u> (itself interestingly a loan-word), by which this is understood as varying both in place and time. As I shall argue, trasnformation is inherent in Balinese culture in a number of ways. At another level, however, this raises wider problems of anthropological theory and it is to some of the main issues that I would like to turn briefly.

Much of the variation recorded for Balinese society is in the jural rules underlying the formation of corporate groups and their activities, or in established social institutions. These have been documented in some detail by the Dutch school of adatrecht, traditional law, studies. Little attention, however, has been paid to the existence of the extremely complex and varied forms which dyadic interpersonal relationships and exchanges may take. The importance of the study of such informal systems of ties has been increasingly recognized and has led to an emphasis not just upon formal institutions, but also upon the pattern of transactions between the members of a society and the interactions through which these are organized. In the development of studies devoted to 'transactionalism' and "network analysis", however, the enthusiasm for such approaches has often led to the neglect of relationships of incorporation. Analyses commonly tend to dwell upon one level or the other and with a few notable exceptions (Firth 1951, 1964; Paine 1974, 1976; Parkin 1975, 1976; and Bloch 1974, 1975, 1977 spring to mind immediately) have mostly ignored the problem of relating formal and informal levels of behaviour. This problem is particularly important in Bali where village society is organized largely in terms of independent corporate groups which each regulate specialized activities and control carefully delimited resources. Analyses in terms of social structure tend to overlook the complex set of exchanges which are carried on between villagers within and outside these contexts, such that complex channels for the conversion of assets from one to the other exist. The alternative possibility of focusing exclusively on informal exchanges between actors, however, is even more myopic, for the ends to which these are directed, and many of the values, often implicit, in terms of which they are conducted, are culturally ordered and may be closely linked to the functioning of corporate groups. In order to understand the organization of social relationships in a Balinese village it is therefore essential to bear both frames of reference in mind.

The connexion between these levels of social action may be restated in a more general fashion. Social action, or exchanges, may be viewed as having two aspects, variously described as the technical and symbolic (Leach 1960), the political and symbolic (Cohen, A. 1969a, 1974) or the altruistic and negotiable (Parkin 1976).[7] These are sometmes identified with different sets of relationships (Cohen) or as inhering in single actions or exchanges (Leach, Parkin). In this thesis I shall try to produce evidence in support of a version of the second formulation. It may also be argued on more theoretical grounds. As Cohen (1977) has noted, these dichotomies are drawn ultimately from philosophical distinctions between means and ends. Where action is regarded asa means to an end, it is instrumental or more broadly utilitarian; where it is held to be an end in itself it attains symbolic significance, which under particular circumstances may come to be regarded as moral (some of the problems in this last concept are discussed at the end of Chapter 6). The difficulty of a simple classification of behaviour in terms of this difference is that it is analytical, not substantive. Not only are the motives for behaviour not immediately obvious to anthropological analysis, there are grounds for questioning whether the actor's intentions are necessarily the same as his motives (Williams 1972). Also in the nature of human thought, it is possible for an end at one moment to become the means to a further end on another occasion and it can be argued that means may themselves become ends (as in the hoarding of money or the commission of acts of violence). Accordingly social action and exchanges in Bali show this double nature - they tend to have both technical and symbolic aspects. A hypothetical purely moral act may subsequently become the instrument for furthering reputation, a possibility which I shall suggest seems to be highly developed if my interpretation of the Balinese ethnography is correct. Inversely, it would appear that not only are the ends of instrumental action culturally conditioned but also the means. For this reason, in the thesis exchanges between villagers will be examined with some care for the range of interpretations which can, or may be, placed upon them. As the thesis develops, it should become clear that my concern will be increasingly

with this last rather than with the dichotomies :mentioned above which are only part of the problem.

For reasons which it is useful to discuss at this point, in the following account, I shall lay emphasis upon society as analyzable in terms of actions (Parsons 1937, 1951; Parsons and Shils 1951) or exchanges (Paine 1974; Kapferer, ed. 1976). The main problem which arises in this regard in the Balinese ethnography is that social groups, institutions, rules and so forth are seen, or better expressed, by the participants as clear-cut, determinate and effectively reified - a tendency which as Lukes has noted is not confined to the subjects of study alone (1973, on the status of society in the writings of Durkheim). The difficulty is that while the Balinese appear to conceive of their social system in this way, careful examination shows that the social institutions in question are often marked by a degree of uncertainty as to their form, bases and implications. Just as the study of language has tended to shift towards a model based on exchange of words in speech acts (Searle 1969) so to avoid false reification it is useful to consider the definition and properties of social institutions as being defined in the exchanges between actors, a methodological and theoretical point which has been developed in the work of the symbolic interactionalists (Mead, G.H. 1934; Blumer 1969; Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds 1975). The adoption of the viewpoint that the definitions of social facts are negotiated and subject to continuous re-evaluation by the members of a society not only avoids certain theoretical pitfalls, it is a convenient tool by which to understand something of the uncertainty and multiplicity of interpretations with which the Balinese approach their own social system.

Theoretical considerations in anthropology tend to involve underlying philosophical issues of which the authors are all too often only partly, if at all, aware. Although it is not immediately relevant to the argument in this thesis, it may be as well to spell out briefly some of the basic assumptions which underlie the present work. This has a certain importance

for the argument in so far as it concerns the problem of deciding precisely what is relevant in the collection of ethnographic data, and in giving at least a rough idea of the status which these have. The discussion of the nature of social structure in recent years has tended away from a focus on jural rules (see the discussion in Firth 1964) towards one based more on the concepts recognized in a culture (Leach 1949; Levi-Strauss 1963: 277-323; Bloch 1977). This raises difficult questions about the meaning of concepts and to what they refer. Leach's argument that such concepts have a clear determinate meaning (1949) has been examined in detail by Gellner (1973a) who has pointed to the problems in applying such concepts, if seen as static, to a changing reality (1973a: 93ff.).[2] An alternative approach to this problem has been proposed by Winch (1958) in which he argues the radical alternative suggested in the later work of Wittgenstein that the meaning of expressions is not fixed but lies rather in their use. This position is important because it suggests the possibility that concepts may have a range of meanings which are far from fixed (it is in this latter that the idea moves beyond Turner's idea of polysemy). Winch has, however, been open to mordant criticism from Gellner who has pointed to some of the highly problematic implications of this formulation tout court (Gellner 1973c), such as that this implies that 'it is the essence of the employment of expressions ... that it is meaningful;' (1973c: 55). Elsewhere Gellner has pointed out that there are contexts in which the significance of concepts is precisely their lack of meaning, or their internal logical inconsistency (1973b: 39-42). His argument therefore develops the notion of the multiplicity of meanings of cultural concepts, by pointing to the logical significance which this may have within a culture. In the course of this thesis I hope to try and show some of the ways in which this may be applied directly to give a greater understanding of the use of terminology and culturally important ideas.

This brings me to another point about the relationship between social action and its cultural representation. Purposeful behaviour may be argued to be based upon recognizable, and theoretically articulable principles or propositions (Gellner 1974a & b). In considering the obverse of this, Bloch (1974, 1975a) has stressed the contexts in which the freedom to express propositions is limited in formal speech. These views will become important later in this thesis when it becomes necessary to consider the place of propositional thought in political action; but a general concern throughout will be with the extent to which, and the way in which, social action may usefully be comprehended in terms of cultural concepts and the propositions which are formulated using these. A similar interest is evident in the work of Ardener on the analysis of events and actions in terms of the underlying cognitive structures through which they are ordered or generated. This is embodied in his distinction between syntagms and paradigms (Ardener 1971), or later p-structures and s-structures (1978), the latter in each case referring to fundamental cultural propositions of a highly abstract nature which may undergo a variety of modes of specification (1978: 109-10) in a given culture. It is instructive to take the example he gives of such a paradigm: misfortune ⟷ personal cause (1978: 109), that is in a given society, misfortune (of variety of kinds to be specified by the culture) has personal causes (subject to similar specification). The instance he takes is witchcraft. This proposition is clearly relevant to the evaluations made by a society's members; but Ardener so far has focused on the existence of single paradigms in any field, rather than as yet turning to the possibility of there being more than one. The Balinese evidence would suggest that there are alternative interpretations of misfortune, such that it may have personal, divine or impersonal causes, without it always being clear that different definitions of misfortune are involved (otherwise the role of spirit-mediums in diagnosing the source of trouble would be largely unnecessary). I shall suggest that it is the existence of multiple paradigms, propositions or meanings of concepts which provides culture in Bali with a great deal of its flexibility and capacity not only to adapt, but also to change from within, as events are interpreted in terms of such (almost prismatic) ideas.

This permits a return to the discussion of the evaluation of behaviour, including whether it is construed as pragmatic or moral. In a recent argument, upon which the theory underlying this thesis draws heavily, Parkin has argued that social behaviour may usefully be seen in terms of exchanges in two analytical orders, which he designates as altruistic and negotiable ideologies (1976: 171-4), the former referring to the realm of symbolic or moral action, the latter to transactions, the implication of his term being that not only is negotiation allowed, but that the rules are themselves negotiable. Toward the end of the thesis, I hope to try to show that a similar argument might well be made for moral, or symbolic exchanges. His points however, is "that individual strategizing does indeed operate within areas of choice and 'rational' means-to-end relationships but that, at a more inclusive level, the choices are set in ordered categories of social and personal meanings over which the individual per se has little if any control. These larger categories are themselves governed systematically by rules." (1976: 164; my italics). This difference is then linked to that between the creativeness of words, parole s, and the constraint of grammatical rules, langue. In this way, he combines Barthian transactions with Lévi-Straussian structure. It is a model of this kind which I hope to apply in this thesis.

There are a number of minor modifications which it is convenient to make, however, for its use in the Balinese case. As it is expressed exchanges occur at two levels, that is they are ranked; altruistic exchanges being in some sense higher and apparently more fixed. I have already suggested that this latter may bear further investigation. The same argument may be made more simply; for as Parkin notes the difference is one of means and ends. These are, however, the logically alternative possibilities of a single set of actions and it might be appropriate to view these not so much as ranked, but as intrinsic to behaviour or the concepts in terms of which they are evaluated, such that they may be viewed from different points of view, or perspectives. This raises a further question which is about the status of ideology in this sense. As it is formulated there is a measure of ambiguity as to whether the term is intended to connote some superior epistemological framework through which the world is understood. To argue that there are actions, concepts in terms of which to evaluate the actions, then ideologies in terms of which to order the concepts tends

to leave ideology as the most important analytical term of all, but one about which it is difficult to say exactly what it is or in precisely what sense it exists. In the present work I shall attempt to keep the number of analytical tools to a minimum and adopt a simpler approach at least tentatively. This is to discuss Balinese culture in terms of events in the world and actions, which may be ordered, or produced, by reference to a set of linked concepts, each containing a potentially wide variety of meanings. Each action may be evaluated as a means to an end or as an end in itself. The connexions between concepts may be seen in terms of propositions- the greater the range of meanings, the larger the number of potential propositions. It appears, however, that widely certain concepts attain a dominant status (Ardener 1975; Parkin 1975), such that the rest of the system is viewed, so to speak, through a filter. Again there may be a variety of such perspectives. So the system will appear different, and a plethora of connexions between concepts may be made, from different points of view which constitute alternative interpretations of what is going on. Recognised, or routinized, forms of this might conveniently be called ideologies, although it is a term which I shall try to avoid. The advantage of this model, which is somewhat naive but adequate for my present purposes, is not only that it incorporates change in the different possible connexions and viewpoints, but that it makes minimal assumptions about what exists and these are largely acknowledged. These are the existence of events in the world, the behaviour of actors and indigenous concepts, expressed in language (or possibly other non-verbal forms). This lays stress upon the native use of terms, which I hope to show is analytically profitable.[3]

Following this brief outline of some of the main theoretical points relevant to the present thesis, in order for the reader to find his way through the dense ethnography it may be useful to adumbrate the chapters and their order. In Chapter 2, I look first at the historical background to Bali, especially what is known of the region towards the north of the traditional state of Gianyar which lies towards the centre of the southern

plain of the island. Relatively little is known of events in the pre-colonial period (which ended in the first decade of this century) and it is made the more confused by being open to widely differing interpretations by various sectors of local society. An interesting feature is that this past is interpreted according to contemporary frameworks of relevance, which may equally be applied to present-day events. Inspection suggests that part of the importance of history is its cognitive value, not so much for the events alone, but for the relationships between them which show the importance of indigenous ideas of 'causality" (broadly interpreted, as this seems to admit of coincidence as an important principle). This suggests that the legitimating effect of history and myth may lie in their capacity to derive the present causally, and so ostensibly really, from the past.

After the outline of what history is known, the thesis turns to the ethnographic background of the settlement of study, Tengahpadang. Chapter 3 examines in detail the main corporate groups to which the villagers belong and shows the extent to which these overlap in personnel, so that the jural autonomy and theoretical independence of these is seen to be part of a social system in which much the same set of people meet in different guises. The network of ties between villagers and other communities is also laid out and the existence of an informally recognized, but variously defined, region within which the field of social relations is largely confined. Inspection of local corporations shows that while they appear to fit classical ideas of corporate groups, close inspection suggests that in almost every case there is uncertainty or multiplicity in the principles of incorporation, and the definition of the group itself. So the concept of irrigation association, for example, may have different meanings to different villagers at different times. Some of arguments about the nature of Balinese village structure are reviewed in the light of this ethnography, which suggests certain shortcomings.

Following the comparison of the different wards in the settlement, which suggests that in many important features they are similar, the

study focuses upon one of the two main communities, Pisangkaja. In Chapter 4, the ward is introduced and its salient features delineated. The table of households is given with certain minimal information on each, and on the most important villagers who tend to recur during the subsequent discussion, because of their central role in village affairs. The format of a table showing the relevant characteristics for each of the 160 households is adopted in each chapter to facilitate the organization of information. One of the functions of introducing this data in ordered form is that it permits detailed checking of the arguments which I present and the possible suggestion of points which have escaped me. This latter possibility would seem not to be harmful - too many works omit the materials by which the assertions of their authors can be examined carefully - but in so far as it enables subsequent readers to contradict me, it will have filled a useful purpose in the study of Balinese society.

Chapter 5 is the largest of all because it is here that the basic economic data on the community is discussed at some length. In order to understand the organization of economic relationships, it is necessary to consider the role of the irrigation association, which controls water but not land, and the effects of the process of technological intensification and elaboration of exchange relationships which Geertz has referred to as "agricultural involution" (Geertz 1963a). The system of ownership of land is discussed in detail, and also the actual distribution of land worked and the harvests yielded. These differ substantially. For while less than half the villagers own enough riceland to live off, almost the whole community subsists in some way from the produce of these fields. The forms of redistribution and reciprocity, together with the variety of occupations undertaken, are examined in detail, because these have far broader social consequences. Tenancy and labour relations tend to create a system of economic patronage between households, but this may take a variety of forms, such that individuals have extensive freedom in impression-management (Goffman 1959). So men may ride heavy economic losses in order to establish positions as altruistically-minded members of the community, through which they may also gain both a

fdllowing and a reputatiɑn. In the cɑurse of the chapter it is also nɑted that the system ɑf land utilizatiɑn cannot be understood without reference to the values which Balinese place upɑn variɑus types of fɑɑd and wɑrk, the classificatiɑn of which required re-evaluation of cɑmmɑn sense ideas of metaphysics.

Part ɑf the agricultural wɑrk and many ɑther tasks are undertaken by vɑluntary assɑciatiɑns, which are an extremely pɑpular mɑde of ɑrganization. Apart frɑm functiɑning as credit assɑciatiɑns these alsɑ prɑvidethe platfɑrm fɑr aspiring pɑliticians to extend their influence and demɑnstrate cɑnspicuɑusly their skills in ɑrganizing men and mɑney. Fɑrming vɑluntary assɑciatiɑns therefɑre is tantamɑunt to a declaratiɑn ɑf entry intɑ the pɑlitical arena. Leaders alsɑ gain frɑm the generally high evaluatiɑn placed ɑn nɑn-cɑmpulsɑry activities. Sɑ, towards the end ɑf Chapter 6, I discuss the cɑncept ɑf the vɑluntary in Bali and suggest that it may cɑme to be identified with the mɑral. This is an unusual cɑnnexiɑn at first sight, but inspectiɑn shɑws that the Balinese have a variety ɑf different definitiɑns as to what cɑnstitutes the mɑral and the gɑɑd. It alsɑ emerges that the single class ɑf vɑluntary assɑciatiɑn, recɑgnized by the Balinese in fact has a wide fan ɑf referents, sɑ that the cɑncept has wide tactical use.

Vɑluntary assɑciatiɑn ties are ɑften cɑntrasted with kinship which is seen as prɑviding a binding and ɑbligatɑry set ɑf ties. This is examined in Chapter 7. The main features ɑf cɑrpɑrate descent grɑups are discussed. Two particular prɑblems emerge: first that the fɑrmatiɑn ɑf kin grɑups is ɑptative in a certain sense; secɑnd that there are alternative nɑtiɑns as tɑ what the basis ɑf kinship is and hɑw it shɑuld be reckɑned. These tend tɑ turn ɑn the prɑblem in defining the criteria accɑrding tɑ which persɑns are alike ɑr unalike, and alsɑ the types ɑf categɑry within which this resemblance shɑuld be understɑɑd. I try tɑ argue that a cɑnceptual mɑdel ɑf this kind is capable ɑf encɑmpassing the variatiɑns in the fɑrm ɑf kinship grɑupings and relatiɑnships repɑrted frɑm different parts ɑf the island. This is alsɑ extremely helpful in understanding the value laid ɑn affinal ties which differs accɑrding tɑ the mɑdel used. Marriage has further significance in that it is an exchange in which twɑ analytical dimensiɑns

are discernible: the exchange of value and the power relationships between thos engaged in exchange (Paine 1974: 6ff.). This distinction helps to make it clear why marriage seems to be a focus for political confrontation within the village whereby it is not only used to forge useful alliances, but also to make symbolic statements about one's status and power. Certain forms of marriage attempt to avoid this by minimizing the emphasis on exchange, others turn this to political advantage - such as marriage by capture - where the challenge to the power and so position of the victim's family become paramount. Appropriately these forms of marriage are open to alternative interpretations, so that the parties to an exchange may have, or claim, different views of its significance. Underlying this is the inherent ambiguity in the gift.

Status differences in Bali are reckoned largely in terms of the ranking of descent groups by caste. In Chapter 8, the problem of the nature of Balinese status differentiation is examined in detail. The material from the traditional kingdom of Gianyar suggests that the Balinese in certain features have a system which approximates far more closely to Indian ideals (or rather Balinese views of this) than has often been argued. In particular, hierarchy is calculated by reference to ideas of natural differences in purity, by which the social order is seen as a legitimate and inevitable part of nature. The relationships between castes can be accomodated on the sort of models which have been developed in the last decade for India, with certain interesting differences. Among these it appears that a multi-dimensional Indian model has been transformed by being reinterpreted in terms of an Indonesian structuralism based on complementary opposition. This moral theory of caste difference is not the only one, however, and there is a parallel model based upon theories of power, natural and supernatural, so that there are alternative frameworks in terms of which social relations may be evaluated. Inspection shows that the critical concepts of purity and power have not only a wide fan of referents, but display serious internal logical inconsistencies which are central to their cultural elaboration and the maintenance of the system of status inequalities.

In Chapter 9, the discussion turns to the ward itself. As this has been examined in various facets in previous chapters, the focus here is primarily on the organization of assets which have been brought from other groups or sets of relationships into the main political field. The ward stands out here by virtue of its substantial material and political prizes for those who are able to gain a degree of control over the process of decision-making by which resources are allocated. The heavy sanctions which the ward may legally impose also make it a powerful group. The chapter sets out to examine how the assets from different fields are organized through systematic patronage and the gathering of clients into factions. These are prevented from running affairs directly by rules which inhibit the open expression of sectarian interests. The complexity of local custom and rules of procedure lead to the emergence of a second type of élite, that of public speakers, who possess great influence over the course of decision-making. The political process in the ward then takes place in two separate, but interconnected, arenas where lobbying and ordering support contrast and complement the presentation of issues and the more general consideration of proposals for their consequences for the community and for moral and symbolic values generally. The view that private transactions of wealth and power constitutes the basis of politics is questioned and it is suggested that the contemplation of the interpretations to be placed upon events and public debate are central parts of the political process. In particular, it appears that in many ways it is the orators who wield the greatest power by virtue of their control over meaning. The forms which this may take are examined.

In the final substantive section, Chapter 10, the examination of the process by which meaning comes to be attributed to events and actions is carried further by reference to the activities of spirit-mediums in classifying unordered experience. Religion is only treated as a special topic in as far as the Balinese may regard certain important decisions as beyond the realm of direct human interference: following Lévi-Strauss I do not otherwise regard it as a separate field, and it is incorporated in various ways in earlier chapters. It is in the field of what are regarded as particularly religious activities, however, that some of the most

acute political conflicts develop. I suggest that this is because influence over important areas of meaning is involved. It is also here that the process by which meaning is attributed can be seen most clearly, both in the routine classification of mediums and in exceptional cases where major choices of interpretation may be mooted. Examination suggests that here dispute may centre upon the hierarchy of values in Balinese society. This, I would argue, is not fixed ,rather the hierarchy itself (or even whether there is a hierarchy) is the focus of negotiation between participants. From this, it becomes clear how certain concepts come to occupy a crucial place, such that a whole series of subsequent propositions follow from them. Which concepts are central and what they entail, however, seems to be the object of much discussion. I conclude with the view that the process by which meaning is established and categories organized requires further study.

Chapter 1. Footnotes

1. In a recent paper (given to the S. O. A.S. Anthropology Department seminar in the summer of 1979), Pocock draws attention to the extent to which Leach's , distinction, on careful examination of his usage, implies that the technical is in some way more 'real' than the communicative. Not only do I intend no such implication here, but as I shall argue these differences depend upon the evaluation and use of a particular event or action. At a more general level, both aspects are intrinsic analytically. In a naive way this is clear from the extent to which technical activities presuppose a cultural theory of causation and metaphysics; while communication is very often a means to an end, whether envisaged by the actors or not.

2. It is not insignificant that Leach's work essentially adopts Wittgenstein's first theory of meaning, in which words, or concepts, strive to show the world, as if they could only approximate it, Indeed in his discussion Leach refers directly to Wittgenstein among others. The influence of Leach's work might suggest that anthropologists would be unwise to ignore entirely the field of philosophy, especially where its contributions touch directly on anthropological arguments.

3. Choice enters into this system at each point: in the cultural recognition of events and behaviour, in the mode of selection of the appropriate proposition or concept, and so forth. Similarly there may be rules of behaviour, language etc. Cultural, or jural, rules I would prefer to see as part of the system of concepts, the system being of course structured more or less according to the view of the culture itself. This general formulation has the great advantage of its ability to account for, and indeed to embody as a central aspect, the problem of change. Bloch 1977 has pointed to the problems of simple theories of change and the need for any satisfactory argument to allow for culturally alternative forms of recognition of social and natural processes. He refers to the existence of two such major frameworks: a culturally specific. one embedded in ritual and effectively identified by anthropologists with social structure; and a second one which is universal in that it recognizes certain practical realities, or at least features which are found in all cultures. This need not be construed, however, as implying, as I noted in footnote 1, that the economic and political is held to be of a different order. In Chapter 5 I suggest certain areas where metaphysical notions distinctly Balinese in flavour appear to bear upon notions of value and exchange; while Chapter 8 points to the complexities inherent in Balinese ideas of power, the culturally posited link between temporal and spiritual power, and and the problem of how power is defined analytically (Parsons 1963). The model which I am proposing here in fact includes this binary distinction in modes of evaluating events, but with the stress on their basis in terms of a dichotomy between means and ends, to the extent that this is culturally formulable. It allows thus for a range of possible frameworks of interpretation, paradigms or relationships between elements.

Chapter 2. Some Problems in History.

Introduction:

Tengahpadang lies slightly inland from the ancient sites of Balinese culture. Its position has affected its history and the present social organization of the settlement, as well as its ties with other villages in the region. In this chapter I would like therefore to sketch out what is known, and more importantly what is understood, of the past of this small part of the island. This is useful as a means of introducing some of the main cultural themes and social institutions of Balinese village society; and also helps to account for the organization of social relationships and the distribution of vital assets. It further enables us to see social institutions, and the cultural concepts which underlie them, not as static, but as processes. There are, however, problems both methodological and theoretical. Historical records for the area are slender and open to divergent interpretation. These difficulties may be turned to advantage, in that the disagreements point to the functions of history in contemporary social action. There are grounds for holding that an account of social change which omits consideration of indigenous models is inadequate (see also Bloch 1977); while the shortage of reliable documentation serves further to highlight the extent to which these order the past, and explain the present by reference to it. This points to a more general consideration, namely that the continuity of Balinese society lies not only, or even primarily (if one adopts an extreme position), in the capacity of antecedent to determine subsequent events; but also in the transmission, and modification through experience, of cultural concepts and the frameworks through which events are perceived and interpreted and behaviour organized. This has the advantage that it avoids any simplistic dichotomy of past and present; by emphasizing the ways in which ideas are modified, or reinterpreted, both in the light of events and the working out of their logical, or empirical, consequences.

In the absence of detailed documentation then I shall lay emphasis upon the ideas, and uses made, of history to the villagers. On first inspection it fulfils certain rather obvious functions, which go part of the way to accounting for the variation in the versions given. There are grounds for thinking, however, that matters are more complex than first appears. For many of the contexts in

which history is invoked are remote from the exigencies of such needs as articulating political groups or legitimating the existing hierarchy. Such an approach also tends to ignore the basic questions of the ways in which the Balinese may classify past events and actions, and of the meanings which these may hold for them. I shall suggest that the past is apprehended in terms of different frameworks by which particular features are selected from the total available and the relationships between them interpreted in a variety of non-coordinate ways. It will emerge that the order which the Balinese place upon the past reflects their present cultural concepts. A consequence of this is that these appear to have their validity substantiated by time. These ideas may represent, or indeed affect, the form of change or stability. Some concepts imply continuity; others change. All tend, however, in various ways to be open to interpretation in terms of culturally recognized or implicit, modes of evaluation. In this sense, history provides a conceptual field within which cultural ideas may be seen by the participants as unfolding differently over time.

While this may go a little way towards accounting for some of the features of history for Balinese villagers, it leaves open certain more general questions. If indigenous views of history show the operation of cultural processes over time; then inconsistencies in these, or in the concepts which underlie them, may emerge in the form of social change or conflict. Simply, if ideas are incoherent, to the extent that they are the basis for action or thought they may lead to diverse forms of behaviour, or to require secondary elaboration to cope with the inconsistencies. This view of history as the variable selection and interpretation of events drawn from a larger pool suggests a possible approach to the analysis of social change. The rectilineal transition from pre-conquest society to encapsulation within a modern nation state (Bailey 1969) is often presumed; although in practice the situation often appears less clear-cut. It may well be a question not so much of the extent to which institutions are 'modern' or 'traditional', as of the circumstances under which different existing or imported cognitive frameworks are used. This formulation has the advantage that it avoids the reification of social behaviour and allows for the increasing number of ethnographic examples of apparently reverse, or diverse, processes (Caplan 1971; Parry 1970). It also suggests

new questions ranging from the degree of internal coherence or external dissonance between models, to the extent to which interpretations and the meaning placed upon events are more or less consciously open to negotiation between the actors within a society.

A great deal has been written on the relationship of history and anthropology (for a recent discussion, see Lewis 1968 ed.). This is not the place to discuss the issues; and I shall restrict myself to arguments which are immediately relevant to the analysis of the past in the region of Tengahpadang. A major problem is the paucity of materials. Almost all information on the pre-colonial period (which ended in 1908) for this area comes from dynastic chronicles. These are written for the most part in the traditional language of texts, old or middle Javanese; and so are unintelligible to the majority of the populace, including a large section of the aristocracy. These dwell almost exclusively on the position and struggles of the landed nobility which ruled the island (Berg 1932; Mahaudiana 1968). For the period following the Second World War, there are records of such matters as changes in land ownership, which permit a more precise documentation of the decline, or perhaps better transformation, of the traditional élite. This lack of sources has certain broader implications. Gellner has pointed out that anthropological analyses are commonly distinguished by explanations in terms of the relationships between social institutions found at any one time (elsewhere he notes that most anthropologists are "functionalist" in this broad sense 1973b); rather than by reference to antecedent events as providing the sufficient conditions for their existence (the weakness of this approach he dubs "the fallacy of origins" 1973a: 100), even where these may be traced as a series ("the genetic fallacy" 1973a: 101). It is precisely what Gellner castigates as fallacious that seems to constitute for the Balinese culturally approved methods of explaining the present by reference to the past.

It would appear that there are several ways in which history may be used by the Balinese. Some of these correspond closely with functional arguments proposed by anthropologists. There is a broad sense in which history is invoked both as a symbol of cultural distinctiveness by which the Balinese identify and organize themselves within the wider political system of Indonesia, or locally against one another (Cohen, A. 1969a: 218-21; 1974). It also provides a source

of conflicting accounts and ideas of the past through which different groups, or segments of society, may legitimate particular claims, or represent alternative models of social structure (Leach 1954: 4-16, 264-81). However to stop at this point and see history as ritual, merely as "'saying things' about social status" (Leach 1954: 279) or restricted to symbolizing "the system of socially approved 'proper' relations between individual and groups" (1954: 15), creates certain problems and leaves interesting issues unexplored. The weaknesses of this position have been exposed in detail (see especially MacIntyre 1970: 69-71; Skorupski 1976: 18-52 esp.). It may be worth noting in passing, however, that these views also tend to have the disguised assumption that groups or status are in some way more 'real' than the forms through which they are represented. Equally serious, this tends to distract attention from how the past is organized culturally, what processes it elaborates and indeed why it should legitimate social institutions at all.

The difficulties of maintaining this position are recognized (for instance by Leach himself in 1969, 1976; whether the conversion is complete is open to question Skorupski 1976: 19-21), and increasing emphasis has been laid on the intellectual significance of history. Although his treatment of the issue is brief, Lévi-Strauss has made certain interesting observations. Apart from noting (1966: 242) the extent to which historical interpretations of events are the product of the observers' categories, he makes the point that there is an infinite number of potential interpretations of a single set of past actions (1966: 257-8)[1]. Further, he argues the importance of "palpable proofs" in giving myth, and a fortiori history, a "diachronic flavour" without which they lose much of their value (1966: 242). These views appear to embody the distinction between the syntagmatic flow of events and the cultural paradigms through which they are understood and ordered. The applicability of this to an understanding of social action and ideas has been argued more systematically by Ardener (1971; 1978).

An approach which lays emphasis upon the cultural classification of events and actions may be worth pursuing further. Indigenous views of history may be of interest not so much for what they say about past events, as for the evidence they provide of the ways events may be related conceptually. For the applicability of cultural ideas may be seen at its fullest extent in completed

series of events. This shows not only the ways in which concepts may have continued reference (for instance to states of the world or as principles underlying institutions) but also they may embody culturally approved connexions between events and actions (as in a quarrel followed by the death of one of the disputants being linked causally in the notion of witchcraft; or similarity in the behaviour of men being represented in terms of descent, caste or identity of interests). It will be evident that cultures differ in the manner in which they recognize processes and connexions, by stressing variously causal links, the working of chance, the result of rational choice and so forth. There is one feature in common in this retrospective application of ideas (which may, of course, have been modified by the events themselves)[2]. In tracing institutions and processes back from the present to their antecedents, there is the possibility of reading this in reverse so that the present appears as stemming from the past in a coherent manner (as in Gellner's fallacies), the form of this varying with the postulated connexions. In this way it is possible to represent history as a conceptual space in which the trajectory of concepts, so to speak, in time confirms their validity. This suggests one reason why history may be of use in legitimating social relations or institutions. I would argue that it does so by demonstrating the valid operation in the world and in time of the principles, or connexions, upon which present claims are based. Whether these are portrayed as necessary, coincidental, or whatever, may vary. History legitimates institutions, or the incumbency of roles, by showing the relevant principles to have worked according to expectation.

This raises questions about the types of process, or connexion between events, recognized in Bali. This is a complex topic which cannot be dealt with fully within the present chapter. For instance the forms of broadly causal relations recognized by the Balinese are a relatively unexplored field (cf. Needham 1976, on the potential value of such an inquiry), and appear to be open to differential interpretation. In Tengahpadang, for example, reference was often made to the origin (buwaka in low Balinese, wit, related to kawit, see Chapter 7, in high), the beginning (kemulan), root source or necessary condition (akar or (b)akal) or reason (alasan) for things[3]. There could also be a significant degree of coincidence as in the gift of a god (pica), which could be represented more determinately as divine will or the causal effect

of previous action, karma pala). The processes involved may be used evaluatively, as Geertz has noted:

> "The Balinese view of the past is not, in the proper sense of the term, really historical at all. For all their explanatory myth-making, the Balinese search the past not so much for the causes of the present as for the standard by which to judge it . . ." (Geertz 1973a: 334).

This is typically understood in terms of a decline from a golden age in the past (1973a: 331-7). Evaluations may differ, however. While the ruling aristocracy often decried all change as for the worse; villagers would often point to the improvement of their lot (see below and Chapters 7 & 9 on some of the details of this in Tengahpadang). This draws attention to the existence of distinct processes, underlying which there may be discrete modes of reckoning time. This is relevant to the present argument in so far as it points to the constraints and alternatives in the evaluation of the links between events, or culturally recognized processes.

In order to understand this, and so the ways in which history may be interpreted, it is necessary to consider ideas of time and process briefly. There is evidence that in fact the Balinese acknowledge more or less explicitly several different scales of time-measurement, broadly viewed as based upon differential perception and use of cycles which vary in length from days to millenia. These yield at least three main systems. First there is a permutational model, based upon the mathematical and regular intersection of weeks of different lengths, often known as the Javanese-Balinese year (Goris 1960a). This may be viewed as "particulate" (Geertz 1966a: 81 fn. 31) and giving different value to particular days or in terms of the co-incidence of cycles, under different circumstances. In contrast, the second system designates clear cycles, such as those perceived in the passing of seasons, or the growth of plants and indeed animals. This is calendrically represented in the Hindu-Balinese solar-lunar cycle of 12 months (Goris 1960a). Lastly there is the cycle of cosmic growth and decline, which appears from any particular point along it much like time moving irreversibly in some direction, and is marked by years (saka) which are however little used in daily life. This model is drawn from the Indian yuga system. In the version most commonly cited in Tengahpadang, however, rather than the world deteriorating steadily through each of the four

periods, or yugas, as in India; in the first it develops out of primordial chaos, to civilization in the second, but reaches and passes its peak in the third. In the final kali yuga, in which somewhat unsurprisingly we live, it plunges into a disorder reminiscent of the Indian original with, as Basham put it: "a confusion of classes, the overthrow of established standards, the cessation of all religious rites, and the rule of harsh and alien kings" (1967: 323). It will be noticed immediately that Geertz's observation on the way the Balinese evaluate history falls within this last phase. One mode which appears to be absent is what Leach (1961: 126) has described as a zig-zag (see the good discussion on this in Barnes 1974: 127-8). As far as I can judge, reversal of this kind is studiously avoided spatially (as in the rule against allowing water in an irrigation system to flow back towards its source), or in movement to-and-fro, kemai-kemu. Taken together, however, the modes of estimating time which the Balinese recognize offer a vocabulary of possible ways of representing and evaluating change.

These various modes of reckoning time are reflected in ways of viewing process. There is a notion of continuity - what was so before will be so still. This is deceptive. For the form may be similar but its meaning changed. As social contexts change, so will the functional significance of the elements (Gellner 1973b), that is its "implicational meaning" (Hanson 1975: 14-15). It may also be argued that the definition of situation and meaning of such elements depend on the evaluation of the actors in different contexts (Bulmer 1969; 1972). As a simple illustration, village wards or communities in Tengahpadang are widely spoken of as permanent, unchanging corner-stones of society, although there is evidence that not only is this not so (Anon 1934: 472-89; Korn 1932: 77-9), but that they may rewrite their own rules drastically (Chapter 9; for an elegant example of how concepts obscure change, see Parkin 1972). Second, there is the closed cycle, typified naturally in the agricultural season and represented socially in such systems as teknonymy, or the stages of metempsychosis, to which we shall return in a moment. In operation, however, the terminal point may be seen as different from the start. So the domestic cycle, agnatic descent or the accumulation ordissipation of property may have elements of direction. This merges into the third form: irreversible change. This occurred for example in the dismemberment of the ninth Balinese kingdom of Mengwi by its neighbours in 1891. Inevitable decline from a golden age would also appear

to fall roughly under this heading, as one of set of discrete ways of seeing process.

That these different forms are not purely the product of the observer's categories may be seen by an examination of Balinese terms. While many concepts may be relatively neutral; there are others which appear to contain more or less explicit references to different forms of process. For instance sari, essence, is not only the part of offerings consumed by gods, it is also that which remains unchanged through the transformations of matter, including growth (see Chapter 5), and is close to an idea of continuity. Patitis, reincarnation, implies conceptually (and in fact spatially, Hobart 1978a: Figure 3 esp.) more or less closed cycles. The idea of war, yuda, suggests a change in the state of the world, even where the outcome is inconclusive for the balance of power. So in various ways, Balinese concepts seem to contain within them references to process (on the place of key ideas such as adat, see Chapters 3, 9 & 10). Apart from this, they may be interpreted differently by reference to the alternative modes discussed; although this is obviously constrained by the implications of process which may be contained within a concept. The point may be made simply by one example, that of rebirth. In brahmanical dogma the attributes and circumstances of men in successive reincarnations (the details of which are held to be beyond human knowledge) are the product of their previous actions, according to the (markedly causal) concept of karma pala, the fruits of action (see Potter 1977: 54ff. on phala, fruits or effects, in Indian philosophy). Far from decline being inevitable, improvement is just as possible; the direction being set by something approaching the idea of will. In popular village belief, however, the doctrine is modified by a further idea, that people are reborn into their agnatic family line, variously understood (Chapter 7). The result comes close to an endless closed cycle which denies generation or dissolution. So reincarnation may be viewed, and evaluated, differently in terms of different models of process[4].

This somewhat lengthy introduction has been necessary on several counts. It has pointed to some of the problems in understanding the past in the absence of external sources. It has suggested the relevance of indigenous categories in the interpretation of events and the part that history may play in legitimating institutions. I have also pointed to some of the ideas of causation, process and perpetuity which may inhere in Balinese concepts and be represented in

various ways according to different models of time itself. This will be of relevance in the argument in this thesis and may conveniently be introduced here, for the light which it sheds upon Balinese representation of past events. Before looking at this however it is useful to sketch in briefly the general background of the history and ecology of the island, from which it becomes possible to see cultural categories in operation in the interpretation of events as they took place in the region round Tengahpadang.

The Background:

With these theoretical considerations introduced, it is possible to turn to the ethnographic background. Bali is a small, but very fertile island, 5, 621 sq. km. in area (Raka 1955: 1), lying 8^{o} to the south of the Equator, to the east of Java and to the west of Lombok, but separated from them by treacherous seas. While it is the most westerly of the Lesser Sunda Islands, or Nusa Tenggara, its ecological affinities with Java have led to it generally being included within the Tropical Rain Forest belt of Central South East Asia (Fisher 1964, 43-4, 209), this distinction from the rest of the group being marked by the Wallace Line. The island has a roughly triangular shape, described by villagers on occasions as like a fighting-cock with lowered head (see Map 1.; also Geertz 1973b: 418). To follow this image, the spine comprises the chain of volcanic mountains which forms the backbone of the island, culminating in the east in Gunung Agung rising over 3,000 metres above sea-level. To the north the terrain slopes steeply down to the sea; while, to the east, habitation is restricted by the frequency of volcanic eruption and laval flow. In the west, at the notional head of the cock much of the lowland is covered with scrub and the highlands with forest, and is sparsely populated. The fourth extremity is equally barren, for the southern peninsula consists of an arid limestone outcrop, as does the island of Nusa Penida off the coast, which was the traditional place of exile and thought of as the source of major pestilences (Holt 1970; Swellengrebel 1960: 38). On the long gently sloping plain in the centre, intersected by innumerable streams flowing from the central mountain lakes, the bulk of the population lives.

It is here during the last two millenia that Balinese culture developed apparently part independently, part through influence from Java and elsewhere

MAP 1. THE ISLAND OF BALI.



(Swellengrebel 1960: 16-35). Over one thousand years ago, Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism seem to have reached the island by means which are not entirely clear. During the second millenium, the most important events in indigenous history were the dynastic marriages between Java and Bali in the 11th. century; the legendary expedition of Kertanagara to Bali in 1284; followed by the supposed Javanese conquest of Bali by Majapahit in 1331-4, from which the contemporary aristocracy ultimately derive their legitimacy and which still provides the source of competitive claims to status. The actual historical accuracy of these accounts is unclear and the subject of dispute (for some of the main views, see Hall 1966: 74; Korn, 1932: 1-58, 135-177; Stutterheim, 1935; Swellengrebel 1960; and the recent exchange between Hooykaas 1974a and Geertz 1975).

The earliest sites in the cradle of Balinese political and cultural development appear to have been at Pèjèng, five kilometres from Tengahpadang, then Gèlgèl and Klungkung. By the end of the 19th. century this area had been divided into the kingdoms of Gianyar, with Bangli to its north-east and to the due east Klungkung the head of which, the Déwa Agung (literally: the Supreme God), was the titular sovereign over the whole island. The rulers of all three were high-ranking nobles or Satriya, titled Cokorda, although in Gianyar they were later displaced by another descent group the Déwa Gedé. The heads of the remaining states all belonged to descent lines titled Gusti in some form (Korn, 1932; 146-9, 227) who were generally held to be of lower (Wésiya) caste by the superior Cokorda (See Boon 1978: 145-185, for a discussion of the problems in the term Gusti.). These were in the same fertile swath to the west and comprised before its collapse Mengwi, Badung and Tabanan. Around the periphery lay the remaining kingdoms. To the extreme east was the partly arid Karangasem (renamed Amla Pura following the devastating eruption of Gunung Agung in 1963) which had strong links to Lombok where the local Sasak population had been conquered by Balinese invaders and colonized. The west was also drier due to the absence of volcanic crater lakes where lay Jembrana and on the steep northern slopes of the mountains, Bulèlèng. Both were in part isolated geographically from the south.

With the conquest of the north by the Dutch in 1849, and of the south between 1906 and 1908, Bali became a part of the Netherlands East Indies, and finally, of the Republic of Indonesia. This has led to a number of important changes. Economically it has brought the island into direct contact with a wider market

system (cf. Kahn 1975), which has changed the old court capitals in varying degree into trading and administrative centres, particularly in the longer colonized north and on the southern road connecting Java with the ports for the eastern islands (see Geertz 1963b, for a description of Tabanan). Also, in the south tourism has developed in recent years into an important industry with local effects in certain coastal and traditional craft villages particularly round the capital Denpasar. Politically the indigenous kings and princes have been replaced by a centralized government administration and political party system often, however, staffed by the old aristocracy (Geertz H: 1959, 26). More generally the advent of the Dutch brought peace and improved conditions which has led to a marked increase in population from about one million in 1930 to just over two million according to the 1971 census. This has resulted in complex pressures, particularly on land, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

As in the past the Balinese are traditionally peasant farmers of irrigated rice in the lowlands, supplemented by taro, coconut cultivation and animal husbandry, particularly of cattle and pigs for marketing now both locally and overseas (Raka 1955: 58-70). Despite its rich waters, fishing is of marginal importance, apparently for cosmological reasons,[5] and is largely restricted to immigrant communities from other islands. In the highlands where irrigation is impossible the main crops are maize and taro, with a small amount of estate farming, mostly of coffee (Raka 1955: 25-32). The settlement pattern consists of tightly nucleated villages surrounded by ricefields sometimes spattered with huts (pondok) as residential land becomes scarcer. For the most part lowland settlements are relatively large, not uncommonly containing several thousand inhabitants, but increasingly interspersed with smaller hamlets of a few hundred people as the terrain rises. These are linked by a grid of paths or roads from north to south roughly following the path of the streams, intersected by others from east to west, breached regularly by the gorges which fan out from the mountains. This topography imposes constraints on the organization of irrigation and on lateral communication in the uplands, which appears to be linked to the shape of the traditional kingdoms (Map 1, especially for the central kingdoms of Tabanan, Badung, Gianyar and Bangli).

The effect of the island's geography upon the local political economy is

particularly clear from a brief outline of Gianyar and the region round Tengahpadang in the interior, where my fieldwork was carried out. Lying in the historical heartland of south Bali, the traditional state of Gianyar is now an administrative district with the old court capital as its centre. It is a small sleepy town with shops and a few small businesses, notably cigarette factories, but without the commercial or governmental activity which characterizes the main towns such as Denpasar, Singaraja or Tabanan (Raka 1955: 113-121). As a largely agricultural district, it has the greatest proportion of its territory under irrigation in Bali and also the highest density of population: the two being closely correlated, as Table 2:1 shows (see also Chapter 5.).

TABLE 2:1, The Distribution of Irrigated Riceland and Population Density in Bali (1948-54)*.

	Area: (sq.km.)	Population:	Density per sq.km.	% of land under rice
Bulèlèng	1,320.8	258,726	196	10.5%
Jembrana	841.8	97,648	116	7.2%
Tabanan	851.5	238,563	280	29.6%
Badung	542.5	255,266	471	35.6%
Gianyar	368.0	211,762	575	42.9%
Bangli	520.8	116,603	224	6.2%
Klungkung	315.0	107,010	340	15.4%
Karangasem	860.9	231,531	270	9.4%
Total:	5,621.3	1,517,109	270	17.2%

* The figures are from Raka 1955: 10 & 28. Owing to the system of collecting data, the riceland figures are for 1948, and the population ones for 1954. The 1961 and 1971 censuses cannot unfortunately be used for this table, as the latter remains unpublished and the former is based upon redrawn boundaries which differ slightly from both Raka and locally available statistics. The present table is, however, adequate for a general impression as the population changes have been approximately the same for the various districts.

The countryside of Gianyar is far from uniform, however. From the broad, gently sloping terrain in the south, moulded into almost continuous rice-field, the landscape gradually becomes more precipitous and carved by increasingly elaborate terracing before it breaks off into dry fields (tegal) as the mountain ridges slope up to the great central crater, within which stands the active volcano of Gunung Batur. This difference between the densely inhabited lowlands and sparsely settled mountains is evident in the differences in population which the two areas support. This may be seen, indirectly, in the census figures for the different sub-districts of Gianyar, in rough order of distance from the sea and capital (Table 2:2).

TABLE 2:2: Population Density for the Sub-Districts of Gianyar (From Sea to Interior): 1961 Census.

Sub-District:	Population	Area (sq.km.)	Density per sq.km.
Gianyar	46,055	48.34	953
Belahbatuh	32,337	39.49	819
Sukawati	40,827	54.73	746
Ubud	31,474	42.16	746
Tampaksiring	25,657	42.41	605
Tengahpadang	29,006	77.68	373
Payangan	26,821	95.49	281
Total:	232,177	400.30*	580

* The 1961 census was based on revised boundaries for Gianyar. This figure for land area is used on all subsequent calculations.

The last three sub-districts are of some interest. Their southern parts fall within the belt of irrigated riceland and contain some of the island's most spectacular terracing, while their northern portions lie above an irrigable level. It is this which accounts for their lower overall density of population.[6]

Although the two areas of Gianyar have distinct peasant economies, the lowlands are dependent upon the system of rivers flowing from the interior to

MAP 2 : THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF TENGAHPADANG.



MAP 2 : THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF TENGAHPADANG.



CODE:

- = road
- = footpath
- = contemporary sub-district boundary
- = river
- = village settlement

TRADITIONAL POLITICAL GROUPING:

- = TENGAHPADANG
- = UBUD
- = PELIATAN
- = PAYANGAN
- = BANGLI
- = TAMPAKSIRING
- = PEJENG

provide water for irrigation. The topography of Bali causes serious problems for intensive rice cultivation in that, over the centuries, the rivers have cut through the soft volcanic rock to beds far below the broad ridges on which the terraces must be built. The solution adopted by the Balinese is to use the gradual slope and tap the water by damming further upstream, so that it can be led by channel, acqueduct and tunnel, often across seemingly impossible terrain, to where it is required. This complex system of hydraulic engineering (for details see Grader 1960; Happé 1919; Liefrinck 1969) requires frequent attention and overseeing and in the past also needed protection from enemy attack during the almost incessant wars. As late as 1886, writing from the subjugated north about the still independent south, Liefrinck pointed to the dangers inherent in this ingenious, but precarious, system:

> 'It is customary in the frequent wars between the various principalities for the rulers of the higher inland regions to divert the rivers supplying the ricefields nearer the coast or to block the streams at a given point and then release a flow of water that destroys all the dams on the river below that point. Incalculable damage has been caused by these stratagems, as in 1884 when the ruler of Bangli caused the failure of most of the crop in Gianyar in order to enforce his claim to the district of Apuan (under the traditional overlordship of Tengahpadang). Only recently the inhabitants of Mengwi ruined much of the crop in Badung by this means." (Liefrinck 1886-7, translated 1969: 43, my parentheses).

So traditional engineering produced a complex irrigation system in spite, or even wherever possible making use, of the heavily contoured landscape through enormous investment in labour and this has remained largely unchanged since. At the same time this skill in redirecting rivers made possible competition for water and created a constant threat to supplies which encouraged in turn the extension of aristocratic authority over the interior in order to ensure the means of subsistence of the great court centres to the south.

In this intricate system, the old northern princedom of Tengahpadang, now an administrative sub-district, seems to have occupied a strategic position; for through it, or forming its borders, run the two rivers the Wos and the Petanu and their tributaries, which supply the water for most of Gianyar (see Map 2.). The settlement of Tengahpadang which gave its name to the area was the main court centre and lies to the extreme south, deep in the belt of irrigated rice

cultivation it commands a view of the southern plain, while Gunung Agung and the volcanic peaks in the west loom in the background. It is perched on a narrow ridge from which precipitous ravines plung down to two rivers, the eastern Wos and the Klungkang, the western branch of the Petanu. To the north there is direct access along the ridge to the water source high in the interior; to the south after some distance the pitted landscape flattens out to the village courts of Peliatan and Ubud, between eight and nine kilometres away. This track has now been made into an unsurfaced road, passable to buses and trucks almost the whole year round. In every direction the countryside has been remodelled into terraces, especially impressive as these fall away sharply into the gorges, except on unirrigable promontories where lalang grass is grown for roofs. Underneath the ridge itself run a maze of tunnels (aungan) excavated during the previous centuries out of the rock, carrying streams to irrigation associations further downriver (for an account of the technological problems, see Liefrinck 1969: 52-7).

This location at the hub of the water system seems to have played a part in the history of Tengahpadang. Although court chronicles do not mention it specifically, it is possible to infer something of the geo-political significance of irrigation in Bali from the frequency of attacks on dams and waterworks. This has also affected the pattern of alliances and emnities within the state. For the western half of Gianyar has traditionally been the stronghold of the Cokordas mentioned above, in theory politically subordinate but claiming higher caste status than the king (or raja) himself. So the pattern of aristocratic intervention and settlement in Tengahpadang seems to have reflected the struggle between these rival dynasties for the control of the water to the domains of the Cokordas. The legacy of this is clearly apparent in the pattern of contemporary political affiliations which divide the village. In order to understand exactly how this came about, it is necessary to examine briefly the character of the traditional Balinese state and the particular history of the region.

The History of Tengahpadang:

The structure and organization of the pre-conquest kingdoms is one of the most obscure areas of knowledge on Balinese society. This is due in no small part to the paucity and evident partiality of the available accounts. These consist principally of early royal inscriptions, prasasti (Goris 1954), and dynastic chronicles, babad (see Pigeaud 1967: 123-8), supplemented and partly contradicted by oral tradition and the accounts of outsiders. These last may offer an independent commentary upon indigenous sources, since the first documented contact with the west in 1597, but have been analysed critically by Boon to show the extent to which ethnographic detail has been transformed to fit western preconceptions (1976a; 1977: 1-69). Unfortunately this approach perhaps tells us more about the observers' models than about those of the Balinese. With this exception, however, most authors have attempted to infer the existence of a definite general system from these heterogeneous chronicles and oral accounts. Such an approach ignores the argument not only that they are used to support competing claims (Leach 1954; 277-8), but that there may be rival frameworks of interpretation, at times clearly linked to different types of discourse (Bloch 1975: 12-22; Parkin 1975: 113-9). Aristocratic accounts are concerned to argue the moral and mystical nature and significance of kingship and the state (Worsley 1972: 37-58), and so also symbolically to stress its unity and disguise the underlying cleavages in society. In contrast oral, especially village, sources lay more emphasis upon pragmatic considerations, such as the ordinary logistics of deaths, destroyed crops or sacked settlements (the distinction is reminiscent of Parkin's between ideology and plan, 1975: 115-8, 125-39). The same events may be represented differently and serve different ends; so the two types of sources tend to portray somewhat varying pictures.

The most recent general characterization of the Balinese state is in the work of the Geertzes (Geertz, H. 1959; Geertz 1973a; Geertz & Geertz 1975: 6-7, 20-7). They have argued that the kingdom "was basically not territorial in nature" (1975: 23). Rather:

> "The political system of the traditional Balinese state was essentially one of multiple interconnected networks of personal, but at the same time sharply limited, ties between superior and subordinate. These networks took the form of highly unstable pyramids of authority; at the apex of each was a king, prince or lord. Such a system,

> based as it was on constant reassertion of personal dominance, encouraged political machination, palace intrigues, and war." (1975: 24).

The extent and form of intervention by the aristocracy in local politics and the authority which they wielded over their subjects has been under dispute (see below). According to the Geertzes "the political influence that the gentry had over village affairs was strictly limited." (1975: 25). This stemmed from a system in which the subjects of different princes, or lords, were "randomly interspersed" with one another across villages (Geertz, H. 1959: 25; see also Geertz & Geertz 1975: 25). Apart from this, they argue, villagers generally owed taxes to different princes, were often tenants of yet others (Geertz 1963b: 101-5; Geertz & Geertz 1975: 25), so creating a web of cross-cutting allegiances[7]. The obligations of villagers were, however, not so much fiscal or even military, for " 'wars' were commonly short, fighting often stopped at nightfall or, sometimes, with the first death in battle." (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 24), as to provide labour for the rites held by the princes. For,

> "it was a theatre-state in which the kings and princes were the impresarios, the priests the directors, the peasantry the supporting cast, stage crew, and audience . . . Mass ritual was not a device to shore up the state; the state was a device for the enactment of mass ritual." (Geertz 1973a: 335).

This interpretation of Balinese history raises a wide range of issues, not all of which can be discussed here. One reason is that a detailed study of the traditional Balinese state has been prepared by Geertz[8]. For his full argument and more detailed substantiation of criticisms of the earlier Dutch works, we shall have to wait upon its publication. One or two points may usefully be noted in passing however. Among the areas of disagreement between scholars is the nature of the state - for instance its territorial basis (discussed briefly below) and the relationship of court and village. On the question of the degree of subordination of villagers Geertz has characterized the prevailing Dutch view as based on a model of the village as republic ('dorpsrepubliek') and "a set-apart, self-contained, tightly knit, precisely delimited social microcosm"; whereas he suggests that "the royal houses did not just ride uneasily above the village community . . . but were directly and intimately involved in it." (Geertz 1961: 500; cf. Korn 1932: 77-9, 229-33, 287-303). It is not, however, always

entirely clear how far different authors are making use of different types of source, whether the accounts of past observers, oral tradition, written village or palace records (Korn 1922: Liefrinck 1917; 1921 on these last). As there is a tendency for influence to diminish with distance from court centres (cf. Jay 1963 on Java), it is quite possible that the situation differed from place to place. It may also be relevant to note a potential difference between the formal relationship of court and village and less publicized links. According to recollection (and in contemporary use) in Tengahpadang rival, but informal, networks of clients were used to further the extension of aristocratic influence. One might argue that to have failed to perceive this local dimension of clientage would have been naive, and out of character, on the part of these strategically-minded princes.

This leads to the broader issue of Geertz's concept of the'theatre state' and the extent to which political activity was an appendage of, and subordinated to, the requirements of mass state ritual. There are two problems. First we must await a critical review of sources. For at first sight the kind of fieldwork necessary to substantiate a statement of that order would appear to postdate conquest. As colonization destroyed the aristocratic political hegemony without corresponding changes in the ritual structure, a certain caution is needed in arguing from the present ceremonial role of princes that the same was so when they also held power. The difficulty in an unqualified assumption that the function of these rites is the same under totally different political conditions is obvious (Cohen, A. 1969a:218-21). A more interesting point is the extent to which ideas of ritual and power were separated in different contexts. As many of the ceremonies were held to be necessary to the maintenance of the state's welfare, at least in publicly expressed belief, their performance may be argued to be as instrumental as the more obvious acts of statecraft. Also Balinese ideas of power are complex (see Chapter 8).

The emphasis upon aristocratic ideology comes out clearly in the Geertzes' and others' accounts of warfare, (see the discussion in Boon 1977: 24-30), which reflect something of such earlier views as those of van den Broek (1885; cf. Bateson's carefully qualified note, 1949; reprinted 1970: 390). Whether fighting was so constrained may be questioned on three grounds. First, it does not follow from the frequency of wars that they were necessarily

petty. Second, the outside observers' accounts already cited, of the dismemberment of Mengwi and the systematic destruction of dams and crops to bring starvation, does not square with the picture of warfare as necessarily restrained and ritual. Finally, the babad themselves allude to the savagery of fighting and massacres (Mahaudiana 1968: 82-3, 85-6; Worsley 1972: 171, 179-81, 193-5). According to the ritual argument, wars were won more by the mystical power (kesaktian) of the prince or his weapon (commonly referred to as a pusaka, heirloom) than by superior tactics or forces. However, kesaktian is not so much an alternative to physical powers as manifest in them (for a clear example see Worsley 1972: 145). In other words mystical power is inferred from its results and like witchcraft may form a complementary theory of causality to explain success in the absence of other evident factors (see Lévi-Strauss 1966: 10-11)[9]. So cultural premises such as mystical power may be validated by ex post facto argument shown in the operation of history. This suggests that aristocratic accounts may play a complex part in representing the conflicts and inequalities of the system. The texts, on the other hand, provide interesting material on the nature and logic of kingship in its moral and cosmological setting.

This type of approach also tends to play down the apparently territorial aspects of the state and the importance of princely estates. As we have seen the maintenance and protection of the irrigation system encourages the development of a spatial dimension to political relations, although Schwartz has suggested that this was more developed for Gianyar than elsewhere (Schwartz 1900: 169-70). Here, there seems to have been an organized structure of princely officials (punggawa) with authority over a roughly defined area of settlements and watersheds, in which local appointed penglurah (now pengrurah) were delegated the task of supervising irrigation and collecting taxes on behalf of the sedahan agung, the prince's agent (Groothoff 1918: 327-8; Korn 1932: 271-2; this system still works in rationalized form with the addition of a sedahan abiyan to collect taxes for dry fields, Korn 1932: 327). The boundaries of the region ruled over by the punggawa of Tengahpadang as recalled by the village elders are given in Map 2., and are almost identical with the present ones, as they are defined by rivers. Summing up the conflicting accounts of the early writers, Korn concluded that there was in fact a territorial

administration overlaid by separate personal estates (1932: 289-92).

The traditional estate system seems to have flourished in the old kingdoms of Klungkung, Bangli, Gianyar and Mengwi, although the details, while much debated, remain confused (see Groothoff 1918; Happé 1919; Haga 1924a, 1924b; Korn 1932, 229ff). According to Boon, this was the means by which Hindu courtly ideals were spread to villages, by imposition or voluntarily (1977: 54-6); while, to Groothoff (1918: 327), it was part of extending land holdings established at the time new areas were coming under irrigation on princely direction. This land, known as pecatu, was worked by tenants who were liable to palace service (pengayah ke dalem) as a result, which obliged them to:

1. maintain royal residences
2. produce materials for this purpose
3. pay levies of rice or gold (Korn 1932: 228)

according to Haga (1924b: 424) this also involved:

4. military service
5. duties at the ceremony of Nyepi (see Goris 1960a)
6. bringing a cock to an annual cock-fight
7. service at regional and royal temples

There is note from Jacobs (1934) of an official visit to Tengahpadang in March 1930, when he recorded that the pecatu system was run by the désa adat (see Chapter 3.) and open only to compound owners. From his orders issued then that service at royal temples (singling out the Pura Penataran Cokorda, see below) should stop, it would seem that the system was still active in some form.

Little detail on land emerges, however, from the earlier history of Tengahpadang. It lies however in one of the longest-settled regions of Bali, from which royal inscriptions date back at least to the mid-12th. century (Sukarto K. Atmojo 1970) and one apparently refers to the ward of Pisangkaja (in which I did intensive fieldwork) as the oldest[10]. This is affirmed independently by local oral tradition. The grounds on which the villagers argue this is interesting. As Pisangkaja contains the main temples and has the ideal plan for a village (Tan 1966; Hobart 1978a: 10-12), it is simply held that, as this is the ideal arrangement, it must therefore be the original from which later settlement spread out. The view of historical process as operating from an ideal to irreversible alteration through contingency is

used retrospectively to infer the past.

Reference to more recent history is to be found in the accounts of the two rival dynasties in Gianyar, in the Babad Manggis Gianyar (Mahaudiana 1968) and in the unpublished genealogy and family chronicle of the Cokordas. Appropriately, they disagree not so much over the events but as to their interpretation. Both claim descent from the legendary king of Gèlgèl and Bali, Dalem Segening, the Cokorda from his queen (perami) the Déwa Gedé from a liaison with a Satriya girl in the village of Manggis. According to the Babad Manggis, the turmoil in the 18th. century brought their ancestor from being a faithful subordinate to found the kingdom of Gianyar in about 1771 (Mahaudiana 1968: 30). The subsequent history of wars and internal rebellions has hinged largely around the more or less agreed superior caste status of the Cokordas (see Mahaudiana 1968: 37-8) and their close kin ties with other rulers, notably the king of Klungkung with the consequent conflict of loyalties (Mahaudiana 1968: 54, for an instance of this). The problem emerges clearly in the rebellion of Cokorda Pinatih, the prince of Pèjèng in about 1846, when the king of Gianyar asked his daughter's hand in marriage in order to unite the kingdom, a request which was flatly refused according to the Babad Manggis (1968: 35). Whether this was an excuse for a fight or not is of less interest than the fundamental issue of the disjuncture between ritual status and political power. As they claim higher caste rank, Cokorda women commit hypogamy if they marry Déwa Gedé; whereas the king is the political superior, in theory at least, of local princes and so entitled to forge alliances with them through their daughters. While at one level each side bases its claims on the principle which justifies its position, ritual purity by birth as opposed to achievements or conquest; at a more profound one there is a basic ambiguity in the concept of satriya itself, as it is defined simultaneously in terms of ascription and also attainment (see below, cf. Gellner 1973b: 38-9). Something of the significance of this will emerge shortly.

This rebellion seems to have led indirectly to the present pattern of aristocratic settlement in Tengahpadang. Earlier, according to the genealogies (Diagram 2:1), a certain Cokorda Segara from Peliatan had established a court in Pisangkaja. Following the abortive rebellion his grandson Cokorda Anom Rembang, with the Cokordas of Blusung and Nyalian, revolted as well. They

DIAGRAM: 2:1.

<u>The Written Genealogy of the Original Cokordas in Tengahpadang.</u>



* According to the genealogy, Cokorda Segara was the 8th. of 9 brothers. They produced, in order of seniority, the following courts: Sukawati, Peliatan, Negara, Singapadu, Peliatan, Petulu, Gentong, Tengahpadang, Ubud. The present line in Ubud is an off-shoot of Peliatan.

**A.A. Oka (Anak Agung Oka) was a female heir, as was her daughter. The title is that for Cokorda women. The significance of tracing descent this way is discussed in detail in footnote 8.

DIAGRAM 2:2.

The Written Genealogy of the Déwa Gedé of Tengahpadang.



* The youngest of five brothers. The eldest became Déwa Manggis VI of Gianyar, the others, in birth order stayed in Tulikup, moved to Sukawati, Siangan and Tengahpadang respectively.

** A.A. Oka took over this position under unclear circumstances. He was both perbekel and punggawa.

*** The Déwa Gedé genealogy shows a Cokorda as heir, the Cokordas explain this as by conquest, see below.

Note: The title group is Déwa Gedé, but later adopted the title Anak Agung, and have been referred to in recent generations by this term, which is used accordingly here.

were defeated and Cokorda Anom fled to Bangli where the family has remained since. The king (raja) then sent one of his younger brothers, Déwa Gedé Serian to settle in Tengahpadang, in the ward of this name, to rule as the head (punggawa). According to the Babad Manggis, in the next generation the various sons founded the present day courts (Diagram 2:2). In the meantime from the court in Yèh Tengah where the elder son of Cokorda Segara had settled, the younger son came to Pisangkaja and founded a court where his cousin had been, although he had no official position. It prospered and in 1970 was still the wealthiest of the local courts (puri). The discrepant accounts of how this came about are interesting as they involve the post hoc explanation of events. The Cokordas interpret the arrival of Cokorda Raka as a means of counter-balancing the influence of the Déwa Gedé. The villagers of Pisangkaja have a different account, however. According to their oral tradition, the prince fled the scene of battle and hid in Pisangkaja. To support this, they point to the timidity of the present prince. As Satriya qualities, strong or weak, derive from birth and devolve consequently down the descent line, the origin of this must therefore lie with the incoming ancestor, which is consonant with his reputed behaviour. In other words, present traits are argued to be the result of descent, the retrospective evidence for which shows descent itself to be a valid principle[11].

The subsequent references to Tengahpadang mainly concern its part in the wars which racked Gianyar. In 1874 soldiers from the region were used to crush an army from the kingdom of Mengwi, which had seized the strategic border village of Kedéwatan (Mahaudiana 1968: 62). Although the Babad Manggis goes into no detail, it is significant that this was the site of a major dam controlling the irrigation of the westernmost watershed in Gianyar (Yèh Dauh) and parts of Mengwi itself. The same chronicle relates, however, that in 1885 Pisangkaja was sacked and apparently burned in a raid under Cokorda Oka, the punggawa of Negara in south Gianyar who had previously been an ally against Mengwi (Mahaudiana 1968: 73). This heralded a full-scale war in which the kingdoms of Klungkung and Bangli combined with the help of Negara in a plan to conquer and divide Gianyar between them; and succeeded in deposing the king and occupying the entire kingdom, except for the region of Tengahpadang and its immediate neighbours. As the Babad Manggis put it:

> 'The kingdoms of Klungkung and Bangli did not dare to enter one of these districts because, in addition to the alliance of their punggawa being very strong indeed, their defensive fortifications were hard to penetrate, because the upland region was hilly and deep ravines formed a natural defense which was very hard to take by force." (Mahaudiana 1968: 78, my translation)

This citation illustrates the point in the introduction about history being the present interpretation of the past. The Babad Manggis is written in a deliberately modern style and portrays the defences as political and topographical. Now in fact for the southern half of this beleaguered territory the ravines are little more than gullies and easily passable to an invading army. What the account omits is the traditional belief that to die by falling is a bad death (Fox 1973; Hobart 1978a: 13) and the risk of any accident in or near gorges is peculiarly abhorrent. The defences of Tengahpadang were probably not just physical, but metaphysical.

The assaults of Negara were repulsed and in 1890 it was finally conquered and Cokorda Oka killed (in a field near Tengahpadang, while fleeing the scene of battle), by a union of the punggawa of Ubud, Peliatan and Tengahpadang, whose solidarity is repeatedly stressed (Mahaudiana 1968 :81-9). Whether this is retroflexive is uncertain as the three were, and remain, intimately linked by marriage and a web of economic and political ties. This signalled the rise of Ubud and the Cokordas, and set the pattern for subsequent competition for office and affiliation to different political parties. This emerges clearly in a summary of an important case brought to court in 1918, shortly after the Dutch conquest, which is presented in some detail, as it points to issues behind this dynastic conflict. (for a fuller account, see Damsté 1924).

Case 1: The quarrel over the estate of the punggawa of Tengahpadang.

> The court heard the dispute between Déwa Anom and Cokorda Gedé Putu Celuki over who should succeed to the estate of Déwa Gedé Madé Rai Sana, the late punggawa of Tengahpadang at the time of the war with Negara.
>
> Déwa Anom argued that the king of Gianyar, on his return from exile, agreed to his, the plaintiff's, adoption by Déwa Madé as his heir, sentana, although for some reason which he did not know, he admitted that this had never been announced in public.

He said that Cokorda Putu became punggawa on the death of Déwa Madé, performed the funeral rites for him and took over his estate as well, but refused to kneel in prayer to the deceased (which is proper on such occasions, but see below).

Cokorda Putu's defence also returned to pre-colonial history. He pointed out that while the king of Gianyar has been interned by the Déwa Agung (ruler) of Klungkung, the punggawa of Tengahpadang "felt himself menaced by Mengwi, which had its troops standing ready (to attack) in Peliatan and in view of the fact that his life was of more value than land and goods, he gave the district back to my grandmother". The punggawa of Ubud and of Peliatan, both Cokorda, arranged for him to assume the post and acted as witnesses to the agreement. His subsequent failure to kneel beside the corpse of Déwa Gedé Madé Rai Sana, he said, was because they stood in the relation of kompiang (great-grandparent/great-grandchild, see Geertz 1966a :20-2).

Judgement was initially given in favour of Déwa Anom, but on appeal, this was reversed. In neither case, unfortunately, do we know the reasons behind the decisions.

This is interesting not just for the notes on, and use of, history; but also for the form and language of conflict. The dispute is argued in terms of the fulfilment of role obligations (Gluckman 1955: 295-305), such as the failure of Déwa Anom to perform the funeral for his purportedly adopted father, and Cokorda Putu's refusal to kneel (nyembah) in deference to the dead. The case also involves conflicting evaluation of status which remains tacit throughout. In the Déwas' account, represented in the official genealogy in Diagram 2:2, Cokorda Putu claims to be the heir, sentana, to a Déwa Gedé which means they are of the same status; whereas, to the Cokordas, he has simply taken over office (penyelidihi) which does not have the same connotations. A similar problem underlies the refusal to pray beside the corpse of the dead punggawa, who is held to be of a lower caste. In stating the relationship as between kompiang, Cokorda Putu was not only invoking a rule which bans the act of prayer to relatives in this category, but also he implied that the Déwa were linked to him by hypergamy, as the term is used not just for agnates but affines as well, and so imputed their inferiority.

More seriously, in raising the issues of descent, status and power, this case touches on the contradictory bases of princely legitimacy and its link with the concept of satriya. For the term refers to a role which is at

once ascribed, and yet depends upon the manifestation of uncommon attributes which may be impossible to achieve. On the one hand, it is a social position ascribed exclusively by birth; on the other, it describes certain qualities of behaviour, above all courage, loyalty and integrity. In indigenous ideology these are associated with, and held to stem from, caste status. In reality, however, the two are by no means invariably concomitant; for they are defined by reference to different types of criteria: the former as the property of an entire class of persons, the latter by observed, individual characteristics (cf. Gellner 1973b: 38-9)[12]. So there are two senses of satriya. First it refers to a member of a caste grouping; second to the role of honest, fearless warrior and ruler. To be so in the former, but not the latter, sense is to lack the diacritical qualities; to have only the latter is to be left with descriptive attributes divorced from a framework of classification and meaning. Nor is this an irrelevant distinction in Balinese society. For not only is it recognized implicitly in much caste terminology, which separates high priests and princes (utama utamaning) from the ordinary members of their respective castes (for details, see Chapter 8), but also it throws light on the notion of divine legitimation of kingship, which at first sight runs contrary to caste ideas. On closer inspection, however, as we shall see in a moment this last provides a necessary, complementary framework of explanation, founded ultimately on beliefs in divine will and individual achievement (Worsley: 1972, 77-80).

This disjuncture also helps to explain certain otherwise puzzling features. First, it helps to clarify the Balinese concern over whether a prince is 'a true Satriya' (as an example, the punggawa of Belahbatuh "considered the king of Klungkung was not a true satriya". Mahaudiana 1968: 81), which makes little sense if it is purely a question of the legitimacy of his birth. Second, it suggests the significance of accusations of cowardice, which are a persistent theme in Bali, whether princes fleeing in battle or capitulating under threat alone. Rather than simply a slur on one's enemies, this is also a statement that such men are not Satriya in the second more powerful sense, merely in the first and so, lacking the appropriate qualities, they are more or less literally disqualified from office. Third, it offers a possible explanation of why, when confonted by superior Dutch forces, some kings marched out with their entourages in ceremonial regalia and committed wholesale suicide in front of their aghast opponents (Boon 1977: 68;

Covarrubias 1937: 32-7; Geertz and Geertz 1975: 33). Faced with being reduced to Satriya solely in its first sense (sense 1), these princes chose instead to remain so in full (in the stronger sense 2), which could only be achieved through death in these circumstances. This may also help us to understand the rise of men who display the required qualities. Either genealogy is invoked to include them within the proper social group (they are 'really' Satriya in sense 1); or their attributes may be legitimated extraordinarily by supernatural signs (a statement of their membership in sense 2). This discussion may be relevant on two counts. It suggests the value of a closer examination of indigenous concepts and possible linkages of other beliefs into a system and raises the questions about the degree of coherence and the particular directions of its application. Also in so far as such ideas are the basis of discussion or action, it shows some of the ways in which concepts may affect behaviour.

With conquest and colonization by the Dutch, the traditional political system was formally reorganized into a rigid, bureaucratic local administration. This has undergone successive changes. By 1970 the island as a whole had become a province of the Indonesian Government under its own governor with a provincial assembly, Déwan Perwakilan Rakyat (D.P.R.); while the old kingdoms had become districts[13] (kebupatèn) headed by an elected official (bupati) and district council based on the old court capitals which had been turned into local administrative centres, with branches of ministries and political party offices. With some reorganization, the old punggawas' territories had become sub-districts (kecamatan) under a single appointed public servant (the camat) who was the lowest level of central government official. Below this were administrative villages (perbekelan) mostly created under the Dutch but in Tengahpadang centred on the old settlement, headed by a quinquennially elected local villager. The smallest unit in the system was the banjar, the traditional, partly autonomous local ward, or hamlet. One consequence of the imposition of this centralized structure on long-established, powerful local corporate groups is that effective decisions tend to be made either by village councils at the bottom or by the district, or even higher, officials. Relatively little formal authority is vested in sub-district or administrative village heads, who tend to act mainly as arbitrators in disputes and as intermediaries for decisions taken elsewhere.

With these changes have gone parallel transformations in the position of the traditional aristocracy. With conquest, the authority of Cokorda Putu was curtailed and on his death the line of local punggawa seems to have ended, as Balinese from the longer colonized north were imported to take their place (Table 2:3). While on the whole the princes responded to the loss of their former positions by competing successfully for office in the new emerging administration and by diversifying into professions, business and military service (Geertz H, 1959; Geertz 1963b), smaller, less powerful courts far from the centres of development, such as Tengahpadang, were more liable to lose ground. As Table 2:3 shows, they have only controlled the office of punggawa or sub-district head once for the brief space of three years; although the general success of high castes is reflected in the fact that only twice has the post ever been held by a commoner. Complete control was kept, however, over the less significant post of administrative village headman (perbekel), to the point that with one exception the candidates were exclusively from the old rival courts, until this too was lost in 1972 in a major confrontation which is discussed later (see Chapters 8 and 9 on different aspects of the change).

Equally important, the economic position of the local aristocracy has been steadily growing worse. Unlike either the greater courts near commercial centres, or even the more adventurous villagers, they have failed to expand into economic enterprise beyond simple retail shops. As Table 2:4 shows, their landed estates have been in such sharp decline that in 1960 when the size of holdings was restricted by the Indonesian Government to $7\frac{1}{2}$ hectares of riceland, or 9 hectares for unirrigated fields (tegal Hanna 1972a: 7; in the village I was generally given the first figure as 8 ha.) only the court of Cokordas in Pisangkaja had sufficient to be affected. Unfortunately in the absence of records surviving from before 1949, it is not possible to reconstruct the original size of the estates, nor fully to chart their shrinking. An idea of the scale of change can be gained from the fact that in the last 23 years, the four courts with surviving estates alone lost over twenty hectares of riceland, apart from dry fields. This is due largely to the social obligations which accompany their traditional role in village life, from supporting retainers (parekan tatadan) and servants, and general assistance on request to old

TABLE 2:3. LOCAL AND REGIONAL OFFICIALS IN TENGAHPADANG

	Bendésa*		Perbekel		Punggawa/Camat
Pre-conquest	I Kelepus (Br.Siklod)**		-	?-1895±	Déwa Gedé Md. Rai Sana (Puri Sarèn Kauh)
	Md. Tagel (Br. Gagah)	1920-5	A.A.Kt.Oka Mergog (Puri Kelodan)	1895-1920±	Cokorda Gedé Pt. Celuki (Puri Ageng)
	Dw.Kt.Pacung (Br. Triwangsa)	1925-40	A.A.Gd.Oka Tombong (Puri Sarèn Kauh)	?	Gusti Ny.Cawi (Singaraja)
	Dw.Pt.Berebeh (Br. Triwangsa)			?	Ida Pt. Kompiang Giri (Singaraja)
	I Géso (Br. Pisangkaja)	1940-7	A.A.Kt.Oka Mergog (Puri Kelodan)	1940-3	A.A.Gd.Oka Tombong (Puri Sarén Kauh)
	Cokorda Oka (Br.Pisangkaja)	1947-62	A.A.Gd.Ngurah (Puri Sarèn Kauh)	1943-8	A.A.Gd.Oka (Gianyar)
1949-	Kt. Gendul (Br. Pisangkaja)			1948-55	Cokorda Raka Selaga (Payangan)
				1955-60	Kt. Rida (Belahbatuh)
		1962-5	A.A.Gd.Bawa (Puri Sarèn Kauh)	1960-70	Cokorda Gd. Agung (Peliatan)
		1965-72	A.A.Gd.Ngurah (Puri Sarèn Kauh)	1970-	Md.Runarta (Payangan)
		1972-	Ny. Cucul (Br. Siklod)		

* The office of head of the religious community and settlement (désa adat). The significance of this role will be developed in subsequent chapters.

** Br. is the accepted abbreviation for banjar, the name of the village ward. In future, reference to this in ward names will always be given, for in the case of Tengahpadang, this is the name of a ward, of the settlement, of the administrative village and of the sub-district. So each is carefully distinguished.

subject villages to maintaining an appropriate style of life and continuing to perform life-cycle and temple rites on the previous scale, without the various methods of raising revenue and refurbishing estates (cf. Parkin, 1972).

TABLE 2:4. CHANGES IN REMAINING ARISTOCRATIC ESTATES IN TENGAHPADANG, (all figures given are in hectares of riceland).

Court:	Riceland: 1949	1972	Change:	1972 holdings as % of 1949.
Cokorda Br. Pisangkaja*	11.25	6.05**	- 5.20	53.8%
Cokorda Br. Tengahpadang	5.895	0.675	- 5.22	11.5%
Déwa Gedé (Puri Kelodan) Br. Tengahpadang	9.24	3.74	- 5.50	40.5%
Déwa Gedé (ex-Puri Ageng)*** Br. Pisangkaja	5.06	0.475	- 4.585	9.4%
Totals:	31.445	10.94	-20.505	34.8%

* the only court left with more than the limit allowed by the Land Reform Laws 1960.

** this excludes .83 ha. as dowry to an out-marrying daughter.

*** apparently the off-shoot from the Puri Ageng when it was taken over by the Cokordas. They subsequently moved to Br. Pisangkaja.

To infer from this that the aristocracy in Tengahpadang is of marginal relevance would however be incorrect. Not only do they possess powerful sources of patronage by virtue of their agnatic links to the major courts, or successful branches, and so continue influential in local politics, often from behind the scenes; but also they remain leading representatives of traditional Balinese society and culture, in terms of which their more recent economic and political interests are commonly phrased if successful, and partly excused if not. At another level though the question of the contemporary importance of the princes is more complex. The authority and decisions of the central government undergo

constant reinterpretation in traditional terms and the ideological relationship between the systems is elegantly summed up spatially; for the two lone buildings of the sub-district office huddled together with a tiny police post are dwarfed by the great palaces lying to the north-east, in a ritually and spiritually superior direction.

This points to the problems in defining simply the position of the aristocracy or the extent to which Tengahpadang is 'modernized' (Rudolph & Rudolph 1967). Bailey has characterized this process of small-scale political systems being engulfed by a larger so that diverse sets of rules and rewards are replaced by a more general one, as 'encapsulation' (Bailey 1970: esp. 144-82). The contrary seems though to occur not infrequently, where the original infiltrates the superimposed system (for an example, see Caplan 1971). Attempts to quantify 'modernity' or metaphors like 'encapsulation' or even 'dominance' are too concrete and unwieldy to encompass the complexity of such processes[14]. Rather as I shall try to show in the following chapters, it is a situation where administrative values prevail on some occasions, or in some appropriate contexts, yet not in others; where, instead of the new political structure reorganizing the old, the traditional becomes a model for the bureaucratic or, as villagers put it succinctly: "the camat grows into a raja"; where villagers may disagree as to how to evaluate a particular issue, or may simply be confused.

These statements require substantiation. The positions of the sub-district officer (camat) and government village head (perbekel) are complicated for a start by their relative lack of formal powers, so they must rely either on their extra-official influence or ability at persuasion. The sub-district head admitted that his aura of officialdom enabled him to impose his decisions without complaint more frequently on ordinary villagers than on wealthy or powerful families. The extent to which local administrators may switch systems in order to carry out their duties may be seen in the following example about a leading low caste family in Tengahpadang.

Case 2: The dispute over the village priest's estate in Tengahpadang.

When the old priest of the senior settlement (in fact désa adat see Chapter 3) temple, the Pura Désa, died he left his property to his son by a younger second wife instead of the main share going to the son who succeeded him in the office of temple priest (pemangku). This latter obtained sufficient temple fields (laban Pura) not immediately to press his claim. In 1972, however, he decided to go with his younger brother by the first wife to make his claim on the estate in question which amounted to roughly one third of a hectare of riceland and a hectare of dry land, tegal. The sub-district officer suggested a compromise in the equal division of the unirrigated fields. Unsatisfied, both sides threatened to go to court and ignore the sub-district officer's decision. At this point he reminded the priest that according to the customary law of Tengahpadang litigation is in breach of the behaviour expected of a pemangku, for which he could be dismissed from office (with the unstated implication that he would lose the right of use over temple lands which were more extensive than the amount disputed, see Chapter 3). The ruling was then reluctantly accepted.

The sub-district officer did not invoke Indonesian law, according to which all male heirs have equal rights, but argued in terms of the Balinese customary code which allows great latitude on division within the family, depending upon the owner's wishes. When this was not accepted he then threatened the priest indirectly with traditional sanctions. The sub-district head's not inconsiderable success stemmed not just from his reputation for impartiality, but also from his skill at working through customary law to ends about which at times no one was certain whether they were traditional or not.

The way in which the indigenous system can gradually transform and incorporate an alien role is shown strikingly in the events which surrounded the birth of the same official's first child.

Case 3: The sacralization of the sub-district officer's child:

The wife of the sub-district head often felt ill and faint, which was not entirely surprising as she was in her first pregnancy. So she went to consult Ni Payas, the local spirit-medium (balian tetakson see Chapter 10), who became possessed by her senior tutelary deity, Batara Ratu Gedé Isteri one of a pair of giant barong Ladung, carried off during the war with Negara and famous throughout the island for curing infertility. The goddess announced that the child was pure (suci) and the mother had not been sufficiently careful, in keeping only to ritually clean places and was as a result romon, polluted in a mild form.

One month later, the official himself chose to go to the healer, as he was inguh, confused and unable to concentrate. This time the medium was possessed by the male barong, Batara Ratu Gedé Lanang, and told that he too was romon for such a pure child. He was then given holy water made with twenty-one flowers to drink. This is highly unusual as seven or eleven flowers are the standard, the larger number being appropriate for ordained priests.

While the announcement of the child's purity was most exceptional in itself, this was not the end of the matter. For the original prediction was gradually elaborated by the village to the point that they were talking of strange portents surrounding the pregnancy, which resembled the supernatural signs preceding the birth of powerful rulers in the babads (see Worsley 1972: 57). Further, the choice of holy water intimated that the official was as pure as a priest, so that he and his wife came to be considered sacred and set apart from ordinary people. By degrees the sub-district officer was converted into a sort of divine figure and treated with inordinate respect by the villagers, who watched the approaching birth with great interest.

Apparently unambiguous government institutions are not uncommonly called in question and reinterpreted in terms of traditional ideas (for a fuller example of the problems of officials, see Middleton 1956). This can be seen in the elections for the post of government village head discussed in Chapter 7, and in the following case:

Case 4: The dispute over civil defence uniforms:

> From the periods of political unrest the wards were each required to organize a body of six youths as vigilantes and night-guards, to assist the national police. These were known as HANZIP (from the Indonesian acronym for civil defence). The administrative village head had arranged for new uniforms, with the costs to be borne by the seven wards in the settlement. The initial amount levied proved less than the costs, so he asked for a further Rp. 750 each. This was raised in the ward assembly in Pisangkaja. It was complained that they had not been consulted about the original decision although both their money and members were involved. They then resolved unanimously not to pay any government tax more on this and demanded a detailed account from the administrative village head of all his expenditure and an explanation of his decision. No further request was ever heard of, and HANZIP was shortly after disbanded.

At least two issues were involved. It had been rumoured that the head had pocketed part of the funds which added feeling to the charge of taking decisions affecting their members and money and so infringing their traditional autonomy, although this hallowed principle is not necessarily as historically old as is claimed (Anon 1934; Korn 1932:77-9). To the village officials it was an attempt to improve the general standards of local policing; to the villagers it was interference in their affairs. It is not irrelevant that the administration lost.

Earlier I suggested that history consists of contemporary, and changing, frameworks of interpretation in terms of which the past is structured and understood. Following from this the present may be seen as part of the same field, and so open to similarly differential evaluation. From the discussion above there seem to be three main models of the political system to the villagers of Tengahpadang, each more or less elaborated in symbolism. The first which has been touched upon in this chapter is based on a principle of hierarchy (Dumont 1970), and organic solidarity, exemplified by the traditional relationship of prince and subjects. In contrast to this caste-based, and partly class-structured, regional model, there is an egalitarian set of values which stresses the democratic character of the mechanically solidary community and corporate groups. Finally a universalistic, rational bureaucracy with organized representation of interests has been imposed, or better added, from outside. Part of the disagreement between the Dutch scholars and Geertz already cited hinges on which of the first two was the dominant system; whereas I would argue that they are modes of evaluation, such that different participants may possess several, divergent ones[15]. The continued vitality of the court and village models may be due not solely to their familiarity, but also in part to the degree to which they have been developed into coherent systems of explanation and action. Further each gives the Balinese an accepted and valued position in a set of solidary relationships; whereas in the Indonesian system their status as citizens is still only part understood at best, and incompletely assumed.

Conclusion:

This brief outline of the history of the region and settlement of Tengahpadang was introduced by a discussion of some of the problems in describing the past, where an account must depend largely on conflicting indigenous sources. While one of my concerns has been to assess these for some skeleton of past events; another, which will be developed in the remainder of the thesis, has been to examine the ways in which history is used by the Balinese. It was suggested that the problem is not simply of stating rival claims to resources or power (of which the indigenous definitions are complex, see especially Chapters 5 and 8), but of alternative ways in which the relationships between events may be understood. History emerged as a potentially important field because the events were past and could be evaluated in terms, and support, of different frameworks of interpretation based on different potential connexions between culturally recognized categories and commonly articulated by reference to indigenous concepts. These may be seen as linked by more or less coherent propositions. It was argued that the use of history in legitimating claims depended in part upon the way these appeared to be validated in the past viewed retrospectively.

This raises the question of the extent to which these views shared common ground, or indeed allowed of different courses of action. Some material germane to this subject was introduced in the course of the chapter. It appeared that the inclusion of Tengahpadang within the aristocratic orbit was linked to its strategic siting near the vital river sources for much of south Gianyar. To judge from the records available, this seems to have been understood clearly by both the rival dynasties, and the enemy states who fought for control of the northern reaches. The significance of this appears to have been agreed - for instance on the value of the dams, destruction of crops and military approaches. On the military implications of topography the Balinese and observer's viewpoints differ. For there is evidence that the apparently impregnable physical defences of Tengahpadang were as much a product of Balinese categories as they were a practical obstacle. This suggests some interesting features of traditional Balinese geo-political thought. From another point of view, however, it appeared that the inviolability of the region in the face of alien attack could be expressed just as significantly in terms of the mystical

power of the defenders, or their indisputable bravery and so the qualification of their leaders as true warriors (Satriya). From the opponents' position there were doubtless equally culturally valid interpretations. It was argued that these different viewpoints were not random or mere 'mystification', so much as logically connected alternatives which impelled men to action, as when the king of Gianyar requested the daughter of a Cokorda in marriage (as king to subject) and they refused (as caste superior to inferior).

The theme of the introduction also emerged in different ways in the course of discussion. In many situations the interpretation of past events is open to question, even where the events themselves are undisputed. This should have been clear from the disagreement over the succession to the office of punggawa in Tengahpadang in which the evaluation of what had happened and what it entailed differed significantly. The extent to which interpretations make use of culturally recognized possibilities was clear in the rival accounts of the arrival of the Cokordas in Br. Pisangkaja. This could be explained in terms of the expansion of the sphere of dynastic influence or fleeing in battle. In this case it was possible to see the way in which cultural ideas such as descent are brought in to explain the link between events - here the claimed past and present manifestations of cowardice. The possibility of such an accusation itself is closely linked to the ambiguity in the formulation of the characteristics of Satriya, which may represent them as the sole and necessary bearers of special qualities like bravery, while permitting the connexion in a more limited sense. It also became clear that the Balinese recognize, implicitly or otherwise, a greater diversity of processes than a simple decline from a golden age. For example, with the waning influence of the courts in Tengahpadang has come the rise of new men, like the sub-district officer who was converted into something resembling a traditional prince. This transmogrification pointed to the extent to which apparently clear-cut roles are open to divergent interpretation within different frames of reference. Equally where there appears to be continuity this may be deceptive. The conflict of the two main dynasties in Gianyar is carried on in Tengahpadang. Because of their loss of power and estates, however, neither the dynasties nor the struggle is any longer the same. As we shall see later (Chapters 8 and 9), the changes in the political fortunes of the courts locally is not just reflected in changing evaluation of their position, but in part a product of this. The different ways in which the

past in Tengahpadang may be understood is linked to the alternative interpretation of events. This is applicable not only to the succession of past events, but also of the present. It is to this that I would like to turn.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2.

1. 'History is therefore never history, but history-for. It is partial in the sense of being biased even when it claims not to be, for it inevitably remains partial - that is, incomplete - and this is itself a form of partiality. When one proposes to write a history of the French Revolution one knows (or ought to know) that it cannot simultaneously and under the same heading, be that of the Jacobin and that of the aristocrat. Ex hypothesi, their respective totalizations (each of which is anti-symmetric to the other) are equally true. One must therefore choose between two alternatives. One must select as the principal either one or a third (for there are an infinite number of them) and give up the attempt to find in history a totalization of the set of partial totalizations; or alternatively one must recognize them all as equally real: but only to discover that the French Revolution as commonly conceived never took place." (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 257-8. The underlining of the parentheses is mine.) "All historical events are to a large extent the products of the historians' choice of categories." (1966 242.).

   This approach differs from Leach in Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954), where the contradictory accounts in myth are linked directly to differences in the structures represented and are not the product of different interpretations. Underlying these different approaches are contrasting theories of meaning. As Gellner points out, Leach assumes that models are static because "words must have determinate meanings in order to mean anything" (Gellner 1973a: 93), whereas, I am following the view that meaning may be essentially ambiguous and variable (Winch 1958; Gellner 1973a; 1973b: 39-42; whatever their disagreements on the finer points, see Gellner 1973c; Crick 1976.).

2. Ideas, or their interpretations, change over time and as I understand him this is related to Carr's idea of the value of history (1964). The ways in which time may be understood appear to vary and to be related to differences in how the cultural categories of history, myth, folk-tale and so forth are evaluated.

3. It is perhaps relevant that some of these are of imported origin. I do not intend to discuss the complex philosophical implications of Balinese ideas of coincidence, or co-incidence, which requires much more detailed exploration and research. On a first approach to Java, see Becker n.d.

4. This approach suggests interesting further questions about the constraints imposed by concepts and their internal logic. It also raises the issue of the factors underlying differential use of alternative models of process. For instance are different modes typically linked to social groups in some way.? While concepts may be held in common, (necessarily so if communication is to be possible) their stress or interpretation may vary. In the example given the high caste, especially brahmanical, view implies

change; the village model denies it at one level. If it were possible to establish different prevailing patterns in the adoption of particular modes of process, this might suggest certain subtle, but fundamental, epistemological differences. This has practical repercussions. It would be a peculiarly basic means of creating, or reinforcing, social differentiation if culture decreed that sequential time were not available to the politically subordinate!

5. In Balinese cosmology, the sea is the direction to which all evil and impurity flows (kelod) and so is dangerous and undesirable. Their dislike of venturing upon it seems to be related to the neglect of fishing as a means of occupation, which is left to a few villages of such other peoples as Buginese and Javanese.

6. A breakdown of figures for the different parts of these sub-districts is unfortunately not available. For my own calculations for the administrative village region of Tengahpadang, lying in the extreme south of the sub-district, the population in the 1961 census was 5,186, on approximately 8.2 sq.km. of land, yielding a density of 632 persons per sq.km. nearly double that of the whole sub-district and close to the mean for the densely habited areas of Ubud and Sukawati.

7. In addition, there were further ties between Brahmana priests and village followers (Geertz, C. 1963b: 104 fn.). In the present at least these tend to be somewhat unstable, see Chapter 8.

8. Negara: the Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. It will be interesting to see how this compares with the southern kingdoms of the island. The aristocracy in Gianyar at least tended to view Negara as unusual, and with features which made it closer to Java than Bali. It is not clear however how much geographical isolation is here being translated into social terms.

9. This can be seen in the santification of barongs, giant puppets in various forms, who are held to possess supernatural powers. The masks are made of woods from the pulé tree, when a swelling occurs, which is supposed to emit light and cries at night. After the mask has been carved and painted, the maker sits at night with it in the graveyard (on the raised pemuwun, crematory platform) inviting supernatural forces to enter it. The mask is not in theory thought to be sakti, unless it cures an ill person who it is judged would otherwise inevitably die. If it fails, it is supposed to be thrown away as useless. Its future reputation also rests upon continued efficacy. The parallel with kings should be clear. The reason given for the success in battle of Cokorda Gedé Sukawati, the punggawa of Ubud, was his sheer personal bravery (Mahaudiana 1968: 83).

10. My thanks are due to Drs. M.M. Sukarto K. Atmojo, the Head of the Archaeological Service in Bali for his generous help with the history of the region and for bringing this inscription to my attention.

11. Descent is, in fact, argued to be a valid principle in nature. This leads into the field of indigenous logic which is too extensive and complex to be examined properly in this thesis. Somewhat simply, descent is a jural principle, while the argument is based on an ethnogenetic theory of character transmission. There are two theories of conception. It is generally thought that the male semen alone is responsible for the child; it is held that each contributes a jewel (manik) the male's being stronger (when pushed they gave the proportions as about 2/3rds to 1/3rd). The first is often given by low castes; the latter by high - some of the implications of these different theories are discussed in Chapter 8 - but the relationship of model and caste is complex and may vary with circumstance. Here the latter fits well with high caste rules governing the differentiation of descent lines according to the caste status of the wife, and also with a strongly patrilineal separation of sex and jural status, by which descent may be reckoned through a female by virtue of her being declared a jural male (Hobart 1977: 196; Chapter 7 below). The Balinese also introduced an interesting revision of the argument to explain trait transmission under these circumstances. In ordinary marriages, they argue, the male is dominant, but in cases of descent via females, nyentana nyeburin, the woman is not just jurally superior, but as the male has few rights, commonly maritally and domestically dominant as well. The proportion of character determination in conception, they suggest, is in fact a function of the power relations in marriage, so here the woman's influence will predominate. This focus upon the possession and manifestation of power might be worth further study. For the present, the villagers use this, perhaps as simple secondary elaboration, to account for the prince's timidity being passed through females, so maintaining the logical integrity of the argument on descent being a natural principle.

12. Gellner has suggested that important cultural concepts may possess a measure of logical incoherence which he argues from a mock example of bobility (akin to nobility, Gellner 1973b: 39). In Bali, from one point of view the problem appears differently. For there are further doctrines which view the possession of qualities as a product of birth (The matter is further complicated by the presence of an intervening concept of purity - so that the attribution of the appropriate level is routine but may equally permit persons who show extraordinary characteristics to possess it. A fuller discussion is this is given in Chapter 8). In this way the problem is simply one that the range of application of a cultural idea is not borne out empirically: not all Satriya are brave etc., which may be tested by observation. There is, however, a sense in which the problem is more abstract and concerns different propositions. It is not always clear whether the connexions are necessarily exclusive. In the field, the link was usually a dogmatic expression that "Satriya are brave"; it not being specified whether this meant "All Satriya are brave" or "All brave men are Satriya". It will be obvious that the propositions underlying the formulation are different and that the logical ambiguity is important to the continued applicability of the cultural statement. It is in this sense of containing discrete propositions represented as a single one that I intend the reference to logical inconsistency or incoherence when these are linked to other propositions in the course of their application.

13. These are sometimes referred to as regencies in the literature, but their size and function make the term "district" seem apt. A fuller account of the structure and operation of the administration is given in Jay 1963, for Java which is similar.

14. The problems are evident in such terms as 'counter-encapsulation' to designate the contrary process.

15. See Blumer, 1972, 73; and his reference to the work of Mead on multiple frameworks.

Chapter 3. Social Groupings in Tengahpadang.

Introduction:

The complexity of social relationships in Tengahpadang is such that it is useful to introduce some of the main groups and divisions which are found before embarking upon a more detailed examination which will occupy the remainder of the thesis. In this chapter I would like therefore to outline the main groupings and institutions in the settlement of Tengahpadang and the field of social relationships of which its members are part. One of the features to which previous scholars have drawn attention is the variation in the structure and articulation of groups in village society in Bali. I would like here to present material bearing on two aspects of this problem. First it is useful to distinguish between forms of social structure based upon jural rules and the informal patterns of exchange which also occur. Much of the variation described refers to the formal characteristics of groups. A survey of these shows, however, that the jural autonomy of these is balanced by the fact that most of them have a similar membership. So, while formal roles in the various groups are kept ideally separate, there are extensive possibilities for the informal conversion of assets and credit between them. An outline of the most important of these groupings will be given in this chapter; a more detailed consideration of the types of link between them will be developed in the following chapters with particular reference to a unit selected for intensive study. There is also a second and more general problem. While Balinese society is organized largely in terms of discrete corporate groups or other relatively clearly bounded social divisions, closer examination shows that the principles underlying these are rarely as definitive and unambiguous as at first appears. Indigenous terminology disguises a multiplicity of potential forms or distinctions which is of importance in the day-to-day functioning of the system. The variation and change which is inherent in this is endorsed in, and indeed encouraged by, the Balinese idea of custom.

Balinese society has commonly been presented more or less explicitly as composed of a series of corporate groups, each with different specified functions. So it has been argued that the essential problems of social integration

are reducible to the adjustment of relations between these groups (Geertz 1972a: 37). An introductory discussion shows, however, that the personnel who constitute the membership for all these various groups are largely the same, as they are drawn from a circumscribed catchment area. Articulation then is not solely at a collective corporate level, but also in terms of the several overlapping relationships in which the actors are involved. While they are publicly recognized rules designed to separate institutions and to prevent the summation of roles (Nadel 1957: 63-96), villagers are also part of a network of ties which are multiplex both normatively (Wheeldon 1969) and in the content of exchanges (Kapferer 1969: 211-5; Mitchell 1969: 20-4), whether public or informal. In this chapter I shall try to show the extent to which the membership of the various corporate groups in Tengahpadang overlap, while the implications of the superimposition of role relationships introduced here will be developed as a major theme in subsequent chapters.

There is, however, a serious problem in a simple description of village corporations and their composition. As we shall see, despite ostensible unambiguity, it is not always entirely clear what the membership is; while the precise definition of the principles of recruitment of groups and their responsibilities is complex and somewhat fluid. The varying nature of possible underlying principles and of indigenous interpretation, noted in the last chapter, apply equally to the organization and operation of corporate groups. So within Tengahpadang alone groups of the same type, for example wards or descent groups, not only differ in their constitution and functions; but commonly undergo structural modification over time, due either to changes occurring at an organizational level (Firth 1964: 30-58, 59-87; 1971: 35-40), or through the deliberations of the membership acting as a decision-making council. Instances of both will be discussed in due course; the latter particularly in Chapters 9 and 10. A descriptive account of local corporations, therefore, tends to distort and reify a complex and varying reality by representing one interpretation, or set of principles, as definitive and general.

This problem has confronted earlier authors who have construed it in different ways[1]. Part of the Dutch concern with mapping the different forms of customary law (adatrecht) may be seen as directed towards this end.

This is evident for instance in the major work of Korn who noted the divergences in local law and institutional structure between villages and tried to organize these by incorporating much of the literature, principally Dutch, into a vast compendium of customary rules and usages (Korn 1932). Coherence was given and diversity accounted for by two principles: the tradition of village independence and by a posited historical development from an original Balinese to an imposed Hindu model (see Boon 1977: 54-6). This general approach has been criticized by Geertz (1961), justifiably for its questionable assumptions about historical archetypes and in so far as it was based upon the model of the village as a republic. The objection to this latter is somewhat less applicable if this is intended to refer to a set of values about village autonomy rather than to some actual measure. The concern with documentation leaves open, however, the problem of how the variation and change is to be accounted for. A recognition of this is to be found more or less explicitly in subsequent anthropological writings on the island.

A fresh approach has been suggested more recently by Geertz (1959a) who has stressed in particular the difficulties in constructing typologies which ignore variation - taking Bali as the example. His argument is worth considering briefly not only because it is a convenient way of introducing some of the main groupings and institutions, but also because it raises indirectly the question of the relationship between the apparent clarity of villagers' models and the complexity of behaviour, and of how change comes about. Briefly Geertz notes the variation in morphology of lowland villages which he suggests may be accounted for in terms of "a common set of organization themes" in which "the play between the several discrete structural forms is great enough to allow a wide range of choice as to the mode of integration with one another in any particular instance" (1959a: 991). These consist of "planes of social organization" which are "a set of invariant fundamental ingredients", "more or less independent of one another" and "adjusted to one another only insofar as seems essential." (1959a: 991). These are listed (1959a: 992) as:

1. "shared obligation to worship at a given temple", by which he is referring to the various congregations of worshippers.
2. "common residence", the local ward or hamlet.

3. "ownership of riceland lying within a single watershed" this area comprising, in this view, the irrigation association.

4. "commonality of ascribed social status or caste".

5. "consanguineal and affinal kin ties", which groups together descent, matrilateral and affinal relations.

6. "common membership in one or another 'voluntary' organization".

7. "common legal subordination to a single government official", by this he means simply membership of the perbekelan, or administrative village.

The precise articulation of these seven planes produces the perceived variation in village form. Viewed in another way, these forms may be seen as 'generated" by the permutation of these elements (1959a: 1010), while order and distinction between them is kept by a separate set of indigenous rules of "hierarchy" (1959a: 1006), not entailed by these principles, and by a rigid ban upon the introduction of ties from one into the other.

In order to understand the relevance of this argument to the study of Balinese village society, it is helpful to consider briefly the nature of this model. For it will be clear that it is principally concerned with formal constructs and comprises a blend of corporate groups, social institutions like marriage, and recognized social divisions such as caste. Several of these planes, each of which is "based on a wholly different principle of affiliation" (1959a: 991), are effectively coterminous with corporations in a strict sense (Smith 1974a: 94-5). Others, however, are not. Kin ties are not necessarily corporate; while marriage is an important social institution (Nadel 1951: 108). In contrast, caste is a principle of ranking actors based upon their kin group membership. This intersection of planes occurs in other ways. For example, the ward or hamlet (plane 2) is a constituent unit of the adminstrative village (plane 7). In some instances temple congregations (plane 1) are based on corporate groups; but often the ward, administrative village and voluntary associations are excepted. One view of the status of these planes is given by Boon who adopts them in modified form. He regards them as "the matrixes [sic] of socio-cultural interaction" and "cross-cutting modes of categorizing and grouping Balinese actors" in terms of "organizational planes of significance" (1977: 59)[2]. That these are indigenous constructs is further suggested by his view that modes

2, 3, 6 and 7 are "exemplary planes, simple components of experience" in contrast to modes 4 and 5 which are complex and based on criteria which 'lend themselves to contradictory interpretations" (1977: 61). Boon further proposes a differentiation within the model by which temple organization becomes 'a metamode to index the other modes" (1977: 61-2; but see my comments above)[3]. As I understand Geertz's argument, it is linked to his more general concern with the importance of cultural models in ordering experience, so that these planes are 'models of' and 'models for'(Geertz 1966b) the comprehension and organization of kinds of social relationship. In this light the emphasis upon form and overt structure make sense as part of the rationalization of indigenous models of social structure.

Geertz's account provides, among other things, a useful contribution towards an understanding of the actors' frame of reference and the problems which this has in coping with the diversity of referents of these core concepts. While the Balinese tend to view their society in terms of different principles of affiliation and treat these as "a set of invariant fundamental ingredients"(1959a: 991), granted the range of variation in institutional forms and corporate constitutions across the different kingdoms in the island, these cannot be explained as generated simply by fixed principles except at such a level of generality or abstraction that the detailed differences in form and process cannot easily be derived from them. The clarity of the indigenous model also disguises the complexity of the principles involved, so that it provides a convenient classification for what I hope to show to be essentially multiple and subject to conflicting interpretations. There is a final problem in the ability of such a formal model to account for change. If these generative ingredients are both fundamental and invariant, it is not easy to see how social change is possible at all. The model tends then to provide a framework in terms of which the Balinese may express their system to themselves despite the complexities found in practice and the change to which it is subject.

If the Balinese view of the bases of their social institutions and groups is imprecise, in what does the difference lie between this and the sort of approach which I am proposing? A not dissimilar problem has been discussed in some detail by Needham (1971), where he sets out to show that the indigenous criteria which constitute the raw material for the analyst's classification of

descent are varied and 'not corresponding entirely to any single principle" (1971: 11). More recently he has elaborated this argument to raise general questions about the classification of the types of data studied by social anthropologists, presumably at both 'emic"and 'etic"levels, and has pointed forcibly to the need for a critical re-evaluation of our ideas of identity, coherence and category in anthropology (Needham 1975). Often apparently unambiguous principles operating within clearly defined boundaries (see Tambiah 1973: esp. 191-2) may usefully be broken down into sets of constituent ideas, or elements, more or less logically or substantively linked, and found in highly variable combinations (Needham 1975: 352-7). I would suggest, following Needham, that close examination of the groups and institutions which compose Balinese society shows that these are less adequately, or accurately, explained in terms of single unequivocal principles, than as a number of related ideas, or rules, so that the Balinese move from the one to another in the course of organizing social action, or thinking reflexively.

This may be seen in a short examination of certain recent arguments about the nature of the principles by which corporate groups are organized, as these provide the framework of so much of Balinese village structure. On the one hand one principle may be logically connected to, or entailed by, a second (Smith 1974: 180ff); on the other, the diversity may come from ambiguity, or multiplicity, in the criteria underlying group formation (this applies to institutions as well, for instance marriage, see Leach 1961a: 105). This latter seems to stem in large part from the nature of corporations themselves; for, as Smith sums up: "I have not found any corporate group constituted on the basis of a single principle." (1974b: 182). The complexity of bases of incorporation is revealed in Smith's analysis, for he refers carefully to the principles which'inform' corporations (Brown 1976: 28)[4]. This includes not just the modes of recruitment but what are seen as the affairs of groups as well. Taking the example of caste "incorporated on the principles of descent, ritual, and occupation" (Smith 1974a: 104), Brown argues that strictly only the first is a principle of recruitment; the last two being affairs of the group (in some cases these may be hard to separate). From the discussion above however, it is clear that descent is not in fact a simple principle (see also Chapter 7). Further the form of ritual and occupation appropriate to a caste depend upon indigenous ideas of purity, which may be differently understood (Chapter 8). So not only may there be different types of principle of incorporation, which may be given

varying stress in different contexts, but also these commonly have multiple referents and may be articulated by indigenous concepts which are open to evaluation in various different ways. In the following sections we shall see examples of this and in later chapters I shall consider some of the factors involved and how this multiplicity may be used, more or less wittingly, in the negotiation of structural change by the participants themselves.

In the last chapter we looked briefly at the political territory which was traditionally controlled by the resident officials, or princes, of Tengahpadang. In this chapter I would like to examine some of the other important ways in which Tengahpadang is connected with the surrounding villages; this time as part of an informal region, differently circumscribed according to the tie . For instance within the sub-district as a whole the settlement is the centre of a smaller market network connectingsome of the local villages. This differs in several respects from the network of marriage ties between villagers and people from elsewhere. Following this discussion of the distribution of important ties with the outside the chapter turns to an examination of the settlement of Tengahpadang itself. This is divided into several linked corporate groups which each possess rights over land and the villagers who live on, or near, it. The relationship between these groups is complex; and while they are quite jurally and conceptually distinct, there are extensive areas of ambiguity and confusion. In the subsequent part of the chapter I discuss the other main types of corporate group. While some of these are contained within the settlement or its constituent wards, others cut across these boundaries in different configurations which are described. As with territorial groups these almost invariably show multiple bases of incorporation or principles which may be differently understood; and different groups of a single kind may have different features accordingly. Finally I shall look at the relationship of these various corporations to local temples and argue that there is in many cases no simple link between them; and even where there appears to be,the congregation may be defined in different ways. Coherence is given by the indigenous terminology which is, however, open to alternative interpretation. It is therefore necessary in certain instances to use Balinese terms in this chapter in order to show the connexions and the ambiguity, for which I apologize in advance.

Market and Marriage Regions:

Tengahpadang lies on a volcanic ridge between rivers, with rice terraces reaching out on all sides to smaller settlements nestling on high ground and hidden within groves of fruit and coconut trees. Most of these lie across ravines, so that travelling is far more arduous than from north to south where an unmetalled road, passable to bus and truck almost all the year, runs up into the interior. Some eight to nine kilometres down this lie Ubud and Peliatan, and twenty kilometres away Gianyar. Above Tengahpadang the road rises to Pujung, five kilometres further inland, and beyond to the water source near Apuh. Eventually, as a path, it reaches Kintamani on the lip of the crater twenty kilometres further up. It was noted in the last chapter that Tengahpadang lies well within the swath of irrigated rice land reaching across south Bali and, with the extension of aristocratic influence, it has been firmly enclosed within the sphere of lowland culture. So, although it is notionally a sub-district headquarters, it has little in common economically or socially with the northern reaches lying in the unirrigable interior. The effective focus for these villages is the low-caste settlement of Pujung, structurally transitional between south Balinese society and the reputedly old mountain culture, which is a rival centre of influence. This has been helped by the success of Pujung's inhabitants, compared with the lowland aristocrats in Tengahpadang, in commercial and governmental activities (Geertz 1963b; Geertz, H. 1959). Villagers from Pujung control two of the main public offices, of regional head of irrigation and collector of taxes on rice fields (pengrurah) and the tax officer for dry fields (sedahan abiyan), as well as running expanding businesses and the local trucks and buses. For most of these mountain villages Tengahpadang lies too far to the south geographically, socially and in its historical links, now that its traditional political power is gone.

The economic position of Tengahpadang is illustrated clearly in its localized trading network and the schism between competing markets. It is the site for the official three-day market, which circulates perpetually round the sub-district centres of Payangan, Ubud and Tengahpadang; but it is made much smaller by Pujung holding a market of its own on the same day, which is commercially as important and attracts at least as much custom. The market place itself is a large permanent structure, consisting of covered sheds, lying immediately to the north-west of the cross-roads in the ward of Tengahpadang (see Map 3.), run by a local official and charging a fee for space taken up inside. Around the main stalls clusters a mass of small-sellers, with a further heavy scattering of small food or drink vendors, a marginal occupation reserved

almost exclusively for women, catering for the public who flock in from the settlement and neighbouring villages. The core is a body of professional, generally full-time marketeers, both male and female, most of whom travel the circuit of the three markets, importing manufactured goods or commodities from other areas, or buying in local produce for resale. While there are slight shifts in price during the course of the day in the light of demand, they do not normally offer concessionary rates or credit to buyers, so there is no stable system of clientèles. These marketeers all come from the larger settlements and towns in the south of the district and their numbers, and the goods they sell are fairly constant. These are shown in Table 3:1 (by broken lines and figures next to the commodities to indicate the number of sellers).

Rather than being the market for the whole sub-district, Tengahpadang serves most of the villages in a radius of up to some eight kilometres in each direction. The number of people who travel in varies obviously with the size of settlement, the distance and the season, but the average number over a period and the goods which they generally come to sell and buy are shown in Table 3:1. There is no simple correlation of distance, or ease of route, and attendance. For, while the people from the settlements to the south-west and west can reach the market without difficulty, they are also near those of Ubud and Payangan. In contrast, the peasants from the small villages in the north-east journey down long distances over rough country. This is the more interesting as they lie close to Pujung, yet still turn up in strength in Tengahpadang. This would seem in part to be because they have traditionally fallen within its orbit and include lowland rice-growing communities. Geographic and economic factors are not then the sole ones affecting the choice of market. This is also made clear by the fact that villagers walk the long distance from Payangan and Tampaksiring although each has its own sub-district market. The reasons seemed not to be primarily for profit so much as accepted habit and for the social functions of the market. The regular influx of visitors offers the main opportunity, apart from theatrical performances, for contact between villages which may be separated by some distance. So Tengahpadang forms the physical focus of a network of social relationships based upon casual meeting in the market and the exchange of information and gossip. As it is only within Tengahpadang itself that this is densely reticulated, for particular pairs of outsiders meet somewhat infrequently on the whole, it may be described as "loose-knit" (Mitchell 1969: 36). So beyond giving a general warning about the identity of local malfeasants and

TABLE 3:1 THE MARKET REGION OF TENGAHPADANG.



Table 3:1 Code.

indicates village with numbers coming to market

indicates both buying and selling (purchases below line, sales above)

buying or selling only - direction show by arrow

full-time professional marketeers attending every 3 days

a.	=	areca nut
ca.	=	cassava and other root-crops
cc.	=	chili
cf.	=	coffee
ch.	=	chickens
ci.	=	cigarettes
cl.	=	cloth
co.	=	coconuts
d.	=	ducks
e.	=	eggs
f.	=	fencing
n.	=	peanuts and beans
o.	=	oil. especially paraffin
p.	=	pigs
pa.	=	papaya
r.	=	rice
si.	=	sirih leaf for betel
sp.	=	spices and condiments
su.	=	sugar
y.	=	mixed greens and vegetables

The goods brought by professional marketeers are shown in full with the number of specialist traders dealing in these shown to the right. Their place of origin is underlined.

Note: This Table is not to scale. For precise distances see Map 2.

TABLE 3:2. THE MARRIAGE REGION OF BR. PISANGKAJA.

(For marriages outside settlement but nearby).



see Table 3:3

═══ indicates both women flowing in and out in marriage

——— indicates women moving in one direction only

3 (2)
1 (-)

this shows the number of marital partners involved. The figures above the line refer to the three high castes, those below to commoners. The numbers on the left in each case refer to the total number of unions contracted (3 for high castes, 1 for low); those on the right in parentheses show the number of marriages of this total which met with approval. So, this distinguishes the incidence of regular agreed marriages from elopement.

similar matters this network seems to have little effect in creating the sort of moral pressures reported by Bott (1957) or Mayer (Mayer, P. 1961), which occurs rather within each community. It does, however, delimit an informal, de facto, but not clearly bounded region within which contact in some form is regular and information flows rapidly.

This informal region of market ties and social contacts appears to overlap in no small part with the distribution of marriage between villages especially for low castes. The details of these are given for the ward of Pisangkaja in diagrammatic form in Table 3:2, and is tabulated in 3:3. From a survey of the other wards, it seems that the range of unions contracted outside the settlement is similar but somewhat less frequent, with two exceptions. One is the other main ward, Tengahpadang, which has a similar variety of ties; the second is the high caste ward of Triwangsa, which has a high rate of exogamy to other parts of Gianyar and beyond. This reflects a difference between the preference of commoners for marrying locally, in contrast to the regular alliances forged between regions by high castes which is discussed at length in Chapter 7.

The pattern of marriage within the sub-district or adjacent settlements is worth study in slightly more detail. As Table 3:2 shows, union between villagers within this area involve a substantially smaller range of settlements than the market region. This is so especially to the south-east (which is near other court centres) and in the north where fewer villages are brought within the ambit of Tengahpadang than use it as a commercial centre. The significance

TABLE3:3 THE DISTRIBUTION OF MARRIAGES BY MEMBERS OF BR. PISANGKAJA

(based on all unions with at least one partner still alive, but not including marriages with Chinese.*)

Location	Low Caste:	Mixed Caste:**	High Caste:	Total
Within ward:	126	12	19	157
Within settlement:	150	5	17	172
To the north of the sub-district:	13 (6)***	-	2 (1)	15 (7)
To the south and outside the sub-district	32 (6)	7	33 (22)	72 (28)
Total:	321 (12)	24	71 (23)	416 (35)

* Chinese marriage patterns are entirely different and are excluded here. These and inter-ethnic unions are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

** This refers to marriages between high and low castes, of which there are none within the region. The significance of the differences between hypergamy and hypogamy is examined in Chapters 7 and 8.

*** The numbers in parentheses refer to marriages which were contracted with the agreement of parents, and so constitute approved alliances. The remaining figures refer to all mariages.

of this is discussed below: as otherwise the market offers one of the main opportunities to meet young people from other villages and is the source of many of the marriages outside the settlement. These are for the most part far from encouraged, however, so that in no sense is this within a preferred region (c f. Mayer, A. 1960: 271-2), except in so far as marriage closer to home is seen as at least better than further away.

There is a strong bias especially among commoners against marriage with outsiders. This should be clear from Table 3:4 which shows that unions within the settlement are approved by parents significantly more often than those with people from other villages. Where such marriages are contracted however, agreement is much more common if the out-marrying daughter (or occasio nally son) lives sufficiently close to make visiting possible, for instance on market days.

TABLE 3:4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF APPROVED LOW CASTE UNIONS IN PISANGKAJA*

	Approved:	Disapproved:	Total:
Within the ward or settlement:	183	93	276
Outside the settlement:	12	33	45
Total:	195	126	321

X^2 = 25.49. So the greater rate of agreement for marriages within the settlemtn is significant at 0.1% (with 1^o of freedom).

* unless indicated otherwise, all marriage tables are based on the totals of Balinese marriages with at least one surviving spouse and excluding Chinese.

Of the 22 unions made by low caste villagers from Pisangkaja within the sub-district 10 (or 45.5%) were generally approved; while only 2 out of 23 were(less than 9%, one of which was to Jungjungan only just over the boundary) further afield. For commoners, in this area at least, nearness to one's natal family seems to be as important as the potentially conflicting demands of descent group

endogamy or status emphasized by the Geertzes (Geertz & Geertz 1975; for a fuller discussion of this, see Boon 1978: 119-30; Hobart 1977 and Chapter 7 below). Over and above this there tends to be a movement of women from the smaller villages towards Tengahpadang (19 into Pisangkaja, 11 out; for all marital partners, this was 22 against 11). For villagers in the latter are reluctant to let their daughters go off to remote hamlets which they describe as pegunungan (from gunung, mountain). The term in this context is something of a slang expression, aptly translated by the American 'hill-billy'. This may be part of a more general flow of women in marriage from the interior towards the plains.[5] A measure of this tendency is given in Table 3:3, because in the vast majority of marriages it is women who move (if men marry out they have, in fact, the jural status of women, see Chapter 7). This may be linked in part to the supposed superiority of lowland villagers perhaps on account of their reputation for relative sophistication in the ways of the world and court culture. While the importance of these contacts outside is growing, the market and marriage regions remain rather ill-defined and informal. From the point of view of the inhabitants of Tengahpadang they delineate, however, a conceptual space within which villagers are marked off as potential, or more rarely actual, partners in the exchange of information, visits orchildren in marriage and somewhat less undesirable than people from further away.

Tengahpadang and Its Territorial Groups:

In contrast to the rather vague regions around Tengahpadang based on trade and marriage, the settlement is the focus of a series of different corporate groups with a wide range of functions, more or less clearly defined. The most extensive of these is the administrative village (the perbekelan already discussed), which is internally divided into wards (banjar patus). While the larger group is officially confined to government administration, the smaller has wide powers over the villagers who are resident within its domain; although in its narrower function it is simply a sub-division of the administrative village. Side by side with these there are two indigenous corporations which are of great religious, customary and territorial significance although they have fewer practical functions. These are the désa adat, a corporation owning the traditional territory of the settlement within which a particular customary law and religious code prevail, and the banjar désa, comprising sub-divisions of the larger group and forming the core of each ward. These two systems are related in a complex manner which will be discussed in some detail in this section. This is partly

because they have multiple bases of incorporation, but also because they depend upon Balinese ideas such as land and custom which may be understood by the participants in different ways.

In the last chapter, we saw that control of the sub-district had passed from the hands of the local aristocracy and with it their broader political horizons. The largest unit in local society over which villagers have much control is now the perbekelan, the government administrative village. This consists of the seven wards of the settlement of Tengahpadang with the pair of hamlets, Sapat and Gentong, strung along the road to the south and two others, Abangan and Kelabang Moding, lying in the rice fields to the west. These are in part satellites of the big settlement, being closely tied economically and pdlitically, although this varies in degree. Sapat, for instance, has a large population of low-ranking upper castes (see Table 3:5) and so inter-marries little with Tengahpadang. The wards vary in size as is clear from Map 3 and the available census returns for 1971, included in Table 3:5. The main function of the administrative village head and deputies is to pass on central government directives and notionally to supervise the proper running of the wards (banjar patus). Apart from this each settlement manages its own affairs.

As the administrative village system in its present form is the product of the Dutch, then Indonesian, rational bureaucratic organization, one might expect it to be based on unambiguous principles. Close inspection though shows the situation to be more complicated, both as the constituent wards are part of a complex traditional social system, and as its officials are simultaneously villagers with non-governmental roles. So the household (or kuren) is both the basic unit recognized by the administration and an indigenous group, the composition of which varies according to the rules of the particular ward (see below). Similarly, each ward decides independently on its own constitution, structure of authority and the conditions of office. So, while every ward is required to elect a member as klian dinas (klian is from the Balinese kelihan, literally elder; while dinas is the Indonesian for government service), within the administrative village there is commonly a disjuncture between the official view of his role as headman and his status within the community merely as its representative, which may amount at times to little more than glorified messenger-boy. At the same time the administrative village head and government headmen are members of villages often engaged in deep internal

MAP 3. THE SETTLEMENT OF TENGAHPADANG AND ITS TEMPLES.



CODE FOR MAP 3. THE SETTLEMENT OF TENGAHPADANG AND ITS TEMPLES.

– – – – = boundaries of tanah désa, traditional residential land of the settlement.
– – – – – – = boundaries of banjar désa, the groups controlling tanah désa. There is none shown between Br. Triwangsa and Br. Tengahpadang as individual compounds belong to different banjar désa (see text for explanation).
——— = indicates road.
~~~ = indicates stream.

Code for Temples: (Given in Table 3:17.)

A = Pura Panti Teba
B = Pura Sengseng Catu
C = Pura Yèh Empul
D = Pura Bolo
E = Pura Désa
F = Pura Mascèti (of subak Langkih)
G = Pura Dalem Kauh
H = Pura Geriya
I = Pura Indra Kelila
J = Pura Penataran Cokorda (Peliatan)
K = Pura Tanjung Sari
L = Pura Dalem Etut Keetut
M = Pura Melanting
N = Pura Dalem Kangin
O = Pura Panti Cameng
P = Pura Jelantil
Q = Pura Duur Bingin
R = Pura Dalem Guang

(Minor temples: Pura Bèji - the sites of ritually pure water; Pura Bedugul - irrigation association field temples and so forth are not shown as these are too small and too numerous easily to be marked.)

Code for Numbers on Map:

1 = Puri (court) of the Cokorda Pisangkaja
2 = Complex of courts of Déwa Gedé and Cokorda Tengahpadang
3 = Market
4 = Sub-district officer's house and police post
5 = Playing-field
6 = Medical post (run by orderly)
7 = Shrine of Raja Patih (guarding graveyard)
8 = Cremation and burial area for five eastern wards: Triwangsa, Tengahpadang, Tegal, Tengah and Siklod.
9 = Cremation and burial area for two western wards: Gagah and Pisangkaja.

S.D. = Sekolah Dasar, primary school
S.M.P. = Sekolah Menengah Pertama, junior high school
~~~

TABLE 3:5 THE CONSTITUENT WARDS OF THE PERBEKELAN (ADMINISTRATIVE VILLAGE) OF TENGAHPADANG.

Ward Name:	No. of Households:	Total Population:	No. of courts (puri):*	No. of high castes	No. of high caste households:	Special Features:
Gagah:	115	588	–	1	3	
Pisangkaja:†	160	622 (727)**	1	5	29	
Tengahpadang:	127	554	4	4	11	Elementary school
Triwangsa:	49	289	3	5	46	Almost exclusively high caste ward
Tegal:†	93	514	–	–	–	Office of mantri, assistant medical officer & secondary school
Tengah:	91	455	–	1	1	Elementary school
Siklod:	71	338	–	1	4	
Sapat:	93	–	–	2	52	Elementary school
Gentong:†	125	–	1	1	15	
Abangan:	59	–	–	–	–	
Kelabang Moding:†	108	–	–	–	–	
Totals:	1,091	3,360*** (3,465)	9	–	161	

† indicates the ward contains a dalang, shadow-puppeteer for performance of rites during temple festivals.
* the term is used here only of recognized courts (the word puri is used politely for all high caste houses). Those additional to Diagrams 2:1 and 2:2 are off-shoots from the Déwa Gedé courts.
** the official figure for Pisangkaja is highly inaccurate by general agreement. The figure in parentheses is the result of my house-to-house survey. A check of other wards revealed less deviation.
*** the total population for the wards of Tengahpadang. Those for the remaining wards had not been made available. As households (kuren) are between 4.5 and 5 persons per household an approximate figure can be derived for the four wards by multiplying the number of households by such an index.

political struggles. As the amount of public funds for development (Ind: wang pelita) channelled through the administrative village head grows in quantity,[6] the administrative village increasingly becomes an important arena to control so that its institutions tend to become enmeshed in political toils, in a competition for power and influence which stems from local and ward politics itself. The principles which inform the administrative village system in theory differ substantially in operation.

In order to understand the nature of these wards, it is necessary to look in some detail at Tengahpadang itself. This is a single nucleated settlement, stretching slightly over two kilometres from north to south and straddling a gorge which drops unexpectedly from its centre. As Map 3 shows to the north-east, at the ritually highest point, stands the state temple of the Cokordas (the Pura Penataran, whose service was discontinued by the district Controleur, in Jacobs 1934), flanked by those of lesser groups. Below this lie the wards of Tengahpadang and Triwangsa which split at some unknown period in the past (most instances of this separation by high castes are much later). So individual courtyards belong to different groups. Near the central cross-roads stand the large courts of the aristocrats, across from which is the market and the clustered sub-district office buildings. Further down the three territorially discrete wards of Tegal, Tengah and Siklod run down to the graveyard in the south. Over to the west of the market, beyond rice fields illicitly tapping water destined for irrigation associations further downstream and a playing-field bordered by a stream, lie Pisangkaja and Gagah. This division is not just geographical and the ferocious annual football match between Tengahpadang and Pisangkaja played on the field sums up their relationship. For as the two largest and most influential wards they tend to be in a semi-perpetual rivalry with one another and a competition for hegemony over the others.

The settlement as a whole forms a single désa adat which is commonly described as legal and religious community (Goris 1960c, who sums up some of the earlier views). The number of these on the island runs into the thousands and each may have its own special, often quite distinct, traditions and practices. So there tends to be great variation in the particular customs of different groups and indeed the emphasis which villagers lay upon the désa adat altogether. It is this in part which seems to have contributed towards the problems in deciding exactly what are the functions of the désa adat and what its place is in local society. In the earlier writings of the Dutch scholars great importance was laid upon this group as a religious community and the corner-

stone of the Balinese social system (Goris 1960c; Korn 1925, 1932; Lekkerkerker 1927; Swellengrebel 1960). This emphasis has been challenged by Geertz on several grounds. He has pointed out that the désa adat tended to be regarded as a 'village republic', while it was largely a religious congregation and often more extensive than "the basic territorial political unit" of the ward or hamlet (1959a: 993). Geertz has also argued that "the notion of a single, uniform social referent...cannot be defended when actual social relationships and not merely ideal cultural conceptions are considered" (1967 : 212). The difference between these views may partly be accounted for by the lapse of time between the respective field observations, for it has been suggested that wards are growing in importance (Korn 1932: 77-9). Further the Dutch tended to lay emphasis upon mountain villages which show in general a more pronounced dichotomy between désa adat and ward, with great attention given to the former. Geertz points more generally to the absence of a single referent for ideas of the village or désa. I would suggest that this lack of unambiguous reference distinguishes most Balinese groups and institutions, so that the terminology disguises the potential variation and gives coherence to multiple grounds of incorporation and the different emphases which may be given to these in different areas. In this section I would like to examine some of the problems in defining local groups, including the désa adat, with reference to the material from Tengahpadang.

Before turning to this discussion, however, it is useful to look for a moment at one of the key terms in the definition of local groups and one which is directly linked to the nature of the désa adat. This is the notion of adat itself. The term is found very widely in maritime South East Asia and perhaps the fullest account of it is given by Sharer in his discussion of the religion of the Ngaju Dayak in Kalimantan (1946; translated Needham 1963):

> "It certainly means more than simply 'usage, custom, habit'. We can only grasp and interpret its significance through the conception of God. Seen in this context the notion has a double meaning. Firstly that of divine cosmic order and harmony, and secondly that of life and actions in agreement with this order. It is not only humanity that possesses hadat, but also every other creature or thing (animal, plant, river etc.), every phenomenon (e.g. celestial phenomena), every period and every action, for the entire cosmos is ordered by the total godhead and every member and every part of the cosmos possesses its own place in this order, allocated by the total godhead. Only living and acting in and by this hadat (we may also say total godhead) guarantees harmony...For mankind, there is no place free of hadat and no time without hadat." (Sharer 1963: 75; parentheses are from the original).

While it is questionable whether what is understood by (h)adat in each of the societies which recognize the concept is the same, it has a certain applicability to Bali where it forms part of a more complex cosmological, or even metaphysical, system. For it seems to be one of the elements in a theory of transformation of the phenomenal world which includes not just order but also matter (linked to - partly Indian - ideas of exchange and action, see Chapter 8). In whatever terms it is described (there are other words, like darma, or sepi, which have similar implications, Chapters 8 and 10), adat does not impose a set of static rules on behaviour, but is seen as changing according to time and place. It is not simply that differences on the ground may be explained by reference to this idea, but the diversity is itself entailed logically, and encouraged, by Balinese ideas of the nature of order. The mutability of the désa adat as reported in Bali can be argued to follow from the concept of adat itself.

To pursue this argument, the position of men in Bali is seen as prescribed locally by their membership of a particular désa, which is commonly linked to a certain more or less clearly defined territory.[7] This defines the form of adat and so behaviour appropriate (patut) to that time and place. This is codified in a body of customs which is in theory the ultimate repository of traditional values, beliefs and rules, binding on all under its authority. As the nature of adat is cosmic, the désa is accordingly in large part concerned with matters which might be described as religious,[8] ranging from the form and occasions of the five cycles of Balinese rites, the panca-yadnya (Hooykaas 1975), to the offerings and prayers necessary and the conditions of ritual purity, pollution and so forth. The emphasis upon the religious nature of the désa adat must be treated with caution, however. This should not be understood as some simple dichotomy between sacred and profane as has sometimes been the case (Goris 1960c; Swellengrebel 1960). As we shall see, the désa adat is not the only group with religious observances or temples; nor is it alone in having definite customs. The same is true of irrigation associations and descent groups; while the ward, which has no temple in Tengahpadang, actually performs more rites than the désa adat (see below). It should perhaps be seen as one of several groups with a spatial referent (see also Boon 1977: 99ff.), a congregation of worship and a body of custom. Significantly this space may be represented as a place of origin or source, as a zone of influence or as a bounded area under different circumstances for different groups; similarly the congregation may be variously defined. As against this somewhat doctrinal view of the désa

adat, it is relevant to note that for much of the time adat is treated more or less as if it were an established body of custom and relatively little attention is paid to its cosmological implications (but see Chapter 10). So, for the sake of simplicity, I propose to refer to the désa adat where possible as the community of custom or, perhaps better, the customary village. (This latter formulation stresses, besides the territorial connotations of désa, not only that the group is concerned with the observance of custom, but also that it is itself defined by adat.) This is intended only as a rough approximation of the Balinese terms, not as an analytical definition, the main advantage of which is its relative blandness (unlike, let us say, religious community). It should be borne in mind, however, that both the constituent terms and the compound have complex and varied referents. In order to understand something of this, it is necessary to turn to a more detailed examination of the problem.

The most conspicuous feature of the customary village is its temples. These fall into three main types which ideally each community should possess, but this too is subject to local variation. These are a pura puseh, temple to the founding ancestor of the settlement; a pura balé agung, temple of the great pavilion, where meetings of its council are held; and finally a pura dalem, often translated as temple of the dead, or of the underworld. It is perhaps more correct, and apposite, to refer to this as something like 'temple of her Majesty' (the goddess Batari Durga, alias Batara Sakti, who is referred to only indirectly in the polite formulation of Dalem, literally: insider, or ruler; for to speak her name may conjure up the mystical power and death with which she is commonly associated). In Tengahpadang, in a not-uncommon pattern (Goris 1960b: 107) the first two temples are fused into a single Pura Désa, or village temple, but the shrines are kept separate and distinct (Hobart 1978a: 14). There are, however, two Pura Dalem, each with special characteristics and their own graveyards, named after their sites as kangin and kauh, to the east and to the west. These are places of worship for the five eastern and two western wards respectively. (Following the Balinese avoidance of direct reference to the deity I shall call these by their common, but less than ideal, translation as the eastern and western temples of the dead.) In addition the customary village owns two special temples (all the temples are listed in Table 3:17 and shown on Map 3). These consist of the Pura Duur Bingin, temple above (which there is) a bingin, banyan or waringin, tree, obtained

under somewhat dubious circumstances discussed in Case 20, Chapter 10; and a Pura Geriya (geriya is the title of the home of a Brahmana priest). This latter is built on the site of a dilapidated shrine and was constructed in the space of a few weeks by the entire community in a state which they subsequently describe as close to ecstatic solidarity (or 'communitas", Turner 1969; see also Franken 1960, for an example of compulsive temple building in Bali with millenarian overtones).[9]

The customary village in Tengahpadang has a territory within which its adat is thought to hold. This is formally understood as a bounded domain which comprises the traditional residential area, the village land (tanah désa). Most of this is split up into house compounds (karang désa) in which the villagers live. Properly everyone should reside within these; but with the rapid expansion of population agricultural land is increasingly being converted into the sites of field huts (pondok). The majority of these lie among the rice terraces some way from the main settlement, so that this latter is more or less coterminous with the extent of official village land. (see Map 3). Occasionally, where convenient fields lie adjacent to the settlement, field huts may be physically contiguous to traditional compounds (see Map 4) but the status of their occupants is, as we shall see, jurally quite different. The village land is marked off from other culturally recognized areas (see below) and there are activities which are appropriate and out of place in each. This is widely phrased in terms of ideas of purity (see Chapter 8) and the dangers of pollution. So habitation and rice cultivation in the wrong domain are held to be inappropriate, or even polluting.[10] Other events are also held to pollute village land, like death or the birth of twins of opposite sex (depending upon the status of the family concerned, see Belo 1935; also Chapter 10), and are removed as soon as possible to areas designated in accordance with Balinese theories of space (Hobart 1978a). This is notably the graveyard and the associated sites of the cremation mound and temples of the dead, which properly lie outside village boundaries to the south or west. Much ritual involves the reinforcement of the classification of types of land, and the removal of matter out of place.

Membership of the customary village is formally defined by reference to land. The heirs to compounds situated on village land form a special

category of villagers known as kerama déśa. On these falls the obligation to become members of the group which comprises the customary village. In the four small hamlets in the administrative village which are not part of the main settlement each has its own village land and an associated group. In Tengahpadang however the position is somewhat more complicated. For the land is divided into seven portions, each managed by a special group, the banjar déśa, comprising all the villagers with rights over compounds within the designated area. (In Triwangsa and Tengahpadang which split in the past the land consists of the sum of the compounds of their traditional members and agreed stretches of communal land.) The seven banjar déśa together form the déśa adat, or customary village; and their seven territories make up the whole of the village land. So the village is internally divided into spatial and social sub-sections.

The administration of the customary village is relatively simple. Each section is headed by an elected official, the klian déśa, who is the representative of the group within the village as a whole and also the deputy of the head of the customary village, the bendéśa adat. This latter is formally elected for a five-year period by the various sub-sections, but the rewards of office are limited and the present incumbent has held the office for over twenty years in the absence of a suitable alternative candidate (see Table 2:3). The village also, in theory, chooses the priest for the village temple, but as this is commonly held for life and passed from father to son, the question of succession rarely arises. The administration of routine matters is left in the hands of the head, although he is answerable in theory to a decision-making council of the sub-section heads. So the customary village is run therefore by an élite council (Bailey 1965: 9-13) which meets in theory once a year, or whenever necessary, in the long pavilion in the group's temple. In practice meetings are less frequent and conducted casually under the banyan tree outside the temple.

The infrequent gatherings of the council are due to the slow-changing nature of the body of custom, to the routine pattern of activity and to the delegation of work. The regulations of the customary village concern the organization of religious matters, from the prescription of offerings to the proper form of all rites and the sanctions for breach of prohibitions. These are transmitted orally and changes are infrequent. Significantly in the most important modification of the rules (discussed in some detail in Chapter 10) the group which met was not composed solely of the council members but

included other notables. The activities of the customary village are otherwise mainly concerned with the administration of temple lands and the organization of rites in the village temple. This last constitutes its main source of activity. As the group as a whole is very large (see Table 3:6 below), the entire labour force of compound occupiers is not needed and the work is devolved onto sets of sub-sections (there are three, indicated in Table 3:6) under the leadership of the village head, advised by the village priest.[11] So in practice it is the sub-sections which are the units mainly active within the village and which undertake most work whether in the temple or in supervising the observance of customary regulations. They supervise no important activities, however, apart from those mentioned above or such minor matters as organizing hunts for squirrels (ngulah semal) which attack the coconut trees owned by members. So the customary village is primarily concerned with the routine administration of an unwritten body of rules and the organization of ritual in the group temple. The corporation and its sub-groups are of importance however because they provide a conceptual link between territory, religious worship and the observance of adat.

There is one further kind of group in Tengahpadang which is also attached to land, but in a rather complex fashion. It is this group however which is of the most important in daily life. In order to understand its composition and relationship to the customary village and its sub-sections, it is necessary to look briefly at Balinese rules of inheritance and succession. According to these, village compounds are inherited by a single heir, unless they are very large and a second son has the means to undertake the burden of customary village duties. For low castes the chosen heir is normally the youngest son; and for high castes the eldest (see Chapter 7). These non-inheriting sons constitute a separate named class of villagers, called pengempian, who have somewhat vague rights of residence within their natal compounds but nothing else. As part of the estate is tied to the compound as laban sanggah, fields for supporting the ancestral shrines, and land-holdings now infrequently exceed the amount customarily regarded as proper (see Chapter 5 for details of holdings), these persons without compounds commonly own no productive land either. So there are two categories of villager: those with rights over compounds, or loosely compound owners, (kerama désa) and others (pengempian). This latter broad class includes, however, both those with no house-land

whatsoever, (the pengempian proper) and those who own field huts (pondok). The three together comprise a separate corporate group, the ward or banjar patus;[12] the proportions of each in Tengahpadang are given in Table 3:6.

TABLE 3:6 CLASSIFICATION OF RESIDENTIAL STATUS IN THE DÉSA ADAT OF TENGAHPADANG
(based on the number of households)

Temple Work Group:	Ward Name:	Kerama Désa:*	Peng-empian:	Pondok:	Total:	% Br. désa**
I	Gagah:	61	28	26	115	53.0%
	Pisangkaja:	79	55	26	160	49.4%
II	Tengahpadang:	62	57	8	127	48.8%
	Triwangsa:	36	10	3	49	73.5%
	Tegal:	60	31	2	93	64.5%
III	Tengah:	63	28	-	91	69.2%
	Siklod:	59	10	2	71	83.1%
	Total:	420	219	67	706	59.5%

* as the kerama désa comprise the exclusive membership of the banjar désa this figure gives its total in each case, while the sum of these is the membership of the whole désa adat.

** this is the proportion of the banjar patus (composed of all three classes; kerama désa, pengempian and pondok) which are banjar désa. The variation population which in turn would seem to be linked to its reputed age, so the supposedly newer wards have less pengempian. (This argument could of course be reversed, as we do not know the actual age of settlements other than Pisangkaja.)

So while the customary village (désa adat) is seen as the corporation nominally owning the land of the settlement this is divided into sub-groups (banjar désa) comprising the owners of compounds on village land. These last, together with those who did not inherit compounds, form the membership of the wards. In this way, those with rights over compounds constitute the core of a larger group; both the village sub-sections and the wards being focused on the same land and with the same names, differentiated in daily life by the addition of the name of the type of corporation.

The grounds of membership of the wards are therefore heterogeneous and may vary according to the constitution of a particular group. In general terms the Balinese see villagers as belonging to a ward by virtue of residence. This requires slightly more careful definition however. In Tengahpadang all persons who have rights over compounds are automatically included within both

the customary village sub-sections and the wards, whether they live locally or not. (If they are absent they must supply someone to do the work and pay the contributions for the former. They may make payment to avoid regular duties in the latter, but are still members). Owners of field huts and all non-inheriting sons gain membership on different grounds. Those who live within the confines of the appropriate section of village land are required to belong to the ward attached to a sub-section on pain of permanent expulsion. Villagers living in the fields fall into a different position and one about which there is some ambiguity. For it is thought that beyond the limits of village land itself the area still falls within the domain of the nearby ward, for purposes both of dealing with disputes and determining residence. This is not, however, entirely fixed and there is a measure of latitude in choice of membership, by which origin from a particular ward by virtue of descent from a member may be grounds for claiming the right to join one group rather than another. The exact position is somewhat unclear. The conditions of membership also differ between wards (see Table 3:7). If one owns a compound one is compulsorily a member of the village sub-section regardless of other considerations; whereas for the purposes of the ward other villagers remain within the household of their birth until they are married. In the six northern wards the rules state that unless a man is the heir to a compound, he must join the ward at the first meeting after the great rite of Nyepi for the purification of the village land, held once every Hindu-Balinese year (Goris 1960a). In the ward of Siklod, however, a man joins only when his younger brother marries (the youngest as heir is included in the household with rights over the compound), or immediately should the younger have married first. So among those without desa rights the unit of membership is the conjugal, or nuclear, family. Among rights' holders this is typically a stem family including the future heir, but this varies and may include single persons. This is known as the kuren, or household, and is also the basic jural unit of Balinese society in terms of which rights and obligations are computed for most, but not all, purposes.[13] So the principles of recruitment to the ward are complex and not always clearly defined, and the unit of membership variable accordingly.

The range of functions undertaken by the wards in the customary village of Tengahpadang is extensive, complex and changeable. It is this group which comes the closest to a multi-purpose, face-to-face community, as well as being

TABLE 3:7 (Continued)

Ward:	Offices:	Deputy to Government Headman	Effective head:	Status of officials	Ward Funds:	Village Section Funds:	When join ward	Comments:
Tegal:	1. government headman 2. village section head 3. deputy 4. deputy	village section head	government headman	government headmen & village section heads must be compound owners, deputy open	Rp.15,000	none	after Nyepi	
Tengah:	1. government headman 2. village section head 3. deputy 4. deputy	none	government headman	must all be compound owners	Rp.40,000	divided immediately	after Nyepi	Apr. 1972, non-heirs free, so Br. village section = Br. ward
Siklod:	1. government headman 2. village section head 3. deputy 4. deputy	both deputy	government headman	must all be compound owners	Rp.200,000	divided immediately	On marriage of younger brother (see text)	

* Village section is used in this table as an abbreviation of the customary village sub-section (the banjar désa).

the smallest unit of government. Each ward is run by an assembly of all its households, so that it is a community-in-council (Kuper 1971). This is a legislative, judicial and administrative body with wide-ranging powers over its members which entitle it to impose taxes, decide its own regulations and punish offenders. Its sphere of competence is extensive. Commonly wards engage in activities ranging from the construction of public buildings and the maintenance of public works and order to harvesting and cash-raising projects. Although it has no special and exclusive temple of its own, the ward is an important work group in the organization of collective rituals. Formally its administration is in the hands of a headman (klian dinas) who is usually assisted by two deputies (petajuh) comprising a secretary and a treasurer (see Table 3:7). These are responsible in all matters to the assembly which meets every 35 days, according to a regular date in the Javanese-Balinese calendar (Goris 1960a), or more often when the need arises. The ward may also have a say in the appointment of priests to temples of which it forms part of the congregation, notably the two temples of the dead, but also some of the special temples (see Table 3:17). While wards are formally incorporated on the basis of residence, their affairs extend widely and, as we shall see, the principles underlying this are open to varying interpretation.

Before turning to a critical examination of the principles of incorporation of local groups, especially the ward, it is useful to note some of the informal processes and differences between groups which have a bearing upon the interpretation of jural rules and indigenous ideas underlying group formation. A major theme of this thesis to be developed in the following chapters is the extent to which social principles generally are open to differential interpretation and evaluation in the light of a range of factors. Part of this is more or less directly connected with differences in the distribution of resources and the aims of villagers in seeking goals by means which may broadly be described as political. These factors affect the social organization of village society in a variety of ways to be discussed in due course.

The groups in Tengahpadang with the most highly developed decision-making procedures, and so the most flexible, are the wards. Each is in theory partly, in practice largely, independent of the others. Not only their members, but the groups themselves, may well have conflicting interests with consequent repercussions on local and administrative village politics. In general the wards

have sizeable treasuries (Table 3:7) and a degree of autonomy which make them valuable prizes in a competition which has become both more intense and multi-faceted with the arrival of national political parties on the scene. It will be clear from Table 3:8 that during the last twenty years it has become general for incumbents to local office to have political party ties, nominal or otherwise. As a result there has been increasing competition for, and a correspondingly greater turnover in, positions of leadership and a gradual shift from office being controlled by wealthy landed villagers to the entry of poor men with party backing (Table 3:8). This has also led to the possibility of the heads of the village sub-section and the ward having links to rival parties, which tends to lead to competition and friction between the two. There are other aspects to this. Traditional patronage tended to be based on ties to, and within, powerful aristocratic families or the control of villagers through agricultural tenancies. Political parties, however, offer a new source of influence. With the decline of the courts discussed in the last chapter the ward assemblies have tended to gain in power; but this is open to subversion from new sources. So there has tended increasingly to be a competition between the representatives of the wards, especially skilled public speakers (or orators), and patrons with political party connexions for control over decisions and, more important, influence over the range of functions undertaken and the extent of powers of the wards. In future chapters I hope to draw together some of the threads in this process; but here I wish primarily to draw attention to the effect of politics on the negotiation of the range of activities of local groups and the shifting balance between them.

This may be seen briefly in a review of the history of the relations between wards and courts which has direct repercussions on the effectiveness of local groups. The main schism in the administrative and customary village is between Pisangkaja and Tengahpadang, whether as wards or village sub-sections. These have traditionally vied for informal dominance over the whole settlement - through both the administrative village system and the customary groups - most recently expressed in terms of political party ties, but before that through allegiance to competing princes and even warring governments. From the time of conquest the ward of Tengahpadang has been the stronghold of the Déwa Gedé; while Pisangkaja has been dominated by the large court of Cokorda. In the early part of this century the posts of administrative village head and punggawa or sub-district officer were mostly controlled by the Déwa Géde or their kinsmen

TABLE 3:8 HEADMANSHIP OF WARDS IN DÉSA ADAT TENGAHPADANG.

Year:	GAGAH		PISANGKAJA		TENGAHPADANG	
1935			Jirna (m) (Batuan)			
1942	Jirna (m) (Batuan)[1]	Bered (r) (Bebandem)	Anak Agung Pageh (p) (Cokorda)	Alep (r) (Dauh)	Tambun (?)	
1945				Kingsan(r) (Cameng)		
1950	Tingkes(m)	Cedig (r)	Kingsan(r) (Cameng) C.	Neka (r) (Dauh) N.	Keramas(r)	
1955					Kawi (r) N.	Tagen (r) (Sulang) N.
1960	Dw.Pt. Bolo (m) C. (Déwa Bolo)	Geduh (r) C.[2] (Bebandem)	Anak Agung Raka (p) (Cokorda) C.[1]	Tagen (m) (P.Bendésa) C.		
1965	Dw.Md. Koyig (p) (Déwa Jati) N	Bered (r) (Jambangan) N.	Sujana (p) (Batuan) N.[2]			
1970	Tangsi(m) (Cameng) N.		Tedun (r) (Pulosari) N.	Dw.Md.Lanus (Jati,m) N.	Degeg (r) N.	Pandé Kerug(r) (Pandé Taman Bali)
1972	Nawi (r) Bebandem) G.[3]	Besog (m) (Tangkas) G.	Kartana(m) (Pulosari) G.	Dw.Md.Gampil (Jati,p) N.[3] Degdeg (m) (Pulosari) G.	Dobiyag(m) (Kebun Tubuh) G.	

1. client of king of Gianyar
2. S. of I Bered(1935-46)
3. SS. of I Bered

1. DH/½BS of A.A.Pageh
2. S of Jirna.
3. MFBS of Dw.Md.Lanus

TABLE 3:8 HEADMANSHIP IN TENGAHPADANG: P.2.

Year:	TRIWANGSA		TEGAL		TENGAH	
1935	Dw.Kt. Pacung (r)		Pageh (?)	Garut (r)	Tapesan (r) (Tangkeban)	
1942						
1945	Dw.Md. Pacung (r)	Dw.Ny. (m) Selangga (Déwa Beng)	Mongoh(m) C.			
1950	Dw.Md. Kerug (p)	Gusti Tokolan (p) (Gusti Sideman)	Arka (m) N.	Lempung(m) (Balé Barak) N.	Tukilan(p)	Degeng (?)
1955						
1960	Gusti Tokolan(p) (Gusti Sideman)[2]		Nedeng(m) C.	Padet(r) (Balé Barak) N.	Sanu (r) N.	Rerod (m)
1965	Dw.Md. Tangeb (p) (Déwa Taman Bali) N.	Dw.Pt. Sandat(p) (Déwa Abiyan Basé) N.	Puji (m) (Cameng) C.	Suci (r) (Pulosari) N.		
1970	Dw.Pt. Seronggo(m) (Déwa Seronggo) N.	Dw.Kt. Tangeb (p) (Déwa Taman Bali)[3] N.	Berata(r) (P.Gèlgèl) N.	Linggih(r) (Gerih)[1] N.	Jedug (?) N.	Damping(m)
1972	Dw.Ny.Karti (Déwa Beng) (p) G.	Dw.Kt. Sandat (p) (Déwa Abiyan Basé) N.	Karta(r) (P.Kayu Selem) N.	Selem (r) (Gerih) N.	Gedé (r)[1] (Tangkeban)	Teka (r) (Pulosari)

1. S. of previous klian
2. Held both posts at once
3. agnatic relative of former klian

1. agnate of previous klian

1. S. of Tapesan, dominant family in ward as very rich.

TABLE 3:8 HEADMANSHIP IN TENGAHPADANG: P. 3.

Year:	SIKLOD	
1935		
1942		
1945		
1950	Kerempang(r)	Tekeh (r)
1955	Ny. Geder (r)	Md. Geder (?)
1960	Kaplig (m) C.	Asin (r) N.
1965		
1970	Jaga (m) N.	Glembung(m) N.
1972	Gusti Kt.Oka (Kramas,m)G.	Nyana (?) (Tangkas) G.

WEALTH OF KLIAN

	Dinas	Desa	Total
Rich (r):	15	18	33
Medium (m):	14	8	22
Poor (p):	8	5	13
Unknown:	3	3	6
Totals:	40	34	74

Here wealth is calculated as follows:
poor = less than 0.2 ha. riceland
medium = 0.2-0.8 ha. riceland
rich = more than 0.8 ha. riceland
cf.Table 5:8. There is little preference for rich klian expressed, but as the duties take time from farming, it is easier if one has wealth. Similarly the descent group affiliation of klian is given, and close kin links where they occur. Once again, there is not a close correlation between kin group size and office-holding, in part as the office is not particularly powerful or prestigious in general.

There are three family lines, however, where the succession requires comment.
1. Jirna - Sujana (Br. Pisangkaja)
2. A.A.Pageh - A.A.Raka (Br.Pisangkaja)
3. Tapesan - Gedé (Br. Tengah)

Jirna's ancestors held minor office in the court of Gianyar and he was sent to aid the Déwa Gedé (and it is said infiltrate the Cokorda-dominated wards). He held the office of klian in both Gagah and Pisangkaja. His son, an orator, briefly became klian too.

Anak Agung Pageh & his daughter's husband Anak Agung Raka were clients of the court in Pisangkaja. The former was appointed by general agreement of the courts; the latter not, owing to his political party opposition to the perbekel and the Déwa Gedé courts.

Ny. Tapesan is extremely wealthy and a Tangkeban which is the largest descent group, so that his position is powerful.

Code: (r) = rich; (m) = medium wealth; (p) = poor } see above
N = nationalist party
C = communist party
G = Golkar (Government group)

TABLE: 3:9 RELATIVE WEALTH OF THE WARDS OF DÉSA ADAT TENGAHPADANG.
(all figures given in hectares.)

Ward:	House-holds:	Riceland: Private:	Riceland: Mean:	Bukti:*	Dry Fields: Private:	Dry Fields: Mean:	Composite Figure:** Private:	Composite Figure:** Mean:
Gagah:	115	47.515	.413	-	37.92	.333	66.475	.578
Pisangkaja:	160	47.68	.298	-	32.815	.205	64.09	.401
Tengahpadang:	127	39.495	.311	.55	26.645	.21	52.82	.416
Triwangsa:	49	9.075	.185	-	7.275	.148	12.71	.259
Tegal:	93	37.28	.401	-	18.45	.198	46.505	.50
Tengah:	91	21.095	.232	.515	9.16	.101	25.675	.282
Siklod:	71	24.725	.348	.29	13.69	.193	31.57	.445
Total:	706	226.865	.321	.194	145.955	.207	299.845	.425

* this is public land linked to a certain office: in each case here it is for the remuneration of the klian of the ward for their public duties.
** the composite figure is an artifical one, intended to give an overall idea of the extent of productive land by combining rice and dry fields. As the former is roughly twice as productive on average (also twice the market price) this is achieved by halving the dry field figure and adding the result to the riceland total. It is a not-unreasonable guide to the wealth of the unit concerned and will be used as a supplementary figure in most tables on land-holding.

the Pradéwa in Br. Triwangsa (see Table 2:3; it will be recalled that the title Anak Agung here is that adopted by the Déwa Gedé). Sometime between the two World Wars, members of Br. Pisangkaja took over the office of head of the customary village which they have retained continuously since. At the time of the revolution against the Dutch after the last war, Tengahpadang backed the colonial government; while Pisangkaja sided with, and many actually joined, the guerillas who won Independence in 1949. This had the effect of breaking the control of the Dewa Gede on the office of sub-district head. By the late 1950s this competition had been rephrased in terms of political party ties, with Tengahpadang claiming allegiance to the nationalist party (P.N.I., Partai Nasional Indonesia) and Pisangkaja to the communists (P.K.I., Partai Kommunis Indonesia). (The complex situation of the allegiance of headmen at this time, and the correlation (or its absence) of wealth and political position can be seen in Table 3:8). After the abortive coup and subsequent massacre there was a short period of nationalist party dominance (Table 3:8), during which time the special temple of Pura Duur Bingin changed hands (see below; Table 3:17; and Case 20 Chapter 10). After this, however, the political balance shifted again with a reaction against the nationalists, expressed by increased membership of the newly-formed government party, the so-called 'non-political party' (GOLKAR - an acronym for Golongan Karya, functional, or work, groups). In 1972 the last post held by the Déwa Gedé and Tengahpadang was finally captured: this was the office of administrative village head. For some time this had been rendered impotent by the political ascendancy of Golkar in the wards while the head remained a nationalist.[14] Local politics may directly affect the viability of groups and range of affairs which they may successfully claim to undertake.

In spite of their structural similarities, the wards differ in size, social composition and wealth. This last can be seen in part from Table 3:9, which shows their overall and mean holdings in riceland and dry fields. These are owned predominantly by the rights'holders with a few exceptions, but the size of individual estates also varies, so that no simple comparison is possible. Nonetheless certain features emerge. The two richest wards in the settlement, Gagah and Tegal, are composed of substantial peasants, but are correspondingly noted for their lack of interest in politics and collective work, which is reflected in the state of their public funds, a reasonable index of the input of labour into ward activities. The poorest wards by some way are Tengah and Triwangsa.

The former is said to be composed of the most recent settlers in the village who have therefore had little chance to accumulate land. The latter consists mainly of high caste families who are thought to have followed the Dewa Gedé to Tengahpadang, when they set up their courts, as courtiers and, as the commoners put it, hangers-on rather than peasants. They are now forced into a great variety of occupations, notable among them professional gambling. As high castes however they have a tradition of involvement in politics. It is the other wards, relatively neither rich nor poor, which tend for various reasons to be the most politically active. This is again partly evident from their big treasuries (Siklod was temporarily somewhat exceptional, as it was in the course of buying a new orchestra). There seem to be three main grounds for this. In Tengahpadang, villagers argue that the poor for the most part are too concerned with making a livelihood to wish to devote time to collective enterprises or politics, which bring less immediate benefit (we shall see exceptions in Chapter 9). Equally solid peasants tend to prefer to invest much of their labour to private ends, rather than towards a public good (Olson 1971; this point will be developed later). Further three wards, Pisangkaja, Tengahpadang and Triwangsa, contain rival princely courts, and the first two have a fairly mixed caste composition (see Table 3:15 below). In different ways these various considerations tend to affect the degree of activity of wards and the parts they play in wider social groupings.

Although the different corporate groups in Tengahpadang are represented formally as having quite distinct principles of recruitment and affairs, it was already noticed that there are certain apparent inconsistencies. These may stem partly from the operation of political interests, but their extent and nature points to more general confusion of ostensibly discrete principles. It is to this that I would now like to turn. The problem of the appropriate group to carry out traditional functions is evident in the organization of work and contributions for the main temples, that is who is responsible for supporting (nyungsung) these. Earlier it was remarked that although each ward does not have its own temple, they do conduct rites and have a measure of control over the choice of priest in the temples of the dead (the Pura Dalem Kangin and Dalem Kauh). These are properly customary village temples, sometimes known as the Kahyangan Tiga (Geertz 1959a: 993; these are the temples of the founding ancestor(s), great pavilion and of the dead discussed above). It is not the customary village sub-sections which support these, however, but the wards

in Tengahpadang and compound owners are treated no differently from anyone else in work and contributions. There is a logical connexion though with the other functions of the ward, which include notably burial and cremation. It seems that matters of death are held to be the affair the wards and by extension this encompasses the temples of the dead although these are traditional sites in adat. The position for the other two special village temples is not so simple however. Both the Pura Geriya and Pura Duur Bingin mentioned above are now worshipped and supported by wards; the former by all seven, the latter by the five eastern ones. In the first case it was the combined wards who helped to rebuild the temple; but the latter was previously a descent group temple which was taken over after a purported trance (Case 20, Chapter 10). Here ward politics was a major factor in annexing the temple which owned substantial property (Table 3:17). So sometimes the logical extension of a native concept such as death may account for a revaluation of traditional spheres of competence; sometimes there is no such simple principle, but rather the claim of special considerations (like the manifestation of a deity's wishes) and the operation of pragmatic interests.

The confusion is not confined to the affairs of groups but extends into their administration and internal organization. Quite simply, inspection of the choice of leaders and the exercise of authority shows that in formal terms often it is the wrong man or the wrong group who take decisions. This is particularly clear in the relationship between the ward (banjar patus) and customary village sub-section (banjar desa). Not only are these two both known as banjar, but also the former tends to interfere in the latter's domain. In theory the sub-section takes all decisions about compounds and changes in the land; but the ward tends to erect buildings on it and otherwise reallocate its use (see Case 21, Chapter 10). So the distinction between rights in land and control over residence become blurred. This also happens in the formal administration of the groups' business. It will have been noticed that in Table 3:7, the head of the customary village sub-section is also a ward official and deputy to the government headman. In fact it is not uncommon for the election to the office of sub-section head (klian desa) to be conducted by the ward and not the customary village units at all (for an example, see Chapter 9). More extreme still in three wards, Gagah Pisangkaja and Tengahpadang, it is recognized that by tradition the sub-section

head is the effective leader of both banjar in all business which does not concern the official headman as representative of the administrative village. In the remaining wards on the other hand there is a clear division of functions between the two groups. In daily life it is noticeable that the term banjar is often used unqualified so that the fusion is helped by a terminological identification and sometimes confusion.

This mixing of groups and the structure of authority is also found in the customary village and the administrative village. This may be illustrated by a simple example during the preamble to the national elections in 1971 (cases which have less rationale for the intervention of government are discussed in Chapter 10, Cases 19 and 22):

Case 5: The prayer for safe elections in Tengahpadang:

> In 1971 the national elections were due to be held and at about the same time many wards were intending to have their own internal polls to choose new heads. Many villagers including the administrative village head were concerned at the political tension which was growing and at the possibility of disturbance or violence as the date grew nearer. So the administrative village head arranged to meet the head of the customary village for a discussion of whether it was possible and appropriate under the adat to arrange communal offerings at all the village temples and for a collective prayer to ask for the safety (selamet) and well-being of the whole community (of seven wards) during this time. The customary village head could find no objection. So the administrative village heads went ahead and issued instructions to his deputies, the government headmen, to organize a mass congregation with different wards taking responsibility for different temples. This took place on a ritually auspicious date ten days before polling.

Here the government elections were the affair of the administrative village and this appears to have provided the grounds for the interest of the head and his intervention.[15] On another occasion however, when the giant banyan tree in the eastern cemetery split one night - a grave portent - it was the same man who organized the priests and experts in adat to decide upon the action appropriate although this has nothing to do with government and was the affair of the customary village. (One might argue a tangential connexion through death and the monopoly of the wards over matters in the graveyard.) It is possible to express this involvement in the recognition of an opposition between the practical and the spiritual, or between dinas and désa (government and custom) to which

villagers would on occasions refer in some way. There are problems in this formulation, however. In the wards mentioned the activities of the village sub-section head, who is in theory the expert in adat, are not confined to spiritual or even customary village matters. We shall return to the significance of this semantic opposition in due course.

This theme of the confusion of the principles which 'inform' groups extends to the question of the bases of recruitment. This emerges in the consideration of the exact definition of the customary village (désa adat). It will be recalled that membership carries with it the burden of carrying out the large annual temple ceremony in the village temple (Pura Désa). In fact, however, although the compound heads are theoretically responsible for the whole rite, they are helped by contributions of labour and raw materials from the remaining households. This reflects a double referent of the term désa adat. First it is the group of heirs to compounds on village land. Second it is the entire congregation who worships at (mebakti in low Balinese; muspa in high) and obtain holy water from the village temples. All these people come under the protection of the village gods and are bound to observe the adat there. (So when instructions are given for the désa adat to turn up for work it is necessary to specify to whom this refers). Désa may refer to a bounded territory which singles out holders of rights or it may refer to an area in which a given adat prevails, which extends to include passers-by and others in the neighbourhood. Part of this stems from an ambiguity in the notion of village land (tanah désa) which may be seen as a bounded area or as a zone of diminishing influence which extends into the rice fields (so irrigation associations follow the adat of nearby villages in such matters as offerings). What appears to be the principle of recruitment of one group (the désa adat) may, differently understood, be the basis of another.

In the last paragraphs we have been obliged to pay attention to the multiple referents of indigenous terms. A degree of structure may be placed on the apparently complex overlapping of the functions of groups and their principles of recruitment by a brief consideration of the categorical and semantic bases of core terms like désa. So I would like to end this section with a short look at some of the ways in which this term may be used. We have seen that désa may denote a tract of residential land. This may be categorized

as bounded, as a zone of influence decreasing in degree or not, and even as focused on the central site of the land of the village temple. (It is here that communion with the gods to discuss changes in adat ideally take place, although this has been displaced for the time being onto the Pura Duur Bingin because this temple had a medium and the village temple did not.) Finally viewed from outside it is the area where a particular adat exists, suitable to that time and place. There are also other kinds of territory and different ways of comprehending them.[16] So a single notion like territory may be representable in a host of ways (cf. Conklin 1964; Tambiah 1973; Needham 1975; on the parallels in different kinds of taxonomy).

The problem of understanding the meaning of désa in Bali may also be approached in a quite different way. This is to consider the various semantic contexts in which it is used. These may be formalized folk taxonomies or simply regular distinctions made by villagers. It is worth noting that in Bali the former often consists not in schemes based on binary opposition but in tripartite classification of phenomena. This certainly applies to the distinction between kinds of land which I was usually given, in Tengahpadang and elsewhere:

Classification of occupied land:	désa	:	tegal	:	carik (uma) (in high Balinese) (in low Balinese)
	human habitation	:	dry fields	:	wet rice fields

In this all residential land is seen as a single class in opposition to productive land of different types. This suggests a possible correspondence with the tendency to blur distinctions within the class when defining groups by reference to land.[17]

There are further antitheses associated with land which are less formal in the sense that they do not form part of fixed, often reiterated, distinctions. Nonetheless reference is made to these in daily life in certain contexts. The heirs to compounds also inherit the lion's share of other types of land. The justification of this is that they incur heavy obligations in contributions to domestic and public rites. So the burden of public duty is balanced by the privileges or advantages of owning productive property. (This is of course a

somewhat ideal conceptual view, as may be seen in Chapter 10, Case 12, where villagers showed a clear awareness that matters were not always as simple). This may be expressed crudely as follows:

<u>désa</u>	:	<u>carik</u>	::	duties of heirship	:	rights of heirship

In this the holders of rights over compounds are contrasted with non-heirs. This has a spatial aspect:

<u>kerama désa</u>	:	<u>pondok</u>	:	<u>peng-empian</u>	::	stable residence in village	: peripheral semi-settlement in fields	: unstable residence (in wild?)

The non-heirs are in fact marginal to the community and traditionally they tended to move away to settle on new land. Now they leave the village as migrant labourers, or even on government-sponsored transmigration schemes. They are often regarded as liable to disrupt the smooth running of village affairs and are sometimes spoken of openly as wild.[18] It is said that it is the mixture of the stable and unstable which makes the ward an uncomfortable or hot (<u>panes</u>) group compared to others.

This brings us to another interesting antithesis which is recognized in some contexts. This is the distinction between the two types of <u>banjar</u>: <u>désa</u> and <u>patus</u>. This may be represented simply as:

<u>banjar désa</u>		<u>banjar patus</u>	::	<u>tanah</u>	:	<u>gaé</u>	::	<u>nyimpen</u>	:	<u>mepatus</u>
group of compound heirs	:	general work group	::	land	:	labour	::	accumul-ation (keeping)	:	sharing (exchange of rice at death)

The <u>banjar désa</u> is largely concerned with matters of property, whether compounds or productive land (as in the hunting of squirrels which eat coconuts), symbolized in the granaries in each compound for storing grain. The <u>banjar patus</u> in contrast is a work group for a wide range of purposes and derives its name from the gift of rice to bereaved villagers as part of the sharing of the burden of the costs. There seems in this to be a measure of opposition between the accumulation of produce by heirs and the sharing enjoined within the wider group. There are also differences in the apparent opposition of land and labour.

For underlying the concept of déśa are ideas of difference due to birth which is manifest in the differential access to land as the supreme resource. This may be contrasted with the ideas of equality of men and an emphasis upon the importance of labour in the production of resources (and the accruing of capital), which should be shared between the members of the collectivity. We shall see how these types of distinction enter directly into public debate later (in Case 22 in Chapter 10). However suggestive this opposition might seem (in part as a reflection of western paradigms, see Ardener 1978), it is doubtful whether it should be seen as in some sense the heart of the matter. The banjar déśa is also a work group and the banjar patus contains all the alleged accumulators. Rather than try to reduce the various semantic oppositions to a perfectly coherent system, I would prefer to see them as part of a more complex, and open, field in which there is room for creativity.

This consideration is also relevant in the final set of oppositions at which I wish to look. These involve the contrast of customary institutions with governmental and the sacred with the secular. This may be represented as:

	déśa	:	dinas	::	custom	: government (service)
or:	déśa	:	banjar (patus ?)	::	sacred	: profane

The first scheme is one which the villagers in Tengahpadang sometimes make; the second is a model often found in Dutch scholarly writings on Bali (see for instance Swellengrebel 1960: 38). The former is a fairly simple system about which little needs to be said other than that it does not claim the comprehensiveness of the latter. This involves an interesting problem; for Hooykaas has made the important point that it is no easy matter to translate the notion of the sacred in Bali (see for instance 1976: 241). The term which most writers seem to have in mind here is that of suci which may more appositely be rendered by pure (see the discussion in Chapter 8). These are not identical; so it is a little problematic to know quite what is intended by designating the déśa as sacred in contrast to the banjar. The problems in Tengahpadang are doubly clear for one group: the banjar déśa should presumably be glossed as sacred-profane (or pure-polluted ?). If the déśa is to be understood as a religious group as opposed to the banjar, equal difficulties occur. At some ideal conceptual level

this might conceivably be the case (although I have not heard it put quite this way in Tengahpadang); but it ignores large parts of the ethnography. Although it is the (banjar) désa which conducts the rites in the village temple, the ward (banjar patus) is actually engaged in far more religious activity. They hold the rites in the temple of the dead, the other special temples belonging to the désa including helping in the village temple itself, organize funerals and cremations and finally are responsible for the purification of the traditional village land during the annual rite of Nyepi (Goris 1960a). This distinction of sacred and profane does not seem to rest lightly on the data (see also Das 1977 on the different models and their problems in India).

In conclusion to this section then, I have examined in outline the main corporate groups in Tengahpadang which are focused on the traditional residential land of the settlement. At a superficial glance these appear to be quite distinct and articulated in a clearly defined and ordered way. They seem to have different principles of recruitment and affairs, and to form two systems of ranked groups. A slightly closer examination showed this neat model to be spurious. There is widespread confusion about the proper functions of these corporations: in the definition of their affairs or sphere of competence, in the procedures for selecting leaders, in rules for the control of resources and even the principles of recruitment. We saw here how it was necessary to depart from Smith's distinction of principles which 'inform' groups in order to understand how this came about. For instance the customary village is incorporated on the basis of land; but this may be seen as a bounded area consisting of compounds or else a less sharply defined zone of influence. The different ways in which indigenous concepts may be understood by the participants can lead to the emergence of quite different groups based ostensibly on a single 'principle of recruitment! In the final part of the section, we explored some of the diverse senses of one of these concepts and showed something of the complexity of its implications.

Specialized Groups:

The other major corporate groups in Tengahpadang may be described much more briefly. They tend to show similar problems in the multiplicity of principles of incorporation but do not present such complex problems in the logical connexions and articulation between them. Of those still to be discussed, the irrigation association and kin groups both link villagers across wards and with other settlements in further constellations of ties. The irrigation associations embrace a population within an area very similar to the market and marriage regions. Although for most commoners marriage is largely local, kin groups (which may loosely be described as based on ties of descent) tend to be more wide-flung. As against this, with the exception of the high castes, the social relationships created by both these tend to be of limited importance. They gain in value where they overlap with other ties, particularly within the settlement (Jay 1969: 156-238; Nakane 1966). This is evident in voluntary associations, which are generally formed within a single ward, their narrow circumscription if anything serving to reaffirm their boundaries. Finally there is a plethora of temples. Some of these are ritual sites for the groups already discussed, although as we have seen the congregations may vary depending on how the principles behind these are understood. Others however have little connexion with commonly found corporations and their congregations establish ties which cut across all others and are explained by reference to particular events in the past (cf. Bateson 1937). Such groups are almost invariably contained within the broader membership of the customary village and provide a further set of links between people from the settlement.

1. Irrigation Associations:

Tengahpadang lies in heavily contoured countryside, so that the peasant farmers, in common with those to the south, do not have a set of discrete village lands, but are members of various surrounding irrigation associations. The distribution of membership in these is shown in Table 3:10, which gives the number of persons owning land watered by a particular association (or subak). The peasant farmers of Tengahpadang are linked through participation in nine different groups to thirty-five wards outside the settlement itself. These lie within a very similar region to those for marketing and marriage, and is geographically circumscribed by the need to be near the fields.[19] (Geertz 1959a:

TABLE 3:10 OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN DIFFERENT IRRIGATION ASSOCIATIONS.

Place:	Irrigation Association									Total No.
	Lan	Pak	Teb	Uma	T.P.	Bel.	M.P.	D.P.	G.P.	
Gagah	97	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
Pisangkaja	74	1	1	-	1	2	1	-	1	7*
Tengahpadang	37	62	2	2	8	-	1	-	-	6*
Triwangsa	15	2	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	5*
Tegal	73	17	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
Tengah	50	1	13	1	-	1	-	-	-	5
Siklod	47	1	17	2	-	-	-	4	-	5
Sapat	3	-	36	-	-	-	-	7	-	
Gentong	-	-	3	1	-	-	3	1	-	
Abangan	26	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
Kelabang Mod.	16	-	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	
Jungjungan	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Dukuh	1	-	2	5	-	-	-	22	-	
Petulu	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	11	
Pujungkaja	13	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	
Pujungkelod	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	
Tengah (M.A.)	-	-	-	29	-	-	23	2	24	
Triwangsa (M.A.)	-	-	-	18	-	-	13	7	10	
Manuaba (M.A.)	-	-	-	11	-	-	4	2	6	
Pandé (M.A.)	-	-	-	21	-	-	1	-	16	
Tangkas (M.A)	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	1	59	
Gunaksa (M.A)	-	-	-	6	-	-	68	7	2	
Kenderan (Ken)	-	-	2	2	-	-	11	4	7	
Kepitu (Ken)	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	4	-	
Pinjul (Ken)	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	24	-	
Peliatan	-	1	-	2	-	-	1	1	1	
Cebok	-	-	-	-	31	-	-	-	-	
Tangkup	-	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	
Tumbakasa	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	
Pakuduwi	-	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	
Pakuseba	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Yèh Tengah	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Ambengan	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Kebon	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	
Kedisan	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	
Taro	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	
Pèjèng	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	
Pisang	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	
Buan Jaka	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Tebasaya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	
Batuan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	
Gianyar	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	
Totals:	469	93	79	126	86	57	131	89	137	

* the courts in these three wards each have one small holding in two other subak of otherwise no relevance (subaks Cebok and Bayad).

Code:
Lan = Langkih
Pak = Pakèl
Teb = Teba
Uma = Uma Lawas
T.P. = Tengah Padang
Bel = Belalu
M.P. = Munggu Penganyangan
D.P. = Dukuh-Pinjul
G.P. = Gunung Patas

M.A. = settlement of Manuaba
Ken = settlement of Kenderan

995-6; 1967: 212-4). Geertz has pointed out that these subak are completely separate from residential groupings. Jurally this is correct, for they form independent corporations; it should not be assumed from this that there is no connexion at all between the two, at least in the area round Tengahpadang. For as a glance at Table 3:10 shows almost every association is dominated numerically by a single ward; in two instances this is a settlement while the remaining two are split almost exactly between two wards. Subak Langkih is however so large that it requires more detailed discussion. It is often referred to as a subak gédé (literally: a big subak) and its five sub-sections (tempek) are each known as subak, each with their own councils operating largely independently of one another. There is a substantial difference, however, between the distribution of ownership and the pattern of tenancy. This latter is given in Table 3:11 and the significance of the difference will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. For immediate purposes there are two features of interest. First, in two of the five sections there is an overwhelming number of members drawn from just one ward; while the others also show marked clustering. Second, compared to the distribution of ownership tenancy is more localized. So the farmers who actually work the land are drawn overwhelmingly from wards lying adjacent to the associations in question. The wide spread of these corporate group links does not lead though in most cases to particularly close ties for a variety of reasons (see Chapter 5, and Hobart 1978b). Irrigation associations do not engender immediate relations of cooperation between farmers as, whatever the formal rules, there is always underlying competition for shares in the group's supply of water which is a very scarce resource. Rather than the closeness of plots encouraging solidarity it breeds dissension. As stealing is rife one's neighbours are the main threat to the water supply, regardless of other ties (cf. Leach 1961b, where somewhat different circumstances produced the opposite pattern). So the language of the rice fields tends to be violence, whether between co-members or competing associations, rather than friendship; and several of the most serious quarrels in the village of Tengahpadang stem from disputes over water or land boundaries.

Each association obtains water from a river tapped higher up the mountainside and brings it down through its own system of conduits, acqueducts and channels, to the fields of each farmer, who pays a share according to the proportion of the total amount of water which he officially takes. Recruitment

TABLE 3:11 TENANCY OF LAND IN SECTIONS OF SUBAK LANGKIH.*
(Number of Members: based on households)

Ward:	Sukabayu:	Lankih:	Uma Dalem:	Telun Ayah:	Keraman:	Total:
Gagah	84	13	-	-	-	97
Pisangkaja	5	70	21	1	1	98
Tengahpadang	-	9	20	2	-	31
Triwangsa	-	7	-	3	1	11
Tegal	4	3	30	26	16	79
Tengah	-	-	6	14	19	39
Siklod	-	-	11	22	25	58
Kelabang Moding	-	-	-	27	-	27
Abangan	-	-	-	4	17	21
Jungjungan	-	-	-	-	5	5
Pujung	1	-	-	-	-	1
Totals:	94	102	88	99	84	467

* this table is based not upon ownership of land in the tax files as is Table 3:10, but as more information is available instead on the list of subak members, which is based upon tenancy. So, the figures for 3:10 and 3:11 are for ownership and tenancy respectively and therefore are not identical.

is therefore based on the receipt of a share of the association's resource in return for which each peasant is required to become a member of the group and to pay taxes, contribute labour and perform temple ceremonies at the association's temple. On the other hand each has equal rights, regardless of the quantity of water obtained, in the decision-making council and to a share of proceeds resulting from fines and levies. As Geertz defines it the subak is founded upon common "ownership of rice land lying within a single watershed" (1959a: 992) or "a single water source" (1959a: 995) - the two are commonly different. This group "regulates all matters having to do with the cultivation of wet rice..." (1959a: 995). There are a number of comments which may be made. First there are commonly a large number of associations lying within a single watershed, each with its own water-source from a dam on the river (Korn 1932: 110-12). Second, while the term subak is used as if it referred exclusively to irrigation associations of wet rice fields, there are references in the literature to other grounds of incorporation, such as ownership of dry fields (van der Heijden 1925: 428). Third, in common with other groups the subak tends to be seen ambiguously in terms both of water and of land which is reflected in the definition just given (see also Birkelbach 1973: 153; Grader 1960: 269). So it is often viewed as land lying within a certain area irrigated from a particular source. In Tengahpadang at least the elements are distinguishable; for fields jointly irrigated do not in fact necessarily form a discrete territory and in places farmers may actually have a choice of the association from which they wish to obtain water. So their land may lie in what might be seen as one association's area but be irrigated from another. This is the case for those peasants who receive water from Subak Belalu (see Table 3:10), but whose land lies within what would otherwise be regarded as the confines of Subak Langkih. While in the region round Tengahpadang the criterion of recruitment to associations is the acquisition of a share of water and their main function is the control of irrigation, their activities may stretch to include the regulation of land itself. As a brief consideration of the rules (awig-awig) of Subak Langkih, given in Appendix 1 make clear, the association may deem itself empowered to legislate on the use of land and access to fields as a whole. In other areas associations may fix the crops which may be grown and the dates for planting and other agricultural work. So there is a tendency for associations to assume a territorial dimension not

actually entailed by their grounds for incorporation which concern the sharing of water.

2. Kin Groups:

Whereas the irrigation association does not emphasize the closeness of its members, the opposite is true of the ideology of kinship. The villagers of Tengahpadang belong to a large number of different kin groups, known by a wide variety of terms depending upon what aspect or attribute is being brought to the fore (for a discussion, see Chapter 7). The most common are soroh (van Eck, 1876; van der Tuuk, 1897) or pemaksaan. The nature of Balinese kin groups has been the subject of some controversy which will be discussed in Chapter 7 (chronologically the loci include Geertz & Geertz 1964, Boon 1973; Geertz & Geertz 1975; Barnes, R. 1975; Needham 1976a; Hobart 1977; Boon 1977). Part of this concerns the character of the kin group and its principles of incorporation. This has been described variously as an ambilateral kin group (Geertz 1959a: 998; Geertz & Geertz 1975: 160-1), or better as a core group of origin (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 60-66, 160-2), like Polynesian descent lines (Boon 1974) but, as I shall argue, with strong elements of patrilineal ideology. In different places, or circumstances, different aspects seem to be stressed but they may for the moment be referred to as descent groups.

In the present context, there are a number of points worth noting. From Table 3:8, it will be clear that there is no simple pattern of predominance of any descent group in public office even where, as in Br. Pisangkaja and Tengah, there may be sizeable blocs of related kin. Of somewhat more importance - for we noted that headmen often had restricted powers - there appears to be no simple correlation between descent group membership and factional allegiance for the five wards of Tengahpadang on which I have information (with the part exception of Pisangkaja as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 9; while I have been unable to obtain full details for Br. Tengahpadang and Br. Tegal). Further, while the Geertzes found that in Klungkung "commoner dadia (kin groups) are normally confined to a single hamlet or banjar" (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 60; my parentheses); in Tengahpadang as the location of temples (in Table 3:12) and the geographical spread shows, descent groups are far from being so confined. In fact, only one local branch of Pasek Gèlgèl, who have built a tiny temple in Br. Tengah for four families, is contained within the ward.

TABLE 3:12 DISTRIBUTION OF DESCENT GROUPS OF ALL CASTES IN TENGAHPADANG

Name of Descent Group	Place of Origin	Number of Households in Ward							
		Gagah	P.A.	Teg.	Tri.	Tegl.	Teng.	Sikl.	Total
Brahmana Manuaba	Manuaba	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Brahmana (Unknown)	Bangli (Bangli)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Cokorda Dalem Sukawati	Sukawati	-	7*	1*	1*	-	-	-	9
Anak Agung Dalem S.	Sukawati	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	8
Anak Agung (Déwa Gdé)	Tulikup	-	1	4	3	-	-	-	8
Anak Agung (Déwa Gdé)	Abiyan Basé	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	7
Anak Agung (Déwa Gdé)	Tirtha Arum (Bangli)	-	-	1.	-	-	-	-	1
Pradéwa Besang	Taman Bali (Klungkung)	-	-	1	12	-	-	-	13
Pradéwa Seronggo	Seronggo	-	3	-	5	-	-	-	8
Pradéwa Beng	Beng	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	8
Pradéwa Jati	Bangli (Bangli)	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	6
Pradéwa Bolo	Tengahpadang	2*	2*	-	-	-	-	-	4
Pradéwa Simpar	Tegal Tugu	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	4
Pradéwa Selangga	Gianyar	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
Pradéwa Batu Aya	Gèlgèl (Klungkung)	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
Pradéwa Selokadan	?	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Gusti Keramas	Keramas	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	5
Gusti Sideman	Karangasem (Karangasem)	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
Gusti Batu Lepang	Batuan	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Gusti Jaga Perang	Bangli (Bangli)	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Gusti ?	Br. Angkan	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1

TABLE 3:12 DISTRIBUTION OF DESCENT GROUPS, TENGAHPADANG SHEET 2.

Name of Descent Group:	Place of Origin:	Number of Households in Ward. Gagah	P.A.	Teg.	Tri.	Tegl.	Tengh.	Sikl.	Total
Pandé Tusan	Bangli (Bangli)	3*	-	13(10*)	-	4	2	3	25
Pandé Besi	Badung (Denpasar)	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	11
Pasek Bendésa Mas	Mas	2	5	2	-	6	5	13	33
Pasek Bendésa Rangkan	Br. Rangkan	-	-	3	-	8	1	-	12
Pasek Gèlgèl	Gèlgèl (Klungkung)	-	12	-	-	3	4*	-	19
Pasek Kayu Selem	Soongaan (Bangli)	1	-	2	-	9	4	-	16
Pasek Kayu Selem	Cebok	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Pasek Kayu Selem	(Bangli)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Pulosari	Besakih	2	44(43*)	3(2*)	1*	30*	9*	5*	94
(Pasek) Bebandem	Bebandem (Karangasem)	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	4
(Pasek) Prasanti	(Mengwi)	-	2	-	-	-	2	5	9
(Pasek) Prabali	Puakan	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
Tangkas	Manuaba	21	2	30	-	3	3	5	64
Tangkas	Gèlgèl (Klungkung)	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Dauh	Tengahpadang	4*	36*	-	-	1*	-	-	41
Tangkeban	(Mengwi)	-	-	-	-	1	36	-	37
Cameng	Cemengaon	9*	15*	1*	-	11*	-	5*	41
Jambangan	Kelabang Moding	8	2	-	-	4	2	-	16
Sulang (Pasek Gaduh)	(Tabanan)	-	1	7	-	-	-	-	8
Sembung	(Tabanan)	-	-	6	-	1	-	-	7
Panti Teba	Tengahpadang	7*	-	2*	-	-	-	-	9
(Pasek) Suwat	Suwat	-	-	1	-	-	10	-	11
Kebun Tubuh	Batubulan	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	8

TABLE 3:12 DISTRIBUTION OF DESCENT GROUPS, TENGAHPADANG SHEET 3.

Name of Descent Group:	Place of Origin:	Number of Households in Ward. Gagah	P.A.	Teg.	Tri.	Tegl.	Tengh.	Sikl.	Total:
Gunaksa	Gunaksa,Manuaba	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Batuan	Gianyar	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	6
Kedisan	Kedisan	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4
(Pasek) Gerih	Tulikup	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4
Balé Barak	Pujung	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
(Pasek) Bungbang	Delod Bungbang	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
Abiyan Basé	Abiyan Basé	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
Loksaan	(Klungkung)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Pengootan	Pengootan (Bangli)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Seronggo	Seronggo	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
Dalem Etut Keetut**	Tengahpadang	-	-	2*	-	-	-	-	2
(Pasek) Aan	(Klungkung)	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
Panti Taro	Taro	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Beraban	Beraban (Tabanan)	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Bitera	Bitera	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Don't Know		39	-	17	1	-	-	29	86
Deliberately Ignore		-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
Chinese		-	5	2	1	-	-	-	8
Totals:		115	160	127	49	93	91	71	706

* indicates local temple in Tengahpadang whether parent temple or not (i.e. panti).

** the other members do not regard this as a kin temple (they are Tangkas) but two do. the designation Pasek, as a title, is much disputed. Here I follow local usage (see Chapter 7).

TABLE 3:13 DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWN LOW CASTE DESCENT GROUPS: TENGAHPADANG.

(Based upon known low caste descent groups: figures are number of households)

	DAUH: Tengahpadang*	PULOSARI: Tengahpadang	CAMENG: Tengahpadang	KAYU SELEM: Cebok	JAMBANGAN: Kelabang Moding *	BENDESA MAS: Dukuh	TANGKAS: Br. Tangkas, Manuaba*	GUNAKSA: Br. Gunaksa, Manuaba *	P. GELGEL: Delod Bungbang	P. GELGEL: Gèlgèl*	TAMAN SARI: Mas*	BATUAN: Gianyar *	PANDE TUSAN: Bangli *	PANDE BESI: Denpasar *	LOKSAN: Klungkung *	TOTAL:
Gagah	4		9	-	8	1	21				2				2	61
Pisangkaja	36	43	15	1	2	1	2									112
Tengahpadang		2	1	-	-	1	30						10			46
Triwangsa		-	-	-	-	-	-									1
Tegal	1	30	11	-	4	2	3				6	4	3			61
Tengah		9	-	-	2	2	3				5	2	1			32
Siklod		5		-	-	23	1			13						56
Sapat	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	-	11
Gentong	1	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	23
Kelabang Mod.	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Abangan	-	-	-	-	4	6	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Jungjungan	22	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
Petulu	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Sebali	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Dukuh	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
Pinjul	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	5
Yèh Tengah	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Breséla	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3
Gadungan	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Pujung	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
Taro	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Buan Jaka	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
Calo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
Tatag	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-	-	17
Tumbakasa	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Kedisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1+	-	-	1+
Tangkup	-	9	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
Cebok	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Pandé, M.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	10	-	-	2	-	-	20
Manuaba M.A.	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	11
Tangkas M.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
Gunaksa M.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250
District Gianyar:	12	-	2	3	51	-	17	25	15	23	33	67	170	1	-	419
Outside District:	2	-	-	-	22	-	-	34	5	66+	5+	-	63	3+	28	228
Total:	82	136	44	9	193	81	129	324	23	107+	85	283+	19+	30	1628	

83+

* known or believed to be central temple of descent group.

TABLE 3:14 DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWN HIGH CASTE DESCENT GROUPS: TENGAHPADANG

(Based upon known temples of high castes: this table is far from complete as data was not available on such groups as the wider Cokorda descent group with their temple in Sukawati. It is intended only to give an idea of the extent of the high caste extension.)

	COKORDA: Penataran Tengahpadang	COKORDA: Penataran Manuaba	COKORDA: Penataran Yèh Tengah	DEWA GEDE: Tirtha Arum, Bangli	DEWA GEDE: Abiyan Basé, Gianyar	PRADEWA SIMPAR: Tegal Tugu, Gianyar	PRADEWA SERONGGO: Seronggo, Gianyar	PRADEWA BATU AYA: Gèlgèl, Klungkung	PRADEWA SELANGGA: Gianyar	TOTAL:
Gagah	-	-	-	1*	-	-	-	-	-	1
Pisangkaja	7	8**	7	3	-	2	-	-	-	30
Tengahpadang	3	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	5
Triwangsa	-	-	-	-	6	2	5	2	3	18
Peliatan	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
Yèh Tengah	-	-	110	-	-	-	-	-	-	110
Br.Tangkas,M.A.	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25
Br.Manuaba, M.A.	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	1	-	16
Bayad	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
Kenderan	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	25
District Gianyar	-	-	-	188	41	64	39	98	43	473
Badung	-	-	-	?	-	-	-	-	9	9+
Bangli	-	-	-	352+	-	9	-	20	-	381+
Bulèlèng	-	-	-	10	-	1	-	10	-	21
Karangasem	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	60
Klungkung	-	-	-	?	-	-	-	118	-	118+
Jembrana	-	-	-	8+	-	-	-	-	-	8+
Tabanan	-	-	-	15+	-	-	-	-	-	15+
Island of Lombok	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	15	-	30
Total:	23	33	117	637	48	78	47	324	55	1362

* This is listed for Gagah and Pisangkaja under Pradéwa Jati, as this is their local temple.

** the Cokorda are followed by 1 low caste man in Pisangkaja; in Yèh Tengah there are 70 low caste families worshipping there.

All the others extend more widely and only two are even limited to the settlement. These are Panti Teba and Dalem Etut Kcetut, which we shall see below (Table 3:17) are questionably descent group temples. (Where Table 3:12 shows only one ward with members, this is because the remainder live outside the settlement. So, rather than being closely circumscribed descent forms the basis of sets of ties between villagers across wards and further afield. The extent of this dispersal can be seen in Table 3:13, for all low caste descent groups on which accurate data is available on the full range of membership. This shows that in descent groups with local members only 22.7% were from Tengahpadang; while 37.6% lived elsewhere in the sub-district; 25.7% in other parts of Gianyar and as much as 14% in other kingdoms altogether. So rather than being confined to the ward or even settlement, over three-quarters of descent ties are spread over a wide area. As Table 3:14 suggests however, for the known extent of the main high caste groups, they are even more widely dispersed which is linked to the history of aristocratic politics discussed in Chapter 2. Although figures are rough as informants were not certain how many members belonged in other kingdoms (and omitting the 70 low caste followers in the Pura Penataran Cokorda in Yèh Tengah), only some 4% of members were in Tengahpadang and less than 10% more in the sub-district and its adjacent settlements; while some 36% were elsewhere in Gianyar and 50% or more were to be found in other kingdoms or even in the neighbouring island of Lombok, colonized by the Balinese. Most of these, appropriately, were in the other old kingdoms of Bangli and Klungkung. Throughout I have been referring to the local level of the descent group, what later I shall term the local clan, rather than the widest range of agnatic kin reckoning, (the clan or dadiya) which in many cases is far greater. So it will be clear that even local branches of descent groups, whether high or low caste, are hardly localized.

As a final comment, the Geertzes have made the useful point that recognizing membership of an active descent group is in a sense optional for low castes (the sense of optional must, however, be defined carefully, see Chapter 6). Villagers who have 'forgotten', or ignore, their descent (keélingan) are listed separately in Table 3:12. There are probably more who deliberately do not bother to attend and maintain that they simply do not know. (and where there is clear evidence of this are listed accordingly in the table). It has been

suggested that the greater the proportion of villagers who belong to functioning kin groups, the more descent, or origin, becomes the dominant principle of social cohesion and division (Geert & Geertz 1975: 72-3). The absence of any close correlation of kinship with public office or even factional conflict in Tengahpadang suggests that while crystallization of known descent categories into groups is obviously a necessary condition, it may be not sufficient for it to become a major organizational factor. In fact, regardless of the proportion of peasants who were organized into descent groups (which varies with the ward), in all these such ties tended to play a relatively minor part and were mainly 'dusted off' for visits to annual temple or shrine festivals. Descent is important, I shall argue in Chapter 7, for the moral ties it establishes between persons and the way in which it provides a conceptual framework for the grouping of kin, who on inspection include optionally selected agnates and a large proportion of affines (see Chapters 5, 7 and 9). There is a discrepancy between the formal characteristics of descent groups and their operation, which may be important in understanding the significance of kinship in Balinese society.

3. Caste:

These various descent groups are categorized into a four-part caste system of caste categories, similar in terminology at a certain conceptual level to those described for the Indian sub-continent, from which they are believed to derive historically. The Balinese further possess a form of Hinduism which accounts for, and justifies, these ascribed differences in terms of cosmological distinctions. As the term caste (wangsa or warna) is generally used in Bali, it refers to the external relations of descent groups which are ordered into a hierarchy (Dumont 1970: 65-6). The exact position of certain groups in the middle ranges, particularly those entitled Gusti, are disputed. These tend to be classed as Wèsiya in areas with substantial Satriya populations, and as Satriya where the latter are absent. This does not necessarily throw doubt upon the applicability of ideas of caste, for the dispute is not simply about warna category but rather about relative position argued in terms of ritual purity. In fact, in Tengahpadang, there is a large measure of local agreement as to the rank order of the main groups of high

castes while among low relatively little attention is given to relative position, except among smiths who stand apart (see Chapter 8). The distribution of the main caste groupings and their usual caste category is given in Table 3:15. Unlike the other principles cited by Geertz, caste does not define corporate groups; rather inclusion within the same broad class is often linked to competition (for example, as we saw in Chapter 2 between the Cokorda and Déwa Gedé). Instead cooperation is commonly between members of different castes. This is in part a product of a division of labour (discussed in Chapter 8) which is expressed in terms of traditional relationships of patronage, spiritual, political or economic.

4. Voluntary Associations:

In contrast to the other types of major social group, voluntary associations appear to present the least problems, as they are defined clearly by reference to specific activities in order to share in which their members associate. While this is ostensibly the case there are two important qualifications. First, as Brown (1974; 1976: 24-8) has noted, voluntary association is not a simple principle of incorporation but coexists with others which it qualifies. As I shall try to show in Chapter 6, the single Balinese term for these, sekaha, refers to groupings which range from the largely optative to the effectively obligatory. Further, as associations flourish they may take on other functions and change their nature (Cohen A. 1974: 66 & 92-3), and so defy simple description much as the banjar patus. The variety of associations in Tengahpadang may be seen in Table 3:16. One striking feature emerges from this table; namely that almost all the associations are not only linked to a single ward, but in fact enclosed within it. In only 4 out of 21 or 22 groups, that is 18% or less, does membership extend beyond ward boundaries. Where this happens there is commonly a dominant ward, as can be seen from a glance at the coconut-collecting and barong associations. To the Balinese, this connexion is so close that they tend to judge the degree of solidarity of a ward at any time by the number of associations in which its members participate. This comes out in the way in which Br. Siklod also works collectively as a voluntary organization, which is not to say that the ward itself is a sekaha. For they are seen as organized by contrasting principles (Chapter 6; see also Lansing 1974, on the notion of kaiket, or obligatory ties). As the table shows,

TABLE 3:15 THE DISTRIBUTION OF CASTE TITLE GROUPS IN DÉSA ADAT TENGAHPADANG.
(all figures based on numbers of households)

	Caste Title:	Gagah	Pisang-kaja	Tengah-pandang	Triwa-ngsa	Tegal	Tengah	Siklod	Total	Total Caste	Total Wangsa	Wangsa %.
B	Brahmana	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	2	0.3%
S	Cokorda	-	7	1	1	-	-	-	9	17	82	11.6%
S	Anak Agung	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	8			
S	Déwa Gedé*	-	1	6	9	-	-	-	16	65		
S	Pradéwa	3	12	2	32	-	-	-	49			
W	Gusti	-	-	2	3	-	1	4	10	10	10	1.4%
Su	Pandé	3	-	13	-	4	11	5	36	36	36	5.1%
Su	Jaba	109	126	101	2	89	79	62	568	568	568	80.5%
Su	Chinese	-	5	2	1	-	-	-	8	8	8	1.1%
	Totals:	115	160	127	49	93	91	71	706	706	706	100.0%

* The Déwa Gedé are now formally titled as Anak Agung (literally: supreme person,great one), although they are related to the various descent groups with Déwa in the title. For convenience here, in order to avoid hopeless confusion, I shall distinguish the two types of Anak Agung.

Code: To the left the table indicates the caste category (warna or wangsa) to which descent groups belong.
B = Brahmana
S = Satriya
W = Wèsiya
Su= Sudra For general purposes this last includes Chinese and smiths (Pandé). We shall see how this last especially forms a distinct group in Chapter 8. Collectively low castes are commonly known as jaba, outsiders.

TABLE 3:16 THE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS FUNCTIONING IN DÉSA ADAT TENGAHPADANG.
(This table is based upon the number of persons not households, see text.)

Ward:	Hoeing:	Harvest:	Coconut:	Roofing:	Music (Gong):	Music (Angklung):	Barong:	General:	Totals: V.A.	Totals: Members:
Gagah:	19	-*	1	-	-	19	3	-	5	43
Pisangkaja:	1 11 7	? ? ? ?	34	-	46	-	-	9	9	107+
Tengahpadang:	-	-	14	11	(±50)	40	56	-	4(5)	121(171)
Triwangsa:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tegal:	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	1	7
Tengah:	-	? ? ?	-	-	-	-	23	-	4	23+
Siklod:	-	-	71	-	71	-	10	-	3	152**
Totals: Sekaha:	3	7	3	1	2(3)	2	2	1	21(22)	
Numbers:	38	?	120	11	117(167)	59	99	9	453(503+)	

? indicates voluntary association whose precise numbers were unknown (as I was about to leave the field).
* there are three harvesting associations temporarily inactive, but not disbanded.
** here the ward as a whole acts as a voluntary association for harvesting coconuts and gong kebiyar orchestra.
*** this is the total number of voluntary associations. Where they are temporarily inactive but the membership is known, this has been put in parentheses; where an association extends across ward boundaries, it has been enclosed by a black border.

Of a total of 22 associations (21 of known size), only 4 overlapped ward boundaries and only 1 included as many as 3 wards, in each case there was a clearly dominant banjar numerically. In 3 of these 4, the linked wards formed a ritual unit for other purposes already. Gagah and Pisangkaja not only perform the désa temple ceremony together but worship jointly at pura dalem kauh whose coconuts the association collects. Likewise, the wards Tegal, Tengah and Siklod jointly conduct the festival in the désa temple in their turn.

The orchestras are gamelan gong kebiyar (gong) and gamelan angklung respectively (see McPhee, 1966, Chs. 15 & 19). The Barong are large sacred puppets described in Belo (1949), who dance to music or sing.

Br. Tegal has little participation in such groups which reaffirms the inference drawn from their relatively small ward treasury that they engage in little collective work. Br. Gagah is also notable for the high proportion of agricultural associations which fits their supposed preoccupation with farming. Br. Triwangsa had no regular associations during this period, but was very active in theatrical troupes formed for a particular occasion. Some of its members were about to organize a more definite association as I left the field. Once again however it is the two main wards which conspicuously engage in such activities. In the few instances where voluntary associations do spread across ward boundaries they tend to fall within some pre-existing wider unit. Gagah and Pisangkaja together support the Pura Dalem Kauh whose coconuts a special association harvests and they, like the three wards of Tegal, Tengah and Siklod, act as a unit in the performance of festivals in the Pura Désa. So where a degree of optionality is permitted in the organization of social and economic activities, it is significant that villagers almost invariably choose to develop further ties within the ward or more exceptionally to slightly wider ward-based units.

5. Temple Congregations:

Finally Tengahpadang is the site for a large number of temples. Some of these belong to the corporations already discussed, and Geertz has argued that the temple system serves as a map for the Balinese of their own social structure "sufficient to permit its participants to find their way around in it." (Geertz 1967: 239; see also 1959a: 992-3). In this way the complexity of different sets of overlapping membership may be made plain, it is suggested, by the groups being classified in terms of ritual sites in what Boon has called "a metamode to index the other modes." (1977: 61-2) which adds a spatial referent to structure.) While it is possible that this is so ideally, the ethnography is less easily classified. As Table 3:17, which describes the salient features of all the temples on, or surrounding, the village land of Tengahpadang, shows for over half of all these there is either uncertainty as to the purpose of the temple or else ambiguity as to the precise delineation of the group which supports it. The map tends to be more confused and complicated than the system which it is supposed to describe.

TABLE 3:17 THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE TEMPLES SITED IN OR NEAR THE DÉSA ADAT OF TENGAHPADANG

Map No:[1]	Temple Name:	Priest:[2] (Pemangku)	Festival[3] Calendar	Barong:[4]	Temple Land: (laban pura)	Supporters:[5] Households	Wards	Désa	Temple Type:	Comments:
A	Panti Teba	I Condèl (G: Gunaksa)	JB	-	-	8	2	1	Descent	Treated as descent group temple, but group unknown
B	Sengseng Catu	I Condèl (G: Gunaksa)	JB	-	-	17	1	1	Special	nyungsung (responsibility of) families from Gagah; argument over whether whole ward should support it.
C	Yèh Empul	I Bawa (Ten:Tangkas)	JB	-	believed to exist in Petulu	?	?	?	Water Source	This is thought to be the water source temple for Subak Petulu to the south.
D	Bolo	J.M.Désa or (P: Pulosari) I Condèl (G:Gunaksa)	JB	-	rice: 0.2ha. dry: 0.15ha. coconut: 8 trees	29+	2	2	Special	Local temple supported by south Gagah, also now origin temple for Pradéwa Bolo as ancestor said to have asked for supernatural power there.
E	Désa	J.M.Désa (P: Pulosari)	HB	-	rice: 1.69ha. dry: 0.15ha.	420 (706)	7	1	Village	Combined Pura puseh and pura balé agung. Properly run by compound owner (désa) but helped by other households.
F	Mascèti	†A.A.Kencan (P: Cokorda) J.M.Désa (P: Pulosari)	HB	-	rice: 0.64ha.	468	11	5	Irrigation Association	For whole of Subak Langkih; each section takes it in turn to perform festival which used to be according to Javanese-Balinese year

TABLE 3:17 (Continued)

Map[1] No:	Temple Name:	Priest:[2] (Pemangku)	Festival[3] Calendar	Bar-[4] ong:	Temple Land: (laban pura)	Supporters:[5] Households	Wards	Désa	Temple Type:	Comments:
G	Dalem Kauh	J.M.Dalem (P: Dauh)	JB	-	rice: 1.0ha. dry: 1.0ha. coconut trees: 30	275	2	1	Village (but see text)	One of two pura dalem, for Gagah and Pisangkaja, but maturan (voluntary offering) from all 7 wards. Responsibility of Br. patus not Br. Désa. Has 2 festivals every Javanese-Balinese year; one for Batara Dalem, one for five Pandawa brothers, also worshipped there.
H	Geriya	1) J.M.Geriya (Tg: Gèlgèl) 2) J.M. Geriya Rana (Tn: Jambangan)	JB	-	-	706	7	1	Village (but see text)	Built in 1960 in 34 days by whole village after the god asked for old temple to be rebuilt through medium in trance. Responsibility of each ward in turn (Br. patus not Br. Désa)
I	Indrakila	J.M.Dalem Kauh (P: Dauh)	JB	-	rice: 0.29ha.	82	3	12	Descent	Descent group temple of origin for Dauh (see Tables 3:12 & 3:13)
J	Penataran Cokorda	J.M.Geriya (Manuaba:?)	JB	-	rice: 1.0ha± dry: 1.0ha±	13	-	1	State	One of the Cokorda state temples Pura Penataran: for family from Peliatan. Worshipped also by Cokordas from Pisangkaja and Tengahpadang and also Déwa Gedé from Puri Sarèn Kauh, Tengahpadang

TABLE 3:17 (Continued)

Map No:	Temple Name:	Priest: (Pemangku)	Festival Calendar	Barong:	Temple Land: (laban pura)	Supporters Households	Supporters Wards	Supporters Désa	Temple Type:	Comments:
K	Tanjungsari	J.M.Désa (P:Pulosari)	JB	-	-	137	5	4	Descent	Local temple (panti) for most Pulosari, but not all in region round Tengah-padang. Now includes Pulosari who previously supported Pura Duur Bingi see below.
L	Dalem Etut Keetut	J.M.Bawa (Ten:Tangkas)	JB	Macan (Tiger)	-	7	2	1	Special	Myth states built by 12 mer from Batur who came to Tengahpadang: 2 now see it as pemaksaan, others no Has voluntary association for barong (see Table 3:16; also Ch. 9.).
M	Melanting	Not fixed	JB	-	-	open	1	1	Market	Market temple with rites offered for auction among 7 wards, paid by administrative village and market, worshipped by marketeers and many families from désa adat

TABLE 3:17 (Continued)

Map No:	Temple Name:	Priest: (Pemangku)	Festival Calendar	Barong:	Temple Land: (laban pura)	Supporters Households	Wards	Désa	Temple Type:	Comments:
N	Dalem Kangin	1) J. M. Dalem (Ten:Pandé Tusan) 2) J. Seliran (Ten:Kebon Tubuh)	JB	Ratu Mas Kèkèt (Lion+)	rice: 0.76ha. coconut trees: 60	431	5	1	Village (but see text)	Like Pura Dalem Kauh actually responsibility of Br. patus (except Br. Tengah = Br. Désa.) Jèro Seliran is responsible for care of barong.
O	Panti Cameng	Not fixed	JB	–	–	44	5	3	Descent	Local temple (panti) for descent group Cameng.
P	Jelantik	Not fixed	JB	–	–	4	1	1	Descent	Responsibility of 4 households from descent group Gèlgèl as local panti (only one to be confined to a single ward, Br. Tengah.).
Q	Duur Bingin	Gusti Mangku Duur Bingin (Tn: Gusti Batu Lepang)	JB	Ratu Gedé Landung (Giant Humans)	rice: 0.76ha. coconut trees: 30	431	5	1	Special	Originally temple of Pulosari Siangan (descent group) Taken over by village after supposed trance (see Ch. 10 for detailed account). For voluntary association for barong (see Table 3:16).
R	Dalem Guang	Not fixed	JB	–	–	5	1	1	Special	Believed to be very old temple, nyungsung by 5 kuren from Siklod for generations. Not descent group.

Table 3:17

Code:

1. The letter of the alphabet is used to indicate the place on Map 3.

2. The resident temple priest (pemangku) who performs all normal rites in the temple. Sometimes the main rite (ngaturang piodalan) during the annual festival is performed by a Brahmana high priest (pedanda).
This column indicates: 1. priest's name
(2. Ward of origin: 3. Descent group title)

1. The priest is addressed and referred to as: Jèro Mangku followed by the name of the temple, or sometimes his autonym (see also Appendix 7.). Full priests are indicated accordingly by the initials J.M. There may be a subsidiary figure of variable function called Jèro (as in the Pura Dalem Kangin).

2. The code for the wards is:

G	=	Gagah
P	=	Pisangkaja
Ten	=	Tengahpadang
Tg	=	Tegal
Tn	=	Tengah

(Manuaba) = priest from the settlement of Manuaba (see Map 2).

3. Descent group title is as in Table 3:12

1) 2) indicates two regular priests or indicates one or other may be used

† indicates incumbent recently deceased.

3. Festival Calendar refers to which of the two Balinese calendars the main rites follow:
HB = Hindu-Balinese year based on solar-lunar months
JB = Javanese-Balinese calendar of 210 days (see Gloris 1960a)

4. The barong are gigantic puppets in a number of forms which are widely believed to be of great supernatural power. Each year in the Javanese-Balinese calendar, for 35 days (a month in this system) they wander around escorted by a voluntary association or similar group. (For details on the kinds of barong see Belo 1949).

5. Each column refers to the number of units of each kind which support the temple (nyungsung, see below).

Terms of Relevance:

Nyungsung	=	to support a temple by bearing the costs and performing the temple ceremonies. This is distinct from:
Maturan	=	to take voluntary offerings and pray (accept holy water) from a temple. The congregation who does this is often wider than those who formally nyungsung.
Pemaksaan	=	in Tengahpadang this means a descent group.
Panti	=	in Tengahpadang the general term for a small local temple nyungsung by a local congregation who recognize the existence of a wider clan grouping (see Chapter 7).
Village	=	this refers here to the customary village (désa adat)

This variety in temple congregations may partly be understood in the light of two types of process. First over time the reasons for association may be forgotten, particularly in minor temples, or else the worshippers die out, move away or more commonly simply let attendance lapse. Perhaps more often though unusual events or occurrences may be interpreted in different ways as signs of divine will and provide new possible explanations of the purpose of the temple which may become incorporated into its routine and concomitantly lead to new, or ancillary, congregations (see Bateson 1937 for an example, and Chapter 10). Second there is a difference between the groups which supports (nyungsung) a temple and the potential range of worshippers who take voluntary offerings (maturan) and pray change over time for countless reasons and may affect the former. As an example of possible change, Pura Bolo in south Gagah has traditionally been run by villagers in the ward of Gagah living to the south of Pura Yeh Empul. It has a large and widely dispersed body of worshippers, because the deity is believed to be very potent and wont to rove around the neighbourhood in the guise of a gigantic snake. It is commonly held that this led to several men going to the temple to pray for supernatural power (numas sakti, see Chapter 8). One of these was the ancestor of a family of Satriya from Pisangkaja, who were not part of the original congregation. As the deity is believed to have looked favourably on them they have continued to attend and support the temple. Gradually it has been treated as if it were their place of descent group origin, despite the predominance of low caste members and they now qualify their caste title with the name of the temple, and are known as Pradéwa Bolo (see Table 3:12). So men may go to temples for various reasons and the supporters or wider congregation may vary accordingly over time.

This discussion still leaves the more general problem, which tends to be glossed over, of the nature of the link between ritual sites and groups and why some types of group should commonly have temples but others not. This may be connected in part with simple ideas of self-aggrandisement (Geertz Geertz 1975: 61-2), by which temple construction is a reflex of group concerns with prestige. However, groups such as the administrative village or voluntary associations do not possess permanent ritual sites at all in Tengahpadang.

Neither do wards, although they are the probably most functionally complex and the groups which are involved in the most intense competition of all. The question of the factors behind temple growth and proliferation are too complex to be discussed properly here, but one point suggests itself immediately. This is linked to the earlier consideration of adat and Sharer's suggestion that "every part of the cosmos possesses its own place in this order..." (Sharer 1963: 75). It is not just that Balinese rites generally tend to mark out the boundaries of relevant space, but also that those groups which are required to have permanent ritual sites, the customary village or irrigation association for example, possess a distinctive, if approximate, territory or spatial focus identified with a major value in Balinese society. First, as a perusal of Table 3:17 (or of Goris's work on "The Temple System" in Bali, 1960b) shows, temples are widely linked to particular areas and topographical features. This emerges not merely in their names - pura segara, sea temple, or pura puser ing jagat, temple of the navel of the world - but in the exceptional concern with the siting of temples (James 1973). Second they are often concerned with unusual events by which the temple marks, or sets the boundaries of, exceptional manifestations. So temples seem to be linked to the sources or variation of adat, both in space and, through calendrically regulated festivals, in time. This argument might possibly be extended to explain a striking feature of Balinese society, by which culturally valued objects from domestic animals to iron, literature or orchestras, have their time of recognition (known as an odalan, often translated as birthday but from the root: edal = to come out, emerge) in a definite proper place where its existence is celebrated. Rather than every group having its temple, it would be closer to the truth to say that everything has its place and may well at some time the object of attention by a more or less defined group.[20]

Conclusion:

There have been two main themes in this chapter: the variable structure and relationships of corporate groups in Tengahpadang; and the discussion of the geographical spread and overlapping membership of these as variously understood by the villagers. Balinese society is noted for the range of theoretically independent corporate groups of which it is in no small part

composed. In this chapter I have reviewed briefly their structure and organization in the area under study. There is however a substantial difference between a formal, or jural, model of the characteristics of local corporations and their operation. This was examined at some length for groups focused around residential land; and similar points were outlined shortly for the others. In theory Balinese corporate groups are structured according to clear principles. These govern not only the grounds of recruitment, but also the range of affairs, the sphere of autonomy and their internal organization of each. This notionally unambiguous classification which seemed to set clear boundaries between corporations proved however to operate only in part. It became apparent that there was extensive overlapping, or indeed confusion, not just of functions but also of the spheres of competence, organization of authority and recruitment to groups. In particular cases this might arise from the play of contingency or tactical considerations, not uncommonly expressed in some way in formal terms. More generally, however, the ideas upon which the principles 'informing' corporations are based allowed of extension and showed varying degrees of ambiguity. So it was possible both for different groups to lay claim to organize an activity by referring to different principles; and for definitions of affairs and grounds for recruitment to vary with different interpretations of the meaning, or reference, of indigenous concepts. We saw how this worked in some detail for the customary village and ward. Finally some of the possible dimensions of semantic variation were outlined using the concept of désa as the example.

The second theme of the chapter was more ethnographic and concerned the overlap of relationships and personnel locally. It was suggested that the web of effective ties is confined to a region and attains an increasing density within the customary village and the ward. For low castes this region varies according to the purpose but is rarely more than some eight kilometres in radius; for high castes the region is far larger and may stretch beyond the bounds of the traditional kingdoms. Within this catchment area ties tend to convolute locally. For villagers the ward and the customary village provide the foci for local political activity and for the definition of a broader group within which a body of custom and religious belief prevail. The other corporations which extend across ward and settlement boundaries tend to have de facto rather than de jure connexions to a given locality. It was shown how this happened in irrigation

associations, descent groups and the largest voluntary organizations. Ties of kinship and marriage cannot be so simply defined however. For all castes these may spread beyond the confines of the settlement. There was a marked preference among commoners, however, to marry locally; whereas for high castes the territorial circumscription was broader, especially for powerful dynastic families. So, with the part exception of aristocrats, villagers tend to be related to one another through a series of overlapping ties in different corporations and by further dyadic links. Here the jural distinctiveness of groups tends to disguise the degree of similarity of the personnel involved. This has implications for the structure and organization of corporations. First it makes possible, and may even encourage, the lack of clarity in the definition of groups. If the members are largely the same, the delineation of spheres of competence and the range of affairs of groups may not attain a critical importance or may be used to tactical advantage. Second this overlap has potential importance for the conversion of assets between groups where these involve substantially the same actors. In the following chapters I hope to show the extent to which these various processes are borne out by the detailed examination of a single community.

Chapter 3. Footnotes

1. Among the works which discuss, or comment on, Balinese village society and its institutions are: Belo 1936; Boon 1973: 105-12; 1977; Geertz 1959a, 1967; Geertz H. 1972; Geertz & Geertz 1975; Goris 1960c; Koentjaraningrat 1975; Korn 1932; 1933; ter Haar, 1948.

2. Boon reads this as "organizational planes of significance". Geertz's sentence actually reads: "The analysis of village structure therefore consists in first discriminating the organizational planes of significance and then describing the manner in which, in actual fact, they intersect." He continues "In Bali, seven such planes are of major significance..." (1959a: 992). My understanding of this is that he is referring to the planes which are of importance in the analysis of Balinese society; whereas the impression I have from Boon's rendition is closer to planes of meaning. Boon, however, has worked closely with Geertz and should know. More generally, it will be noted that this indigenous approach depends upon a determinate theory of meaning and reference which was criticized in Leach by Gellner (1973a, 1973b; see also Crick, 1976). It is interesting to note that a different type of model was developed also for South East Asia by Leach (1954) to try to account for variation and change.

3. Geertz's distinction between worship groups, or congregations, and the principles underlying the main local groups and institutions is, however, important as it brings out the complex relationship of the two. Precisely what is singled out for specifically ritual attention and the nature of the group concerned seem to vary. For instance, in some parts of Bali, wards may possess temples; in others they do not but may have shrines which do not necessarily serve the same cosmological functions (see also Chapter 10, Case 21.) While the Dutch tended to stress the religious nature of the village community (desa adat; see Goris 1960c), Geertz has pointed to some of the problems in this (Geertz 1961; 1967: 212). One might add that this raises problems about the designation of something as religious. This issue is discussed briefly below. The whole question of indigenous definitions of the religious and the idea of worship would seem to need more careful study.

4. Smith further points out that the formal and substantive entailments of such principles affect the form of corporations which qualifies the principles themselves. For:

> 'Clearly, if a series of principles such as descent, locality and property are combined to demarcate and constitute the corporate unit, besides their formal or conceptual consistency with one another, their combination generates operational interrelations of a substantive kind... However, while the substantive requisites and entailments that attach to a specific set of clearly defined incorporative principles

> indicate their conditions of integration and continuity, they also appear to determine the form of the corporate unit based on that set... such differences of corporate form inevitably qualify the specific principles selected and the mode of their combination." (1974b: 183, his italics).

In other words, the logical and contextual combination of different principles underlying groups causes changes in the principles themselves, so that simple determination of invariant fundamental ingredients is difficult.

5. This is distinct from migration, which is not highly developed. In the period from 1917 to 1972, apart from policemen and other officials away on duty, nine males had entered, and thirteen left, Pisangkaja, out of a total population of over 700 people. A further eight were overseas, either on government sponsored trans-migration schemes of working in various occupations. Most, if not all, are likely to return, from past experience. So about 30 males in two generations have moved in or out. The number who have gone away on temporary seasonal work is higher. So also is the total of persons who have entered or left Pisangkaja on marriage, which as we have seen is the main source of mobility.

6. In 1972, this was due to total some Rp1,000,000 (£1,000). In Tengahpadang itself, this is under a measure of scrutiny from the sub-district officer who is resident there, but nonetheless offers a substantial prize for those who benefit from it.

7. The term désa tends to have a territorial referent among its various connotations (see van der Tuuk 1897) and may be linked with Indian ideas (Inden 1976: 13-14). Désa in Bengal means a country, or territory.

8. Religion is intended here in a loose sense. The problems in anthropological definitions are legion, see for instance Geertz 1966b; Gellner 1974c on Durkheim; Goody 1961; Horton 1960; Lévi-Strauss 1962, 1966; Skorupski 1976.). Balinese indigenous distinctions of what constitutes agama, often translated as religion, are also complex (Hooykaas 1973b). In some senses the views of religion in Tengahpadang have much in common with Burridge's approach (1969). As he put it, religion is 'concerned with the systematic ordering of different kinds of power, particularly those seen as significantly beneficial or dangerous... which, though sensed and affective, are currently not wholly comprehended..." (1969: 5). The distinction between politics and religion, it then follows, is in part between understood or encompassed power and that which is not, or not yet. According to this argument there is not necessarily a difference between what are often termed religion and politics, in so far as they are both concerned with power in some form. One possible application of this approach is laid out in Chapters 9 and 10. Following my general argument, however, that concepts may be linked in many potentially diverse ways it should be noted that there are times when the Balinese treat religion and politics as antithetical, or classify particular institutions according to a dichotomy of sacred: profane. As we shall see, these neat conceptual oppositions are hard to maintain systematically without torturing the varied ethnographic accounts or ignoring alternative modes of classification. A more detailed examination of the ways in which conceptual or semantic distinctions may be rerendered in terms of different categorical systems is discussed briefly in Chapter 8 (on darma) and is one of the themes of a forthcoming research trip.

or semantic distinctions may be rerendered in terms of different categorical systems is discussed briefly in Chapter 8 (on darma) and is one of the themes of a forthcoming research trip.

9. Following the model of adat the temples of the customary village may be seen as the spatial foci through which the congregation (however defined, see below) is connected with this wider order. Similarly, the building of the Pura Geriga took place in 1960 at a time when the administrative village was deeply divided by political party loyalties. In some sense this may be seen as the resolution of secular conflict by recourse to religion; but it might equally be viewed as the reaffirmation of customary values against disturbances seen as caused by non-traditional, even non-Balinese, institutions. As we shall see in Chapter 9 national politics is regarded as out of place even in 'secular' groups like the ward.

10. Significantly where dry fields fall within the bounds of village land, as with the dry fields attached to temples in one ward (Map 4), they are regarded as set apart and somewhat dangerous. Although habitation in the rice fields is increasingly common (and popular in so far as it not only avoids certain public responsibilities, but also is far from most of the population and so from witches), this is thought to lead to their eventual impurity (Korn 1932: 83).

11. Owing to its size of 420 households in all, the entirety of seven banjar désa is not required to each festival (piodalan). These are sub-divided into three units, which habitually perform the rites and carry out the preparation together, the duty being rotated clockwise. This provides an interstitial level of grouping within the settlement, which is of some importance for marking the wards which are tightly linked in practice. The three units are: Gagah and Pisangkaja (140 households); Triwangsa and Tengahpadang (98 households) and Tegal, Tengah and Siklod (182 households). So a heavier burden falls upon Triwangsa and Tengahpadang, in terms of the obligations on each désa member, which suggests that the division may be as much a ratification of existing patterns of ties between wards as an artificial imposed one. The collective work of more than one banjar désa raises questions about Durkheimian notions of aggregation encouraging solidarity. As these festivals involve complex division of tasks, there is often dispute over the exact outlay and the assumption of a fair share of work, so that it tends to take the intervening three years between occasions for the wards to regain good relations rent asunder by collective activity.

12. These three classes are defined by reference to land, as owners of a traditional section of village land, as owners of housland (in the fields) and those without any houseland (but possibly with farmland in a few cases). This classification parallels to some degree a similar distinction in Javanese villages (Koentjaraningrat 1967: 266-70; Jay 1969: 313-6). There is a similar use of tripartite classification in both cultures for the types of temple, again in some of these, with reference to the ground and the original settler. For the Balinese distinction between puseh (original founder), désa (collective group on village land) and dalem (dead ancestors), the Javanese have discrete

shrines for the following sets of spirits: (c) akal bakal, the founding ancestor of the village (Koentjaraningrat 1967: 269-70; cf. Geertz 1960b: 26fn who refers to cikal bakal); the danyang desa, the guardian spirit of the village area (Geertz 1960b: 26-8, 82); and the individual ancestors who are worshipped at their graves (Jay 1969: 179-84, 329-30).

13. The kuren usually possesses its own kitchen (paon) and forms an economic unit, but the domestic and jural groups may be distinct in the limiting case (see Chapter 4). For most purposes this must be able to produce both a male and female for different kinds of work (the term for spouse is pekurenan); but most wards recognize incomplete households of batchelors (balu muani) and spinsters (balu luh), the latter commonly being granted certain exemptions, the former not. While the kuren generally forms a household therefore, this is not always so. It is also the general unit of membership of superordinate social groupings; but again there are exceptions. Voluntary association membership or tenancies on riceland and the attached obligations fall on a single person.

14. In the past it seems that the emnity between courts was largely responsible for this pattern of opposition. Now it is more complicated. While the courts retain a certain influence in Tengahpadang through control over the administrative village headmanship, in Pisangkaja the position of the court is currently less critical as a result of its economic and political decline and the changing balance of power (discussed briefly at the end of the last chapter and later in the thesis). At the time of the Revolution, the conflict was both between rival wards and the local Cokorda against the Déwa Gedé. The extent to which political parties have been more than convenient idioms for long-standing quarrels is a complex issue which is discussed in Chapter 9.

15. This case also refers back to the argument of the last chapter, that there are different frameworks for the evaluation of contemporary social relationships and action. Here there are discrepant views on the part of ordinary villagers and certain young active village politicians, who scoffed at the idea of inviting the gods to intervene in political party affairs or including government business under adat. There is a further aspect to the matter. The administrative village head at the time (Table 2:3) was a fervent, and the customary village head a lukewarm, supporter of the nationalist party, who were in danger of losing their political dominance. So the plea for solidarity and no violence (against them) gave an added spice to the whole issue.

16. There are several kinds of link between a group and a particular space. Others of some interest are the irrigation association and kin groups, which also possess spatial referents held to be pure (suci). These differ significantly in their designation. The irrigation association is focused on the source of water, usually a spring (where there is a temple such as a Pura Ulun Siwi; for the groups around Tengahpadang this is at Apuh to the north in Map 2), and at the point where their own

water supply is divided from the main stream (for Subak Langkih (see below) this is near Pujung - Map 3). Kin groups commonly refer to their place of origin (kawitan, see Geertz . . Geertz 1975) and may be applied at different levels. Royal families tend to proliferate state temples (Pura Penataran) at important points in their realms (jagat in high Balinese; gumi in low. The word - perhaps significantly - is also used for the world as a whole).

17. Despite my persistent inquiry I was unable to establish the existence of a classification which linked habitable land with forest, of which there is precious little left on the island (cf. Endicott 1970: 101-19). Woods however are broken down separately in a different set:

Classification of types of wood:	alas wayah	:	alas cerik	:	ebet
	virgin forest	:	secondary forest	:	clumps of wild growth

18. Recognition of this in part underlies the attempts of the compound occupants to remove them from the ward altogether, discussed in Chapter 9, Case 17. Orators who have a reputation for bravery, but also wildness, are drawn often from non-heirs - 9 out of 16 in the ward studied.

19. This statement is substantially correct, as most owners are also tenants. It does require qualification where absentee owners are concerned, although with the Land Reform Laws this is now a minor issue, as landholding in associations lying in different sub-districts is generally not permitted. It was not possible to obtain full and accurate figures for tenancies for such a large area, as these not only change, but also official lists tend to be out of date, and memories incomplete for an inquiry (but not in practice, where the layout of fields provides the list). Table 3:11 shows the closer geographical circumscription of actual tenancy for Subak Langkih.

20. Some of the principles underlying this differentiation of groups may be linked to sets of semantic oppositions. For example, land as a focus of groups may be divided into residential (unproductive ?) and productive, and the latter into irrigated and dry (this omits, however, productive land within the compound). Another distinction to be discussed in Chapter 6 is that between compulsory and voluntary groups. These distinctions may be used to form a multi-dimensional model which might go some way to accounting for some of the more obvious permutations found in the island. Such oppositions, as we noted above in the discussion of the various contexts in which a term like désa is used, are not necessarily fixed but may have a range of meanings between which the connexions are complex and potentially varying. Whether other principles underlie the recognition of objects as valuable in the same way would require more research.

Chapter 4. Pisangkaja: the Unit of Intensive Study.

Introduction:

The aim of this chapter is primarily descriptive. As we have seen, the variety of corporate groups to which villagers from Tengahpadang belong and the size of the total population enfolded is somewhat large for intensive study. So I wish to address myself in the following chapters to the detailed analysis of social relationships and processes within a norrower confine. For reasons which will be discussed, the most suitable unit proved to be a ward and the field of social relationships of its members. Of these, the oldest and largest ward, Pisangkaja, was the best choice on account of its recent history, social composition and place in local affairs generally. I propose in this chapter to describe the layout of the ward and its surroundings. For the Balinese the space in which they live cannot be described simply geographically; but includes their evaluation of its significance, of which I shall try to note some of the major features. The present pattern of settlement in the ward has undergone change during the course of this century from being a small community of compound owners to becoming a larger, more diversified group which is bursting its traditional territorial boundaries. I would like therefore to trace briefly the history of change during the course of the last fifty or so years to show the process of compound fission and their present internal structure. The ward contains one hundred and sixty households and during the course of the next six chapters, the thesis will investigate in detail the pattern of ownership of resources, social relationships and special features of these. In order to do so, it is convenient to introduce standardized tables so that the reader may, if he wishes, follow serially the different sets of ties and attributes of each household. The format is given here for the first time and the table lays out, with the aid of a map, the compounds, their component households and numbers of members as well as their caste titles and their local descent group ties. Not all households, let alone villagers, play an equally important part in local affairs. So in the final section I shall introduce some of the main actors and the relations between them.

For a variety of reasons the entire settlement of Tengahpadang is unsuitable for intensive study. First, and perhaps foremost, it is too large to

permit the detailed examination of the pattern and effects of overlapping and cross-cutting relationships on social action and its meaning. Second such a study by the nature of the distribution of ties within the settlement would consist in no small part in the investigation of seven largely separate and different wards. Even were this feasible it would prove repetitive, for there is extensive similarity in the social processes at work in each. Third a focus on a specific type of group, such as irrigation associations (Birkelbach 1973) or descent groups (Geertz & Geertz 1975) is likely to prove at worst barren, at best incomplete; as it isolates one set of relationships from their social context and one set of semantic features from their broader field. While each institution or group has singular significance, they differ in their importance in social action. In this second respect it is the ward in particular which serves as the main face-to-face community and which harbours the resources and prizes regarded as valuable, at least by the villagers of Tengahpadang. So the ward makes a convenient unit of intensive study from which to trace out the diverse ties of its members. As Geertz has noted, however, these are not simply contained within the ward. So in subsequent chapters I shall examine the main groups and institutions with particular reference to one ward, but as part of a more complex field of social relations.

Of the wards. Pisangkaja was the most suitable for detailed research on a number of grounds. By their size and place within the settlement the two largest wards proved on early inspection to offer the widest variety of social forms and processed, and to be the foci of much of the supra-local social activity within the customary and administrative villages. Tengahpadang was the less appropriate not only as it was spatially mixed up with Br. Triwangsa, but also the presence of the market, sub-district office, police station and a concentration of courts all combined to make it somewhat unusual for a rural commumity. Pisangkaja lacked these drawbacks without at the same time being untypically remote or enclosed. It also had interesting organizational features: by repute the oldest part of the settlement, it was the site of a number of important temples, and some of the main local experts in <u>adat</u> lived there. Apart from its court, it had a wide range of castes and some notably influential low caste families. The changing economic and political position of the Cokorda was reflected in trans-formations in traditional patron-client relations with villagers and in the shifting balance with the other main dynastic family in Gianyar - the Dewa (that is the

Dewa Gede and Pradewa). Moreover the distribution of low caste descent ties offered the possibility of numerically and politically dominant groups emerging as suggested by the Geertzes (1975: 67-85). This is not to imply that Pisangkaja is 'representative' - it is open whether this evaluation should apply to past acts or to the varying ways in which these may be interpreted (see also Needham 1975 on the problems of classification by representative examples) - rather it presents a range of elements widely found in Balinese society. It is this ward and its field of social relations, by which the members are linked in various constellations of corporate group and dyadic ties to other villagers, both within the settlement and beyond, which will be the primary object of study in this thesis.

The Ward and its Surroundings:

Pisangkaja is closer than most of the other wards to having the classic, ideal layout of the settlement (Tan 1966: 471-2). From north to south runs a broad path intersected at right angles by another leading from Tengahpadang to the rice fields and ultimately to Yèh Tengah and Payangan. These cut the ward into four neat quarters (tempèk) which form the basis for most division of public work and are named simply after the quadrants where they lie (see Map 4.). In the ritually purest direction, to the north-east, stands the imposing facade of the village temple, decorated with elaborate carving in volcanic rock (paras) and beside it the Pura Mascèti, belonging to the neighbouring irrigation association of Langkih. Immediately to the north-east of the cross-roads, in the appropriate place, is the large walled compound of the court, now open on part of its south face. This is where the prince started a shop in 1969, and from which he surveys the activity in the street, raised above it by the stereobate of the shop.

The central square (bencingah) of the ward is the focus of public activity, and is clearly marked off from the private realm by the high walls and screened doorways which mark Balinese compounds. In the north-west corner lower than the raised ground of the court (on the close connexion between height and status, see Hobart 1978a: 13) stands the meeting house (balé banjar) for the banjar désa and banjar patus, which is also used by one of the sections (Tèmpèk Langkih) of the local irrigation association, with its close ties to Pisangkaja (see Table 3: 11) translated spatially. To the south of this is the ward's granary which was moved from behind the meeting-house in 1972 for complex religious and political reasons

MAP OF BR. PISANGKAJA

N
GUNUNG
AGUNG

RICEFIELDS

SUBAK (TEMPEK)

LANGKIH.

TO DAMBUDA AND YEH-TENGAH

TO YEHGAH PADANG

ILLEGAL RICE-FIELDS.

RICEFIELDS LABAN MASECTI (TEMPLEFIELDS)

TEGAL PURA DESA

LABA DALEM

LABA DALEM (TEMPLE FIELDS)

BENCINGAH.

FOOTBALL FIELD

I

NW 21 NW 22 NW 20 NW 19 NW 24 NW 23 NW 25 NW 28 NW 26 NW 27

NE 20 NE 19 NE 22 NE 21 NE 24 NE 23 NE 26 NE 25 NW 1 NW 3 NW 2 NW 4 NW 5 NW 6 NW 8 NW 7 NW 12 NW 9 NW 10 NW 13 NW 11 NW 16 NW 15 NW 14

NE 18 NE 17 NE 15 NE 14 NE 16 NE 13

E F

2

NE 12 NE 11 NE 10 NE 9 NE 8 NE 7 NE 6 NE 5 NE 4 NE 3 NE 2 NE 1

1

8

9

SW 21 SW 22 SW 26 SW 23 SW 24 SW 25 SW 1 SW 2 SW 4 SW 3 SW 5 SW 6 SW 7 SW 8 SW 9 SW 10 SW 11 SW 12 SW 14 SW 13

SW 15 SW 16 SW 17 SW 18 SW 19 SW 20

SE 9 SE 26 SE 25 SE 24 SE 23 SE 21 SE 20 SE 19 SE 18 SE 17 SE 16 SE 15 SE 14 SE 13 SE 12 SE 10 SE 11 SE 8 SE 7 SE 6 SE 5 SE 4 SE 3 SE 2 SE 1

G

H

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

CODE SHEET FOR MAP. 4. LAYOUT OF PISANGKAJA AND FIELDS.

= boundary of traditional village residential land (tanah désa)

= road or path according to width shown.

= river (distinguished from road by single wavy line)

= banyan (waringin) tree

= building

= ricefields (uma in low Balinese; carik in high)

= dry fields (tegal)

= coconut trees owned by Pura Dalem Kauh (the western temple of the dead)

Temples (follows code in Table 3:17 and Map 3):

E = Pura Désa (village temple)
F = Pura Mascèti (irrigation association temple)
G = Pura Dalem Kauh (western temple of the dead)
H = Pura Geriya
I = Pura Indra Kelila

Code of specific buildings or places:

1 = ward meeting house (balé banjar)

2 = cock-fighting shed (wantilan) used mostly for theatre and shadow-play

3 = stall (warung) selling meals owned by Ni Kerti (SE12)

4 = stall owned by Ni Keripit (NW8) selling coffee and used for gambling

5 = rice granary owned by ward. This was moved from behind the balé banjar during fieldwork in a case reported in Chapter 10.

6 = village shrine built at same time as granary moved (Chapter 10)

7 = stall owned by Jèro Jempiring, forced to move from previous site at 6. by ward decision, selling coffee and cakes (SE4)

8 = balé timbang, weighing shed for rice merchants buying padi

9 = Pura Bedugul, one of a number of small ricefield temples for Subak Langkih lying in the fields

10 = Rajah Patih (literally: minister to the king; here again Batara Dalem, or Batari Durga) a shrine guarding the graveyard and Pura Dalem Kauh with a statue of a male sitting in it.

11 = rough area for high caste burial

12 = rough area of low caste burial

13 = Chinese graves (with open prospect of ricefields to south, which fits Chinese geomantic concerns and also Balinese sacred geometry).

14 = cremation mound (pemuun)

15 = rough grassy area for cutting by ward (ngarit). Out of view to the S.E. of the high caste burial area lies a long promontory of lalang grass used for roofing and owned by the Pura Dalem Kauh worked by its voluntary association.

16 = small shrine for source of ritually pure water (bèji)

17 = site for ordinary clear drinking water. Somewhere below here is reputed to be the village of tonya, spirits of men who have died a 'bad death' by falling into ravines.

18 = temporary stall of Ds. Ny. Geriya (SE9) selling coffee.

19 = temporary stall of Ni Rupa (SE20) selling rujak, mixed fruit salad, fruits and betel nut.

20 = temporary stall of Anak Agung Anom (NE2) selling cakes, coffee and meals.

21 = stall of Ni Darni NE13 selling coffee and fruit

22 = stall of Ni Kasih (SW4) selling coffee and meals

23 = stall of Jèro Gambir (SW1) selling coffee and tipat (rice confectionery of a sort)

24 = stall of Anak Agung Putu (SW5) selling coffee (sometimes meals).

25 = meeting house of Gagah (Balé Banjar Gagah).

which will be discussed in Chapter 10. Dotted around this area are the various stalls owned by women of different castes, selling fruit, coffee and light meals which cater to the needs of the villagers who frequent it from day-break till long after dark. Activity begins at about five in the morning as peasants pause on the way to the fields for coffee. The square is then taken over by small women traders and passers-by on the way to market or on errands. To these are added later the men sheltering from the midday sun under the large banyan tree, toying with their fighting-cocks (mebongbong). Again from late afternoon this fills up often with visitors from other wards at which time news is passed on - political discussions tend to take place in the compounds discreetly separated from this - and gossip exchanged commonly against the din of the local orchestra (a gamelan gong kebiyar,[1]) practising in the shed loaned by the court, just to the north-east of the square itself, till late into the night.

To the north the row of compounds stretches in continuous settlement, but is marked off at the boundary with Gagah by a specially constructed concrete step. To the west on the road running to the ricefields the walls and gates of the houses are noticeably smarter than the usual dilapidated mud brick, setting off the compounds of the most substantial villagers including the head of the customary village and the village temple priest from the rest. Beyond this lie the rice terraces, built up several metres above the house tops. The last houses appear to be part of the same section, but are classed as field huts, for the boundary of village land runs along the path of the stream, and they stand on converted riceland, and so are not liable for customary village duties.

To the south, the road passes between ricefields, flanked by coconut palms belonging to the Pura Dalem Kauh which lies to the south-east of the graveyard, beside which stands the pemuun, the mound where the exhumed corpses are cremated periodically by the ward collectively. This is also a site for asking for supernatural power (nunas sakti or nunas ica, see Chapter 8) and villagers who are seen around here unnecessarily after dark are suspected of witchcraft. Behind the temple a precipice falls suddenly away into a ravine over a hundred metres deep. This is thought to be the territory of a village of tonya, spirits of those who have had a bad death.[2] Relations with these are held for the most part to be extremely cordial. At least one man in the ward is thought to have a mistress there, whose powers enable him to see into the future. They are thought to be on good terms with the court. When the roof of

the main pavilion (the balé gedé, Tan 1966) had to be put on the forty villagers were helped, according to all accounts, by a hundred tonya who it was said could be heard groaning under the strain.

To the north of the temple lies a pure water spring which provides much of the drinking water for the village. Then the land rises sharply to the football pitch and bridge which separate Pisangkaja spatially and spiritually from Tengahpadang. Below the market on the hill lives one of the main witches in the settlement, who is prone to appear at night as a shower of molten metal or a large buffalo with gored horns. It is said that before death of the present prince's father, who was accustomed to remind the villagers at night of his extraordinary powers by appearing as a funeral tower (badé) or a burning banyan tree, that there were spectacular confrontations between these two, for anyone who was foolhardy, or 'hot',[3] enough to stay and watch. At night every so often this is still supposed to happen, but with new assailants from Pisangkaja. The geography of the ward, explained to me repeatedly, much as I have recounted it here, is a complex blend of technical and mystical features which the Balinese see as a single system in the natural and social world surrounding them.

The compounds of which Pisangkaja is composed are given in Table 4: 1, which follows ward procedure by dividing them into four quarters. It will be noted that in practice these do not correspond to the purely geographical divisions, in order that the ward can balance the number of households for purposes of work teams. The owners of the traditional compounds (kerama désa,) and the occupants of field huts are distinguished from each other and from the non-inheriting households who also reside there. Apart from this, compounds are differentiated by caste status and by the descent group affiliation of its members. Agnatically related compounds are shown through the system of ranked ancestor shrines, in which the compounds that have split off from the main branch have subordinate status to the original and are known as sanggah gedé (literally: a big shrine, in low Balinese; the term is merajan agung for high castes.). The range of such links is approximately that of remembered, or traceable, kin ties so that the sanggah gedé system effectively marks the spread of what may conveniently be termed a lineage. Proximity does not necessarily imply close agnatic ties, as is obvious from the table. Even where adjacent compounds share a title they may simply be clan mates, as is the case with SE2 and SE3. There are no

TABLE 4:1 THE HOUSEHOLDS IN BANJAR PATUS PISANGKAJA: 1972.

Karang:	Name on Ward Roll-Call:	Descent Title:	Sanggah Gedé:	No.in kuren:	Karang Origin:*
NE1	Cokorda Putera (1)	Cokorda	NE1	15	0
NE2	Cokorda Raka Jangji	Cokorda	NE1	1	0
	Cokorda Putu	Cokorda	NE1	8	-
	Cokorda Alit Lanus	Cokorda	NE1	4	-
	Cokorda Alit Nama (2)	Cokorda	NE1	6	-
	Cokorda Oka	Cokorda	NE1	2	-
	Cokorda Ngurah	Cokorda	NE1	6	-
NE3	Degdeg Siang (3)	Pulosari	Br.Siklod	9	0
	Wy. Tiles	Pulosari	Br.Siklod	3	-
	Wy.Tempil	Pulosari	(none)	2	-
NE4	Déwa Md. Gempol	Pradéwa Jati	Jati	4	0
NE5	Wy. Kénak	Cameng	Br.Tegal	4	C
NE6	Wy. Togog (4)	Pasek Gèlgèl	Kedisan	-	C
	Md. Tènda	Kayu Selem	Beng	3	-
NE7	Ni Kt. Repun	Chinese**	-	1	0
	Ni Pt. Mariani	Chinese	-	5	-
NE8	Md. Dada (X)	Pulosari	SW3	7	0
NE9	Anak Agung Gedé Anom	Anak Agung	Bangli	4	0
NE10	Anak Agung Rai Jasa	Anak Agung	Bangli	4	0
	Anak Agung Aji Oka (5)	Anak Agung	Bangli	5	-
NE11	Karda Sampun (6)	Pasek Gèlgèl	NE11	6	-
NE12	Kt. Lanis	Pasek Gèlgèl	NE11	6	A
NE13	Ny. Kara	Pulosari	Br.Gagah	5	C
NE14	Ni Wy. Kari	Ignored (7)	NE14	4	0
NE15	Ny. Badra (8)	Cameng	NE15	8	0
NE16	Gampil Cameng	Cameng	NE15	3	A
	I Gerondong	Cameng	NE15	3	-
	I Gelèdèr	Cameng	NE15	5	-
NE17	I Surung	Cameng	NE18	6	A
NE18	Kt. Kingsan (9)	Cameng	NE18	7	0
NE19	Pica Cameng	Cameng	NE19	7	0
NE20	I Kamoih	Cameng	NE18	6	C
NE21	I Sukèn	Pulosari	SW3	6	C
NE22	Kt. Jambul (10)	Cameng	Br.Gagah	5	0

TABLE 4:1 HOUSEHOLDS IN BR. PISANGKAJA: Sheet 2.

Karang:	Name on Ward Roll-Call:	Descent Title:	Sanggah Gedé:	No.in kuren:	Karang Origin:
NE23	Ny. Sujana (11)	Batuan	Br.Gagah	5	C
NE24	Kt. Serandig	Dauh	NE24	7	O
NE25	Kt. Yasa	Dauh	NE25	6	O
NE26	Wy. Ngèmbon	Dauh	NE25	2	B
	Ny. Kedeng	Dauh	NE25	3	-
	(I Kicèn	Dauh	NE25	3	-)
NW1	Kt. Tagen (12)	Pasek Bendésa	NW1	6	O
NW2	Déwa Kt. Gempul (13)	Pradéwa Jati	Jati	3	O
NW3	Déwa Ny. Gempil (14)	Pradéwa Jati	Jati	7	O
NW4	Wy. Lasiya (15)	Pasek Bendésa	NW1	5	O
NW5	I Laba	Dauh	NW5	5	O
NW6	I Tonik	Pasek Gèlgèl	NW6	4	O
	I Mupu	Pasek Gèlgèl	NW6	6	-
	Kacir Sèngat	Pasek Gèlgèl	NW6	3	-
	Jèro Geriya (16)	Brahmana	Bangli	3	-
NW7	Kt. Mara (17)	Dauh	NW8	4	A
	Wy. Teken	Dauh	NW8	2	-
	Ny. Kembar	Dauh	NW8	3	-
NW8	Wy. Surata	Dauh	NW8	3	O
	Md. Lonid	Dauh	NW8	6	-
	Kt. Gampil	Dauh	NW8	5	-
	Ni Kelepon	Dauh	NW8	2	-
NW9	Kt. Mejul	Dauh	NW8	8	A
	I Rebit	Dauh	NW8	3	-
	(I Tunjung (18)	Dauh	NW8	4	-)
NW10	Kt. Gendul (19)	Pulosari	NW11	7	O
	Ny. Gelis	Pulosari	NW11	5	-
	I Keredek	Pulosari	NW11	3	-
NW11	Ny. Gangsar (20)	Pulosari	NW11	8	O
NW12	Dugdug Sandek	Pulosari	NW11	6	A
	I Belet	Pulosari	NW11	3	-
NW13	Ni Lungid	Pulosari	SW3	5	E
SW1	I Tangèn	Pulosari	SW3	5	O
SW2	I Tarik	Dauh	SW2	7	O
	I Kenyung	Dauh	SW2	7	-
SW3	Jero Mangku Désa (21)	Pulosari	SW3	5	O
SW4	Degdeg Mangku (22)	Pulosari	SW3	8	B
	I Terima	Pulosari	SW3	3	-

TABLE 4:1 HOUSEHOLDS IN BR. PISANGKAJA: Sheet 3.

Karang:	Name on Ward Roll-Call:	Descent Title:	Sanggah Gedé:	No.in kuren:	Karang Origin:
SW5	(Ni) Anak Agung Putu	Anak Agung	NE1	6	E
SW6	I Rubik	(Tangkas -	-	5	0
	Ni Cenok	now ignored)	-	3	-
SW7	I Kartana (23)	Pulosari	none	6	0
	Ni Polokan	Pulosari	none	4	-
SW8	I Neka (24)	Dauh	SW8	4	0
	I Kencan	Dauh	SW8	4	-
	I Mukun	Dauh	SW8	3	-
SW9	I Pukel	Dauh	SW8	1	0
	I Mongoh	Dauh	SW8	4	-
SW10	I Munjuk	Pulosari	SW10	8	0
	I Dugdug	Pulosari	SW10	6	-
	I Digdig	Pulosari	SW10	7	-
SW11	I Lembut	Kayu Selem	Cebok	9	0
SW12	Kt. Selem	Pulosari	SW12	6	0
	I Tomblos	Pulosari	SW12	4	-
SW13	Ni Muklen	Pulosari	SW12	3	B
SW14	Kt. Bidel (25)	Pulosari	SW14	9	0
	I Dayuh Mertha	Pulosari	SW14	4	-
	I Sayub	Pulosari	SW14	4	-
SE1	Wy. Sama	Pulosari	SE1	3	0
	Md. Balik	Pulosari	SE1	4	-
	Ny. Lipet	Pulosari.	SE1	3	-
SE2	Md. Pudet	Dauh	SE17	7	0
SE3	Kt. Suberatha (26)	Dauh	SW8	-	0
	I Dungka	Dauh	SW8	4	-
	Ni Doneng	Dauh	SW8	2	-
	I Bawa	Dauh	SW8	7	-
SE4	Anak Agung Gedé Darma	Anak Agung	NE1	1	0
	Anak Agung Aji Plasa	Anak Agung	NE1	1	-
	Jero Jempiring (27)	Anak Agung	NE1	4	-
SE5	Tagen Buyut	Pulosari	NE22	7	0
SE6	I Delep	Tangkas	Br. Siklod	6	0
	I Keper	Tangkas	Br. Siklod	3	-
SE7	Déwa Md. Tagel	Pradéwa Simpar	Singakerta	-	0
	Déwa Ny. Laba	Pradéwa Simpar	Singakerta	4	-
SE8	Ni Tambun Toko	Chinese	-	1	0
SE9	Déwa Kt. Geriya (28)	Pradéwa Bolo	SE9	6	0
SE10	Anak Agung Anom Jasa	Anak Agung	Bangli	2	D

TABLE 4:1 HOUSEHOLDS IN BR. PISANGKAJA: Sheet 4.

Karang:	Name on Ward Roll-Call:	Descent Title:	Sanggah Gedé:	No.in kuren	Karang Origin:
SE11	Déwa Pt. Pandé (29)	Pradéwa Seronggo	Jati	3	D
SE12	Kt. Rugrug	Dauh	SE17	7	D
	Wy. Séro	Dauh	SE17	3	-
	Ny. Sorog	Dauh	SE17	5	-
	Md. Suradnya	Dauh	SE17	3	-
SE13	Déwa Md. Nombong (30)	Pradéwa Jati	Jati	4	C
SE14	Md. Sandi	Cameng	Peliatan	7	O
SE15	Ni Wy. Kintil (31)	Pasek Gèlgèl	NW6	2	O
SE16	Kt. Kontèng	Pulosari	Br. Tegal	4	O
	I Gading.	Pulosari	Br. Tegal	2	-
SE17	Jero Mangku Dalem Kauh (32)	Dauh	SE17	7	O
SE18	Wy. Pageh	Pulosari	Br. Tegal	1	O
SE19	Déwa Md. Doblé (33)	Pradéwa Jati	Jati	6	O
SE20	Ny. Rantun	Dauh	SE17	5	O
	I Kaling	Dauh	SE17	4	-
SE21	Cekeg Pulos (34)	Pulosari	SE21	6	O
SE22	Ny. Dungki	Pulosari	SE22	5	O
SE23	Tedun Pulosari (35)	Pulosari	SE22	3	A
SE24	Md. Silir	Cameng	Br. Gagah	5	O
	I Jontol	Cameng	Br. Gagah	3	-
SE25	Cekeg Mileh	Sulang	Br. Tengah-padang	3	E
SE26	Déwa Ny. Geriya	Pradéwa Bolo	SE9	3	O

PONDOK-PONDOKAN: Field Compounds
(in the text, these are indicates by (P) inserted after the quarter)

NW14	Ni Ngambet (X)	Dauh	SE2 & SE17	4	F
NW15	Ni Sinah (X)	Pasek Bendésa	Gentong	4	F
NW16	I Keted (X)	Pasek Bendésa	Gentong	7	F
NW17	Anak Agung Putera (36)	Déwa Gedé	Puri Cokorda Tengahpadang	4	G
NW18	Md. Susila (37)	Chinese	-	3	C
	Md. Gina	Chinese	-	4	-
NW19	Ni Antrog	Pasek Gèlgèl	Kedisan	3	C
NW20	I Reca	Pulosari	(forgotten)	6	H
NW21	I Kisid	Cameng	NE15	5	J

TABLE 4:1 HOUSEHOLDS IN BR. PISANGKAJA: Sheet 5.

PONDOK-PONDOKAN

Karang:	Name on Ward Roll-Call:	Descent Title:	Sanggah Gedé:	No.in kuren:	Karang Origin:
NW22	I Nampa	Pulosari	NW11	5	H
NW23	I Dugligan (38)	Cameng	NE15	7	C
NW24	Déwa Wy. Kelila	Pradéwa Seronggo Jati		2	G
	Déwa Ny. Kelila	Pradéwa Seronggo Jati		3	-
NW25	I Geningan	Pulosari	SW3	4	G
	I Racik	Pulosari	SW3	3	-
NW26	Dayuh Kelila	Pasek Prasanti	Br. Siklod	4	A
NW27	-	(empty, belongs to Ni Cenok SW6 who lived there till 1971)			
NW28	I Nyèmbèng	Pasek Prasanti	Br. Siklod	7	O
SW15	Gomboh Runti (X)	Pasek Bendésa	Gentong	6	F
SW16	I Sukri	Jambangan	Br. Gagah	7	I
SW17	I Darna (X)	Pasek Gèlgèl	SW19	4	F
SW18	Ni Dehen	Jambangan	Br. Gagah	1	I
SW19	Karda Langkih (X)	Pasek Gèlgèl	SW19	5	F
SW20	I Dani (X)	Pasek Gèlgèl	SW19	4	A
SW21	Gomboh Suti	Pasek Gèlgèl	SW19	4	H
SW22	I Kemplung (X)	Pulosari	SW3	8	F
SW23	I Sadiya (X)	Pulosari	SW3	5	F
SW24	I Longsog (X)	Dauh	SW8	4	F
SW25	I Bakta (X)	(Pulosari - now ignored)	-	1	F
SW26	Kembar Lèkok	Dauh	SW8	4	H

(X)This indicates a family of traditional parekan, servants or tenants.
* This refers to the means by which the compound came into existence since 1917. The figures refer to the code in Table 4:2. In addition, old or original compounds at that time are signified by the symbol "O".
** There are several Chinese families in Tengahpadang (see Table 3:12). These would form the object of an entire separate study, as they form a distinct group within a broader Chinese community. However, such village Chinese at least in rural areas like Tengahpadang can be treated largely as ordinary villagers. Many of them are married to Balinese, have never spoken any Chinese dialect, are perforce members of wards, and kerama désa. They also pray at Balinese temples and have Balinese ancestor shrines, parallel in most cases to Chinese. Certain institutions such as ancestor worship, lineality and hypergamy enable them to fit in fairly easily. Commonly they are regarded as a sort of high ranking sudra, who take women from ordinary low castes, and even on occasion give them to triwangsa, of which there is one instance from SE8. Their position is complex, but they can be treated as part of the society for most purposes.

Table 4:1 Notes.

Code:

Karang: = compound (karang dés̀a if on village land; pondok if outside)

Sanggah Gedé = lineage shrine location

No. in kuren: = number of persons in household recognized by ward

Karang origin: = full details of the code of this are given in Table 4:2 which accompanies Table 4:1.

Special Notes on Leading Figures within the Ward (includes also persons who have roles or attributes of particular interest.)

From this complete list of households, it is useful briefly to distinguish a smaller number who tend to play a large part in the activities of the ward, or who otherwise possess special features of interest. These are designated by numbers after their names in the table. Most of these will be discussed in the text, but for ease of reference, a note on each of these is given below.

1. The court which has been referred to in Chapter 2. The compound area between NE1 and NE2 is not clearly divided and NE2 is really a subordinate of the main court, but is separate for ward purposes. When referring to the prince, it is to Cokorda Putera, the head of NE1, who also owns a small shop facing the street from his compound.

2. This household has the head of tèmpèk Langkih in the local irrigation association, who is Cokorda Alit Nama.

3. Degdeg's son, Ktut Kacir is a noted orator and also political strong-arm man (at present for the Jèro Mangku Dalem SE17).

4. I Togog is almost always absent in Bulèlèng where he is a taxi driver, his fields being worked by a tenant (see Chapter 5) and his dés̀a duties undertaken by I Tènda by private arrangement.

5. Anak Agung Aji Oka, now an old man, is a well-known actor, specializing in the classical opera, arja, but also dancing a wide range of parts. He spends no small part of his time travelling and teaching. He is, by virtue of his knowledge of the classical traditions, one of the villagers who is consulted on matters of custom and so forth.

6. Karda Sampun is an in-marrying man who has become a successful entrepreneur of a small copra-processing firm operating from his compound.

7. Ni Kari is one of the small number of households who knows her descent group temple but ignores it (known as keélingan). In this case she has forgotten, so she says, her descent title, which is interesting for it shows the limited importance of this within the low castes, if for no other reason than that no one bothers to find out.

8. Ny. Badra is the main shadow-puppeteer in the settlement and also a wealthy man who is tied by close links to the leading families of which he can be counted as one.

9. Kt. Kingsan had a long period of being klian, supported not by the leading villagers but by the poorer. His position was mainly due to his ability and honesty.

10. Kt. Jambul is included as he is the object of concern by villagers. His father was reputedly cursed by his mother (kewastonin) for insulting her food. Since then the family has in fact lost all its land and is now wretchedly poor. This is held up as an example of the validity of such mystical forces (see Chapter 7).

11. Ny. Sujana is the son of the previous klian of Gagah and Pisangkaja, I Jirna, and himself very politically active as a client of the court in Gianyar among others. He is a noted public speaker for his voice and arguments which are said to be sweet (manis) and refined (alus).

12. Kt. Tagen is a long-serving klian dĕsa of the past, who was put up as a candidate by the leading families, but failed to get the support which went to I Kingsan (NE 18).

13. Political opposition is in many cases associated with neighbouring or adjacent courtyards, which in many instances stem from petty quarrels. This is so of the relations between NW1 and NW2, for the latter contains Déwa Kt. Gampil, a professional gambler and leading orator of the faction D (Chapter 9) led by his father's younger brother from SE13. (All the Pradéwa who call themselves Pradéwa Jati, as opposed to those who attend the same shrine but carefully distinguish themselves as Pradéwa Seronggo, e.g. SE11 & NW24, are close patrilineal relatives, which emerges in the frequency of variation by vowel difference on G*mp*l. This is commonly used to designate different members of a sibling set.)

14. Dw. Md. Lanus is an in-marrying male from Kintamani who was briefly klian désa (see Table 3:8). Relations with NW2 are generally poor, as a result of an inheritance dispute, but the family had been under the general Pradéwa umbrella during the 1960s, but was changing its allegiance during fieldwork (see Chapter 8).

15. I Lasiya was a local policeman, popular and an influential figure from the side-lines in ward politics.

16. Jèro Geriya was married to a Brahmana in Bangli who died in 1965, so she returned to live in her natal compound. She remains as an in-marrying member of the Brahmana provided that she maintains all the proper observances on food, temple or shrine worship and sexual contact. This is in some doubt, but the family is sufficiently influential (with up-and-coming public speakers like her brother Kacir Sèngat) that no one has yet tried to challenge her title.

17. Kt. Mara is perhaps the most celebrated living orator and has played a large part in the course of ward politics over the last three decades. He is noted for his defence of banjar matters from outside interference and for his knowledge of adat (an essential in any public speaker) and the history of common law.

18. This is another policeman married to a local girl, but as the household is not a kerama désa (like I Lasiya NW4), he is formally free of ward duties. He remains, however, a representative of his affines interests informally.

19. Kt. Gendul is the son of an immigrant merchant from the northern village of Taro, I Géso, who married into a well-established family of Pulosari. He became bendésa and his son followed him after an interval. Kt. Gendul, unlike his father has tended to be unsuccessful in business, which consists of owning the local bus. Much of the family's wealth comes from its ricelands now (see Chapter 5). He remains though an important figure and has an extensive following (Chapter 9).

20. I Gangsar is one of the wealthiest men in the ward. He has had a passionate interest in music since childhood and so has been the head of the gamelan gong kebiyar (orchestra) for as long as anyone can remember. He is also deputy klian dinas.

21. He is the son of the previous priest of the Pura Désa, the village temple and one of the experts in adat, as the priest of the senior temple. He now doubles as priest for the irrigation association's temple, Pura Mascèti, which happened when the ward refused to allow the son of the previous priest, Anak Agung Kencan (from SE4 who was given land by the court at SW5) to become priest, partly as a result of pressure from interested parties, as there was nearly 2/3rds of a hectare of temple riceland involved (see Table 3:17) which becomes the perquisite of the incumbent priest. This is one of the main low caste families in the ward, with strategically placed marriages both within and beyond the ward.

22. Degdeg Mangku is the half-brother of the village temple priest and his mother, as second wife as favoured by her husband who left much of his inheritance to the son. This led to the dispute recorded briefly in Case 2. He became klian désa in 1971.

23. I Kartana is still in his twenties and the formal head of the ward, to which office he was elected with the support of Faction A (Chapter 9).

24. I Neka is the head of one of the wealthy clique of villagers with NW10 and SW3, who have played an important part in local politics.

25. Kt. Bidel is a villager who is noted for his piety in performing cremation (ngabèn) for his parents and for offering at his ancestor shrines. For this he is said to have been given lasiya rahayu, spiritual and material welfare (the terms are very complex: lasiya has connotations of prosperity and good fortune, rahayu has implications of correctness, appropriateness, but may also be referred to as the high Balinese of lasiya, see van Eck, 1876). From a holding of 0.53 ha. of riceland in 1949, he has increased his fields so far to 1.38 ha. and although he is still paying this off, he seems set on further expansion. Part of this is achieved by minimizing his labour exchange relations with other villagers and relying on a small pool of domestic labour, which has made him unpopular (for a full discussion of the reasons, see Chapter 5.).

26. Kt. Suberatha is the head of the compound but away on police service. His is one of the family of Dauh who have traditionally been allied to the wealthy élite.

27. Jèro Jempiring was the wife of Anak Agung Ngurah, the WFB of Anak Agung Raka SW5, the klian dinas during the period of P.K.I. domination of ward politics. She features importantly in Chapter 10, Case 21.

28. Déwa Kt. Geriya is a generally popular man, who was a veteran (unlike most Pradéwa, from whom he is carefully distinguished by stressing his origin temple as Pura Bolo) and represents the interests of some of the Pradéwa in the ward, who are not linked to SE13.

29. A very poor family, the man being a professional flower-collector (for perfume in offerings). His son is one of the most forceful of the young orators. They are the only high caste family to fall under the patronage of a low caste man, mitigated in this case by the latter being a ritually purified priest (SE17).

30. Déwa Md. Nombong was a truck driver who returned to Pisangkaja after making substantial capital, which he has invested in land. He has emerged as the leading Pradéwa linked to the perbekel and his daughter's husband in Br. Triwangsa.

31. Ni Kintil is generally believed in the ward to have great supernatural power.

32. He is the elder brother's son of the previous priest of the Pura Dalem Kauh. He was made priest in 1958, at the age of 19. He has become an increasingly important local figure, see Chapter 9.

33. Déwa Md. Doblé is a good public speaker and organizer, who heads two successful voluntary associations (see Chapter 6.).

34. He is the father of Jèro Jempiring (note 27 above). His three sons were all linked politically to their ZH, Anak Agung Ngurah, and died in 1965.

35. A wealthy man and briefly village headman with the support of Kt. Gendul NW10 and Déwa Md. Nombong (SE13).

36. Anak Agung Putera is descended from the Puri Ageng in Tengahpadang (see Table 2:2), which was passed over to Cokorda . This is linked to the otherwise curious feature of maintaining the merajan (shrine in high Balinese) as her place of ancestor worship. Her mother inherited a large estate, which still totalled 5 hectares in 1949, but she gambled it away (at cekian, a game somewhat like dominoes).

37. Md. Susila is a Chinese merchant in Denpasar who was born in Pisangkaja as part of the big Chinese family which inhabits SE8. Most of these have, in fact, now returned to China leaving the Balinese women behind.

38. I Dugligan is, with Kt. Bidel (SW14) and I Karda (NE11) the main ascendant farmer. He specializes in lending money in return for the right to work fields in pawn, by which he is able to sell large harvests for more cash, in an upward spiral, the counterpart of the downward capital loss of the courts in Table 2:4.

simple divisions of the ward geographically by caste or descent.

The Pattern of Settlement:

Pisangkaja has grown within living memory. At the time of a shattering earthquake in 1917, which is well remembered by the more elderly and serves as a convenient base line, informants agreed that there were only 56 compounds in place of the present 79, and a mere eight households of non-heirs (pengempian). Table 4: 2 breaks down this process of growth, which show that out of the 23 new compounds on village land 10, or less than 50%, have resulted from the

TABLE 4:2 CHANGE IN COMPOUNDS: BR. PISANGKAJA 1917-72. *

No.	Process:	Karang Desa: (village compounds)	Pondok: (field huts)	Total:
A.	Division within family by agreement:	7	2	9
B.	Division within family following litigation	3	-	3
C.	Purchase of compound	7	3	10
D.	Obligatory conversion from pengempian: **	3	-	3
E.	Settled on village land:	3	-	3
F.	Gift of the court (NE1):	-	10	10
G.	Moved out of village to live on own riceland:	-	3	3
H.	Gift of field hut land from kin or affines:	-	4	4
I.	Switched ward membership:	-	2	2
J.	Temporary resident in field hut owned by household from another ward:	-	1	1
Total:		23	25	48

* The dates are determined by my fieldwork for the end, by a massive earthquake in 1917 as a fixed starting-point by which villagers themselves mark periods. In 1917, there were 56 karang desa (and only 8 pengempian) with a single pondok, owned by the father of I Nyèmbèng, NW 28. In the meantime, these have risen to 79 karang desa and 26 pondok. so expansion has been almost equally within tanah desa and outside, but proportionately

there has been far more increase in residence in the rice fields (from 1 hut to 26).

** There used to be a large compound for a Brahmana priest, a geriya, to the south of the court, on the present SE7-12. He is believed to have gone insane (part of the reputation of Pisangkaja as being dangerous to Brahmana) and several families settled there. Only SE7 and SE9 were village members, the others being treated as pengempian in 1917, but were obliged to become full members shortly after.

Note: the letters to the extreme left are used in Table 4:1 to identify the compounds which have emerged since 1917, and by which method.

division of old compounds, peacefully or otherwise, between kin; while in 7 instances owners sold part of their compound land to others prepared both to pay and take up the duties required. A further three were allocated unoccupied village land in return for becoming working members, (ayah). At the same time there has been an equal expansion into the ricefields. Part of this is a result of the Land Reform Laws, at which time the court, in order to reduce its holdings to the legally allowed maximum, converted some sections of riceland into field huts for its close servants (parekan tatadan). In slightly over 50 years the number of compounds had doubled in all and the category of non-inheriting households has grown from a handful to the second largest in the ward.

The internal composition and structure of the compound is governed partly by the dynamics of kinship, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, partly by ward regulations, which tend to limit the scope for joint family development by systematically breaking up the membership into equal and independent units for all public purposes. As Table 4:3 shows in the village area 48, or some 60% of, compounds are occupied by only one household; while the remaining 31 contain a total of 83 kuren households including 52 families of non-heirs. The total number rarely rises above three however, both on account of shortage of space and because of the frequency of quarrels.

TABLE 4:3 RANGE OF COMPOUND COMPOSITION IN BR. PISANGKAJA: 1972

Class of Compound:	No. of households						
	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	Total
village compounds:	48	17	9	4	-	1	79
field huts:	23	3	-	-	-	-	26
Totals:	71	20	9	4	0	1	105

In the majority of compounds (30 out of 34) the households are related through ties of descent (see Table 4:4). In the remainder they are affines, with one exception of a Chinese family where there is no tie at all. In practice however, non-inheriting households quite often live in different compounds from those where they originated and show a tendency to move in with affines, a preference which will emerge as significant in the following Chapters.

The rules by which all villagers, unless they are heirs, must join the ward on marriage as independent members strengthens the fissile tendencies of the sibling group. This is encouraged by inheritance principles which permit the division, or more generally the transmission to a sole heir, of the joint estate either during the life or on the death of the holder. So almost all households are variations on either a nuclear family if non-heirs, or a stem family if heirs. This may be seen in part in Table 4:5, which shows the number of members in the various households. The wide spread and the strong tendency for there to be different modal sizes for heirs and others reflect these two different forms of family structure. Nor is there any simple correlation between the size of households or compounds and wealth. As will be evident from the tables on land-ownership and other occupations (Table 5:11 and Appendix 3), the largest households include the court (NE1) and a landless villager (SW11); while multiple compounds range equally, with perhaps a slight tendency for size to reflect poverty and the inability to buy land elsewhere or to pay the costs of litigation over inheritance. In short household and compound size is the product in large part of the operation of inheritance rules and the ward constitution.

These tables also point to two possible misconceptions about family and household structure. First that the basic unit is a kitchen. This stems from a confusion of the status of the domestic unit, the kuren, (linked to the term kurenan, a marital partner) with its functions which commonly include cooking in a separate kitchen (paon). For instance I Pukel (SW9) is a young batchelor compound owner as his father has died. His elder brother, I Mongoh, is married and they form two kuren (being kerama desa and pengempian respectively) but I Pukel eats from his brother's kitchen. It is often said that a kuren must necessarily contain an adult male and female, preferably married. This is the ideal, and typical, situation but not always so. As was noted above,

TABLE 4:4 THE BASIS OF TIES IN MULTIPLE HOUSEHOLD COMPOUNDS: BR. PISANGKAJA 1972.

	Descent	Affinity	Descent/ Affinity*	No Tie	Total
Formal composition according to ward register of members:	30	2	1	1	34
Actual residence pattern in daily life:**	29	6	1	1	37

* SW6 consists of households who are affines, but also linked through a relationship of adoption.

** the first row gives the formal ties between households, the second is the actual pattern of residence in early 1972. This shows a trend towards living with affines, a relationship which we shall see is of some importance in other fields. The totals are different as they are based upon the number of compounds, not upon the number of households (there are no compounds formally with mixed principles of affiliation).

Note: 1 of the 2 cases of formal affinal ties, and the compound where there is no relationship between households are both Chinese.

TABLE 4:5 THE RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD SIZES: BR. PISANGKAJA 1972.*

Category:	Household (kuren) Numbers:											
	0.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	15.	Total.
Kerama Désa:**	3	6	3	9	10	12	15	12	5	3	1	79
Pondok:	-	2	1	2	10	4	2	4	1	-	-	26
Peng-empian:	-	1	6	20	13	6	5	3	1	-	-	55
Total:	3	9	10	31	33	22	22	19	7	3	1	160

* This is based on the effective pattern of residence in Pisangkaja, which totals 727 persons (see Table 3:5). There are in addition 29 persons normally absent, working overseas or elsewhere, or on official duty as police. There are two households who are normally resident in Pisangkaja who are not shown here (and are placed in parentheses on Table 4:1) as they are both government officials and not included by the banjar as members. They are NE26, Kicèn, a sub-district clerk and NW9 Tungjung, a local policeman from Bulèlèng by origin.

** As this is a table of effective size, there are some kuren apparently with no members. These are kerama dēsa who are absent, leaving some arrangement for their duties to be carried out on their behalf by others. There is also one very large kuren, the court NE1, which comprises 9 ordinary members (including two servants from elsewhere) and 6 additional servants, parekan, from tenant families in the ward, who are fed and clothed by the court and so are included here.

compound owners have duties (as ayah) regardless of any other status. I Pageh (SE18) is an ageing batchelor, but must fulfill his obligations alone, as must old widows like Ni Kintil (SE15). In the ward, however, they are classed as banjar balu, literally the widowed ward with the suffix luh or muani, female or male. The former are entitled to certain exemptions. There are several of these who are indicated in Table 4:1 by the prefix 'Ni' for females (rather than 'I' for males - see the introductory note on names). Membership of corporations in Bali is self-evidently a jural question, quite distinct from the practical exigencies of life, although these may be given recognition.

The Community and its Main Actors:

In the course of the following chapters I shall try to document in some depth the overlapping sets of social relationships in which villagers are involved and also note socially relevant features, such as the extent of land holding, occupations and so forth. For simplicity in each case I shall use the basic format of Table 4:1, so that the reader can, if he wishes, follow the super-imposition of relationships of various sorts. This quantified material alone is incomplete by itself, however, as it ignores the framework of meaning and value which the actors attribute to these features and to each other as persons. This has two aspects. First the members of the ward form the most developed moral community (Cohen A. 1969b; Middleton 1960: 230-70), both in the sense that the other members are complete persons sharing the same values (Bailey 1966; 1971: 1-24) and that they may see one another as ends in themselves, not simply instrumentally (Cohen A. 1977), although I shall argue that there is an inherent ambivalence in this distinction of means and ends (Chapter 5). Second the villagers are linked by complex, more or less stable ties of friend-ship and emnity. These are partly related to the alliances and divisions formed within and across the boundaries of different groups, the dimensions of which will be explored in the following chapters. While these basic forms of affiliation fix certain aspects of social position, they are neither entirely determinate nor the objects of exclusively cynical manipulation. For they are also the coordinates of the framework of meaning within which actors assess the nature of roles and resources as well as their use to particular ends. These elements are subject in the process to potentially differing evaluation by the

participants. There are a number of villagers who, by virtue of their ascribed roles or personal attributes, seem to play an especially important part in these social conflicts. As they hold much of the centre of the stage in village life, I wish to introduce the main actors very briefly in the last pages of this chapter.

The old dynastic disputes have played a part in the social changes in Pisangkaja. Before the Second World War informants agree that the ward was dominated by the local Cokorda, with support from wealthy low caste families. Countervailing influence was felt from the courts of Tengahpadang and the administrative village head by various routes which included at times some of the local Pradéwa and the family of I Jirna (NE23), who was a political emissary from the court in Gianyar (see Table 3:8). Succession and inheritance, however, has divided the Cokorda into two compounds. The main line of the Puri Saren Kangin (NE1) was by far the wealthiest family in the settlement (Table 2:4), with an extensive network of tenant farmers and servants, part of which remains and forms the political clientèle of the young prince (who is more interested in his shop despite the mutterings about being a Wèsiya, or merchant, to which this has widely led). The much poorer cadet line (NE2), which produced one customary village head in the past (Table 2:3) and boasts the present head (pekaseh) of the local section of the irrigation association, is quite separate from, and in the past tended to be in political opposition to, the main court.[4] Its social position is in some ways closer to the Anak Agung, who are reputedly the descendants of Cokorda by low caste secondary wives (penawing) and so have an interstitial position, termed jajaran, between the court, jèro or inside, and the jaba, or outside proper composed of low castes. Of these, the two families directly related to the court, SW5 and SE4, contained a number of teachers and officials. They were particularly important as clients and supporters until their involvement in the growth of the communist party in Pisangkaja, in bitter opposition to the nationalists who were composed amongst others of their old dynastic rivals, the Pradéwa almost all from the Jati lineage (see Table 4:1) led by Déwa Madé Nombong (SE13). They included NW2 and NW3 with the son of I Jirna, Ny. Sujana, as their spokesman. With the republican ethos following Independence and the gradual loss of its estates, the relationship between the court, and so by extension the lesser aristocratic families, and the villagers has changed. In the 1960s the prince formally joined the ward, although he has remained a

largely honorary member to this day. While the formal features of caste ranking are intact, from marriage rules to the use of language and even occupational preference there have been steady but complex changes (discussed in Chapters 5, 8 and 9).

With this has gone the corresponding rise of some influential low caste families. Perhaps the most respected of these is the one headed by Kt. Gendul (NW10), the son of a previous customary village head, I Géso, and kept in office himself for over twenty years, it is said on account of his financial honesty and the problem of finding someone else for a post with little power and heavy responsibility. The adjoining compound (NW11) contains I Gangsar who has been the leader of the orchestra for as long as anyone can recall, and who is also now the deputy government headman (wakil klian dinas). Immediately opposite lies the courtyard of the village temple priest (SW3) and that of his brother, Kt. Degdeg, the present head of the customary village sub-section (in SW4). The compounds were divided following the quarrel recorded in Case 2. These are closely linked by a succession of marriages which extend to embrace the other rich of the village, notable among them I Badra, the local shadow-puppeteer (at NE15), I Neka (in SW8) and I Tedun (in SE23) the previous government headman. To these have been added more recently two farmers, I Dugligan (NW23) and I Bidel (SW14), whose entrepreneurial methods have led to some disquiet (Chapter 5). Although many of these come from one descent group, this is far from united. Other families of the Pulosari descent group were, or are, their political opponents. This includes the home (SW7) of the present government headman, I Kartana, and the family of Degdeg Sian (NE3) who were supposed to have been palace guards, a tradition carried on by the present heir, I Kacir, who doubles as the local strong-arm man. So the traditional clique of big low caste families is by no means based just on descent, but rather is noted for its wealth and political clout, in which marriage becomes a vital mechanism in its consolidation.

There is another centre of influence. This is centred in part upon the Pura Dalem Kauh which has a long history of somewhat obscure mythical links to Pura Indra Kelila, the origin temple of the Dauh descent group. Its priest-hood has in living memory been passed down within this group (SE17 and SE12). The previous incumbent Kt. Séré, a teacher, died in 1965; but was succeeded by I Dugligan (SE17) who, despite the conflict in role requirements and with the

aid of an expanding practice of clients dependent on him for ritual services, has gradually become an important patron. The other main family of Dauh (spread over the complex of NW7 to NW9) has led the political opposition in the village to the dominance of their neighbours in NW10-12 and is widely famed for its oratorical skills, which extend to some of its women. It also included the two most formidable public figures of their day, I Rangin and I Kebet (NW8), both of whom died in 1965. The orator from this family, however, who has survived the longest and with the most imposing record for the defence of democratic values and the small villagers is Kt. Mara (NW7). During the Second World War when the rich monopolized the allowance of cloth, he turned this into a major public issue (see Case 16: The case of the orator's underpants, Chapter 9), which started the tradition of active opposition to the alliance of court and wealthy villagers. In a form which changes as it is reinterpreted, these lines of cleavage are still to be found and play a not-unimportant part in the pattern of social behaviour within the ward.

Conclusion:

The aim of this chapter has been simply to sketch in the ward of Pisang-kaja and its inhabitants in broad outline. Even from this brief introduction it should be apparent that the ward has expanded greatly in size in the course of this century and has altered its social composition accordingly. The Balinese preference for a single successor to the position of member of the customary village, which is often coupled with a system of sole heirship to the compound and productive land, has therefore increasingly led to divisions of wealth within the family and also the ward. The next chapter examines the implications of this in some detail. In the last section above it should have been clear, however, that there other important grounds for cooperation or competition. Villagers differ from one another in the pattern of their descent ties and so the evaluation of their caste status. Within this, however, kin are differentiated from one another by the different marriage alliances which they have formed and often by diverging membership of voluntary associations. Some of these ties are introduced into the organization of factional membership in the ward assembly; but may equally provide the basis for emnities which are expressed, or furthered, through rivalry in different arenas. The variety of links and possible lines of

cleavage are such, however, that there is no simple correlation between the membership of groups and political opposition; rather the different sets of relationships are refracted in contexts of opposition of different kinds in a complex manner. In order to understand how this occurs, it is necessary to turn to a detailed examination of the social institutions and corporate groups which link and separate villagers in different ways.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. This is a large ensemble, principally composed of different types of metallophone, led by two drums of different size, and tuned to an individual pentatonic scale by the smith who made it (Lentz 1965; McPhee 1966). Just as adat differs from place to place, so does a single melody played on differently intervalled gamelan. Orchestral playing is normally an exclusively male activity, in contrast to singing and dancing or to the easy mixture of the sexes in the square itself.

2. The beliefs about different forms of death give the impression of being linked logically into a wider system in a complex manner. Certain types of demise are appropriate to a given caste, so that to fall in battle is good for Satriya, but not for others. Generally, a good death is in one's bed in old age in the natural course of time. Bad death is by accident, in particular death by falling, especially into gorges, or during childbirth. The spirits of those who fall into the many gorges are inevitably drawn to the settlements of tonya. When an American tourist crashed through a bridge barrier into a river some miles from Tengah-padang, there was fascination as to how long it would take him to learn the language and customs and I was used as a yardstick. The death of a woman in childbirth is considered tragic and dangerous throughout much of Indonesia (the term is widely pontianak, for such a spirit). Her spirit can never attain rest and wanders ceaselessly seeking vengeance on all women in her state, and trying to lure all men (who are responsible for her being pregnant in the first place) to their deaths. They may be distinguished from ordinary women, for if one sees them from the back, they have a hole through them. One encounters them in the areas outside settlements and in the wild, where they roam.

   This spatial referent seems to be of some importance and links these beliefs to the idea of adat, and the unfolding of life and events at the proper time and in the correct place. Death should be from age or illness in the customary village in one's bed not on the floor, for childbirth in full health, not outside residential or agricultural areas, where men should not go. It would seem that in space and time there are zones, which are part of different systems of order, each with its appropriate inhabitants, but outside which one goes at one's peril. Normally men are safe within the settlement and ricefields which are the preserve of humans, but where some animals may not venture. There are times when even this is dangerous, at midday (teng'ai), dusk (sandé kala), and midnight (tengah peteng), when the officers of the gods of the désa temples (the Pura Désa and Pura Dalem) are sent on tours of inspection. To meet one of these invisibly is to fall ill with fever and there is a definite concern with not moving at exactly these times.

   Men beyond this safe and proper area are, however, in great danger. This applies geographically to moving into gorges, which are not part of normal human space, and to women in childbirth who, far more than mediums with only limited contact with the supernatural in temples,

come into intimate contact with the world of spirits. People in these places are in great danger as they are transgressing into other orders, geographical or spiritual, with potentially disastrous consequences. It follows that women in childbirth are in the greatest peril as, in giving real flesh to spirit (the pure spirits of reborn ancestors, see Hobart 1978a: 15-18), they are poised between two of the most clearly contrasted zones of adat, the material and the spiritual worlds.

3. The classification of forms of consciousness is discussed in Chapter 10. Briefly, the Balinese have an elegant solution to the problem of belief (cf. Needham 1972) in supernatural phenomena, by differentiating them according to an indigenous theory of mind and vision. This ranges from 'cool' (etis) to 'hot' (panes) and forms a gradient of decreasing ability to see or have contact with the spirit world.

4. In the period leading up to the abortive communist coup d'état in 1965, members of this cadet line were among the prominent party members. Since their deaths the family as a whole has been reunited under the patronage of the prince, with the exception in part of Cokorda Alit Nama (the irrigation official). The relationships are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

Chapter 5. Village Economic Organization

Introduction:

In this chapter I would like to examine the importance of economic activities and the distribution of productive resources for the organization of social relationships in Tengahpadang. The village economy is based mainly on the peasant cultivation of irrigated rice terraces which are the major form of productive capital. Irrigation is organized by a special association (the subak). As we saw in Chapter 3 this is primarily concerned with the regulation of water and has little say in how the fields are owned or worked. The pattern of land-ownership has changed, however, during the course of this century with the expansion of population. While there has been no significant change in the proportion of villagers owning riceland, this period has seen a decline in aristocratic estates and the rise of village families. The unequal distribution of irrigated land affects not only the organization of economic ties, but also other relationships between villagers. In this chapter I shall examine in detail the immediate consequences of this and their implications will be developed later in the thesis. Although half the villagers own no riceland, it is interesting that other kinds of highly productive land and certain profitable occupations are relatively neglected. In order to understand this, it is helpful to look at Balinese ideas of purity and identity. This points to the special value placed on rice and riceland. The awareness of the differential access which villagers have to this is linked to the existence of complex systems of redistribution. These take many forms. Of particular importance are various institutions encouraging sharing and agricultural tenancies accompanied by the widespread use of labour exchange. As a result, there is little relationship between the amount of land owned, land worked and the harvest brought home. Labour exchange is important not just for the social relationships which it activates, but also because the wide choice of forms results in the recruiting of work teams having symbolic as well as practical implications.

An examination of economic relationships in which the villagers of Pisangkaja are engaged shows the existence of a maze of forms of redistribution. These arise ultimately from the differences in the ownership of irrigated riceland.

In the course of the chapter I shall discuss in detail the pattern of land-holding and its changes, and their relation to the main social divisions, such as caste, within the ward. A study of the local economy also requires an investigation into other forms of investment and the proliferation of secondary occupations. These show singular features which will be discussed. In order to facilitate detailed scrutiny of the ethnography the chapter includes tables which give details on each household in the ward. These are substantiated in appendices. It will emerge that less than half the ward owns enough riceland to subsist on, but that most villagers work land and almost live directly or indirectly off its produce. Careful inspection shows the existence of a wide variety of types of redistribution. This stems in part from the operation of corporate groups which offer tenancies and other forms of employment as well as making exchanges of food obligatory on many set occasions. Their constitutions also tend to work in favour of poorer members. This accounts, however, for only a small part of the land and yield. Much of the redistribution is organized through dyadic ties between villagers. Agricultural tenancies, or regular labour in the fields and in processing the crop, provide an extremely important means of gaining access to riceland or its produce. In the course of the chapter we shall examine the forms which this may take and the ties which result. This last includes notably economic patronage between wealthy and poor households which may be mobilized to various ends. These ties are territorially circumscribed. While the customary village is the widest group within which prescriptive exchanges occur, dyadic ties are largely focused on the ward or even more narrowly on neighbourhoods. In later chapters we shall see some of the reasons why this should be so.

The organization of labour relations will be discussed in the last part of the chapter and provides evidence for the argument advanced in the introduction about the coexistence of instrumental and symbolic aspects of social action. There is a widespread, if often implicit, tendency among anthropologists to distinguish economic or political ties from those which are thought to carry a heavier symbolic load (for perhaps the clearest statement of this, see Cohen, A. 1969a, 1974). A study of labour relations in Pisangkaja shows the extent to which supposedly 'economic' ties come to have more complex meanings attached to them, to the point that farmers are prepared to ride substantial losses in productivity in the course of organizing work teams. There are several aspects to

this which will be discussed below more fully. Briefly it appears that casual labour is inefficient and that the greater its use the smaller the harvest. Peasant farmers are confronted with the dilemma of maximizing their yield or maintaining their reputations as moral persons by allowing poorer villagers the chance to work for reward. Only a minority incur opprobium by working alone or employing labour at commercial rates. Further, there are many different kinds of labour exchange, each of which has its own significance. Examination shows that the types of tie used are closely related to the kind of reputation which villagers seek to establish. Those who aspire to political or social prominence notably engage in reputation-management (Goffman 1959) in this way. So the demonstration of one's moral qualities is an important aspect of agricultural relationships. This may in turn have further implications. Such exchange therefore offers a field in which men not only obtain labour but also may make statements publicly about their natures.

There is a further point which may be worth making on a somewhat similar score. Certain types of land and occupation are relatively neglected despite the potentially high income which they offer. Dry fields may be made to yield crops with a market value in excess of that of rice but few farmers exploit these systematically. Likewise highly profitable activities like palm-wine tapping and butchery are undertaken only by a few villagers who may become quite rich through so doing, because of the lack of competition. This is partly explicable in terms of Balinese modes of evaluating the phenomenal world, which are partly implicit but clearly discernible. Objects in the world are classified by their degree of refinement or coarseness, this gradation reflecting cultural ideas of ritual purity. By its habitat and physiological characteristics rice emerges as pure by contrast to root crops. Similarly occupations which require contact with gross substances like intoxicating liquor or blood tend to be viewed as degrading. In the course of the chapter we shall see how these ideas structure the preferences and avoidances of high castes in particular in their choice of occupation. A study of village economics may usefully include a brief discussion of cultural values as these affect the demand and supply within the market. This makes the familiar anthropological point that formal economics tends to presuppose cultural values.

Given the range of village economic activities, the present chapter is

necessarily somewhat long. So it is useful to outline its structure. I shall start with an examination of the irrigation associations to which the farmers in Pisangkaja belong and shall point to the limited sphere of competence which they have. In order to understand the values which the Balinese in Tengahpadang bring to their economic choices, I shall then turn to cultural ideas of production and exchange. This shows the value of rice and so rice terraces. In the following section, I turn therefore to examine the system of ownership of irrigated riceland in detail and to the range of occupations by which villagers attempt to make a living. In the final sections I shall consider the implications of differential access to productive land for redistribution, both corporate and inter-personal. One aspect of this is developed in more detail. This is the organization of labour exchange ties as this illustrates both the value laid upon redistribution and the inherent ambiguity of means and ends where there is choice.

The Irrigation Association:

Irrigation associations present a clear example of the limitations of corporate groups in organizing diverse fields of activity. As we noted in Chapter 3, these are predominantly concerned with the supply and regulation of water to farmers. In some parts of Bali they are reported to take on additional responsibility for the organization of planting and other tasks. In Tengahpadang however, such extension is limited and associations have no control over the devolution of property nor over the recruitment of labour for cultivation. By the nature of their resources and the inelastic form of capital investment in irrigation works and terraces, these groups have little scope for innovation and are mostly confined to managing the routine distribution of water. Their room for technical improvement is further restricted by their membership which is largely composed of small farmers with little spare income. As the cultivators rarely think their share of water is enough, there is widespread tension and mistrust between members. Such cohesion as they exhibit is principally in the face of other associations. So while irrigation associations are technically important in organizing hydraulic engineering, these ties are rarely mobilized elsewhere. This division of functions in agriculture raises an interesting point. Geertz has noted the extraordinary elaboration of traditional forms of rice production in Java which he has termed 'agricultural

involution' (Geertz 1963a). Similar tendencies are evident in Tengahpadang. The different history and organization of cultivation in Bali however point to the distinction between the development of indigenous technology on the one hand and the convolution of social relationships on the other. The remainder of the chapter will be largely concerned with the latter.

One more general issue may be worth considering first in passing. The existence of a complex, and apparently ancient, system of irrigation in Bali has received relatively little attention (but see Geertz 1973a). The island now supports an extremely dense population largely on rice terraces fed by traditional irrigation systems. The topography of the island, where rivers have cut ravines deep into the soft volcanic rock far below the ridges and promontories on which cultivation takes place, have presented natural obstacles. As was noted these have been overcome by tapping water high up inland and leading it to its destination by way of a complex system of channels, aqueducts and tunnels under rock. While control over critical points seem to have been important in shaping dynastic politics (Chapter 2), it is not entirely clear how large a part the traditional rulers actually played in organizing and coordinating irrigation works. Although stress has been laid on the role of princes in opening up new lands, it is unclear how far they actually initiated this, as opposed to proclaiming their interest or involvement. It is perhaps questionable whether Bali can be easily incorporated into Wittfogel's model of hydraulic civilizations (Wittfogel 1957; see also Geert's criticisms of this: 1973a:338), although we must wait upon more detailed historical analysis of the function of traditional kingdoms and their rulers in Bali for a fuller picture.

Whatever its origin the system of irrigated agriculture in Bali has proved capable of supporting an ever-increasing number of people on relatively fixed areas, by the adaptation of traditional technology and economic relationships. By 1954 Gianyar as a whole had a density of over 500 people per sq. kilometre (Table 2:1) and in Tengahpadang by the time of fieldwork this had reached over 600 (Chapter 2, footnote 3). In his analysis of rice cultivation in Java, Geertz noted the existence of similarly dense populations and explained them by reference to the process of 'agricultural involution' (1963a:127 on population densities). This consisted in the increasingly elaborate development of traditional methods of production by which a growing population could be

supported without fundamental change. As the productivity could not keep pace with the rise in numbers, the result was the fractionation of land-holdings, or of plots worked, and increasing but shared poverty (1963a:97). Bali seems to offer an interesting example of variation on this theme. While by Javanese standards Tengahpadang now seems to have agricultural involution in an acute form, there are certain instructive differences. First the history of colonial occupation has been short and largely indirect. So it seems that the process may occur without the complex historical conditions which Geertz noted for Java. Second much of the technological development appears to have occurred long before the rapid increase in population (at a time when man-power was short) rather than being a simple response to it. Third the fractionation of holdings may be linked in part to the differences between the Javanese inhertitance rules which encourage the division of estates and the Balinese which favour a single heir. In so far as this refers, however to the working of land we shall see that there is extensive re-distribution. Fourth, while the tenancy system reduces variation in nett yields, even if the traditional aristocracy is omitted, substantial differences in wealth remain. It is possible that this is connected with different cultural ideas of hierarchy and social inequality. Perhaps more interesting than this, however, is the institutionalized division of agricultural functions in Bali which permits a distinction to be drawn between the technological intensification of production which is largely the concern of the irrigation associations and the convolution in social relationships which takes place mainly within the ward. It is to the first of these to which I wish to turn now.

In most accounts of Balinese agriculture the irrigation association, is either specifically delimited as the object of study (Birkelbach 1973; Grader 1960), or the focus of attention (Geertz 1967; 1972a; Liefrinck 1969) so that, by default, the economic system at the local level tends to be seen as effectively coterminous with the association itself. This is misleading. For there are many sets of ties which are not contained within the corporate framework of the irrigation association. These include not just the different relationships concerning property, but also the entire complex of labour organization in agriculture. These are vital to any understanding of village economics and so more widely to aspects of social differentiation and integration in Balinese society.

It was noted in Chapter 3 that it is not the case that "the irrigation society, or subak, regulates all matters having to do with the cultivation of wet rice..." (Geertz 1959a:995). At least in the region round Tengahpadang its functions are concerned with securing the supply of water by ensuring the working of its dam (empelan),[1] repairing banks (pundukan) and regulating the use of its system of channels (telabah, main conduits and daanan, side-channels) and dividing-blocks (the general term is tem(b)uku, properly a block giving equal partition as opposed to pemaruan, where the size of the streams differs) so that proper apportionment and delivery is assured. The association also implements its rules (awig-awig) which are concerned primarily with preventing the theft of water, or abuse and damage of corporate and private property. In Langkih, these cover such topics as: stealing water (Appendix 1, rules 1, 2, 3, 12, 15), stealing crops or installations (rules 6, 7, 16), interfering with banks and terraces (to obtain water - rule 4; to enlarge one's holding - rule 14), fishing (rule 5), control of animals (rules 6, 8, 9,) and general clauses designed to cover potentially suspicious behaviour or circumstances (rules 11, 12, 13). This is done through a system of guard-duty (telik) which is often carried out both day and night during critical periods, before harvesting or when water is seriously short. In certain parts of the island there are reports of demand for water being regulated between associations by regulations governing the cycling of agricultural seasons (see Geertz 1972a). Officials denied that this happened in Gianyar; but in theory the coordination of planting, stages of work and ritual are required during the drier season cycle of kertamasa, but left notionally free during an open cycle known as gegadon (for details see Hobart 1978b)[2]. Around Tengahpadang the main purpose of this is seen as to synchronize harvests in order both to concentrate labour and prevent large losses to any individual from pests. So the irrigation association is not a land-owning corporation, nor does it directly concern itself, other than in the ways just mentioned, with the organization of labour on the terraces of its members nor their other doings.

The irrigation association forms a corporate group consisting of all the persons not who own land within a particular area, but rather who have rights and share control over a collective asset - irrigation water. So members may join, if the group permits, by paying a sum according to the quantity of water asked which serves effectively as a compensation to the other members for their loss; on leaving a similar amount may be repaid to the person who resigns

(Grader 1960:280-1; Liefrinck 1969:47)[3]. Membership imposes obligations and gives certain rights. Each farmer is required to work on repairs to the conduits or other installations, to help in guarding fields and share the burden of temple ceremonies in the association's temples. Repairs are particularly onerous as most of the channels are simple mud and brick constructions which tend to collapse easily, especially during the rainy season, and may require a large labour force summoned at short notice to work for long periods sometimes kilometres away from the settlement. In some areas (Birkelbach 1973:166; Liefrinck 1969:17) a special class often composed of poorer farmers may be delegated the tasks of actually carrying out the work, but round Tengahpadang the associations require each member to contribute an equal share of all labour involved, whether in rebuilding installations or other tasks. If this proves more than needed, a rota system may be used; but many breaches are in feeder canals from the main streams and these involve only those farmers affected who are responsible for their upkeep. So villagers with dispersed plots in different sections or even associations (for example: I. Geningan (NW25) who has fields spread across two sections of Subak Langkih: Langkih and Uma Dalem; or I Badra (NE15) with land in both Subak Langkih and Subak Pakèl) may require at .. times to be able to draw on substantial labour. In the irrigation association members act as a body for work without regard for differences in wealth or the distribution of holdings in water.

While labour is organized on a <u>per capita</u> basis, taxes levied by the association depend upon the quantity of water obtained by each cultivator. These are payable for any purpose agreed by the association (or in Langkih - the section council). This is normally restricted to payment for guard services if performed by special delegates, or to materials for repair or temple festivals. Liability is estimated in terms of indigenous units of water. The popular view has been summed up by Geertz, who described this as the <u>tenah</u>, which is the "final unit of water, <u>and</u> the amount of land it irrigates, <u>and</u> the amount of rice seedlings needed to plant that land, <u>and</u> the amount of (unthreshed) paddy harvested from it... " (1967:230, his italics). Birkelbach largely follows Geertz in his view (1973:155). However as early as 1915 there was a report from Happé (published later in Adatrechtbundels 15: Happé 1918) discussing the system in detail. He pointed out that this was an ideal folk model and did not fit the allocation of water to actual land areas (1918:44-5), which could be measured more

precisely in special water-units, or tektek. These types of unit were not fixed but consisted of a proportion of water available. This is the case for Tengahpadang where in common parlance the unit for calculating the share of water is the (bi)bit tenah (literally a seed tenah); while the tenah are the harvested sheaves of rice, their size in theory varying with the area to be planted. In practice, however, there is little relation between these. In Section Langkih plots irrigated by a single tenah of water may be anywhere from 0.29 ha. (Kt. Mara NW7) to 0.575 ha. (I Tagen SE5) which is effectively double the area; while small holdings of less than 0.16 ha. (I Sukèn NE21) may be harvested in sheaves of 42kg., compared with sheaves of only 36kg. off holdings as large as 0.35 ha. (Ni Repun NE7, worked by I Rugrug SE12).[4] The size of sheaf (tenah) is in fact not determined by the amount of seed needed but by weight; for they must be carried by men two at a time on a shoulder pole (tegen). All taxes are calculated then in terms of water-units, popularly known as bit tenah, which bear little or no relation to the sizes of padi bundles, tenah. While levies vary with the quantity of water, by contrast any profits from fines or the division of income from whatever source are shared equally among members, independent of the size of their holdings or allocation of water. Redistribution in however small a way is a marked feature of almost all Balinese corporations.

The task of overseeing the routine affairs of the association, as in other groups, is delegated to a specially appointed set of officials who have the responsibility for running the day-to-day administration, collecting taxes, imposing fines and generally attempting to enforce regulations. The main office is that of the head of the association (pekasèh) often helped by a number of deputies who may be chosen from, and responsible for, the different main irrigation channels. Large associations are commonly divided into sections (tèmpèk) (see also Birkelbach 1973:163). In Langkih each of these has its own official, known as a pekasèh, and a council generally holding its meetings in, and choosing its head from, the dominant or numerically powerful wards.[5] Meetings are normally held every 35 days according to a particular combination in the Javanese-Balinese calendar, unless work demands otherwise. The whole association, known as a subak gedé (literally: big subak), is under a single official (the klian pekasèh) above whom stands the regional head of irrigation (the pengrurah, from Pujung, see Chapter 3) who is also collector of taxes and the sole intermediary between associations.

This is a difficult position for in years of drought violence or its threat are reportedly not uncommon between associations over charges of theft and diversion of water.[6] Unlike the positions of administrative village head and government headman of the ward, which may be fiercely contested posts in Tengahpadang, there is little competition for office. On the contrary, it is at times necessary to force the post upon some young, literate and able farmer despite his genuine protests. For, in contrast to the administrative village and ward, headship of the irrigation association not only may not be renumerated except for exemption from ordinary taxes and duties, but offers little access to, or control over, a substantial treasury as surplus is normally divided immediately.[7] Further for various reasons which will be examined the post carries little authority or scope for the exercise of innovative talents.

While technologically the installations of the irrigation association are ingenious, the materials used in construction are commonly little more than mud and stones for conduits which are often kilometres in length, split coconut trees or bamboo for aqueducts and inexpensive logs for weirs to keep the water level right. To avoid constant breakdown would require an extensive outlay of capital in a systematic improvement of waterworks by replacing makeshift ones with lasting, but expensive, materials such as concrete. While this may be done at the weakest points, the costs of rebuilding the system are so high that reliance is commonly placed instead upon the extensive use of labour to patch up the innumerable breaches which occur and involve a great deal of water loss, often at critical periods in the rice-cycle. The choice between permanent and expensive or cheap and short-lasting installations faced by irrigations associations has a bearing upon the pattern of economic change, or rather its lack, in irrigated rice production and requires a more detailed discussiong of the implications of technology upon the process of making decisions within associations.

By the nature of the resources and the geography of the region, the various physical structures controlled by the irrigations associations are effectively rigid and unchangeable. On the one hand, not only are the sources of water fixed, but also associations are set within a wider system of distribution covering an entire watershed; on the other the topography of southern Bali, let alone the enormous investment of labour in constructing a particular pattern of terracing, militates against change. Further there is an interesting rule which must be followed in laying out conduits. It is strictly prohibited to build

channels so that at any point water is made to run back in the direction from which it came. As we shall see, there is some evidence that this may be a manifestation of a deeper structural theme which forbids any direct reversal of flow, evident also in such fields as marriage and caste. As a result of these considerations irrigation is constrained within a very rigid technical framework which allows very little alteration, except at great cost or of questionable value. In turn this means that there is little opportunity for extensive management other than to maintain the status quo, or for developing new ideas beyond trying to encourage the investment of capital. As a result irrigation association councils are rarely innovative bodies, nor do they provide much scope for leadership as the nature of the assets which they control are largely fixed.

The actual layout of the irrigation channels, together with the pattern of land ownership within the association, combine to have a significant effect upon the form of decision-making and political action in the assembly of members. The main sub-channels owned by the group consist of streams intersected at intervals by dividing-blocks, (pemaruan) which separate off side-conduits of one or more members. (The proportion of the stream to be directed off is calculated simply by cutting sections out of the wooden blocks in a ratio set by the number of units required). So receipt of water is organized serially along a single duct. Much of the time, particularly when needed badly, the quantity of water delivered is below the optimum level; so pilfering is constant regardless of the rules and systems of guard duty which, unless very carefully organized, lead to selective punishment and widespread abuse by the guards themselves - quis custodiet ipsos custodes ? The methods of stealing are simple: blocking the main stream or more often the opening of those higher up in order to divert water; or by various methods of digging through or undermining the earthen installations (a clear list of methods is incidentally provided in the specified fines in Appendix 1.). As water is scarce, not only are members not united by proximity into interest groups, but instead they are divided by their rival concern over obtaining what they regard as adequate supplies at one another's expence, so that serious quarrels are not infrequent. Ultimately the organization of the irrigation association brings individual interests into direct competition and atomizes its members accordingly.

The size of holdings of peasant farmers further affects this state. Table 5:1 shows the pattern of distribution of water within the five different sections of Subak Langkih, from which it is clear that only a small minority of villagers in any section obtain more than one bit tenah. While computation of a household's requirement, let alone the productivity of the land, is a complex business; it would be accurate to say that those villagers with land watered by one bit tenah or less fall within the category of 'subsistence' farmers[8] in that, unless they have other major sources of income or no families, there will be no, or precious little, surplus in rice (for yields and basic dietary food-stuffs, see below). In other words small-scale peasant farmers predominate in the association. These comprise anywhere between 70% to nearly 90% of the membership (Table 5:2). To the extent that a congruence of interests occurs within the association it is based neither on political factions nor on neighbouring fields but on size of holdings. This directly affects decisions taken by the group on capital investment. As the majority of members have little, if any, surplus or very occasionally are large farmers with dispersed holdings, their stake is too small in a particular area to be worth large financial outlay, they tend to vote against expenditure where possible, and this composition further ensures the conservative nature of the assembly as a decision-making body. As a consequence this spends a good deal of its time thinking of reasons for not taking action beyond routine repairs. In the absence of adequately large groupings within it with reasons to pressure for change, the association tends to be static, backward-looking body.

There is little connexion for the most part between relationships within the irrigation association and other local corporations. Nonetheless the overlap in personnel with the ward has certain implications. First, demonstrated ability at leadership enhances a man's reputation and credibility, which may be used to effect in the ward. This has happened with the head of Section Langkih, Cokorda Alit Nama (NE2), who has been able to build up a small, but definite, following and a name for leadership through his position. Second, quarrels in one arena may be played out in the other. For example, a fight in 1950 between Kt. Mara (NW7) and I Nyèmbèng (NW28) over whether the latter had reduced I Mara's holdings by cutting away his terrace walls still provides the ground for a long-lasting political emnity within the ward. The other way round it was noted that guard systems

TABLE 5:1 THE SIZE OF WATER HOLDINGS IN THE SECTIONS (TEMPEK) OF SUBAK LANGKIH

Section:	Units in Tenah *																					
	$5\frac{1}{2}$	4	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$	2	$1\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{3}{16}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{8}$	1	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	Total Holdings.
Sukabayu:	-	-	1	-	2	1	1	2	8	1	2	-	8	1	1	27	9	12	4	-	14	94
Langkih:	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	1	6	3	-	1	8	5	-	54	3	15	-	2	6	108 **
Uma Dalem:	1	-	1	1	2	1	-	-	8	-	-	-	7	2	-	51	3	9	-	-	2	88
Telun Ayah:	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	5	-	56	-	22	-	2	6	99
Keraman:	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	3	1	-	59	5	7	-	-	2	84
Total:	1	3	3	3	9	2	1	3	26	6	2	1	28	14	1	247	20	65	4	4	30	473

* The tenah is the indigenous unit of water measurement. Actual holdings are calculated by multiples and fractions of this, the main being: tenah =1; sibak $\frac{1}{2}$; depuk $\frac{1}{4}$; sihit $\frac{1}{8}$, from which may be produced fractions of fractions. In the region round Tengahpadang, the tenah is defined simply as a proportion of the total water supply and the basic unit of calculation of liability for costs. It is therefore a proportional figure which need not be the same from one section to another, let alone between irrigation associations. This identity of water, land etc. is used not as an accurate measure but as a convenient means of talking to indicate rough areas and amounts.

** This includes 6 holders of temple fields who are omitted from Table 3:11, but are included here, as in voting policy they side with small-holders and tenants (see text). In a small number of instances men may have holdings in more than one section. The results here are not treated as cumulative, as the concern of this table is to show the size of holdings within a given council's domain.

TABLE 5.2 PROPORTION OF SMALL WATER HOLDINGS IN SUBAK LANGKIH

(All holdings calculated in tenah)

Section	More than 1 tenah	1 tenah or less	total holdings	% with 1 tenah or less
Sukabayu_ :	28	06	94	702%
Langkih:	28	80	108 *	74.1%
Uma Dalem:	23	65	88	73.9%
Telun Ayah:	13	86	99	869%
Keraman:	11	73	84	869%
Total:	103	370	473	782%

* As on the previous table this includes 6 persons working temple lands.

are notoriously partial in their implementation. It is common to fine personal or political opponents, or even on occasions, to damage their property. More generally the irrigation association always remains a potential arena for factional conflict. So on the one hand its officials may come under pressure from various sides to make discriminatory use of sanctions, funds of influence; on the other the parties may more or less explicitly agree not to extend disputes so as to affect production, but instead to limit the scale of conflict (see Bailey 1969: 29-30). Finally, as land-holding and labour relationships are organized through ties other than the irrigation association, the formal separation of corporate groups in no way inhibits the conversion of wealth into credit in more politically advantageous arenas by means of work arrangements or straight economic patronage.

To sum up, irrigation associations control the allocation of water and the technical installations for its distribution, but have no authority or rights over land, and only a marginal say in how it is worked. Rights over productive resources and labour are controlled through entirely different sets of relationships which refer back to the various modes of organization within the settlement and ward, not the irrigation association. These involve the devolution of productive property and capital assets, which splits Balinese village society in a number of different ways, perhaps most importantly into land-power and landless, and the categories which are not quite coordinate with this, of compound owners (kerama desa) and non-heirs (pengempian). One of the features of labour relationships is that they bridge this diversion to form complex sets of ties of obligation, and superiority or subordination which may in turn have wider social implications.

The Significance of Land and Its Yield:

In order to understand the importance which irrigated rice cultivation has for the Balinese and so the value placed upon rights over terraced fields, it is necessary to examine Balinese ideas of production, exchange and purity, if only briefly. In this section accordingly I wish to look at the other types of land and examine the part they play in the local economy. It appears that, unlike riceland, these are not often used to their full capacity. This seems to be linked in part to different types of exchange of produce, but also to underlying notions about the nature of different commodities and their exchange. The Balinese classify the world according to a scale of relatively refinement or coarseness, such that the more subtle is also regarded as purer. This theory goes part of the way towards accounting for the status of rice and riceland; and also suggests a rationale for puzzling features of exchange relationships involving food and cash. It might be argued that indigenous ideas on these matters are largely peripheral to the harder questions of the allocations of capital to production or its use in consumption. Examination shows however that the cost of building and maintaining ancestral shrines is commonly greater in monetary terms than the entire family living areas and amounts to a substantial proportion of the total commercial value of rice fields themselves. I shall suggest that to draw a dichotomy between unproductive expenditure in sites to gods and productive investment in rice terraces is at odds with Balinese ideas about successful cultivation. This depends in different ways, or at different levels, as much upon the ancestral spirits as it does upon farming (see also Hobart 1978b, for a fuller discussion of this problem for rice ceremonies).

The relative value laid on different categories of land shows complex considerations to be involved. There are several types and in order to understand the great importance the Balinese attach to rice terraces which are not necessarily the most productive type of soil, it is useful to consider the economic, social and conceptual aspects of the various forms of cultivable land and their products. However, for peasant farmers in this region, rice is not merely the culturally valued crop, it is terminologically identified with food and welfare itself. So it is principally in terms of ricefields that villagers think when evaluating not just the class of wealth of their neighbours, but also a person's standing and in a certain sense his worth.

The largest single area of agricultual land other than rice terraces consists of dry fields (tegal) which is a somewhat loose term for all ground which is cultivable without supplies of irrigable water. These fields vary from fertile gardens to rocky outcrops containing more or less only stands of trees, or lalang grass for roofing. On occasions dry fields may be terraced and irrigated where the lie of the land permits and, more difficult, the members of an irrigation association are prepared to admit further division of their water. In the area north of Pujung this is being done on a large scale as the boundary of irrigated riceland is pushed further uphill, which reduces the flow of water to the south (for the response, see Hobart 1978b). In long-settled areas the conversion is of marginal importance. In Pisangkaja since 1917 out of some 33 hectares of riceland, less than 1 hectare has been changed from dry fields, while during the same period almost the same amount has been transformed from rice terraces into field-hut space. Dry fields are used to grow a wide range of produce, including cash crops. These may be set aside for groves of coconut or other trees. Space is generally given however to vegetables and root crops, such as cassava, yams or sweet potatoes, which may also be used for animal fodder. More important these constitute a dietary supplement amounting at times to a staple which is much disliked; the proportion of rice decreasing the poorer the family and the longer the period since the last harvest (on the ranges of mixture, see Raka 1955: 47). This inclusion of tubers in food is felt to be humiliating, or perhaps better, degrading. That they are eaten by animals is significant. The degree of systematic exploitation of these dry fields depends upon three main factors: the need of the household for root crops as food at a particular time; the labour spare from rice cultivation; and equally important, but often neglected in accounts, the industry of the family in question. This does not seem to vary simply with the ratio of producers to consumers (Sahlins 1974: 51-92). Rather there seems at times to be a tendency for many of the poorer families to concentrate on production for use value; while others exploit this produce for marketing (cf. Sahlins 1974: 115-8). Finally, as these plots are generally some way from the settlement, there is a greater risk of theft despite the use of various, sometimes fascinating, methods of prevention. These may range from the use of potentially lethal fire-hardened bamboo spikes (sungga) on approaches, hidden at odd angles in the grass, to an effective though expensive means known as èmpèr-èmpèr. This consists of worn clothing

(usually female), which is hung round the perimeter of the area to be protected above head height. Passing underneath this causes ritual pollution (here: leteh ; for an introduction to the different types of pollution in Bali, see Chapter 8), and is very effective.

Although dry fields are potentially highly productive, their theoretical capacity is rarely reached. Their market value around Tengahpadang is almost exactly half that of rice land. Although in view of the very low frequency of sale this can only be an approximation, in the remainder of the thesis where an overall index of field holdings is relevant, I shall follow the Balinese in computing the value of dry fields as half that of riceland.[9] Despite this recognition of the productivity of dry fields, it is generally assigned a somewhat marginal status in indigenous thought in everyday discussion.

By contrast the remaining category of land, house gardens, are of great importance. Almost every compound possesses a plot of cultivable land of some size, known as kebun (kebon) or teba. The restriction on letting animals into the ricefields means that most livestock is kept in the compound and the manure makes the ground exceedingly fertile, as the Balinese fully recognize.[10] An indication of the commercial value of potential yields may be calculated from Appendix 3; for annual output is about half the capital value of wood and standing crops (see also footnote 9). In addition, maximum use is made of space by a system of tiering. At ground level various root crops and vegetables are grown which will tolerate a degree of shade; for around these are bushes, such as coffee (kopi) and small trees like banana (generically: biyu) and papaya (gedang). Rising high above this are the stands of fruit trees and coconut palms (nyiuh). In view of the high productivity of this land and its far higher potential commercial yield in marketable produce, it is interesting that, in striking contrast to the rice fields where indigenous technology has pushed production levels to their limits, apart from tiering, little attempt is made to exploit house gardens to the full, or for sale (with the occasional exception of certain types of very large fruit tree, like wani (kemang magnifera) or durèn (Ind: durian, durio zibethinus), the harvest of which may sometimes be sub-contracted).

So in practice ricefields are not necessarily the most productive form of land, although far more labour is invested in these than in others. Under root crops alone, dry fields for a far lower amount of labour put in can achieve roughly double the monetary return on good land, although cycling of crops is necessary.[11]

House gardens under normal conditions of cultivation apparently may yield up to five times as much in terms of market prices as riceland of the same area, subject to size limits set by the quantity of manure available. These figures are only approximate, but correspond, with the more informed opinion of expert farmers. A full study would be a large undertaking in view of the range and variability of factors, and probably of strictly limited value in any case. For the micro-ecological variation partly caused by the history of use under complicated tenancy systems, the wild variation in efficiency created by differing schemes for labour exchange or hiring, coupled with seasonal fluctuations of water and persistent theft, make elegant economic general analyses of the sort proposed by Sahlins (1974) a complex business. In no small part, such analyses depend upon factors which must be apprehended more or less consciously in an indigenous framework of thought; for instance the allocation of labour bears in mind the expectations of return, and further involves farmers' assumptions or calculations of risk and uncertainty. Economic analyses generally pay relatively little attention to indigenous concepts in such matters. Also certain values are at times assumed. It is questionable whether the preference in lowland Bali for irrigated rice agriculture, or the avoidance of certain remunerative occupations of low risk, such as palm-wine tapping and butchery, can be explained purely as the product of market forces. As I shall now try to show, in order to understand the pride of place occupied by rice and the time and labour devoted to its cultivation, it is instructive to look at such social features as the classification of land and produce, Balinese notions of wealth and the consequences of exchange, and even the theories of causation underlying agricultural production and consumption themselves.

In the first instance, part of the difference in use of land is linked to villagers' ideas of its jural status and the differing patterns of social relationships involved. There are three recognized categories, as was noted in the discussion of village land in Chapter 3. The precise constellation of rights over these vary somewhat. Both dry and rice fields are seen as private property, over which particular individuals have the exclusive rights to use, dispose of by gift or sell on the open market. This is subject, however, to certain important qualifications. In theory, no property can be sold without the consent of the expected heirs, which in effect means agreement within the household. Further,

sale of rice fields is discouraged and reasons have to be stated to the sub-district officer, although there are many convenient excuses, by which indebted parties can arrange disposal. So fields constitute something approaching the private possession of the household, vested in a single named title-holder. The remaining type is different, however, as it is garden area lying within compounds on village land, so its tenure is subject to membership of the customary village and the continued performance of status obligations. It is also in theory removable,' should the group so decide. Traditionally the compound occupiers own outright the buildings which they construct on the land and have the right to cultivate the ground and dispose of the crops and trees they have planted. More recently, it has become accepted practice that they may sell the right to settle on part or all of this land to a candidate approved by the customary village sub-section which may lay down conditions as to an acceptable purchaser: commonly that he be from the ward, or at least the settlement. Failure to fulfil the required duties is punishable by withdrawal of the rights of occupancy. So, in contrast to the other types of cultivable land, house gardens (kebun or teba) are seen as part of a complex of rights in which the individual holds a share of the collective good. This has an effect upon claims over the produce of the land. For each of the three categories seems, in local thought, to be associated with different forms of use, exchange and sets of social relationships.

This goes a large part of the way to explaining the under-production on compound land. The produce is seen as part of a system of generalized reciprocity within the ward. Vegetables and fruit, other than those earmarked for immediate consumption, may be and are, freely requested by other villagers, especially neighbours who tend to keep a careful eye open. To refuse to part with produce is not only in effect to deny one's social relationships with others, but also liable to raise murmurs about whose land it is. Controlling demand is achieved instead by a generally casual attitude to production, a variation of Sahlins' argument about the constraints induced by production for use (1974: 41-99). So, in spite of the high market value of such fruits as papaya, jackfruit, mango or certain types of banana, cash-cropping of gardens in a systematic fashion seems never to be done in Tengahpadang. The reasons, however, are not argued out as I have. My enquiries were, for the most part, greeted with incomprehension: one simply didn't cultivate kebun in that way. The more thoughtful villagers pointed out that, if one did, the effect would simply be that more people than

usual would materialize in the neighbourhood to ask, as there would be more to spare. Conceptually, garden land falls into a different class from the other types.

These differences in village representations of land are closely linked to parallel divisions in the types of crop ideally grown, the value placed upon them and upon patterns of exchange or accumulation. These take the form of a series of largely explicit tripartite distinctions in local thought. The basic classification of land was noted in Chapter 3:

<u>désa</u>	:	<u>tegal</u>	:	<u>carik</u>
residential land		dry fields		rice fields

These are generally associated with a division of produce grown on each, although there is a small degree of latitude, as dry crops may occasionally be introduced between rice cycle by good farmers to balance the use of nutrients. The most common crops, however, are:

fruit (vegetables for consumption)	:	root crops (vegetables for sale)	:	rice

So, the various types of land usually produce crops which tend to fulfil different functions:

luxuries	:	emergency commodity	:	staple

The polar opposition between village garden land and irrigated riceland emerges most clearly, however, in the different forms of distribution associated with these crops and zones of production, which consequently imply different aspects of sociality and identity. In this, <u>tegal</u> appears as its interstitial position would suggest, as a vague category with somewhat fluid characteristics, partly derived from the opposed categories and apparently with few distinctive characteristics of its own. It may be significant that there is only a single term for dry fields in general use across all levels of the Balinese language which is <u>tegal</u>; whereas ricefields are differentiated in each, so they are known as <u>uma</u> (the personal name of the Hindu goddess, but riceland) in low Balinese, <u>carik</u> in high and <u>sawah</u> in even more elevated usage. Garden land too is distinguished into

abiyan (low) and teba or kebun (both higher). So:

sharing	:	marketing ?	:	retention
redistribution		consumption or exchange ?		accumulation
social unity	:	?	:	social differentiation
measure of group solidarity	:	?	:	measure of standing within group

This is not a simple system of spheres of exchange, for all goods are in theory marketable. However, there are clear differences in the rights over, and use of, produce from different zones. For instance, fruit grown in tegal cannot be requested in the same way that it may when produced in house gardens. Again, there is a plot of illicitly watered kebun behind the living-space of I Badra (NE15) which borders on village land and over which villagers sometimes maintain that they have rights of request, as it is thought of as growing effectively on communal property.

The distinctions just drawn are not merely ideal and unrelated to the discriminations made by actors in actuality. This should be clear from the concentration of labour in rice production. In discussing wealth there is a noticeable tendency for villagers to define this by reference to irrigated riceland alone, and to omit gardens altogether, while also largely ignoring dry fields at the same time. Ownership of riceland singles out persons of substance, pemekel or anak mekel (literally those with provision or substance, bekel - the root of the title of village head, perbekel), so more generally someone of substance. As we shall see, this metaphor is significant. Ricefields come close to furnishing one of the main tangible 'measures of man' (Burridge 1971: 42; money is of increasing importance, but remains more a potential in a largely agrarian setting like Tengahpadang). There are other indices of different orders which spring to mind and will be examined later in the thesis. Notable among them are knowledge and also moral worth (darma) which may at times be subsumed under a more general, but heterogenous, notion of ritual purity (kesucian, see Chapter 8).

While there is ethnographic evidence that rice land is a critical material index by which to differentiate villagers, this still leaves the vexing question of what particular qualities make it the focus of attention. This is a complex problem, which requires detailed consideration beyond the scope of the present

work. As it will be relevant later, however, it may be interesting to introduce a possible line of enquiry which offers an explanation of certain otherwise puzzling customs. For instance, it is unclear why the sale of food, including rice, cleanses it of all ritual impurity; or why when rice may be openly bought and sold, there is a strong feeling that it should not be exchanged for money; or yet again why money, and rice in specified forms, may be offered to gods, but generally not rool crops in Tengahpadang. To suggest an answer to these problems involves what might seem a digression into Balinese theories of causation and the properties of matter; but these have direct bearing upon the field of economics.

Cultural Representations and Economic Choice:

There are grounds, both ethnographic and textual, for thinking that Bali has absorbed extensive religious and philosophical influence from India in the distant past. Among these appear to be aspects of a theory of substance and action. In a recent argument put forward for India, Marriott has suggested that these differ in certain fundamental and important ways from western ideas. Rather than there being a clear dualistic division of person from object transacted, the person is affected in his constitution by, and is in fact the product of, his exchanges with the world. "Actors' particular natures are thought to be results as well as causes of their particular actions (karma)." (Marriott 1976: 109). The items exchanged may be graded on a scale of increasing subtlety: in the few examples he gives, for instance, knowledge is more subtle than money, which in turn is less tangible than grain or land. These, however, are not so gross as cooked food or garbage (1976: 110). The underlying principles, he suggests briefly, are based on the diverse criteria of their intangibility, capacity of 'transformation' and also generation' (1976: 110).[12] It seems that these are assumed to be coordinate. What is interesting is the close parallel between this model and Balinese ideas of exchange, economic and otherwise, and the differentiation of persons. It is relevant that probably the most general of all the many systems of classification in Bali, one which embraces both the physical and immaterial worlds, is based upon a progressive scale from the coarse (kasar) to the refined (alus). While it is too early to be able to assess how applicable this ideal Indian model, itself only briefly adumbrated as yet, is to Bali, I shall try to show below and in subsequent chapters (especially Chapter 8) that the similarities are suggestive.

According to this scheme grain and land stand fairly high on the scale. In Bali rice is the basis not only of the daily diet, but also of a bewildering variety of products which may be derived from its flour, through fermentation and so forth. So, it has an ability to be transformed far greater than have other crops; although it should be noted that this argument is partly circular: the currency of rice encourages its adaptation to diverse ends. There are other relevant characteristics, specifically Balinese. Fruit and rice appear to be more refined than the other crops discussed, as they grow upwards and are elevated above the earth; in contrast to root crops which by definition do not. The colour of rice is also seen as an index of its ritual refinement (unlike root crops which are often described as barak, red). Finally rice is peculiarly the product of water, which is seen as having a complex range of important properties and is associated with ritual purity (Hobart 1978a). The coconut which also possesses some of these features - height, colour and here, storing water - shares something of the position of rice and in certain forms may be used as a source of hdy water (see also Hooykaas, J. on the symbolic use of the coconut in the purificatory lis, 1961: 6-7). Marriott has suggested that money is subtler, on the grounds that it has greater powers of transformation. There is some evidence that money is highly ranked as a substance, and this helps to explain some striking features of the ethnography. As I noted, there is a sense that money and rice are substances which should be kept distinct. Where rice is transacted in terms of money it is significant that, where the former has become grosser through contact, its transformability is restored. For instance, food, including rice and its products, which has been offered to deities (lungsuran, in high Balinese; paridan if offered in rites to the dead, pitrayadnya) has very restricted use and is classed as a form of garbage. By being sold it regains its previous status, for it is said to be 'purified by the market', that is any exchange for money. Also, for instance, the payment of high ranking ritual practitioners must take the form of money and (uncooked) rice, known as sari, the significance of which will be discussed below. Further in the agricultural cycle money is not seen as inferior; rather it is specifically used by persons who wish to claim substance by showing their command over, and generosity in parting with, money for the lower form of labour. (To the extent that it is morally ambiguous, money may be so because of its excessive capacity for transformation under different circumstances.) Land is subtler than labour. So in the process of cultivation there is a triangle of transformations by

which the lowly substance of labour is not received directly by land-owners, as this would affect their own composition. Instead this is directed onto the earth which transforms it into refined rice (see Diagram 5:1). It could be argued that it is this absorbtion of grossness which makes the earth of questionable purity.

DIAGRAM 5:1 TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION OF IRRIGATED RICE.



This ideology is convenient, for it makes it possible as well to legitimate the reification of property to which Bloch (1975b) has drawn attention. The rights of others by virtue of their labour, in the past or present, are effectively denied through denigration, and translated into subordination.

This scheme is helpful in understanding the particular value attached to rice, and also provides some insight into the significance of its exchange. The accumulation of rice through the holding of the land on which it grows is an index, more or less literally, of the substance (bekel) of a person. In being more refined than root crops or fruit (other than perhaps coconuts), its possession and transaction connote greater value. Exchange, however, raises wider problems of its own, both as to the differential status of the goods and persons involved. The extent of elaboration of ideas on this in Bali suggests that it may be regarded as of importance. There are different, logically connected theories about the significance of exchange itself, which permit conflicting interpretations by those engaged in it. The first stresses the different, and incomparable, worth of the items in question; the second, closer to Mauss (1954), tends to emphasize the participants and the balance of exchange. So in accepting substance the recipient

may be held to be gracing the donor by incorporating relatively coarse material items (an idiom used for giving to gods, priests and kings: maturan, a term which lowers oneself, sor); but in return he may be seen to benefit the lower by sublime gifts of knowledge, welfare of the state and so forth (classed as pica, a term elevating the giver, singgih). Phrased differently the superior party can command these resources to be produced or handed over to him by others; while offering or forcing those below to accept what he chooses togive (see Chapter 7; on the complex ways in which exchange may be understood, also Bloch 1978: 32). On the other hand from a different perspective which is given cultural recognition also (Chapter 8, on the Balinese use of the idea of darma), the incumbents in these high positions are maintained there by those below. So village exegetes may argue that the donor not only places the recipient under obligation, but that the latter may be viewed as dependent (cf. Mauss 1954: 68-76). Something of this double-edged quality of the gift in Bali comes out in such questions as whether priests are in fact patrons or clients of those who use their services. According to the first view, their patronage is unquestionable as it rests upon the gift of superior value, according to a pre-existing classification. By the second, however, in receiving payment, they are commensurately dependent upon the congregation.

These ideas are relevant to the exchange of rice. For in the various stages of preparation its nature undergoes change. Following Marriott, as padi it has the greatest powers of generation - seed beds are laid with padi still on the stem - and so is acceptable to princes and landlords from tenant farmers. As milled rice (baas) it has a higher capacity of transformation into different food-stuffs. In this form it is used, significantly, together with money as the means of reciprocating priestly services for which cooked rice may never be used. Only men who are prepared to admit complete inferiority or subordination will accept the grosser form of cooked food. (The question "dija ngalih nasi ? ", "Where do you get (cooked) rice ?", is a way of enquiring who a man's patron is.) The implications of receiving any material substance noted above still creates problems. This is partly resolved by an elaboration on theories of substance which distinguish the essence (sari) from the material part.[13] The reciprocation with priests takes the form of offerings (banten) containing money and milled rice, the former narrowly, the two together more generally, being called the sari of the offering. The implication is that the priest accepts only the essence, through the rite of nabtab

(wafting the sari towards him). However they also commonly accept the substance. For this reason, as we shall see in Chapter 8, a Brahmana priest who wishes to retain great respect may well acknowledge the gift and its essence, but give its contents away to a lower party, so avoiding both the grosser substance and the ambiguity inherent in acceptance. Gods too are placed in a similar position by having offerings directed to them. Gods are seen as finding the essence of offerings wafted up as pleasurable (actual acceptance is a moot point for non-corporeal beings whose doings are beyond knowledge by men). Further however, each god is commonly accompanied by a buta, sometimes thought of as a being and often loosely translated as demon, but closer to an element or basic substance (cf. Mershon 1970, on elementals). In Tengahpadang, it was openly stated that the god (batara) and buta were simply different aspects of the same force or idea. By this division, transactions are largely with the material part (from which the elements originated in the first place, leaving the spiritual aspect untouched. Be this as it may, the main point is that by its nature a gift of rice tends to imply, or constitute (according to the point of view), a relationship of inequality. So on the occasions where it is customary to offer rice to other villagers, as at major rites of transition (manusayadnya), the reciprocity in due course of time is an explicit denial of inequality, within a certain context.

Finally something of the significance of rice in Balinese thought may be gleaned from the terminology. In the various speech levels of the Balinese language, the term for cooked rice - nasi (low), daar (middle, or market language), ajengan (high, or refined)[14] - is the word for food and nourishment itself, so that to indicate food without rice requires circumlocution. There is also a more involved, but interesting, link. One of the most important mythological substances in Bali, with complex Indian literary and religious roots, is the ambrosia, or elixir, of immortality, (a)merta (also: amreta, amrita)[15]. In religious texts, this is commonly one of the qualities conveyed by holy water, tirta (Hooykaas 1964, 1966) which may elegantly be described itself as tirta merta (Hooykaas, J. 1961: 17). It is also the vital fluid in the body (Weck 1937: 40ff). What is at first sight more surprising is that the Balinese villagers, in Tengahpadang at least, should also refer to rice as merta (and say that this is the source of happiness). Now it also happens that it is a common personal name, in most cases intended to indicate or bring health (like the autonyms Sadiya, Lasiya, Selamet; other names, like Pica

and Mupu used in this chapter, also have significance, cf. Geertz 1966: 14 on personal names). Once I photographed a young man, I Merta (SW12), helping to hoe the family ricefields. This caused great general amusement, because I had succeeded in encapsulating "(I) Merta ngalih/ngaé merta", (I) Merta (the man) looking for/working on merta (rice), with the further implication of man making the elixir of immortality, and the puns on merta being self-generated. This should not necessarily be dismissed as peasant ignorance. Van der Tuuk (1897) has noted that the plant nasi-nasi, used as a symbol of rice (Hobart 1978b : 61-62) is known as taru amreta, the tree of immortality. Further, in his detailed discussion of the idea of the elixir, Bosch notes that from the early textual references " we do well to remember that the conception of amrita originally did not imply the notion of an eternal life.. . . 'Immortality to man means to live a complete life and to be happy.' " (Bosch 1960: 62-3). Contemporary peasant Balinese appear remarkably faithful to ancient usage.

It would also be unwise to dismiss this discussion as mere indigenous ideology without import for the patterns of material production and exchange. The channelling of capital is directly linked to the role of the ancestral spirits in the provision of merta and the material welfare of their descendants. The purified dead (lelangitan in low Balinese, from langit, sky; or lelu(w)ur, the high Balinese term from luur, above) who have gone to another world (literally: kedituané, thither) are generally benevolent, unless ritual improprieties, usually the failure to receive adequate attention (keélingan, being forgotten), are committed. Then they cause suffering (mintelin) as a reminder of their neglect. This takes two principal forms: first they may bring illness or cause quarrels; second the household economy becomes bu(w)ut, disordered and ruined. On the one hand any form of production or work is unsuccessful; on the other what is produced disappears quickly without bringing benefit. It is the ancestors who are largely responsible for inducing this feared state which leads to " (E)wug ! (Tu)sing mesaré megaé." [16], "Chaos !. One cannot rest, nor work"; implying that effort is unrewarded and worry prevents any relaxation. By contrast, if relations with the ancestors are good, then there is a state of sarwa mupu, sarwa nadi, "everything yields profit, everything becomes fruitful "(nadi is one of the most complex of common Balinese words: its meanings vary from being able to, or being allowed to do something, to entering trance, as well as apparently being the root of dadiya, a term used in Tengahpadang for clan). One of the main requirements of ancestor

spirits is a suitable shrine (sanggah in low, or merajan in high Balinese). These are very expensive constructions of fired brick (citakan), carved elaborately vdcanic rock (paras) and beaten palm fibre (eduk) for roofing. There are no absolute standards, both the shrine and rites being graded according to the means of the living (Hobart 1978b: 77), too little and too much being equally dangerous. As Appendix 3 shows, the appropriate level of capital investment on shrines is exceptionally high, commonly being more (the exceptions are listed) than for the entire secular buildings for living, storing grain, cooking, the animal and equipment sheds and the walled surround of the compound itself. The total figure is a substantial proportion of the value of the family ricelands, generally being at least $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ of the main source of production itself. In some compounds such as NW4, the cost of the shrine comfortably equals that of the substantial ricefields. A proper seat for the ancestors is an essential part of effective material production.[17] The people of Pisangkaja argue this by pointing to what is seen as the definitive local test case of two closely related families: Kt. Gendul (NW10) and Ny. Gangsar (NW11). While I Gangsar keeps a lineage shrine (sanggah gedé) appropriate to his and the other members' wealth (and further is on good terms with his deceased grandmother, footnote 20, Table 4:1), Kt.Gendul is one of the few whose secular dwellings exceed in cost the shrine. As Appendix 3, also shows, while I Gangsar's capital is gradually growing, Kt.Gendul's rice-fields have effectively been halved in the last twenty years. What would commonly be regarded as frozen capital, is seen by the Balinese as an essential investment with direct consequences upon agricultural production and domestic consumption.

This apparent discursion into the cultural significance of rice and indigenous ideas of substance and exchange is relevant to the study of Balinese village economics. Land remains, and is seen, as the main source of subsistence. The potential productivity of the different forms varies, but may well be far higher than is normally achieved. There are grounds for thinking that cultural factors play an important part in determining the type in which labour is invested. While one class of land, house gardens, is known to be exceptionally fertile, systematic exploitation of these is not found in spite of the little labour needed, because the land is seen as belonging in some way to the community and its produce open to claims by others. So labour is concentrated on land where such obligations do not apply. Over the last half century the economy has changed both in the extent of markets and also the balance of land and labour. Rather than this last being redeployed into increasing the cultivations of other crops, the intensive

farming of rice has instead been intensified further. This is not because rice forms the only staple. For root crops in practice share this standing but are denigrated in thought. Rice is unlike these in that it is perceived to have qualities, apparently of ancient pedigree, which give it the status of an important measure of value. Although Burridge may be correct in seeing money as the measure of man in complex economies, there may be several such measures articulated by their differing cultural significance. In the rest of this chapter I would like therefore to examine in some detail the forms in which resources are held and the social implications of their unequal distribution. Conceptually, lowly-valued labour is exchanged for more refined resources such as rice or money, which brings about inequalities in the natures of the participants. So the ownership of irrigated riceland tends to assume great importance and its unequal disposition has complex consequences.

The Web of Economic Ties:

With this discussion behind us, we can now turn to the questions of the ownership of irrigated riceland and the distribution of its yield. In this section I would like therefore to document carefully the pattern of land-holdings and the changes which have occurred over the last two decades. The most striking feature is that not only has the proportion of peasant farmers remained stable despite the increase in population, but also almost exactly half the villagers did not, and do not, own irrigated riceland at all. This raises an obvious question as to how they obtain a livelihood and the chapter therefore turns to the detailed documentation of the sourcees of income of the households in Pisangkaja. Two interesting features emerge. First, there is no simple correlation between the paucity of land and engagement in non-agricultural occupations. Some of the richest families are very active in menial supplementary jobs and some of the poor abstain from the opportunities available. Second, ideas of ritual purity play an important part in defining the value placed upon different kinds of occupation. Certain activities are scrupulously avoided, especially by the high castes who are more concerned about their ritual state than commoners. This also has the consequence that a few relatively lucrative activities have few people willing to undertake them. These supplementary occupations mostly offer services to other villagers. So, in the last part of the section, I shall examine the extent to which local corporations are involved in redistribution, whether by acting directly as employers or

by prescribing exchanges between members which work to the benefit of the well-off. In this the allocation of agricultural tenancies is particularly important. Much of this is organized not by corporations but by individual villagers. The distribution of these is, however, closely linked to the corporate framework. For they are almost exclusively contained within the ward, so that this is the group within which redistribution attains great importance. The extent of this is such that there is little correlation between the area of land owned and land worked, or with the size of the harvest yielded. This will be documented in some detail as it is a timely reminder of the possible complexity of different types of rights over productive property in peasant societies.

1) Rights over Productive Land

The pattern of land tenure in Pisangkaja is undergoing gradual change, which has repercussions upon economic and social relations within the community. The state of affairs for the period before 1949 is somewhat uncertain in the absence of land records. The historical material examined in Chapter 2. suggested that there was a small set of aristocratic families which constituted the ruling elite, with large estates employing a proportion of the village populace, either part- or full-time in tenancy on pecatu lands. In Tengahpadang, however, there seem to have been many snall peasant farmers living off their own land. Between these two there was a category of high caste Balinese forming a penumbra round the courts, but apparently for the most part relatively poor. So although by status and political connexions they were distinct from ordinary villagers, this was, and is, not reflected in theri contrd over productive assets. The post-war period has brought a number of changes, which consist essentially in a tendency towards the reduction of large estates counterbalanced by the rise of some small-holders and landless families. As the previous discussion might have led one to expect, these changes are almost exclusively in the ownership of ricefields, which are transferred something like ten times as often as dry fields. Part of the diminuition is through holdings being split by inheritance; but the extent of this is held in check by the mechanisms already mentioned. More is due to the loss of lands by aristocratic estates, which have been snapped up by successful peasant farmers or landless households with capital accumulated by various means. So, while the number of households in the ward has grown, the proportion of landowning and landless families has actually remained constant and the size of holdings on

average decreased slightly. As against this, however, the total of villagers without direct access to productive land has risen, which has had complex effects upon the elaboration of economic relationships more or less directly concerned with agriculture.

The following figures bear out these general remarks. Over the years since Independence, the population of Pisangkaja has grown steadily: in 1949 there were some 118 households, as against 160 by 1972, a rise of just over a third (for the constraints on calculations for the earlier date, see footnote to Table 5: 3). During this period, the area of riceland has increased only slightly, from some 45 to 47.7 hectares (that is 6%). It is interesting that this increase in numbers has not led directly to a larger proportion of families being without land, as Table 5: 3 makes clear; for more households now have access to rice fields than before. In 1949 only 62 of the present households owned irrigated riceland; by 1972 the figure had risen by over a quarter to 79. So the percentage of families owning rice terraces has only dropped from 52. 5% to 49.4%. As a generation ago, roughly half the villagers possess ricefields. This does not mean that the village economy is static however, as these proportions disguise an increase in absolute numbers. For the total of households without irrigated fields has risen from 56 to 81, an addition of 25 households, nearly a third more than in 1949. Almost all these are dependent for their subsistence directly or otherwise on the same amount of farmland as before.

TABLE 5: 3 CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP OF RICELAND SINCE 1949 FOR HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN PISANGKAJA IN 1972.

	1949*	%	1972	%
Own riceland:	62	52. 5	79	49. 4
Own none:	56	47. 5	81	50. 6
Total:	118	100.0	160	100. 0

* All these tables require a note of caution on the definition of population. There has been a small amout of migration and some families have died without issue since 1949. It is not possible to incorporate all these factors in a single table, particularly as informants are not always clear whether a family migrated before 1949 or after in one or two cases. So the figures for 1949 refer to the land-holdings of contemporary kuren in Pisangkaja, whether they lived in the ward, as almost all did, or elsewhere in a small minority of instances. The main irregularity, where migration is largely confined to poor families, is Anak Agung Putera (NW17) from the Puri Ageng, who owned over 5 ha. in 1949 (see Chapter 2). Otherwise this method of reckoning, which is regrettably necessary, causes little misrepresentation.

This expansion in land-ownership is the result of different processes. These are summarized for convenience in Table 5: 4, which shows the quantity and source of rice fields obtained by families previously without any. There are three main ways in which villagers may acquire holdings.

TABLE 5: 4 THE SOURCE OF RICELAND AMONG PREVIOUSLY LANDLESS HOUSEHOLDS.

Source:	No. of house-holds:	%	Amount of land:	%
Purchase:	9	47. 4	3. 375 ha	58. 8
Inheritance:	6	31. 6	1. 405 ha	24. 5
Both purchase and inheritance:	2	10. 5	-	0
Conversion of dry fields:	2	10. 5	0.96 ha	16. 7
Totals:	19	100. 0	5. 74 ha	100. 0

These figures are taken from the full table of changes in landholding given in Appendix 3.

The division os estates is not the most important method of gaining land. While nearly one third of landless households came by their rice fields through inheritance and a further 10% secured some in this way, the amount transferred in this fashion was slightly less than a quarter of the total, for many of the plots were of marginal size. In contrast, over half the people who acquired land did so, at least in part through purchase, and this accounted for nearly 60% of all transactions. (The turnover of riceland on the market is fairly low, being about 1% of the total amount each year. This was briefly raised to 5% at the time when the Land Reform Laws led to enforced sales by the large estates.) In two instances men took the step of irrigating existing dry fields, but this accounted in all for only a sixth of the area. So landless villagers may move into farming through obtaining a share of family land or through purchase. In this latter, commonly at least part of the capital has been earned in the developing commercial sector outside the village in occupations such as trading, driving trucks or taxis, or even wage-labour. For poor families it is not easy, however, to break through to become peasant farmers. Many of these households had fairly recently been formed, so it is too early to state how many will gain the capital necessary to buy ricefields. However, of the 56 households who owned no land in 1949, only 12 (21. 4%) had obtained some during the following period of over twenty years. So the various ways of

acquiring irrigated riceland have so far just about kept pace with the expanding population.

The consequence of this growth in the number of landowners on a fixed area has inevitably been a decline in the size of estates. The difference in the position in 1972 from 1949 is described in the histogram, labelled Graph 5: 5. After the end of the last World War, the most common size of holding was somewhere between 0.3 and 0.6 ha., with a few smaller, and a substantial number larger. By 1972, the highest frequency of plot size was between 0.3 and 0.4 ha., with a cluster between 0.2 and 0.7 ha. This has been accompanied by a contraction in the average size of holding among land-owners, which has fallen from 0.73 ha. (0.81 ha. if Anak Agung Putera is included) to 0.6 ha. in 1972. Much of this, however, is accounted for by the sharp decline in the fortunes of the two large courts (NE1 and NW17) Cokorda Putera and Anak Agung Putera. If they are omitted, the drop is marginal: only from 0.56 to 0.53 ha. on average for land-owners. So the main change has been the vast losses incurred by the courts, or in one or two cases wealthy peasants, and the position of the smaller farmers is now relatively stronger.

Close examination of the pattern of land changes since 1949 shows that there has been a large measure of consistency. The courts apart, the proportion of villagers in each category of farmer has not altered drastically. As should be evident from Graph 5: 6 and the resumé in Table 5: 7, there has been a slight decline in the percentage of farmers, who may be classified as comfortable, balanced by the emergence of a number of marginal holdings. At the same time the proportion of subsistence cultivators and wealthy peasants has stayed effectively the same, although the overall total of the latter has risen. Many of these originate, as Graph 5: 6 shows, from comfortable farmers; some of the wealthy have enhanced their positions, while two have gone into serious slumps. One of the most interesting features of the changing conformation of land tenure is the remarkable stability of small holdings. It is among the landless, then in the larger plots of over 0.4 ha., that change is as frequent as stasis. Stability disappears almost entirely among the category of wealthy farmers, where almost all undergo shifts in fortune; the number gaining land being balanced exactly by those losing, although the size of the increases outweighs the decrement. The complete loss of lands among small farmers is therefore a relatively rare event, so when it occurs the catastrophe is often well remembered. The three

GRAPH (HISTOGRAM) 5:5. SIZE OF IRRIGATED RICE HOLDINGS IN BR. PISANGKAJA: 1949 AND 1972 (FOR OWNERS ONLY).
(see footnote to Table 5:3. Area is in 1/10ths ha.)



1972

TABLE: 5:6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIZE OF HOLDINGS IN PISANGKAJA IN 1949 AND 1972 (IN 1/10ths Ha.).



TABLE 5:7 THE STABILITY AND CHANGE OF THE CATEGORIES OF LANDOWNER IN PISANGKAJA: 1949 - 1972.
(Based for 1949 on the 118 contemporary households then; for 1972 on the full 160 households.)

Category:	1949	%	1972	%	Stable since 1949	%	Gain since 1949	%	Loss since 1949	%
Landless Villagers:	56	47.5%	81	50.6%	44	37.3%	12	10.2%	-	-
Marginal: (.01-.20ha)	4	3.4%	12	7.5%	3	2.5%	1	0.8%	-	-
Subsistence: (.21-.40ha)	20	16.9%	25	15.6%	17	14.4%	2	1.7%	1	0.8%
Comfortable: (.41-.80ha)*	26	22.0%	26	16.3%	13	11.0%	8	6.8%	5	4.2%
Wealthy: (.81-2.10ha)	10	8.5%	15	9.4%	2	1.7%	4	3.4%	4	3.4%
Large Landlords: (3 ha. +)	2	1.7%	1	0.6%	-	-	-	-	2	1.7%
Total:	118	100.0%	160	100.0%	79	66.9%	27	22.9%	12	10.2%

* No attempt has been made to modify this figure by reference to a consumption index, based upon the number of persons to feed in the household. The range of factors and other occupations is too great to make it a useful exercise. The terms used are those given by the Balinese and are a general index or measure of the family status in terms of land.

This table accompanies Graph 5:6, which shows changes in the holdings of the original 118 households by 1/10ths. of a hectare. It is important to note that four squares are asterisked. These refer to the changes in land-ownership of the four major patrons in the ward, which points to a measure of instability in holdings of riceland as a feature of this role in Pisangkaja.

most notable disastrous instances, outside those of the courts, have been of the father of the present priest of the western temple of the dead (the Jèro Mangku Dalem SE17) who, like the father of I Jambul (NE22), lost his entire lands (although the latter was a somewhat special case of cursing, see Table 4: 1, footnote 10). The other was Kt. Gendul, discussed above. It is significant that the first and last mentioned are the leaders of the two largest political factions in the ward. The remaining two major patrons have had equally unstable fortunes. These are the prince, Cokorda Putera (NE1) and Déwa Md. Nombong (SE13), who is only shown as having risen from landlessness to owning 0.37 ha., but he was negotiating to buy a further plot of similar size as I left the field (these four are shown by asterisks on Graph 5: 6). So among peasant land-owners there is substantial stability and gains, if anything, are more common than losses (15 to 10); but political leaders in the ward of Pisangkaja seem to be drawn from highly mobile families, as it happens more often on a downward path.

At a more general level this shift in land tenure has implications for the evaluation of the major traditional political division of Balinese society between court and villagers. It also raises the question of the extent to which the religious status differences between castes is under-written by differences in land holdings. Among low caste descent groups there has been no significant variation in the pattern of change; as the number of households have proliferated, the average holdings have correspondingly dropped slightly, which is reflected in Table 5: 8. The position for high castes is not so simple, as the table shows. In 1949 the Cokorda owned between them over a quarter of all riceland in the ward; by 1972 this had sunk to less than a sixth, the total amount being nearly halved. The most surprising feature, however, is the marked discrepancy between the Cokorda and the remaining high castes. For not only are these latter (terminology distinguished, as noted, as jajaran, in contrast to the court, jèro, and low caste outsiders, jaba,) by no means in the same class in terms of average land-holdings, they are in fact for the most part poorer than the ordinary low caste villagers. In 1949 the mean plot size of Anak Agung families was 0.19 ha., and only 0.273 ha. for the Pradéwa, as compared with 0.319 ha. for the large population of jaba. The Anak Agung have remained static since (with one more household appearing to lower the mean slightly), while the Pradéwa, two of whom have been truck and bus drivers and bought land with the proceeds, are now effectively identical in their average holdings with the low castes. Overall then the lesser ranking

TABLE 5:8 LAND-HOLDING BY CASTE IN BR. PISANGKAJA: 1949 AND 1972 (IN HECTARES).

Caste Title:	1949 household:	1949 rice-land:	1949 dry fields:	1949 mean rice-land:	1972 household:	1972 rice-land:	1972 dry fields:	1972 mean rice-land:	total change:	mean change:
Brahmana	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	0	-	-
Cokorda	6	12.51	3.925	2.085	7	7.5	2.495	1.071	-5.01	-1.01
Anak Agung	7	1.33	0.615	0.19	8	1.33	0.615	0.166	-	-0.02
Déwa Gedé*	(1)	(5.06)	(-)	(5.06)	1	0.475	0.10	0.475	(-4.585)	(-4.59)
Pradéwa	9	2.455	2.115	0.273	12	3.325	2.205	0.277	+0.87	-
Jaba	90	28.685	26.29	0.319	126	34.70	27.24	0.275	+6.015	-0.04
Chinese	5	-	0.06	-	5	0.35	0.16	0.07	+0.07	+0.07
Totals:	117 (118)	44.98 (50.04)	33.005	0.384 (0.424)	160	47.68	32.815	0.298	+2.70 (-2.36)	

* As noted in the previous tables, Anak Agung Putera has moved into Pisangkaja since 1949. Her holdings make a significant difference to the results which accordingly have been calculated to exclude her for the first date. Figures in brackets include her for this period and represent the effective change in land of contemporary kuren in Pisangkaja. It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that her caste title was Déwa Gedé, but like them she now adopts the form Anak Agung. The two groups of this title are, however, quite distinct.

high castes are not economically distinguishable from ordinary villagers by their access to rice fields.

As is done politely in public, I have treated all the Cokorda as belonging to the court up till now. Closer inspection, however, shows that economically the junior lines are indistinguishable from the other high castes, with mean holdings in rice of only 0.252 ha. in 1949 and 0.242 ha. in 1972 (see Appendix 3, for details on individual land changes). So the main status categories might more aptly be redrawn to separate the court of Cokorda Putera (NE1) from all the remaining high caste families. This has been done in Table 5: 9, which highlights the gap between the prince and all the others. Alone, he owned a quarter exactly of all the ricefields of the ward in 1949; although by 1972 this had sunk to about an eighth. He still remains clearly separate from the rest though, especially from the other high caste families, who are slightly poorer in fact than commoners.

TABLE 5: 9 AVERAGE HOLDINGS FOR MAIN STATUS CATEGORIES: 1949 & 1972
(all land estimated in terms of hectares)

Category:	1949 house-holds:	1949 rice-land:	1949 dry land:	1972 house-holds:	1972 rice-land:	1972 dry land:	mean change: (rice)
Puri: (NE1 only)	1	11.25	3.18	1	6.05	1.75	-5.20
Jajaran: (all high castes except NE1) *	21	0.24	0.165	28	0.235	0.131	-0.005
Jaba:	90	0.319	0.292	126	0.275	0.216	-0.044
Chinese:	5	-	0.012	5	0.07	0.032	+0.07

* This includes Jèro Geriya, who remains in theory Brahmana (NW6). Her presence makes only a marginal difference. The term jajaran here is extended to include the off-shoot, cadet line of Cokorda (NE2).

The Chinese, who have been under restrictions on land purchase and are engaged mainly in trade or specialized occupations, must be excepted from this scheme. So great is the change in aristocratic fortunes that whereas in 1949 the court was incomparable with mere villagers, by 1972 it was no wealthier than the three big families of Pulosari combined in close marriage; although its political position remained distinct, if for no other reason than that it controls some ten tenancies or more, as against three for the Pulosari. The gross discrepancy between high customary and ritual status of the rest of the high castes and their evident poverty

raises the question of whether there is any link between this absence of role summation and their apparent activity in local politics. More detailed examination, however, over the critical decade between 1960 and 1970 shows in fact that there is no visible connexion. For the distribution of wealth among neutral households is almost identical to those belonging to the rival political parties of the communists and nationalists.[18] Far closer is the link between size of estates and membership of the nationalist party (P.N.I.), which had a clean sweep with one exception through the richest families in the ward. To the extent that high castes have been politically prominent, this does not seem to stem directly from any disjuncture in aspects of their social position.

2). Service Occupations:

The most striking feature by far, however, in the distribution of irrigated riceland among the villagers of Pisangkaja, is that half own none. So these cannot depend for their livelihood on owning rice terraces but almost all derive subsistence from the harvest of this land in one way or another. The shortage of cultivable ricefields leads to an extra-ordinary proliferation of occupations within the village. The whole complex is summed up in Table 5:10, which shows the diverse sources of income. This may on occasions include temporary migration although it should be noted that this is generally for a short period of days. Otherwise almost all the families subsist somehow within the confines of the village economy. Some idea of the return from the most important among this maze of activities is indicated in the footnotes to the table. Skill is a major factor limiting the number of persons in a given occupation. With the exception of such crafts as tailoring, which requires the outlay for a sewing-machine, capital is not the principal constraint. The resulting picture is complex. The way in which the Balinese actually set about these tasks, or other activities not mentioned here for lack of space, is often more so (for the classificatory principles involved in selecting boars, see Hobart 1974). What does emerge, however, is that there is no simple tendency for occupational specialisation to burgeon only among the landless. Regardless of such factors as the ratio of producers to consumers, as the villagers themselves recognize, there tend to be families who work hard and others who do not.

Of more relevance, in fact, in the restriction of occupational choice seems to be the concern with the nature of the undertaking, especially the exchange of substance invdved which was discussed earlier. Work which requires knowledge,

TABLE 5:10 MAIN SOURCES OF LIVELIHOOD OF MEMBERS OF BR. PISANGKAJA.

	No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields:	Farming:	Other Occupations:
	NE1	Cok. Putera	6.05	1.75	landlord	owns shop
	NE2	Cok. Putu	0.59	-	landlord	tailor rice merchant (s)
		Cok. A. Lanus	0.295	0.23	farmer	tailor owner
		Cok. A. Nama	-	-	tenant	tailor
		Cok. Oka	-	-	tenant	tailor
		Cok. Ngurah	0.155	0.515	farmer	tailor
*		Cok. Jangji	0.41	-	-	-
	NE3	Degdeg	0.36	0.03	farmer	driver rice merchant (s)
		Tiles	-	-	farm-help	food merchant (s)
		Tempil	-	-	-	palm-wine tapper
	NE4	Dw.Md.Gempol	-	0.03	-	food merchant (s)
*	NE5	Kénak	0.31	-	land pawned	market porter food merchant rice-miller
	NE6	Togog	0.305	0.04	landlord	driver
		Tènda	-	-	-	joiner/carpenter rice-miller
	NE7	Ni Repun	0.35	0.06	landlord	-
		Ni Mariani	-	-	-	fruit & betel seller
	NE8	Dada	0.46	0.33	farmer	veg. merchant rice-miller
	NE9	A.A. Anom	0.51	0.13	farmer	rice merchant (s)
	NE10	A.A.R.Jasa	0.585	0.25	farmer	painter
		A.A.Oka	0.235	-	land pawned	actor barber
	NE11	Karda	0.68	0.105	farmer	livestock merchant copra producer
*	NE12	Lanis	0.795	1.755	farmer	-
*	NE13	Kara	0.10	0.11	farmer	market porter stall owner
*	NE14	Ni Kari	0.665	0.18	farmer	-
	NE15	Badra	1.53	1.03	farmer	rice merchant (s) shadow-puppeteer
	NE16	Gampil	0.35	0.28	farmer	-

Table 5:10 Sheet 2.

	No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields:	Farming:	Other Occupations!
*	NE16	Gerondong	0.18	0.115	tenant	works for WF (NE18)
*		Gelèdèr	-	-	tenant	rice-miller
	NE17	Surung	0.55	0.285	farmer	-
	NE18	Kingsan	0.85	0.695	farmer	porridge seller
*	NE19	Pica	0.37	0.105	farmer	rice-miller
	NE20	Kampih	0.34	0.18	farmer	-
	NE21	Sukèn	0.155	-	farmer	rice merchant (s)
*	NE22	Jambul	-	0.24		economic client to NW10 Kt. Gendul rice-miller
	NE23	Sujana	-	-	-	rice merchant
*	NE24	Serandig	0.405	0.24	farmer	rice-miller
	NE25	Yasa	0.37	0.61	farmer	-
*	NE26	Ngèmbon	0.185	0.24		economic client to NW3 Dw.Ny.Gempil builder
*		Kedeng	-	-	farm-help	-
	NW1	Tagen	-	0.34	-	builder toll-bridge keeper
	NW2	Dw.Kt.Gempul	-	0.21	-	gambler rice porter
	NW3	Dw.Ny.Gempil	0.49	0.365	farmer	blacksmith food merchant (s)
	NW4	Lasiya	0.41	0.12	farmer	policeman
*	NW5	Tombong	0.395	0.16	farmer	palm-wine tapper
*	NW6	Tonik	0.24	0.38	land pawned	vegetable seller
*		Mupu	-	-	-	rice merchant (s)
*		Kacir	-	-	-	rice merchant
*		Jèro Geriya	-	-	-	-
	NW7	Mara	0.29	0.09	farmer	rice merchant (s)
		Teken	-	-	tenant	-
*		Kembar	-	-	tenant	-
*	NW8	Surata	0.56	0.355	part pawned	-
*		Lonid	0.19	-	farmer	sawsman food merchant (s)
		Gampil	0.40	0.15	farmer	food merchant (s) village sweep

Table 5:10 Sheet 3.

	No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields:	Farming:	Other Occupations:
*	NW8	Ni Kelepon	-	-	-	stall owner rice merchant (s)
*	NW9	Mejul	0.45	0.15	tenant	works own pawned land rice-miller
		Rebit	-	-	tenant	or helps father
	NW10	Gendul	1.22	0.10	landlord	part-owner of bus livestock and rice merchant betel-nut seller
		Gelis	0.46	0.45	farmer	builder/carver
		Keredek	-	-	farmer	works family land
	NW11	Gangsar	1.73	1.69	landlord	betel-nut merchant
*	NW12	Dugdug	0.36	0.08	farmer	rice-miller
		Belet	-	-	-	rice-miller
	NW13	Ni Lungid	0.22	0.075	farmer	rice-miller
	SW1	Tangèn	0.32	0.10	farmer	stall owner
	SW2	Tarik	0.64	1.32	farmer	-
	SW3	J.M.Désa	0.79	0.755	temple land tenant	temple priest (pemangku)
*	SW4	Degdeg Mangku	0.75	-	farmer	stall owner builder
		Terima	-	-	farm-help	
	SW5	A.A. Putu	-	0.04	-	stall owner gambler
	SW6	Rubik	0.37	-	tenant	sawsman rice-miller
*		Ni Cenok	-	1.56	farmer	rice porter farms family land
*	SW7	Kartana	0.435	0.395	farmer	sawsman
		Ni Polokan	-	-	tenant	-
*	SW8	Neka	0.81	0.92	farmer	vegetable seller
*		Kencan	-	-	-	forestry in Kalimantan (Borneo)
*		Mukun	-	-	farmer	works family land stall owner
	SW9	Pukel	0.135	0.28	farmer	sawsman farm-labour contract team for mupang
		Mongoh	-	-	farm-help	

Table 5:10 Sheet 4.

No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields	Farming:	Other Occupations:
SW10	Munjuk	0.81	0.51	farmer	-
	Dugdug	-	-	farmer	may work family land at times peanut vendor sawsman
*	Digdig	0.15	0.10	farmer	may work family land at times rice-miller
SW11	Lembut	-	0.165	tenant	builder
SW12	Selem	0.38	0.20	farmer	porridge seller
*	Tomblos	0.18	-	farmer	rice-miller
SW13	Ni Muklen	-	0.4	farmer	farms family land (I Selem)
SW14	Bidel	1.38	0.17	landlord	-
*	Dayuh	0.17	-	tenant	-
	Sayub	-	-	tenant	vegetable seller
* SE1	Sama	0.65	0.34	farmer	son is policeman
*	Balik	-	-	-	-
*	Lipet	-	-	tenant	rice porter
SE2	Pudet	0.57	0.62	farmer	rice-miller
SE3	Suberatha	0.905	0.71	landlord	policeman
*	Dungka	-	-	tenant	porridge seller
	Ni Doneng	-	0.16	tenant	forestry in Kali-mantan (Borneo)
	Bawa	-	-	tenant	barber
SE4	A.A.Darma	-	-	-	hotel cook
	A.A.Plasa	-	0.125	-	carver
	Jèro Jempiring	-	-	-	stall owner
SE5	Sampun	0.575	0.52	farmer	-
SE6	Delep	0.32	0.03	farmer	rice-miller
	Keper	-	-	tenant	rice-miller
SE7	Dw.Md.Tagel	-	-	-	forestry in Kali-mantan (Borneo)
*	Dw.Ny.Laba	-	-	-	economic client of SE9 Dw.Kt.Geriya rice-miller
SE8	Ni Tambun	-	-	-	supported by sons
SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya	0.845	0.99	farmer	stall owner solderer

Table 5:10 Sheet 5.

	No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields:	Farming:	Other Occupations:
	SE10	A.A.A.Jasa	-	0.07	farmer	works family land (from NE10)
	SE11	Dw.Pt.Pandé	-	0.04	-	flower-seller
	SE12	Rugrug	-	0.015	tenant	-
*		Séro	-	-	tenant	-
		Sorog	-	-	-	carpenter rice-miller
*		Suradnya	-	-	tenant	jackfruit seller
	SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	0.37	0.09	farmer	ex-driver
*	SE14	Sandi	-	0.06	-	economic client to SE13 Dw.Md.Nombong pig merchant porridge seller
	SE15	Ni Kintil	-	0.15	-	-
*	SE16	Kontèng	0.11	0.17	tenant	-
		Gading	-	-	-	-
	SE17	J.M. Dalem	-	0.15	temple land tenant	temple priest
	SE18	Pageh	0.67	0.285	farmer	-
	SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	-	0.14	tenant	pig merchant rice seller building-lime dealer
	SE20	Rantun	1.21	0.12	farmer	stall owner
		Kaling	-	-	farmer	works family land
	SE21	Cekeg	0.52	0.51	farmer	rice-miller
	SE22	Dungki	0.39	0.22	farmer	builder fruit-salad vendor
	SE23	Tedun	1.515	0.75	farmer	-
	SE24	Silir	-	-	-	builder
*		Jontol	-	-	-	betel-nut vendor
	SE25	Cekeg	-	-	farmer	works family land (kin in Gagah)
	SE26	Dw.Ny.Geriya	0.57	0.045	farmer	tailor blacksmith

Table 5:10 Sheet 6.

	No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields:	Farming:	Other Occupations:
*	NW14	Ni Ngambet	-	0.05	-	servant to NE1
	NW15	Ni Sinah	-	0.05	-	servant to NE1
	NW16	Keted	-	0.05	tenant	builder pig merchant
	NW17	A.A.Putera	0.475	0.10	landlord	servant to NE1
	NW18	Md. Sila	-	0.10	-	large-scale merch ant and trucker
		Md. Gina	-	-	-	stall owner solderer
	NW19	Ni Antrog	-	0.715	-	rice-miller
*	NW20	Reca	-	0.20	tenant	-
*	NW21	Kisid	-	-	tenant	works variously as tenant or farmhand for NE15 Badra rice-miller
	NW22	Nampa	0.26	-	farmer	-
	NW23	Dugligan	0.34	0.48	farmer	money-lender for pawned land
	NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila	1.05	0.295	landlord	-
*		Dw.Ny.Kelila	-	-	farm-hand	helps father
	NW25	Geningan	1.425	0.54	landlord	-
		Racik	-	-	farm-hand	helps father
	NW26	Dayuh	-	0.42	tenant	-
*	NW28	Nyèmbèng	0.825	0.49	farmer	traditional healer (balian)
	SW15	Gomboh Runti	-	0.12	tenant	servant to NE1
	SW16	Sukri	0.81	0.77	farmer	-
	SW17	Darna	-	0.215	tenant	servant to NE1
	SW18	Ni Dehen	0.105	0.40	landlord	-
*	SW19	Karda	-	0.35	tenant	servant to NE1 builder
	SW20	Dani	-	0.35	tenant	servant to NE1
*	SW21	Gomboh Suti	-	0.06	farm-hand	helps SW20 Dani (F) and NE15 Badra (WF)
	SW22	Kemplung	-	0.275	tenant	servant to NE1
	SW23	Sadiya	-	0.075	tenant	servant to NE1 builder

Table 5:10 Sheet 7.

No:	Name:	Rice-land:	Dry Fields:	Farming:	Other Occupations:
SW24	Longsog	-	0.075	tenant	servant to Cokorda Tengahpadang vegetable seller
SW25	Bakta	-	0.07	-	servant to NE1 (too old to work)
* SW26	Kembar	0.295	0.15	farmer	palm-wine tapper

* indicates members of the household go away from the village on temporary seasonal migrant labour for harvesting coffee, or for road building, construction and so forth.

The occupational system is an extremely complicated field which cannot be dealt with properly here. The following notes are merely a guide to the return on these activities.

Occupation:	Requirements:	Return:	Comments:
Tailor	Capital Rp. 14,000 for machine and skill	Rp. 1-300 per day	Much depends upon skill for size of demand
Driver	No capital but must pay for learning to drive	Rp. 130-210 (+ meals)	Works on %age of gross return (usually 10%)
Gambler	Capital only needed for runs against luck, varies with type	Variable ! Up to Rp. 1000 a night or more	High dividend games more dangerous than those where bank takes % on all bets
Builders Carpenters Wood-carvers Joiners	Capital little, skill is the most important asset	Income varies widely depending on the contract	Reliable trade as there is great demand, especially for skilled craftsmen.
Sawsmen	Rp. 2-4,000 for long saw.	Highly variable	Planks in Bali are still cut by handsaws, arduous but needed work
Smith	A simple forge costing about Rp. 2,000	Nett income about Rp. 25 per hour	Working metal is dangerous mystically, so not an open trade (see text)
Barber	Rp. 3,000 for equipment.	Rp. 2-300 on market days; little otherwise	Considered pleasant light work (see text)
Flower-seller	No capital, but courage as climbing high trees may be required	Rp. 200 a day	Flowers used for kembang rampé, an ingredient in all offerings by merchants each day.

Table 5:10 Sheet 8.

Occupation:	Requirements:	Return:	Comments:
Palm-wine tapper	Bottles and sundry gear Rp. 2,500	Rp. 75 a day clear from only 2 trees	Requires minimal time and effort for secure return as demand always exceeds supply (for reasons, see text)
Livestock dealers	Most work as agents so no capital, but needs skill in judging weight	Rp. 100 a head and more if bargain seller down	Kt.Gendul(NW10) & Karda (NE11) are dealers, but would not indicate profits !
Stall owners	Capital anywhere from Rp. 5-30,000, mostly fixed in cost of building	Rp. 150 upwards depending on a range of factors including too many competitors	Stalls are discussed at some length in the text
Rice merchants	Scales: Rp. 2,000 Stall: Rp. 3,000 + buying capital	Very variable according to season:Rp. 25-50 per 100 kg. sack of milled rice	Strong competition between the big dealers.
Rice merchants (s) = small	Capital just a few hundred Rp. Depends for success on fiddling scales and buying up in remote villages	Profit up to Rp. 100 a day.	Requires walking about 20 km. a day.
Foodsellers	A vast range of different types, all with low capital outlay Rp. 500 ±	Rp. 100+ a day	Depends on quality of food, hours of work etc.

As a final note, manual labour on roads, or contract porters, at this time was about Rp. 80-120 a day, for men.

or aesthetic skills, or contact only with relatively refined matter, whether painting, sculpture or tailoring is held to be desirable and appropriate particularly for high castes (see Table 5:11). In general it would seem the more that manual labour, or contact with gross substances is involved, the lower the rating of the occupation. Such activities as building or carrying (for market porters) are relatively lowly; while butchers and tuak (palm-wine) tappers are jobs which are shunned by most despite the high profits and demand, as they are widely thought to be polluting. This is not just an ideal scheme which the dictates of worldly necessity ignore, as should be evident from Table 5:11, which lists the frequency of occupations undertaken in the long run by members of Pisangkaja, apart from farming. It should be noted, however, that ritual practitioners, who range from priests of various kinds to different types of indigenous medical healer and specialists in the complex religious offerings and shadow-puppeteers, have been omitted. These require formal ritual purification (mewinten) and are graded according to a complex set of criteria, from knowledge through dietary restrictions to moral stature, far too elaborate to be compared to daily activities. Birth and death specialists rank lowest (the latter must have a caste status at least as high as that of the corpse, but otherwise this is held to be demeaning, or polluting, work).

The position of some of the occupations on this table require comment. There are special caste groups of smiths (pandé) including blacksmiths, (pandé wesi, or besi) who stand in some ways apart from the caste system (for a detailed discussion on this and the place of metal in ranking, see Chapter 8). The two smiths in Pisangkaja both come from the descent group titled Pradéwa Pandé, and so are held to be suitable people to handle this special, but dangerous, substance. More surprisingly at first sight, particularly in view of Indian influence on Bali, is the possibility of high caste men becoming barbers (there is no caste title of this name, nor is it thought of as an hereditary occupational function). This consists, however, solely in cutting the head-hair (the head being the purest part of the body) of the living; and rather than stressing the contact with excreta, or marginality, villagers point to the lightness of the work and the aesthetic sense needed. Gamblers form a rather different category. These may meet with a certain amount of opprobrium, for undertaking no useful task: but for the most part I was surprised at the lack of censure and the large proportion of high caste gamblers. This may perhaps be explained by the relatively refined substance with which they come into contact. Geertz has suggested (1973b) that betting on

47.

TABLE 5:11 THE PURITY OF OCCUPATIONS AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CASTE. (based on common occupations found in Pisangkaja; but excluding ritual practitioners.)

		Cok-orda	Anak Agung	Pra-dewa	Chi-nese	Low Caste	Total	%. High Cast
REFINED ↑	Tailor	5	-	1	-	-	6	100%
	Carver/Painter	-	2	-	-	-	2	100%
	Dancer/Actor	-	1	-	-	-	1	100%
	Flower-seller	-	-	1	-	-	1	100%
	Blacksmith*	-	-	2	-	-	2	100%
	Solderer	-	-	1	1	-	2	100%
	Gambler	-	1	1	-	1	3	67%
	Stall (cooked rice)	1	3	1	-	3	8	63%
	Big Merchant (general goods)	1	-	-	1	2	4	50%
	Driver	-	-	2	-	2	4	50%
	Barber*	-	1	-	-	1	2	50%
	Stall (general food)	-	-	3	1	1	12	25%
	Animal merchant	-	-	1	-	3	4	25%
	Rice merchant	1	1	-	-	9	11	18%
	Policeman	-	-	-	-	4	4	-
	Mixed food stalls (part-time)	-	-	-	-	5	5	-
	Vegetable seller (inc. root crops)	-	-	-	-	6	6	-
	Betel-nut seller	-	-	-	-	4	4	-
	Market Porter	-	-	-	-	2	2	-
	Sawsmen	-	-	-	-	5	5	-
	Carpenter/Builder	-	-	-	-	12	12	-
COARSE ↓	Palm-wine tapper	-	-	-	-	3	3	-
	Totals:	8	9	13	3	63	96	

* the positions of blacksmith and barber are somewhat higher than might be expected. Nowadays, occupations are not strictly caste-linked, although the pandé, smiths, constitute the title of a series of metal-working occupations closely associated with named castes. For further comment on these professions, see the text.

cockfights has a privileged cultural position.[19] This may be so in Klungkung, but round Tengahpadang as it involves animals it is often regarded as lower than other forms of gambling, but it remains despite this very popular. Lastly the position of rice merchants is lower in the rank order of preference than might be expected, due to the number of low caste women who engage in it, as it is a convenient part-time job. A good index of its standing is given by the presence of Cokorda's. As the highest ranking Satriya in the region, by agreement they are more conscious and constrained in their choice of activity. So the types of work undertaken by different castes tends to bear out the general principles about differentiation according to substance. The choice of occupations involves the consideration of a range of cultural values.

3) Redistribution:

This profusion of occupations is organized and structured in terms of an elaborate system of traditional social relationships. In this, the corporate groups in the village play a major part by redistributing wealth to a greater or lesser degree among their members. This is done through a variety of different types of social institution; while new practices may develop into custom over time in response to what is seen by villagers as an increasingly serious problem of shortage. In some cases substantial assets are involved and, unsurprisingly, there may be intense competition for control over their allocation.

An important function of local residential groups may be to define a catchment area, within which generosity with help and gifts, especially food, is expected and the return vague, or in the unspecified future for ritual exchanges (Sahlins 1965: 147 ff; on 'generalized reciprocity'). Overlapping informal groupings - such as pengapit, the two immediately abutting compounds on either side which are ritually bound to observe mutual death pollution, or pisaga, a looser term for neighbours in the adjacent or nearby courtyards - are enjoined to the free exchange of domestic goods and help at all times, unless relations have been brdken off completely (a state of puwik). Beyond these small, primary zones (Barnes 1969: 59) the main groups concerned are the ward (banjar patus) and the wider customary village (désa adat). Earlier the rights of other villagers to ask for produce from house gardens was discussed. There are also more specifically defined occasions for gifts. After harvest poorer ward members and sometimes kin and affines may ask for, or be offered, sheaves of padi by the more substantial land-owners.

At this time it is also customary for the owners of local stalls (warung) to benefit either by straight gifts of padi (particularly when the ward harvests collectively), or by dispensing coffee to workers in the field at rates vastly above those of the market. Finally there are strong customary obligations to visit (medeldkan) and take gifts of milled rice (ngejot baas, and sometimes other commodities) at the main rites of transition, which are binding within the residential group unless, as one villager put it, one is not on speaking terms (puwik see Bateson 1949: 40; Hobart 1975: 9) or mad (buduh)! The occasions and expected gifts are summarized below in Table 5: 12.

TABLE 5: 12 CUSTOMARY OCCASIONS FOR GIFT-EXCHANGE IN TENGAHPADANG

Occasion:	Group Expected:	Gift: *
Marriage	all households in the customary village	½ kg. milled rice (baas)
New Year (Galungan, see Goris 1960a) only to newly-weds	all households in the customary village	¼ kg. milled rice
Tooth-filing) Death)	all households in the ward	1/3rd. kg. milled rice & 3 coconuts **
Day before cremation	all households in the 1) ward, or 2) invited outsiders	½kg. milled rice*** 1½ kg. milled rice
Ancestor shrine annual festival	up to third collaterals (in theory, but see Chapter 8.)	1½ kg. milled rice & 3 coconuts.

* base, leaf for making betel may be given also, usually 1 ampin = 25 wads.
** close family (carefully vague) are expected to bring also a small pillow gåleng, which has never been used and is ritually pure (sukla).
*** this is in addition to them performing the entire cremation ceremony (see Chapter 3, under banjar patus).

My attempts to check the quantity and source of donors were met with frowns, but there seemed a reasonable degree of overlap between theory and practice.

Almost all corporate groups at the village level have an organized system for collecting contributions, sometimes as with the irrigation association varying according to holdings, and for redistributing the proceeds equally to the members. The corporations and forms involved are listed in Table 5: 13; the details are discussed for each group in the appropriate chapter. Basically this consists in income from various sources being divided among the membership in standard

TABLE 5:13 OUTLINE OF CORPORATE GROUPS AND REDISTRIBUTION: TENGAHPADANG.

(This is a table only of the redistribution within corporate groups. If this does or should occur, it is marked by a "x"; for descent, the sanggah gedé, or lineage, is shown as "s" and the local descent group "d".)

Form:	Group:							
	Perb.	Désa	Br. Désa	Br. Pat.	Sub.	D.G.	V.A.	Total
I. Catchment area for generalized reciprocity:*								
Garden produce:	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	1
Harvest gifts of padi:	-	-	-	x	-	(s)	-	2
Rites of passage:	-	x	(x)	x	-	s	-	4
II. Redistribution of goods equally to members of group:								
Taxes levied:	-	(x)	x	x	x	d	x	6
Fines on members:	-	-	x	x	x	(d)	x	5
Food/cash from temple festivals:	-	(x)	x	-	x	d	-	4
III. Employment opportunities offered to members of group:								
Building or supply contracts to persons:	x	x	x	x	x	d	(x)	7
Sub-contracting to voluntary associations:**	-	-	(x)	x	(x)	(d)	-	4
Permanent salary:	-	x	-	x	-	(d)	-	3
Harvesting:	-	-	-	x	-	d	x	3
Tenancies:***	x	x	-	(x)	x	d	-	5
Totals:	2	6	6	10	6	s=2 d=8	4	44

Code: perb. = perbekelan (administrative village)
désa = désa adat (customary village)
br.désa = banjar désa (customary village sub-section)
br. pat. = banjar patus (ward)
sub. = subak (irrigation association)
D.G. = descent group, specified as - s, the lineage, or d - local descent group
V.A. = sekaha (voluntary association)
( ) = may engage in this form of redistribution, but not a main source. Where used for the désa adat or banjar désa, it means that it is the other unit which is primarily responsible, but may be referred back.

* All three of these activities are widely carried out between affines and neighbours, but they are not included here as they are not corporate.
** () refers to use of orchestras run by voluntary associations only.
*** This includes temple priests obtaining remuneration from land.

shares. Much of this is from taxes either levied on the members themselves to some end which yields a return, or taken from others (as when a group holds an open cockfight to gain cash). Almost all groups fine infringements of their rules with enthusiasm, and periodically this is doled out impartially, so that the more law-abiding gain at the expense of the others. The system for computing costs at temple festivals is complicated by some groups owning resources from rice fields (see Table 3:17), or imposing differential contributions by status, as in the contributions for the village temple festival, (see Chapter 3,) or holdings so in the subsequent equal share-out the poorer benefit disproportionately. This does not seem to be a source of dispute, which is instead more often over whether profits should be handed out or betterinvested to bring interest.

Corporations may be more directly involved in the village economy. Some may be direct employers of villagers, or organize labour collectively for a wide range of ends. This is particularly true of wards, but also of the customary village and descent groups. First there are a surprising number of buildings and other constructions which groups require to build, decorate or maintain especially granted the tropical conditions and light materials. There are also a variety of odd goods and specialized services which are required from time to time as well. Second the wards especially may sub-contract land to voluntary associations in auctions (lélangan) to the lowest bidder. For their religious ceremonies all groups require the services of specialized orchestras (see Table 3:16) and are expected to hire those with many of their own members. Third there may be menial jobs at times deliberately created to offer employment to the poorer villagers. Pisangkaja for instance charges a toll on a bridge, which it built over a small ravine, from all merchants travelling to and from the west on market days and run bya landless villager who retains a substantial share of the profits. The village square is also swept daily by another, in return for a monthly salary and a tax on stall-keepers.[20] The customary village and some descent groups do the same with their temples. One of the main sources of padi for villagers is from work at harvest time. There is a rank order of preference, by which the ward has first option on this labour. If they waive the right, descent groups may harvest; or failing that vduntary associations and the open market take over. As Appendix 5 makes

clear, the nett yield from this is commonly between 50 and 100 kg. of padi, or more for an industrious family.

The most valuable asset owned by corporate groups which may be used to provide villagers with a means of livelihood is irrigated riceland. Several of the major groups in the settlement own fields, either as land linked to public office (bukti) for the remuneration of incumbents (see Table 3:9; in addition, the office of administrative village head carries rights over 1.54 ha. more), or temple fields (laban pura) which may be used either as a stipend for a permanent priest, or to defray some of the heavy costs of the periodic temple festivals ((pi)odalan, see Table 3:17). This latter is more common and accounts for eight out of the nine public tenancies held in Pisangkaja. Between them these provide a measure of subsistence for a small number of villagers. Six are filled by landless men; while of the remainder two are the perquisite of office of the Jèro Mangku Désa (SW3) as priest of both the village and irrigation association temples, who is already a wealthy man. The full list of the corporate groups, the beneficiaries, tenants and terms of tenure are laid out in Appendix 4.

A consideration of the full pattern of sharecropping among the households in Pisangkaja shows the limitations of corporate groups in providing subsistence for the growing number of landless villagers. As Table 5:14 indicates, out of a total of 48 publicity acknowledged tenancies only 9 or less than 20%, were on collectively owned land. So the majority of cultivators of the land of others obtain fields through private agreement. This may take several forms. The most common is simple sharecropping (nandingin) with a verbal agreement on the division of the yield and costs which is public knowledge but not registered at the sub-district office, as strictly in law each party must have an equal share. Apart from this infrequently pawning (ngadéang) occurs. (There were four such land-owners in Pisangkaja, see Appendices 4 and 5 for details.) In this the right to work fields is given in return for a large capital sum, the harvest serving as interest until such time as the loan is repaid or the land purchased directly. For smaller amounts a man may let his land for cash and an agreed sharing of the crop, melaisin (of which there are 2 instances, see Appendix 4).[21] Both these are now generally embodied in written contracts, as the

amounts involved encourage backsliding. Finally there are usually a few informal arrangements, mostly between kin reckoned bilaterally, to work or help on land for a vague return (8 households in the season studied in detail, Appendix 4). It proved impossible to follow the exchange of services and rice in these last as they are loose and so are not included under formal tenancies below.

In Chapter 3 and 4 I argued that the ward and customary community provided the catchment area within which ties tended to be mobilised if they were to be effective. So it is interesting to test this suggestion against the evidence and look at the pattern of tenancy agreements in order to see what part, if any, these local groups play in circumscribing the population of potential workers. The origins of landlord and tenant in all known cases are detailed in Table 5:14. Corporate group land should, however, be omitted at the start, as the bases of allocation are fixed by different principles. Out of 39 private share-cropping arrangements, 27, or 69.2%, are between members of the ward and a further 7 (so bringing the total up to 87.2%) within the settlement. These figures are, however, misleadingly on the low side.

TABLE 5:14 THE SPATIAL CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF TENANCIES INVOLVING VILLAGERS FROM PISANGKAJA: 1972

Nature of Tenancy	Circum-scription:	Frequency:	% of all cases:	% of private tenancies:
Private between landlords and tenants from Pisangkaja:	within ward:	27	56.3%	69.2%
Private between landlords from Pisangkaja and tenants from elsewhere:	within *désa*:	2	4.2%	5.1%
	outside *désa*:	4	8.3%	10.3%
Private between landlords from outside and Pisangkaja tenants:	within *désa*:	5	10.4%	12.8%
	outside *désa*:	1	2.1%	2.6%
Corporate group tenancies with farmers from Pisangkaja:	(all in effect within *désa*:)	9	18.8%	-
Totals:		48	100.1%	100.0%

Of the 12 tenancy agreements not within the ward, 2 are by recent immigrants with men from their natal wardswithin the settlement (NW17; SE18) and 2 more with close matrilin (NW9; SE18). Of the remainder, 6 are traditional ties between prince and client villager and, as aristocratic estate were widely spread, the network of dependents correspondingly dispersed. Only 2 arrangements, in fact, were not based upon some prevailing tie, and both these were between adjacent wards. So it seems that there is a strong tendency for share-cropping agreements, in Tengahpadang at least, to be exclusive to the ward unless close kin ties or traditional relationships of aristocratic patronage intervene.

Although the demand to work ricefields is far in excess of the supply, tenancies are fairly stable and the share of the crop to the worker relatively high. These do not show division of the order of 80% to the land-owner mentioned, but not documented, by Birkelbach (1973: 165). The system of share-cropping agreements and its terminology in Tengahpadang is fairly simple and is based on varying fractions of crop division.[22] Under nandu the tenant receives half the crop; under nelon a third; and in ngempat a quarter and fifth respectively (in the last three terms, the roots refer to the base numerals). Geertz (1967) further notes that divergence from these standards is the norm in Klungkung. By contrast, round Tengahpadang, the terms are scrupulously observed and witnessed; but the appearance of variation is given by the complex division of overheads, by which the owner pays all irrigation association costs and the labourer just his personal fines for stealing water. Further the system of splitting shares after harvest and carriage benefits the tenant, as the charges are borne more by the owner. Finally, the share-cropper is entitled to a seed allowance calculated as a tenah, which is almost always more than is needed (see above; for details on the division, see footnotes to Appendix 4). Two other systems are found in Pisangkaja: ngelélang, auctioning to the lowest bidder, and majegin which requires the tenant to furnish an agreed quantity of rice or cash but allows him to keep all the profit. These tend to be harsher than the regular division, so it is interesting that they are normally employed by corporations, which generally attempt to redistribute on the cheap.

There are several factors of some importance which account for the tendency for tenancy rates to be low and incumbents fairly secure. First the landlord has greater control if the tenant may expect to be retained in the long term. Second, according to local thought, the mistreatment of land (by tenants after a quick return) may severely affect its future productivity; so, as good careful farmers are always in short supply, they are not only safe in tenure but are in sufficient demand as to be lured away. The bald statistics on the quantity of labour available, do not indicate local evaluation of the quality of that labour. Third the tie involves a degree of goodwill and trust. In theory, a share-cropper can turn to the authorities and demand an equal share in the proceeds but risks any future employment by so doing. More commonly, however, formal agreements are only part of a wider, more diffuse, relationship of mutual assistance, with the provision of labour in return for rice when needed, which merges into a tie of political patronage. Finally these take place within a moral community for the most part, which generally has tacit agreement as to the approved range of division. Landlords prefer tenants on whom they can exert pressure to prevent misuse of the land or misappropriation of harvests which effectively means the choice either of close kin or fellow ward members. This cuts two ways, however, and constrains the terms which landlords may easily demand. This may help to explain why local groups tend to demand tougher conditions of their tenants. As collectivities they have the authority to impose requirements which individual members would not dare. The only share-cropping arrangement in Pisangkaja where the tenant receives less than one third of the yield notably is with a recent immigrant (NW 24) from another settlement, which does not prevent him from being roundly condemned.[23]

Something of the complexity of share-cropping arrangements comes out in Table 5:15 below, which shows the relationship between existing social ties (if any) and the division of yield in private known share-cropping agreements. Curiously, ties of agnation, affinity, traditional servitude and the (relatively) open market are more or less equally balanced, each accounting for between 20% and 30% of the whole. From the evidence available there is no marked trend to offering agnates preferential terms. Several features need

TABLE 5:15 THE BEARING OF EXISTING TIES UPON DIVISION OF YIELD IN TENANCY (based only upon private tenancy agreements)

	Tenant's Share								
	2/3	1/2	1/3 (clean)*	1/3	1/4	Majegin	Open	Total	%
Agnates:	1	2	1	5	-	-	1	10	25.7
Affines:	-	2	1	4	-	-	1	8	20.5
Court servants:	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	11	282
None:	-	3	-	4	1	1	1	10	25.7
Total	1	7	2	21	1	1	3	39	100.1%

* This refers to a system in which all costs, including carriage and harvesting are borne by the owner, the tenant taking a clear third.

comment. The high rate offered in some instances to share-croppers with whom there is no kin or traditional servitude tie are special cases. This is where the landlord is generally absent from the area and must place total trust in the tenant. In one example (SW11), the landlord is from outside the sub-district and so his legal position is dubious. The full nandu equal partition between agnates occurs only where these are uterine brothers (the one case of a greater yield to the tenant is a father with his son: I Sama and I Lipet, SE 1). The two cases of equal division between affines also involves extraneous factors, for the land lies far from Pisangkaja and the owner (SE18) must trust to the honesty of his mother's natal kin. The incidence of tenancy involving agnates is also higher in one sense than is shown . For there are several vague sharing arrangements between persons linked by descent (see Appendix 4). This is interesting for, as will become apparent, agnates tend to avoid one another in many contexts. In this instance it might be explicable in part in terms of the moral bonds linking close lineal relatives, except that it tends to occur where the tenant, or helper, has a claim under Indonesian national law. So for some it may be part of a gradual de facto transference of plots; for others, it seems at times nearer to a sop designed to discourage attempts to demand land legally.

Apart from the share-cropping system, there is one important method of redistri uting the harvest which has already been mentioned in passing but is of such as scale as to merit closer consideration. In the region round Tengahpadang, it is common for the ward, or possible other groups, to harvest collectively. Each household is required to send one grown person to work as part of a team (or section, tèmpèk), or more if they so wish. For the aged or those with good reason not to be able to take part it is possible to pay for non-attendance (mayah pengaab, the general term for this in all groups) and hand over compensation (meserah kalah) usually at a low rate (5 kg. padi while I was there), as this is largely an opportunity to get a good return on labour. All villagers in the ward are effectively obliged to have their land harvested by the group; for if they use private hired labour (pederep) they still incur the full charges of the ward (upah mederep, upah manyi), at the standard rate of 1/17th. of the gross yield, chosen in the field from the sheaves (so that the owners are careful to tie these in even sizes, as the ward has first choice). There are further costs of carriage (upah bèlesèngan), from the fields to individual compounds, at a rate varying with the distance and so anywhere from one hundredth for adjacent fields to as high as one twenty-fifth. It is also customary, in place of a traditional cooked meal for workers, to offer a further half of the carriage charges on top of this, known as the penasi, a literal terminological substitute. The quantities involved are therefore large. The yield for labourers from harvesting is about 6%, or some 7,000 kg. of padi in the season which I studied carefully, with up to 3,000 kg, or close on 3% for carriage. So nearly a tenth of the gross product of the riceland of villagers is redistributed without their direct choice to the labour force of the collected households. In compensation, however, by contributing their own labour landowners can obtain a share as well. During my fieldwork the ward harvested; but during the previous year it had been left to descent groups and as I left voluntary associations were being formed to take over. In each case, the conditions and rates are the same, and are more expensive than the open market, where harvesters ask at most 1/20th, and correspondingly lower carriage rates, but in return this effectively restrict the field to poorer families.

At this stage, it is worth examining briefly the effects of these various systems upon access to the main productive resource in the village. Only 79 households (49.4%) own rice fields; for two this is nominal as the land is pawned, and twelve other households have marginal plots of less than 0.2 ha. So in fact only 65 out of 160 families (or 40%) own enough to obtain what is thought of as a subsistence crop. In striking

contrast to this low figure 116 households (72.5%), that is almost double, work much of the time as farmers. These consist of 70 peasant farmers (43.8%, and a further 46 landless households, who work as tenants in some form (36 or 22.5%) or in full-time labour (10 or 62.5%; for details, see Appendix 4). On top of this seven families of landlords, mostly absent wage-earners or the elderly, obtain padi from their land, so that 123 households live in whole or part, off village ricelands: that is over three-quarters. So 37 families (23.1%) do not live off farming or its direct yield, except at harvest time. This seems a high proportion until it is inspected more closely. Then it transpires that, of these, 3 are normally absent working elsewhere (and pay compensation to the ward), 3 are Chinese in trade or normally absent, 7 successful craftsmen, merchants or porters, and 11 more widows with more or less slender means of support. The remaining 13 have no regular employment and live mainly off gambling or casual labouring jobs (see Appendix 4 for breakdown). So by various methods of dividing the produce from harvests, while only two-fifths own enough land to live off, four-fifths, or twice that, gain a substantial proportion of their subsistence from that land.

To sum up, there is a wide range of means by which harvest produce and other goods tend to be redistributed within the ward among villagers. As we saw, the ward, or less frequently the customary village, are communities within which sharing is expected and regular gift-exchange required. By the division of contributions to corporations, the poor tend to recoup more than they give in everday financial dealings. Most important however, corporate groups act directly as employers and also re-allocate private sources of wealth. In particular this is done on a large scale through communal harvesting and share-cropping of publicly owned land. The extent of the latter is limited by the amount of ricefields which the groups hold, and the use of part of this as stipends for officials. So the major portion of land made available for working belongs to private owners. Despite the imbalance in the market, such tenancies are not for the most part characterized by extreme or organized exploitation which, if anything, is more marked in the democratically constituted groups. This is because a whole range of factors intervene, and the relationship may be reinterpreted in terms of patronage with a varying degree of political connotation. Land-owners, who in some cases are not much wealthier than their tenants, are also affected by the moral implications of economic relationships. For in the terms which they offer, and the

locality from which they are drawn, landlords are making statement which affect their social reputations directly. While it can be argued that this is a dispensable luxury where material return is at stake, this is questionable in a social system where ward councils wield extensive powers over their members across a broadly defined field, so that even when such matters appear to lie beyond the bounds of the group's jurisdiction, they are capable of convenient reinterpretation when the need or opportunity arises.

These complex sets of economic relationships have a directo effect upon the pattern of production and distribution (with obvious consequences for consumption). This can be seen by looking at the clear difference between the three criteria seen as critical by the Balinese: the ownership of riceland, the area actually worked, and the size of harvest taken home. These are tabulated for each household in Pisangkaja in detail in Appendix 54, together with the consumption index of each. The distribution of land owned differs substantially from that worked, as can be seen from the profiles of each in the histogram in Graph 5:16. As we noted above, the number of households which do not own land is far greater than those which do not work definite plots, a drop from 81 to 54 (labourers are excluded as there is no clear area farmed). Various factors, including constraints on the size of labour force discussed below, tend to restrict the size of plot worked. So this tends to be concentrated over a narrower range than the area owned, with a clear mode emerging between 0.3 and 0.4 ha., lying in a band between 0.1 and 0.6 ha. Some of the big farmers stand out from this, at the extreme being men such as I Badra (NE15) working 1.53 ha. I Gangsar (NW11) 1.38 ha., I Geningan (NW25) 1.425 ha., and I Tedun (SE23) 1.515. There is, however, little connexion between the amount of land worked and the harvest yielded for a variety of reasons. As Graph 5:17 shows, apart from the landless who obtain quantities of padi, in place of the clear mode in land working there is a more or less continuous but slow decline. Landless harvesters comprise the largest section of villagers with for the most part somewhere below 100 kg. each harvest, and so probably roughly double for each year. Beyond this, however, the number of farmers obtaining a nett yield from 100-1300 kg. a crop drops only slightly. It is above this level that the picture becomes more erratic. So there are significant differences in the amount of land owned by villagers, but less in the area worked; while the quantity of rice placed in the granary, or at least left to the householder, shows remarkable even-ess, which is a reflection of the different processes of redistribution at work.

GRAPH 5:16 COMPARISON OF AREA OF LAND OWNED WITH LAND WORKED IN PISANGKAJA (GEGADON: JUNE-NOVEMBER 1971).



GRAPH 5:17 THE HARVEST YIELD AFTER LABOUR COSTS IN PISANGKAJA (GEGADON SEASON: JUNE - NOVEMBER 1971)
(All figures are in kilograms of wet padi)



GRAPH: 5:18 PRODUCTIVITY OF FARMERS IN PISANGKAJA (ESTIMATED IN KILOGRAMS PER HECTARE GROSS FOR GEGADON SEASON).
(based only on plots of known size, so effectively the productivity (gross) of peasant farmers).



Close examination shows a factor to be at work which has so far been obscured by more obvious ones. First, however, it must be noted that the extent of share-cropping gives a hefty skew to the nett yields. For quite clearly the varying costs of carriage and terms of division between landlord and tenant from harvests off plots of differing size result in major sources of discrepancy. There is, however, a clear mode in the area of land worked, so one might expect a high frequency of yields in the low hundreds for tenants and in the higher hundreds for peasant farmers. However a second factor altogether seems to be in operation which complicates the picture further. There is a vast range of differences in gross productivity among farming families, that is the quantity of padi obtained in the field off a given area before costs are incurred. This is delineated in Graph 5:18, which is a histogram of the frequencies with which a given amount of padi is produced per unit area. In order to achieve precision, it has been necessary to restrict the table only to those farmers working plots of surveyed land. The harvest was weighed for each household. As a result, tenants have had to be omitted for the most part. It is probably that this would have swollen the figures slightly towards the upper end of the main concentration, as tenants are chosen from among the better farmers, which would even the distribution out even more. Whatever its limitations, the histogram does show, however, the great range of gross yields off a fixed area. Between 14/1500 kg. per hectare and 38/3900 kg. per hectare, there is astoundingly little variation in frequency of productivity. Quite simply, at least among peasant farmers the results from their farming vary enormously, by a factor of almost threefold. Obviously, in some cases this is made easier by the extent of land being restricted, as for Cokorda Ngurah (NE2) who attained 4,390 kg., per hectare (but cf. Sukèn NE22). This is far from uniform. though, for farmers such as I Geningan (NW25), who works the third largest area for a small household, has one of the highest returns with comfortably 3,930. per hectare. Matters are clearly complicated and as we shall see there is evidence, unfortunately more suggestive than conclusive, that the type of grouping used, and the number of participants (in contrast to Sahlins's arguments, on the whole the fewer the better), may play an important part in determining the size of yield.[24] Productivity is however only one of the considerations involved in the recruitment of labour in rice farming and the use of personnel more generally, and has a wide range of implications beyond the narrowly economic. In order to put these into perspective it is necessary to turn, in the last part of this chapter, to an examination of the social consequences of labour relationships.

The Significance of Labour Relationships:

While the major resources in the village economy such as land and water are generally controlled, within strictly defined limits, by corporate groups, labour poses a more complicated problem. When this is required in vast quantities, whether at temple festivals, in irrigation or for harvesting, it may be mobilized by corporations; while the more minor regular works can be delegated to sub-sections, or to smaller groups, such as voluntary associations which may be used to carry out the heavy first hoeing (m(eb)akal) for instance. However the range of circumstances under which labour is required is so varied that its organization on a corporate basis would be ponderous. Flexibility is achieved through the use of a wide selection of forms of dyadic relationship, in other words through ties in social networks. Apart from those between prince and servants or landlords and tenants, there are others, sometimes for less stable, which require brief mention. In particular there are other forms of clientèle, by which I mean simply the set of invididuals who use the specialized services of someone or who are dependent upon a resource which he controls. There is an ambivalence noted earlier as to who is the superior party, or patron. In Pisangkaja this seems to be assessed in no small part by the value of the service and the extent of demand. Conceptually, subservience is expressed as following a superior (ngiring the form used to elevate others - singgih). So in the most common forms of clientèle one is said to follow a prince or priest (there are separate specialized words for this latter), but hardly a rice-dealer or stall-keeper.'

Besides this there are informally recruited sets of people who are used for the major work of agriculture and the processing of padi afterwards. These range from the highly flexible and changeable teams invited to help with a particular stage of work in the ricefields, which Mayer (1966 : 115) has termed 'action sets', to the regular recruitment of particular people either as co-workers or as labourers for an employer in milling rice. These types of tie involve latitude for choice between alternative forms and personnel. So such economic relations are not just means to particular ends but also, in the expression of preferences, they serve to make statements, to a varying degree intended, about the intentions and social relationships of actors which affect their social reputations. This seems to apply most strongly to patterns of attendance at stalls and agricultural labour, it would seem because these take place conspicuously in public.

There are various forms of more or less institutionalized relationships within Balinese society, in which villagers require the services of others. The simplest is perhaps rice-dealing. In Pisangkaja there are two regular large-scale merchants, I Kacir (NW 6) and I Sujana (NE 23), and two occasional ones, I Karda (NE 11) and Kt. Gendul (NW 10). As I noted earlier exchanges involving rice and money are relatively pure, but as the main merchants are landless, they are dependent upon their clientele for their means of support and are in direct competition for customers. Apparently stemming from this in part, they are active political opponents in the ward, both being orators of some standing; and an examination of their dealings shows a tendency for these to be clustered according to the lines of factional cleavage at the time. A somewhat similar pattern exists for temple priests (pemangku) who are the general religious functionaries within the village, experts on the performance of rites and the intricacies of the Balines calendrical system, and consultants on religious matters which is such a broad field that it seems at times to be all-encompassing. Their knowledge and capacity to mediate between men and greater spitirual powers gives them a very important place in village society, especially in Tengahpadang where there are no high priests (pedanda) or celebrated textual experts (ballan usada or wisada). They are effectively patrons to ordinary villagers, the more so the less they require the payment of cash (sari) for their services. In this the position of the priest of the Western temple of the dead is less fortunate. He is both poor and, for reasons which we shall see, has heavy commitments. Again there is underlying competition between the two priests in the ward with strongly political dimensions, as public position affects the demand for their services. Between 1970 and 1972 when the priest of the temple of the dead emerged as the most powerful political patron in the ward, the demand for his ritual assistance trebled, to the point that villagers were coming from other settlements to ask him for advice or to perform rites. So economic competition tends to be expressed in terms of political differences, while factional support may be instrumental in affecting the size of clientèle.

The system of giving custom to regular stall-keepers is different in certain respects. With one or two notable exceptions stalls are run by poor women with no other means of support and tend to proliferate beyond the strict requirements of demand. The relatively lowly evaluation of this occupation is further reinforced by indigenous theories of substance, as cooking involves the downgrading (however necessary) of food, in return for the more elevated cash. Unlike the other contexts mentioned so far, the exact extent and composition of the clientèle is an eminently public affair, as their placing in most cases round the village square in mutual view suggests (see Map 4). The pattern of attendance at particular stalls is the product of a range of factors, not least the quality of the comestibles. The acknowledgement of discrepancies in wealth encourages the patronage of stalls especially within one's own ward, with a tacit understanding that circulation is appropriate. Despite this, villagers could easily name the habitues of each, who make their choice according to three main criteria (apart from the quality of food and service): neighbourhood, kinship and political faction ties. Each stall tends to be patronized by kin and nearby compounds; while two in particular are the foci of rival factions, those of Ni Kasih (SW 4), over 80% of whose regular customers are clients of her affine, Kt. Gendul; and Ni Kerti (SW 12), who is generally popular for her food and charm, with over 60% of her clientele from supporters of the Jèro Mangku Dalem (the priest of the western temple of the dead), while Jèro Piring (SE 4) is scrupulously avoided in general by these last, for political reason which will become apparent in Case 21 Chapter 10 (see also Hobart 1975: 90-1). The intricate tracery of movements between, and seating at, village stalls is a manifestation of the changing patterns of political alliances, a source of fascination and of critical interest.

While the patronage of coffee-shops and eating places may reflect current friendships and the mutant state of coalitions within the ward, agricultural labour offers an opportunity not only for the conspicuous demonstration of ability to command a following, but also provides both a means of rewarding

past support and actively shaping new political ties through casting a net more widely to include previously unconnected people or even the followers of opponents. The close cycling of agricultural seasons and the preference for the highly productive technique of double hoeing the ground (numbeg) in place of ploughing (which is more or less unused in this part of the island) requires the co-ordination of large amounts of labour in heavy demand over a short period. The concentration of the villagers' open fields in one section of Subak Langkih further ensures that the whole matter is highly public. So, to have a large force of men working one's fields is an index of popularity, a common guise for influence. The return varies but generally consists in abundant refreshments and meals, often supplemented by payment. While a few farmers prefer to cultivate alone and others content themselves with working with a few friends, many will be invited by a minority who use this as an occasion to demonstrate magnanimity and in so doing place others under obligation. The seasonal shortage of labour, the sanctioned opportunity to press gifts on others, coupled with the public nature of the endeavour, combine to make agricultural labour relations not just a necessary means of carrying out economic activities but, almost more important at times, a medium with few rivals for the expression and extension of support.

The pattern of relationships involved is complex and multifarious, for the labour required each season runs into thousands of man-days, which needs the mobilization of a wide range of pre-existing ties or the forging of new. These are summarized in Table 5:19 below. This shows that in the season beginning in January 1972 (a co-ordinated cycle, Kertamasa) nearly 800 persons were called upon for labour, using close on 600 different relationships, often with a single person being used both on more than one occasion and by more than one farmer. The types of tie used show some interesting features. First the proportion of agnates invited is low. Patrilineal ties beyond the household itself only accounted for 11.5% of the total and less than 9% of the men mobilized. This stands in marked contrast to the frequency of use of affines who, in terms of ties, amounted to over 28% of the work force, or over a quarter. Equally interesting, kin ties as a whole

account for just over half of the number of ties invoked, but actually less than half the total labour supply. While neighbourhood and friendship between them are the basis of close on 20% of ties, the single largest category in the provision of labour is voluntary association, with 218 out of the total workforce of 774 (the exact ties used by each household is given in Appendix 6). Patronage stands as only a small proportion, because it is confined here to ties which are not subsumed under other headings. As we shall see, a high proportion of the other relationships may become involved in political activities. Finally, the heading of 'no outstanding tie' refers to invitations to other villagers with whom one has no specific recognized basis for association.

TABLE 5:19 RELATIONSHIPS USED TO RECRUIT HELP FOR RICE CULTIVATION : PISANGKAJA (KERTAMASA SEASON; JANUARY - JUNE 1972).

Relationship to farmer:	No. of ties invoked:		% of ties used:	% of men used:	
Household:	98		16.9%	12.7%	
Agnates:	67		11.5%	8.7%	
Affines:	164		28.2%	21.2%	Total kin: 335 % ties: 57.6% % men: 43.4%
Distant kin:*	6		1.0%	0.8%	
Neighbourhood:	56		9.6%	7.2%	
Friendship:	56		9.6%	7.2%	
Vduntary Associations:**	25	(but 218 men)	4.3%	28.2%	Total ties: 207 Total men: 400 % ties: 35.6% % men: 51.7%
No outstanding tie:	51		8.8%	6.6%	
Pdlitical party:***	13		2.2%	1.7%	
Sundry:	6		1.0%	0.8%	
Patron-client:	39		6.7%	5.0%	
Total:	881	(774)	99.9%	100.1%	

* these terms are villagers' classification, in which distant kin are persons with whom some form of association is thought to exist, but whether by descent or marriage is generally unclear.

** voluntary associations are used only by 25 men, but as each contains close on 10 men (see Table 3:16) the actual number of ties indirectly mobilized is large. These have, however, been kept strictly separate as the ties are qualitatively different, and members of association are often related by different links and may be used in this way at other times in the agricultural cycle. On voluntary association see Chapter 6.

*** this refers to national political party co-membership where there is no other outstanding tie. It is distinct from recognized patron-client ties in functions. This last category consists of 34 political clients working for patrons, 3 tenants working for landlords and 2 landlords invited by tenants. A political client here is someone with no prevailing kin tie.

It is largely through this, and the vague category of friends (timpal), that influential men draw others into their circle. As the sheer prolixity suggests, rice farming ties are one of the most important ways of activating and servicing social relationships (cf. Gulliver 1955).[25]

Earlier I noted that share-cropping agreements were largely confined to the ward, or at widest the settlement, unless these were traditional patrimonial ties to a prince. This tendency is even more strongly evident in the circumscription of agricultural labour ties used in irrigated rice farming, as should emerge clearly from Table 5:20. Three out of every five ties mobilized is drawn from the same neighbourhood within the ward, which underlines the tendency of relationships such as kinship to be of significance particularly where locality reinforces them. Of equal

TABLE 5:20 THE TERRITORIAL CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF LABOUR TIES FOR RICE CULTIVATION IN PISANGKAJA (SEASON JANUARY - JUNE 1972)

Origin	No. of ties:	% of all ties:		No. of men:	% of all men:
Neighbourhood:	336	60.4%			
Ward:	147	26.4%	86.8%	701	90.6%
Settlement:	53	9.5%		53	6.8%
Outside Settlement:*	20	3.6%		20	2.6%
Totals:	556**	99.9%		774	100.00%

* these are almost exclusively clients of the minor Cokordas and friends of villagers in field-huts (pondok) lying nearby,

** this total excludes voluntary associations which cannot be localized.

interest, five-sixths of all ties are restricted to the ward and, of the remainder, most are with villagers in other wards of Tengahpadang. This emerges even more forcefully from an examination of the proportion of

the labour force recruited from the ward, which is over 90%. Work relationships are tightly convoluted.

There is a range of different forms in which labour is mobilized for rice cultivation, and each has its distinctive features and consequences. The largest single source of labour is through voluntary associations. These will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Here it is principally important to note that they are a popular and approved way of working land. They take pride particularly in their competitive superiority to other associations and it is a common sight to see rival gruups hoeing adjacent fields at breakneck speed, to see which can work faster. The cordiary of this, inevitably, is that the quality of work suffers, as it is the even bite of the hoe in breaking up soil which is critical. Solidarity with one's fellows and productivity, as we shall see, do not go hand-in-hand in Bali.

The majority of relationships are dyadic, and apart from household labour, are divided into four named, institutionalized forms of tie, each with a distinctive type of exchange and with differing implications. First there is the direct exchange of labour between two men, *mesolisl*, by which they work each other's fields in turn, the total number of days spent on one man's land properly being exactly balanced on the other's although not necessarily the particular task. This direct exchange carries strong connotations of the equality of the parties involved, for the content in each direction is identical. It is normally found between people who are, or who wish to maintain that they are, friends of equal standing. There is a clear expectation that the relationship will continue indefinitely, and its incidence is fairly low as is clear from Appendix 6. A weaker version of these values are found in *mesebau*, the exchange of productive equipment and draught-animals. Few farmers keep the full range of tackle or two bullocks (water-buffalo are not kept as the fodder is lacking), and commonly agree before the season to co-ordinate their farming, so that they can use whatever equipment of the other they may require in turn. Once again this is found traditionally between close villagers of similar standing.

In contrast the remaining two forms involve the exchange of different kinds of item and have more complex connotations. The most used method of recruiting labour is to invite other villagers, ngajakang (root: ajak to invite), to come for the day to carry out whatever task was proposed. In return for this the guests are treated to lavish refreshments: coffee, betel-nut and packs of cigarettes, and fed a large meal, well-garnished and with substantial quantities of meat (not normally important ingredient, except on special occasions). Money may also be slipped in too. These are normally jolly occasions, with a great deal of merriment, laughter and buffoonery especially when the food provided is up to expectations, and the big villagers vie with each other over the excellence of their hosting. In this party atmosphere, it is not surprising that the general quality of the work is low, for it is seen by most villagers as an occasion to be bucolic rather than sedulous. A field hoed by ngajakang is usually so distinctive, as to be discernible to the anthropologist. The exchange of labour for cooked food involves two fairly coarse media, and this seems to be connected with some of the distinct properties of ngajakang. It is very rare for high caste villagers to accept invitations from commoners (or for these to be given), nor for the leading low caste families to take up requests at all, except sometimes of their equals. As in preman relations, reported for East Java by Jay (1969: 252-4), ngajakang may carry both connotations of equality and asymmetry. Many villagers engage in mutual invitation for the pleasure of the occasion, but others may issue requests, as if treating the gathering as a moment of solidarity, then find grounds to refuse the counter-invitation and so turn the relationship delicately into one of asymmetry. At its best the art of the use of ngajakang can be remarkably subtle.

The final system is wage labour, ngepupah, by which a land-owner makes an agreement with others to carry out a particular stage of cultivation for a fixed sum in cash. Some villagers specialize in this work and may form teams which hire themselves out regularly, often under a particular head, in return for a substantial income. At first sight this might appear the type of labour relationship which would carry the most sense of inequality. Certainly it is found, for reasons which will be discussed,

to be practiced mainly by the élite of the village. However an inspection of the labour teams shows them to be villagers of some standing and rarely landless; also in a high proportion of cases they were affines, or more rarely agnates or neighbours, of the land-owner. The theory of substance suggested earlier may be of help; for in offering cash, one is providing an entity of sufficient value that it should not be wasted on outsiders nor on those of far lower status, but given to appropriately close recipients, themselves of suitably refined substance. This would assist in explaining the otherwise somewhat puzzling features that on the one hand it is not the poor who tend to work for cash, and on the other that the leading families conspicuously use ngepupah, which would be odd were this to be so morally dubious.

The deployment of labour in these various types of relationship has complex and interesting consequences, both in terms of the economic and the symbolic considerations involved. It is a truism of peasant life in Tengahpadang that the more men are invited to help farm, the lower the yield (cf. Sahlins 1974: Chapters 2 and 3). By indigenous criteria of agricultural efficiency, it is also held that different types of labour arrangement may be ranked according to the quality of the work, and so the size of the harvest. In decreasing order of efficiency these are: working alone (or with household members, who suffer directly from poor standards); wage-labour; exchange between equals (meselisi); use of voluntary associations; and finally invitations (ngajakang). In short the more popular the form, the less productive. It is difficult to assess the precision of Balinese views on the rationality of labour investment because so many factors such as the quality of past work, the location of the land, the availability of water and the extent of theft, the degree of fertilization and so forth, discussed above, all have an effect on the yield. These are not clearly separable, for concerned farmers tend to be careful with their selection of help, if any. Out of interest though an examination of households using fairly constant methods of cultivation, with a similar quality of land and water supplies, showed striking differences in productivity. Peasants who worked alone or with only household help obtained an average crop of

some 3,040 kg. per hectare, compared with those using only household labour and voluntary associations of 2,530 kg. per hectare. For those using invitations as the main source of labour, the figure dropped to as low as 1,980 kg. per hectare, that is one third less. For the reasons stated, these figures must be treated with caution, but they do tend to support indigenous theories of labour efficiency, presumably in part because they rely on similar types of observation. My concern here is not however with the actual returns, so much as villagers' perceptions of these which emphasize that the more people and the more convivial the system of labour used, the lower the harvest. If this is thought to be so, then the obvious questions arise as to why co-operative work should be so widely practised and why, independent of the size of holdings, there is so much variation in the number of people invited and the forms chosen.

There are certain pragmatic possibilities which carry a certain weight although, on inspection, these can be seen to depend as much upon the form of exchanges as their content. A small section of farmers in any season ask for help because of illness, incapacity or absence, but this is restricted to a few absent wage-earners, widows or the elderly. Nor can the scale or selection of assistance be simply viewed as an economically rational response to the risks inherent in rice farming, which have been reduced substantially by indigenous technology. For, on the one hand dry fields and other resources are designed to this end; on the other many of the workers are poor, landless villagers who are hardly a prop against crop failure. Rather it is the farmers who are likely to be asked to bail out their helpers in time of need. Instead this pattern of cultivation appears more closely connected with the conversion of material resources to non-economic ends. This does not necessarily work in a simple way however. First, by no means all the farmers employing large labour forces gain commensurate credit, nor are they always active politically, even in a broad sense. Second the scale of losses in harvests due to extensive invitation are seen as sufficient as to suggest the choice of other, more efficient, means of rewarding actual or potential followers such as ngepupah or straight gifts. An examination of the payments to wage-labourers shows that, in fact, those from within the ward were paid on average over 50% more

(per unit area) than outsiders hired on the open market, and would range for clients or regular workers up to three times the value.[26] Apart from gifts of rice and othe food, one of the most popular forms of recompense in ngajakang is notably redolent with symbolism, for it consists in the gift of old items of clothing, worn by the donor and so no longer pure (sukla). Third, whether it is small peasants offering simple meals to keep kin or friendship ties alive, or the more influential villagers laying on lavish meals to press their generosity on others, the actual material content of the exchange is relatively small, with the exception of ngepupah and hardly sufficient recompense to political supporters, nor worth the deficit in crop to the farmer. Approached as a utilitarian system for the efficient mobilization of labour, the pattern of agricultural work on rice in Pisangkaja, with its questionable productivity and apparently redundant proliferation of labour arrangements, makes little sense.

As its public nature and the anticipated conviviality suggest it may be the act of exchange itself and its significance to the actors, rather than the balance of goods and services at the end which may at times be the more important. This deserves brief discussion.

There are three separate dimensions of choice in recruiting labour, each with its distinctive set of implications: whether to invite help at all (beyond the domestic unit); which type to propose; and finally which categories of relationship should be mobilized. This last, which is in some ways the most complex, can be dealt with briefly; because on the one hand, the grosser distinctions between using outsiders as opposed to village members have been discussed, on the other the fine tuning of balance between different classes of social tie is at a more detailed level of analysis than is possible here. This is the more complex because relationships are commonly multiple, so that a single person may simultaneously be neighbour, agnate, affine and political client. We shall have the opportunity to examine the significance of these differences later after a discussion of the institutions themselves. It is the other two axes which possess rather obvious meanings.

As we have noted, the plight of the landless in Pisangkaja is openly recognized and there are a wide range of institutional means available for the redistribution of various goods, sometimes in return for services. This is not held to be a matter for free choice but of moral obligation, by which land-owning villagers are enjoined to help the less fortunate. So the evident withholding of assistance is tantamount to a declaration not just of a lack of concern for the welfare of one's fellow-men (seen here as the moral community of the ward or possibly settlement, Bailey 1966), but also a more fundamental denial of social responsibility. This is lent an added edge because of the greater material reward that one can obtain by ignoring such customary obligations. Morality and productivity are seen as incompatible in this system. Affluent, entrepreneurial farmers, like I Bidel (SW 14) or I Tedun (SE 23), work large farms almost alone (see Appendices 5 and 6 for respective details of the land cultivated and labour used, but are the object of open opprobrium. The precise significance of even such categorical principles is liable to varying interpretation, which can be used to great effect. Over the years, Kt. Mara (NW 7), a leading public speaker has ostentatiously worked his land alone or with minimal assistance. With a plot of less than 0.3 ha. he is a subsistence farmer, who maintains that he is unable to afford the luxury of turning the work of cultivation into a party. In so doing he very effectively emphasizes his stance as a villager who is both hard-working and poor and so reinforces his identity with a large section of the ward who are also poor (and think of themselves as hard-working by contrast to what is thus portrayed as hedonistic and prodigal). Even apparently unassailable core values are open to varied reinterpretation.

The second dimension is the range of meanings which may be conveyed by the choice of types of labour relationship. Each of these tends to have quite different connotations, which were discussed above. So, while the use of voluntary associations is an index of sociability, balanced labour exchange (meselisi) conveys something approaching solidarity with ordinary villagers. Invitations, as we saw, are ambivalent; for they can suggest friendly sharing, but just as easily friendly superiority. In this, ngepupah has a special place because the list of villagers employing this (see Appendix 5) is almost

exactly congruent with the recognised political élite within the ward (see Chapter 9).[27] This system is clearly highly flexible and may be adapted from season to season. The type of labour force recruited may also vary with career and circumstance. Well-established leaders like the customery village head, Kt. Gendul (NW 10), no longer need to demonstrate their position; far less the prince, Cokorda Putera, who takes no part in agriculture at all. In contrast, other such as the Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE 17) invest heavily in village labour, in order both to show and to extend the range of their support. He invited so many people to help with his second hoeing (melasah) that, with one man almost to every 10 metres square, they were continually in one anothe r's way. The last main patron is equally interesting. Dewa Md. Nombong has recently returned after a long period of absence working as a driver. The broad mixture of types of tie which he uses fit well with his need to re-establish a position with in the community. Villagers, especially in the out-lying field huts, may, on occasions, use labour from outside the ward, or even settlement. Constrained in part by appearances, over the seasons, the main families generally make delicate use of ties to important political figures, or followers, in other wards. So there is a close connexion between the type of relationships used and social position. This is complex, however; for these can as easily be turned to misrepresent as to signify. In extending ties of balanced exchange (meselisi) neither I Geningan (NW 25), as one of the largest land-owners, nor Dewa Putu Kuat (SE 11), as an aspiring orator, are attempting to achieve ordinariness but each, for his own reasons, to signal it. These various forms do not have simple determinate meanings, for as I have tried to suggest, through use in different contexts, they may be interpreted so as to convey various possibilities. This happens at two levels: in the symbolic statements made through inviting particular individuals, and also in the wider pattern composed of all these statements. These differ as do the words in a discourse from its sentences. Social dexterity lies in part in perceiving and articulating this latter which, it would seem, largely pass the majority of peasant villagers by. To try to reduce economic relationships in Balinese village society sdely to their instrumental components would be to

miss much of their significance. The convolution of social relationships tends to result in ostensibly economic acts being transformed into complex social messages.

The customary values of the village which lay obligations on men to redistribute rice and other goods are generally subscribed to, at least in public, to judge from the material discussed.[28] In behaving in accordance with these ideal standards of behaviour villagers are, in a definite sense, acting morally. Yet at the same time this may also be a convenient idiom for developing practically rewarding relationships or demonstrating the size of one's following. More subtly, in adhering carefully to highly regarded values in the community, men may enhance their reputations greatly by, so to speak, investing in morality. So rather than this being an end in itself, it may also become, through the public approbation which is conferred upon ethically good actions, a means to further ends. This raised the age-old question of the nature of morality and whether villagers should be seen as engaged in entirely cynical exercises. As there is arguably an inherent ambiguity of means and ends, by which almost any end may become a future means, or a means become an end, the antithesis may be false at this level. For the villagers' motives give the appearance of being a complex blend of conscious manipulation (especially among the élite) coupled with tacit support for, and not uncommonly active pursuit of, socially ideal goals. A close scrutiny of the labour teams formed by the priest of the temple of the dead who privately would speak in pragmatic terms, showed that many ties would be hard to explain in terms of political expediency. The Balinese, like other peoples, are capable of using a social value, while also subscribing to it.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the village economy of Tengahpadang is heavily dependent upon the cultivation of irrigated rice terraces, and shows the symptoms supposedly associated with advanced agricultural involution. Closer inspection, however, showed that some of these in fact pre-dated the

expansion of the population in the island while others were connected with particular aspects of social structure and so not generally, nor necessarily, products of rice cultivation. The notion of involution has two important aspects in Bali: the technical intensification of cropping methods and the convolution of social relationships connected with the production, distribution and consumption of wet rice. It was also argued that the concentration of labour in irrigated terraces is not, as tends to be assumed, simply because it is the most productive form of investment, for it appeared that this was not necessarily so. In part the value placed on rice as a crop, and on riceland, seemed to derive from its position in a complex classificatory scheme of substance, which forms part of an indigenous theory of possible Indian derivation concerning matter and transaction.

The economic and social consequences of the convolution of relationships are extremely complicated, and take a variety of different forms. It emerged, for instance, that the ward was the primary community within which sharing and mutual assistance were encouraged, and to a lesser extent the customary village, so that patterns of exchange were notably constrained by locality. The main corporate groups in Balinese society themselves engage in periodic redistribution, and may also act as employers and landlords in their own right. The problem of landlessness and poverty is not shunned, but is publicly acknowledged to the point that villagers are under heavy moral obligations to offer opportunities of work to their fellows at terms distinctly more favourable than the market rate. In some cases, this takes the form of regular share-cropping agreements; in others, a looser, more flexible arrangement for agricultural labour changing each season. These provide means for substantial villagers to convert economic assets into social or political credit, either directly or by acquiring a reputation for morally upright conduct towards others, which is a useful, if not critical, asset for a political figure. At the same time labour relationships, like patronage at stalls, communicates a great deal about the standing and intentions of Balinese villagers. While there

are connexions between economic subordination and political allegiance, this does not always take the form of a simple transformation of economic resources into patronage. Although tenants are commonly engaged in multiple relations of exchange with their landlords, as we shall see later, in less than half of these did this develop into a political tie. The various institutional systems of sharing and labour exchange offer a wide range of possibilities and room not only for manoevre, but even for reinterpreting the values and relationships themselves, which gives Balinese economic activities something of their varying flavour.

Chapter 5 Footnotes

1. The construction of dams and water separation systems may be very complicated, as may be gathered from that of Subak Langkih. This has fifteen serial, but separate, sections which carry out functions ranging from sand removal traps (which still allow volcanic ash through) to a set of stone extractors of different sizes, to sluices to remove excess water and hollowed blocks to regulate the precise flow.

2. The kertamasa season runs approximately from December to May and the gegadon from June to November, although each is slightly short of a full six months, so that it is not in phase with the western, nor Balinese, calendar years. The difference is largely an ideal one, with work in theory being co-ordinated in the first, but not obligatorily in the second. For various reasons there are variations between farmers in both seasons in practice. The grounds are discussed in detail in Hobart 1978b: 68-74.

3. At the time of my fieldwork in Subak Langkih this figure stood at about Rp. 26,000 (£. 26.00), for the standard unit of one tenah, a proportion of the total flow. The calibration of water and other measurements for rice is discussed below.

4. Geertz points to a degree of variation in a footnote (1967: 231, fn. 9), which he explains as a product of ecological factors within the subak itself. One might go further. To take an example from a set of adjacent plots in a sub-section (Langkih Kaja) of Section Langkih, which lies in a single area watered by the same stream, through dividing-blocks in good condition, the following variation occurs:

SE 9 Dewa Kt. Geriya: $1\frac{1}{4}$ bit tenah for 0.845 ha. =0.676 ha./tenah
NW 13Ni Lungid : $\frac{1}{2}$ bit tenah for 0.22 ha. =0.44 ha./tenah
NW 5 I Laba : 1 bit tenah for 0.395 ha. =0.395 ha./tenah

This is typical - there are far more extreme examples. There are similar difficulties in linking sheaf size with micro-ecological variations. The majority of tenah of padi are around 40 kg. (this was weighed for each household in the village as part of research into harvest yields). The principal reason for this is that 80 kg. on a shoulder-pole for men is a convenient load; while women carry one sheaf on the head - this numerical and positional difference is symbolically significant. Degdeg Siang (NE 3) however only has sheaves of 20 kg, because his fields lie in section Telun Ayah (but 0.36 ha), for it is far too heavy to carry moreover such a long distance. In contrast, Dewa Ny. Kelila (NW 24) who is thought to be the strongest man in the ward works for his father and makes bundles of 60 kg. as he has no difficulty in carrying 120 kg. over distances to the fieldhut. Nor is there any simple relationship between the size of sheaves and plots even with immediate locales.

I Surung (NE17) brings in tenah of 50 kg. off his plot of 0.55 ha., whereas his field neighbour, I Suken (NE21) garners in units of 42 kg. off a mere 0155 ha. While on the next field, I Rugrug who is a small-built man working 0.35 ha. has sheaves of only 36 kg.

5. In 1972, the system of leadership was :

Section Sukabayu:	I Cutet	Br. Gagah	the dominant ward
Section Langkih:	Cdk.ANama	Br.Pisangkaja	the dominant ward
Section Uma Dalem:	I Kawi	Br.Tengahpadang	second largest ward
Section Telun Ayah:	I Mojd	Br.Tegal	second largest ward*
Section Keraman :	I Rerod	Br. Tengah	second largest ward

*Tegal, as Table 3.11 shows, is the ward in Tengahpadang with the largest membership in the section.

6. During the period of my fieldwork there was, fortunately, no shortage.. On the other hand, this also meant that I have been unable to study the process of conflict between subak in the area.

7. Birkelbach reports that the mean size of irrigation association heads' fields corresponds almost exactly with the mean for the association as a whole (1973: 156); and further that heads must own land in the subak (1973: 163). This latter is not so around Tengahpadang. As one local instance, Cokorda Nama, the section head of Langkih, is only a tenant farmer. While pekaseh may on average be as wealthy as other members, there is a wide range from Cokorda Nama with no land, to the head of the whole association, Kt. Suci, from Br. Tegal, with well over 2.0 ha. in Langkih alone.

8. I do not intend to enter here into the long debate about useful definitions of economic classes within peasant societies at different stages in their history. Data are presented below on the access villagers have to productive assets, the forms of capital they hold, and the command of services which they possess. Further, as we shall see in the succeeding chapters, the value attached to labour in production and more generally by the Balinese (cf.Bloch 1975b) varies, so that it has a different significance in different contexts. More immediately, the Balinese have various systems of ranking villagers, one of the most often heard in conversation being another distinction into :

lacur	= poor
sedeng	= medium (comfortable)
sugih	= rich

Others are used below in the text to produce a finer grading. The point, however, is that systems like the one above are not rigidly fixed, but vary in their reference according to context. When talking about land-holding, villagers will emphasize the area of ricefields or their productivity; when referring to disposable assets, they apply something close to a consumption index for harvest and income. Rather than attempt to define a rigorous set of criteria for class, I shall on the other hand examine the forms of access to production, on the other discuss the varying contexts and conflicting interpretations which the Balinese themselves put upon their differential control over productive resources.

9. As the previous footnote should make clear, it is very difficult to reproduce, or even to know exactly, the criteria villagers use in different contexts to assess the economic standing of others. This varies in addition with the position of the assessor and includes such diverse factors as his computation of the number of consumers, his knowledge of the family's diligence, let alone his own consistency. This overall weighted index is therefore far from complete, but it is a rough assessment which corresponds as well as can be expected with observed use of resources, and villagers' evaluation if pushed.

10. Keeping cattle without access to grazing land creates problems. These offer some insight into the value of labour. For cattle are normally kept in the compound, while small boys or adolescents go out to scythe grass (ngarit). It takes one boy between 2 and 3 hours daily to cut 20 kg. from the banks of roads or rice terraces, due to the high demand. A one-year old calf requires 15 kg, and adult of 4 years, 30 kg.a day. The return on labour in terms of the market price is minimal. The sale value of a 4 year-old is Rp. 25,000. Even allowing no cost in obtaining a new-born calf (if produced within the family stock), this is a return of less than Rp.1.per hour. Cattle, however, are draught animals for brief period of harrowing (not ploughing, see Hobart 1978b) and produce useful manure as well.

11. The value of good quality riceland in 1970 was of the order of Rp. 6,000 per ara, or 1/100th hectare. As no tegal was sold during this period, it is not possible to give a comparison. Factors of distance, productivity and so forth are sufficiently complex as to make simple evaluations off small samples inaccurate. There is also a great difference, as we shall see, between the normal productivity achieved and the potential. This is a consequence of a whole range of variables, including notably labour input. The achieved yields were calculated for a number of households. A reasonably average example is given below, for NE3 Degdeg, who has which subsistence holdings and a reasonably small labour force (for the problems/ are created by work teams, see below; suffice it to note that on the whole, the smaller the better).

Off 0.36 ha, of riceland, watered by a standard bit tenah, the nett yield in wet padi was about 900 kg. after payment of harvest and carrying charges. As the fields lay some way away, this latter were somewhat higher than average, but accounted for only 13 kg. loss. With a market value of Rp14 per kg. at the time, this gave the total yield for two harvests a year as Rp. 25,500, or Rp.70,800 per hectare. They own no tegal, but this will usually yield quality yams at about 120 kg. per ara, although cycling of crops is necessary. With a sale price of Rp.12.5 per kg., this would give a yield off one hectare of dry land of Rp.150,000. In contrast, their garden land (to be discussed below) was exceedingly fertile, but in no way exceptional. Off only 0.07 ha. of garden, the yield during the year was in the region of Rp.27,000, that is over Rp.380,000 per hectare. (Of the total, over Rp. 10,000 was from 10 coconut trees, and the commercial value of bananas was Rp.9,350.) As this last depends for its productivity upon manuring, clearly it cannot be extended indefinitely. Further, other factors intervene to affect the value and status of this land, which for the majority of families is by far the most productive in cash terms.

12. Marriott's work offers wide scope for development. Two areas spring immediately to mind. First, while terms such as subtlety and grossness, are translated from the Sanskrit, it is unclear whether ideas of substance, transformation, generation and so forth are parts of the "emic" model as well for they have been incompletely spelled out. In short, the philosophic concepts underlying this field are an important area of study. This leads us to the second question of the degree to which such models are systematically elaborated. Such issues are involved as: is the system closed and in balance through time? How does it link with other cardinal concepts, such as merta, the elixir of immortality or welfare, sari, essence, and others? Further research is necessary to decide how far these ideas are developed in Bali into a logically consistent framework. One could go further and enquire into indigenous ideas of logic itself.

13. Sari is, in fact, more than simple essence and a term which requires more detailed study than is possible here. Among its referents are mother's milk, the yolk of an egg (van Eck, 1876) and significantly that which makes ground fertile (van der Tuuk, 1897) and is present in the products of agriculture. It would seem to correspond in some way to an immaterial, subtle aspect capable of passing or undergoing transformation through different material forms. Its link with substance, and such vital fluids as merta (see text and footnote 15), would require further study. There is an elliptical reference to the two terms in Mrs. Hooykaas (1961: 17, line 22) "tirta merta, sari tirta". It is not entirely clear whether this is simply a not-uncommon reversal of the last two words, for the sake of the flow of the sentence, which would make merta and sari parallel terms as forms or qualities of tirta. On the other hand, conceivably it might refer to the essence of holy water. However, in this case the terminal -n, on the previous word, to make a Balinese genitive has been omitted.

14. There are still higher terms: miunan or merayunan, used for priests and princes (Chapter 8).

In common with other societies, the Balinese have a highly developed technical vocabulary for the different stages of rice growth and the products. These are not of direct concern here, apart from the main terms: for the growing plant, padi (low), pantun (high); for stalkless grain in husk, iliih; milled white rice, baas (low), beras (high).

15. Somewhat confusingly for classical scholars, the Balinese tend to omit the initial a- from amerta, without changing its meaning. Hooykaas' texts on Siwa priests incantations (1966), gives instances of both forms being used synonymously throughout. The Balinese language tends to stress bi-syllabic forms, but the initial a- is introduced or omitted according to indigenous aesthetic feelings for the flow of speech. This is an important aspect of Balinese grammar generally which has been little examined.

16. Or sometimes "ewung" is the form found. This system points to the conjunction of yet another form of classifying substances by spiritual temperature into: hot (panes), intermediate (dumalada) and cool (etis). When households are ewu(n)g or bu(w)ut, they are also hot. It would appear that these states are caused by variations in temperature. So also may the condition of the body be affected by intake of food, all of which is graded by its heating or cooling capacities (Weck 1938).

17. This is not intended to imply that there is a straight market choice between investing in shrines and ricelands, for the latter is not usually for sale in small units, whereas improvement of ancestor shrines can be a piecemeal operation. The comparison remains interesting, however.

18. Tested on the composite figure for land-owning (which includes dry fields at half the value of ricefields, it will be recalled), the distribution in the ward of Pisangkaja of the high castes by wealth and political party was a follows (this excludes NE4; NW6 and NW17, which are effectively headed by women; the categories of ownership have also been modified upwards slightly to account for holdings in dry land):

	Neutral	Communist	Nationalist
Poor: (0-.20ha)	8	3	3
Subsistence: (0.21-0.50ha)	2	2	1
Comfortable: (0.51-1.00ha)	4	-	1
Wealthy (1.00+ha)	2	-	1

Using contingency tests, X^2 is 4.12 (with 6^o of freedom) which is not remotely significant, even at 10%. The same test performed on ricefields alone was not significant either, even where it was used to contrast just politically active and inactive households.

The table of wealthy villagers is interesting, as it shows the strong position of the leading Pulosari, low caste villagers, but the absence of the Dauh descent group from the highest category of land-owners.

Leading Village Families ranked by Wealth in Riceland in 1972

Family	Compound	Party	1949	1972	Change
Cokorda Putera	NE1	P.N.I.	11.25	6.05	-5.20
*Jero Mangku Desa	SW3/NW25	P.N.I	1.765	2.215	+0.45
				(2.965)	(+1.20)
Gangsar	NW11	P.N.I.	1,305	1.73	+0.425
*Gendul	NW10	P.N.I.	2.07	1.94	-0.13
**Bidel	SW14	P.N.I.	0.53	1.55	+1.02
Badra	NE15	P.N.I.	1.38	1.53	+0.15
Tedun	SE23	P.N.I.	1.16	1.515	+0.355
*Dw.Kt.Geriya	SE9/SE26	Golkar	1.645	1.415	-0.23

* Here the effective family grouping is larger than one household, so the total wealth is given. Due to a quarrel between the Jèro Mangku Désa and his half-brother Kt.Degdeg, this latter has been included separately in the figures in parentheses, as they are temporarily on bad terms (Case 1.).

** This includes land which Bidel began to work in 1972, but had not yet paid for, so this is not entered in the official figures used in other tables.

The predominant position of rice in estimating substance is emphasized in this table. Were the composite index to be taken, which includes dry fields, such villagers as I Ianis (NE12) should be included, yet he is most certainly viewed neither as a man of substance nor as pdlitically important.

19. Geertz distinguishes 'deep play', or gambling for large stakes and honour, from ordinary betting, which he says is despised. For another, quite different field for the possible use of the idea of 'deep play', see Chapter 9 and the role of orators.

20. The toll-keeper is I Runtig (NW1) who owns no riceland. The charge is: Rp.2½ for each merchant for a two-way passage. He must give Rp.300 to the ward each month and pockets the rest. This sum is used to pay the sweep, who used to be I Mongoh (SW9), but he gave it up and it was taken over by I Mukun (SW8, husband of Ni Kerti SE12, who owns a stall in the square), who grew tired of this after three months, although there is a salary each month of Rp.300, with a further tax on temporary merchants of Rp.2½ a day, or on permanent stalls of Rp.75 a month. I Gampil (NW8) then asked for it. He owns substantial rice terraces and the strength of public feeling against his being allowed the job, reflects both, the consciousness of the need for such work to be reserved for the impoverished, and as he was given it, the play of political influence in deflecting general feeling and fixing decisions in the assembly, which will be discussed in Chapter 9 (see also Hobart 1975).

21. To pawn is ngadéang (Root: gadé) and to lend nyandra. Geertz (1967: 238) says first that plais (cf. melaisin) in Kungkung is a system of key money in which the owner screws up the amount by accepting successively larger bids (for a better discussion of how this works, and some of the sorts of checks, see Caplan 1972). This does not occur in Tengahpadang, where cash is too short and the tenant in the commanding position. Second, Geertz states that the system is illegal, which is interesting, as melaisin agreements in Tengahpadang are registered and witnessed at the sub-district office. (melaisin =obtain money for land; melaisang to give land for money). This may denote a regional difference, a change in policy or perhaps the systems differ slightly in how they operate.

22. Geertz notes a similar terminology but in some instances with different proportions in Klungkung (1967: 236-7). In a more general survey, Birkelbach (1973) seems to have followed Geertz, but makes no reference to the existing sources for other parts of Bali (Korn 1932: 581-2; Adatrechtbundels XV, XXIII, XXXV). Geertz distinguishes:

nandu	= half the yield to the tenant
nelon	= two-fifths
ngapit	= one-third
merapat	= a quarter

This local terminology in Klungkung, runs into etymological difficulties, for nelon stems from telu =three (with the verb form: nelu (in) - nelon) and used in most of Bali for the division 1/3:2/3 reported as early as 1886 by Liefrinck (translated in 1969, see p.68 on divisions and footnote 16). Korn (1932) and the Adatrechtbundels do not list ngapit or marapat. These work are notable, however, for the number of references they make to Gianyar.

23. This is no idle threat. Balinese wards have extensive formal, and even more wide-ranging assumed, powers over their members. Failure to meet with approved standards of behaviour or regulations renders one open to a series of escalating sanctions from being sent to coventry (kesepèkang) or even having ones compound sealed up, so that ingress and egress is impossible. The next step is mesélong, or expulsion, which was the traditional death penalty, as other villages would not accept such a person, who was literally beyond the bounds of society. Now wards have been known to carry out summary executions for infringement of their constitutions. It was thought that in this particular case the landlord will modify his terms, especially as the share-cropper is the brother of Kt. Mara, a leading orator, who is waiting for a suitable opportunity to square matters.

24. Obviously there are other factors, such as the adequacy of water, the quality of the soil, individual expertise and so forth. It will be noticed, however, that these also vary according to the industry of the farmer. Water supply depends on frequency of visits to the fields and the removal of others' blocks on the stream (and setting up one's own). The quality of the soil depends in no small part on how well it has been worked in the past and what improvements have been made to it. Below we shall examine the effect which the type of labour force has by taking only adjacent fields with similar qualities of land, water and so forth, leaving the labour as the main variable. This is obviously rough, but the range of factors which might be considered are numerous and would require far more complex methods of study to evaluate the relative influence of each.

25. There is a further method, which would be given more prominence if space permitted. This is the threshing and milling of rice. The principal stages are nebuk ngaasin, removing the seeds from the stem (sheaves are carried back unthreshed) using a bamboo pole with a steel rim, and ngelusung, pounding the rice in a mortar to remove the husks. If rice is to be sold, it is given only one milling (which helps to keep the weight higher), if eaten then it receives a second. There are standard rates for performing this very arduous work, which is principally carried out by women. These are 1/10th. of the yield for one milling, 1/8th, for two, and commonly a share of the stalks and inner integument (ewot) which is excellent animal fodder. The patterns of work are so complex however that it is not possible to calculate the proportion of the total ward harvest which is redistributed in this way. It is substantial, but the work is hard and is slowly being replaced

by mechanized milling machines. Feelings are very mixed about this, because while it saves hours of back-breaking work, it also deprives the poor of their traditional method of meeting subsistence requirements, for being large capital investments, the proceeds go to the very rich, who invested in them.

The labour patterns in rice milling are interesting, for they show a concentration of ties exclusively between women and the marked tendency for relationships to be confined to a single neighbourhood within the ward. Among co-workers 44 out of 52 ties (or 84.6%) were so; while between workers and employers 80% were within the neighbourhood. The high proportion of local ties between neighbours in co-work (15 see footnotes to table) as against only 4 between adjacent compounds, in contract to a preponderance of ties of employment between pisaga (21 as against 15 neighbours), suggests what the Balinese themselves maintain, that the differences in wealth between adjacent compounds, coupled with the obligations on exchange, tend to lead to more or less established relationships of economic superiority and inferiority, or economic patronage. Only under certain circumstances does this extend itself into political subservience as well, partly because ties between women are partly distinct from those between men, who are classified as political in contrast to women. Neighbourhoods, on the other hand, are vaguer areas which permit households with much in common to associate easily. The pattern of rice-milling relationships is summarized below.

	Domestic.	%	Co-worker:	%	Wage Labour	%
Uterine ties:	52	85.2%	9	17.3%	I6	13.2%
Compound agnates:	1	1.6%	1	1.9%	-	-
Compound affines:*	7	11.5%	6	11.5%	7	5.8%
Agnates:	1	1.6%	-	-	5	4.1%
Affines:	-		11	21.1%	26	21.5%
Distant kin:	-		1	1.9%	6	5.0%
Pisaga:**	-		4	7.7%	21	17.4%
Neighbour.:	-		16	30.8%	24	19.8%
Servants:	-		-	-	11	9.1%
None:	-		4	7.7%	5	4.1%
Total:	61	99.9%	52	100.0%	121	100.0%

* this includes instances of husband and wife working together which is a minor category.

** Pisaga are adjacent compounds on traditional village land. Neighbours are a looser category of nearby courtyards beyond pisaga. Under this latter, I have included co-residence in pondok which is seen as the same, Without this, the figures for neighbours read: 15 (not 16) and 15 (not 24).

26. The most accurately measurable, as it is the most common, is transplanting. The mean cost per hectare is Rp.870 for men hired from outside Tengahpadang, but Rp.1,510 per hectare for ward members. That is nearly 75% higher return for the same wrk. For the heavy labour of first hoeing, some villagers were paying as much as Rp.3,100 per hectare, as against Rp.920 for outsiders.

27. There are some exceptions in each season, on the grounds of illness or conflicting obligations. There is one refreshing exception to all the expectations: I Dayuh (NW26). In his youth he attempted to carry out a marriage by capture (melegandang) a form as we shall see more or less de rigueur for political aspirants (Chapter 7). He failed, for unlike them he did not have the necessary support to resist the enraged family of the girl. His behaviour is therefore rather consistently inappropriate to his relatively humble position and is a source of some amusement.

28. The extensive powers of groups, especially the ward, to harvest the land of members and the obligation to use local ties for cultivation may be seen as a recognition of the rights over land by virtue of labour rather than inheritance, or 'ownership' (cf. Bloch 1975b).

Chapter 6. The Place of Voluntary Associations

Introduction

Besides the irrigation associations and informal labour exchange relations, the Balinese organize a variety of work groups for specialized tasks. These provide a flexible means of mobilizing labour for a wide range of ends, not only economic but also cultural. Whatever the formal activities in which they engage, they almost always have material aspects. For they generally serve as credit associations and may also yield a separate, more or less irregular, source of income to villagers. The formation and membership of these groups show, however, that they are not simply of economic importance, but have a more complex social significance. This seems to stem in part from their strongly solidary ethos (as a result of which they contain relatively few high caste members). Their popular appeal leaves the possibility open that they may be used to further positions within local political arenas. In starting, or being prominently active in, associations, aspiring men may enhance their reputations and gain public support. The value which villagers place on membership is not, however, just because of their ideals of equality, which hold in large measure for other corporate groups. The special significance of 'voluntary associations' is as much connected with the cultural emphasis laid upon their being optional and the moral implication of choice. The sense in which such groups are indeed voluntary is complex, and how far work on their behalf is held to be good is open to divergent interpretation.

In the previous chapter it was argued that irrigation associations provide the formal framework for the organization of wet rice cultivation. Their activities are restricted, however, primarily to the distribution of the supply of water and to the maintenance, or improvement, of the basic capital investment in technical equipment of the group as a whole. The organization of agricultural labour lies outside the domain not only of the irrigation association, but for the most part of other corporations as well. Peasant cultivation tends to encourage the recruitment of labour on a fairly small but varying scale. Demand fluctuates according to the size of fields or changing tasks, and specialized skills may be needed which cannot be provided directly by large undifferentiated groups.[1] The exception is harvesting which can be carried out by wards or descent groups divided into teams, although they are

somewhat Brobdingnagian on smaller plots. The complex pattern of agricultural activity limits the possible mobilization of the major corporate groups in village society.

This system leaves wide scope for more flexible forms of working party. These may either be specialized groups carrying out formally delegated tasks, or may spring up to organize collectively activities which fall between the recognized spheres of competence of the established corporations. Similarly there are other niches, in Tengahpadang notably in ritual and recreation, in which associations of villagers with particular skills or interests may form. In general such association offers a means for the conversion of labour into goods or cash by carrying out some activity for which there is demand. Whether their ostensible purpose is economic, for instance hoeing or coconut-gathering, or cultural in the case of orchestras or theatrical clubs, most associations accumulate earnings assiduously. The choice of augmenting this capital by extending credit on interest to members, or periodically splitting the proceeds, depends upon the decision of the association in council. The scale is such that in Pisangkaja the associations combined rival the ward itself in the amount of credit which is made available to villagers.

A consideration of the manifest aims of associations is inadequate, however, to account for their potential importance or dynamics. Closer scrutiny reveals an interesting inter-play between cultural values and pragmatic possibilities. In Chapter 3, it was noted that associational activity varies between wards and seems to be loosely linked to the level of cooperation and solidarity. The emergence of work, or recreational, groups which serve to unite ward members in different constellations of ties is generally seen as encouraging, and expressing publicly, a sense of social cohesion. This is often a stated aim in their inception.

At the same time, however, the proliferation of such associations is also closely connected with the intensity of factional activity within a ward. This seems to stem from the way in which ideal goals may become the means to personal advancement. The process of formation, and the implications of leadership, show how these conflicting tendencies are related. The creation

of an association extends or reinforces sets of personal ties, which may be converted into relationships of cooperation in other arenas, most notably ward politics. The fostering of culturally approved ends and private utility may be far from incompatible and indeed latent within a single action. In furthering social cooperation the founders, or leaders, of associations especially have the chance to show their capabilities in organizing men, and so their suitability for office or for a voice in public affairs. At the same time this may offer a means of raising support, and further gaining access to sources of credit of which they may influence the allocation. These tactical considerations appear to be only partly formulated. Nonetheless the step of forming a voluntary association is tantamount to a declaration that one has entered local politics seriously. While this may be a sufficient condition to become a contestant, it is not however always necessary. Some men appear deliberately to eschew associational membership as part of their reputations. More generally, though, the formation of local associations is a process which tends to have the contrasting effects of encouraging solidarity within the ward, while at the same time potentially undermining it.

The significance of voluntary associations stems not simply from their possible political aspects, but also from the cultural values which surround them. In general the constitutions and ideology of local corporate groups are strongly democratic and carry the implication of the equality and solidarity of members. Within memory the princely courts stood apart from village society, being represented in wards and irrigation associations by clients or tenant farmers respectively. Their progressive inclusion in local activities is seen as an explicit expression of their changing social position. Whereas membership of the main corporations was in effect generally inescapable by 1970, to the extent that joining local associations was in fact voluntary, it connoted identity with other villagers and the loss of superior status. This is reflected in the pattern of membership and the type of association joined. The higher the caste, the more marginal participation in associations altogether, and in particular the less the involvement in economic work groups which require manual labour. In the decision to take part, and the choice of activity of the association, men make statements about their priorities, and so their social reputations.

The most interesting cultural feature of voluntary associations rests in fact ultimately on a discrepancy between their public evaluation and the observable variation found among groups. All associations are classed together as similar by virtue of the property of being voluntary, in contrast to the other groups which are seen as obligatory. The sense in which associations are truly voluntary, however, varies greatly; and we shall see later in the chapter that they do not constitute a class possessed of a distinct, invariant feature. Their heterogeneous basis offers possibilities for local accentuation of different aspects. In the region round Tengahpadang however, the various associations are identified terminologically and treated as if a separate category of optional groups. Accordingly, in local though not only is the variation explained exegetically, but more important the cultural implications of the dichotomy seem to be followed through consistently. For, if participation and work in most corporations is obligatory, or close to contractually enforceable,[2] then it is only in working voluntarily that a man can show his moral nature. By a somewhat curious twist then, voluntary association emerges in one light as singularly moral. This position is, however, open to divergent interpretations, as the qualification of good may be given to different kinds of behaviour. This has one interesting consequence. As the narrowly factional advantages of voluntary association are closely linked to their cultural (and potentially moral) evaluation, the diversity of prescriptions means that political action is constrained by, and may even be an essential part of the working out of, culturally alternative possibilities.

Voluntary Associations in Tengahpadang:

There are several different types of work or recreation group in Tengahpadang, known as sekaha.[3] The usual translation of voluntary association comes reasonably close to describing the general view held by villagers. There is a large number of different grounds on which sekaha are traditionally founded in Balinese society and depending upon these they may range in length of life from a few days to decades. The functions which they commonly undertake vary, it seems, according to custom in different parts of Bali, so that those in any village represent only a proportion of the total variety found. The types of sekaha existing in Tengahpadang are given in Table 3:16; while

the range of forms reported for the island as a whole is formidable (Adatrechtbundels XV, 1918; XXIII, 1924; XXXVII, 1934; Korn 1932). Geertz, for instance, lists sekaha for weaving mats, moulding pottery, brick-making or even food-dealing (1959a: 999), activities which either were not carried out or otherwise were performed using different ties in Tengahpadang. There sekaha are a popular mode of organization and are seen, whatever their functional origins, as highly enjoyable, essentially good causes between which competition is healthy, and above all for which working together is a valued end in itself.

This common representation of sekaha in Tengahpadang requires, however, slightly closer examination. For existing accounts emphasize distinct and sometimes different features. So the term has been reported to be used to designate any group (Geertz 1959a: 999); a specialized sub-division of a larger corporation, or an association with some specific function (Korn 1932: 120ff); "completely voluntary organizations" (Geertz 1959a: 999), or voluntary cooperatives (Boon 1977: 61); or simply an "informal" organization (Lansing 1974: 15). It is not uncommon, as should be apparent, for one author to single out more than one different characteristic. So sekaha has been defined in a variety of ways: as a generic term for group; by reference to its affairs; or to the procedure for entry. To this one might add that in Tengahpadang its distinguishing features may include the style of work, or the quality of the relationships which are held to exist between the members. The term is not however applied indiscriminately. In Tengahpadang cooperative societies (cooperasi) where members hold shares by virtue of subscribing capital rather than work are regarded as distinct. So too are formal sub-divisions of corporations for work (tèmpèk) and organizations encouraged by the government, such as the ward civil defence groups (pertahanan sipil) or youth group (pemuda). Also, to the best of my knowledge, local associations of national political parties (partai politik) are never referred to as sekaha. For the most part these tend to be viewed as institutions outside traditional Balinese society, a distinction underwritten by the use except in the case of tempek of Indonesian rather than Balinese terms.

As with the corporations discussed in earlier chapters, the distinctive characteristics of groups designated by the term sekaha may vary.

Whereas for the former the ambiguity stems largely from a diversity of principles of incorporation, that is multiple bases of recruitment and definitive activities, sekaha are normally defined without reference to the qualifications for recruitment but rather in terms of their affairs. This is clear from a glance at their names, where the type of sekaha is specified by stating the activity of the association in question, as in sekaha numbeg, hoeing association, or sekaha gong, an orchestra. The restrictions on recruitment are for the most part simple and unspoken: age or health, for members must be able to participate fully; commonly residence within the ward or occasionally a wider unit; sometimes, by the nature of the activity, sex. Membership normally extends also only to a person rather than to a household. So in the limiting case more than one member of a domestic group may belong to a single sekaha, and temporary substitution follows lines of friendship as often as kinship. At the same time, in Tengahpadang at least, the term sekaha carries with it ideas of being voluntary or optional in some sense. The difficulty is that voluntariness is not so much a principle of incorporation as a qualifier of other principles (Brown 1976: 29-30). More seriously, as we shall see, the nature of the choice varies such that there is a good case against treating this as falling within a single category. The Balinese term sekaha therefore implies a distinct type of grouping while in fact retaining a range of different referents. With this caveat, for the sake of simplicity I shall refer to sekaha in future as voluntary associations or organizations.

These associations differ therefore in their constitution and in their relationship to the permanent corporationsof village society. In Tengahpadang the most important of these tends to be the ward, but occasionally a temple congregation. This may affect the pool of potential members, set conditions on the election of leaders and circumscribe the sphere of competence and the degree of independence of the organization. At one extreme lie associations which are formed by decision of the ward (or other group). Here the incumbent to the position of head may be chosen not by the members but by the wider assembly, to which the group and its head are ultimately subject and responsible. In Pisangkaja for instance this clearly holds for the coconut-gathering association and sometimes for dance groups formed for a particular occasion. The position of the orchestra is, as we shall see, ambiguous. The rights of other corporations also tend to set limits on the emergence of some

types of voluntary association. It will be recalled that there is a rank order recognized among corporate groups by which preference is determined. This applies too to such matters as the right to undertake certain activities, like harvesting for example. Only where other groups waive their claims may voluntary associations be formed. Such associations also have a degree of jural subordination. In disputes within or between associations, the matter may be referred to the ward should difficulties arise. The central position of the ward may be seen from the common practice of reporting the creation or dissolution of an association to the assembly, at which time the responsibility of the ward may be stated or debated. There are some voluntary organizations which remain however effectively beyond the control of other groups and undertake activities which fall outside their jurisdiction. Most of the small groups are of this kind and tend to be more ephemoral, like theatre groups formed for a single performance. So voluntary associations differ greatly in their duration, independence and mode of articulation to the perduring institutions of village society.

There are other ways in which voluntary associations may vary from the standard representation. Although they are generally thought of as specialized organizations, there does seem to be a tendency for them to spread the range of their activities over time. The classic example of this in Pisangkaja is Sekaha Langkih which has turned its hand to a plethora of different tasks. The extension of functions depends on the choice of the members and, of course, the continued vitality of the association. This raises more general questions of the circumstances under which voluntary associations are likely to prove successful and the ways in which they differ from permanent corporations. Obviously, as they tend to be small compared to the other groups, their individual members are in a position to exercise a substantially greater measure of control over decisions of policy and credit from which they benefit. Further, the smaller the group, the more each person is affected by the quality of his own work. The more in fact it is like a private good rather than a public one, (Olson 1965) as it may be especially in the ward. This suggests that the distinctive cultural features of voluntary associations may be linked to particular factors of size. There are other possibilities however, which should not be ignored, such as the quality of

leadership, the expectations and aims of members and the degree of internal specialization and differentiation of the group. There is some evidence that all these may affect the functioning of a voluntary association and its particular character. The way in which these various considerations influence the structure and organization of associations may be seen in an examination of the ethnography.

The main features of the various voluntary associations in Pisangkaja are presented in Table 6:1, and this extends to include those groups which hage come to an end in the recent past, but on which there is reasonably reliable information. These range from the large and more or less permanent organizations, like the ward orchestra which has been running for as long as can be remembered, to the more ephemoral agricultural work teams. This table brings out clearly a number of points made above. The formal links between the associations and other groups varies widely. Nor does the designation of their function necessarily correspond with the full range of activities which they undertake. Perhaps the most striking feature, however, is the amount of capital which such associations may accumulate and the size of the turnover, which includes the distribution of dividends or profits to the members. The four groups on which accurate information is available about their book-keeping mustered between them something in the region of Rp. 180,000. The size of this figure is apparent when considered in contrast to the other main capital-accumulating group, the ward, whose treasury reached the maximum figure of Rp. 80, 000 (Table 3:7), although admittedly its turnover is far greater, as are its powers of taxation. Apart from these substantial credit associations, there are other groups who tend to divide profits more regularly, such as Sekaha Langkih, and the short-lived dance and theatre troupes.

The extreme example of external control over the affairs of a voluntary association is provided by the Sekaha Nyiuh, the coconut-gathering group. It will be recalled that western temple of the dead (the Pura Dalem Kauh) possesses a certain amount of temple property. This includes a hectare of dry land, consisting of a small garden area round the temple and a long precipitous promontory lying to the south. This is uncultivable and is covered

TABLE 6:1 CONTEMPORARY AND RECENTLY-ENDED VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN BR. PISANGKAJA.

Type or Name	Head		Start	End	Current Members	Greatest Capital*	Turnover 1970-1	Activities	Authority
Numbeg (Hoeing)	J.M.Dalem	SE17	June 1969	-	7	Rp. 22,000	Rp. 29,025	Hoeing Harvesting	Independent
	Dw.Md.Doblé	SE19	Dec. 1969	-	12	Rp. 24,875	Unknown as no accounts	Hoeing Harvesting	Independent
	Kt. Gendul	NW10	1948	- 1957+	21	-	-	Hoeing Harvesting	Independent
Nyiuh (Coconut)	Dw.Md.Doblé	SE19	1967	(1973)	35	Rp. 56,000	Rp.125,400	Gathering coconuts Cutting lalang grass	Sub-contractor to Br. patus Pisangkaja and Gagah for 30 coconut palms and 1 ha. tegal
Langkih	I Dungka (1950-63) I Kemplung	SE3 SW22	1950	-	9	Unknown as no accounts are kept		Roofing Hoeing Harvesting Cutting lalang Slaughtering Pigs	Independent Largely confined to field-huts in Langkih (hence name)
Gong Kebiyar (Orchestra)	I Gangsar	NW11	pre-1940	-	46	Rp. 76,775	Rp.128,120	Music for all rituals needed Accompanying dance & theatre	Orchestra value Rp. 2,000,000+ gift to Link to ward, if any, unclear

* This refers to the largest sum in the association's treasury during 1970 and 1971. Turnover here indicates the capital built-up, investments made and dividends or interest paid to members .

Note: The short-lived dance associations, sometimes formed for a single performance, are excluded from this table.

in the tough lalang grass, which is used for roofing and may be cropped roughly every six months. There are also thirty coconut palms belonging to the temple which arch over the path running from Pisangkaja down to the graveyard. These belong in theory to the two combined wards of Gagah and Pisangkaja which provide the congregations for the temple. For reasons which have now apparently been forgotten, the management of these seems to have been largely taken over by Pisangkaja. The proceeds, however, remain divided equally between the two wards, such that whichever is responsible for carrying out the temple ceremony receives the income from the sale of produce.

The present Sekaha Nyiuh was founded in 1967 and acts as the contractor responsible for maintaining the trees and land and for harvesting them as is appropriate. The arrangement is that a contract is normally offered for a period of five years to the highest bidder, the terms and the head being decided by the ward in assembly. At that time the largest offer was by Dewa Md. Doblé (SE 19), who stated that he was prepared to form an association which would furnish 200 coconuts every three months and half the lalang grass every six. The marketable value of these respectively is something like Rp. 3,000 and Rp. 5,000 so the return to the wards each year is of the order of Rp. 22,000, with a small extra income deriving from the sales of firewood and grazing grass lying on the border of the promontory near the cemetery. The gross harvest from the coconuts, however, was such that over 300 remained every three months as profit to the association. As a result, its potential annual income from different sources was almost certainly in excess of Rp. 30,000, although with the slight irregularity in harvesting and a certain laxity in book-keeping this figure is only approximate. The resources of the association are further swollen by interest on capital loaned out. There is relatively little labour required for a return of over Rp. 1,000 per person each year; but the task of climbing the high coconut trees is somewhat dangerous and this helps to limit the size of the association to its membership of 34. There is a further consideration. The subordination of the association to the ward assembly results in local politics affecting the terms and personnel of the group. In 1967 the nationalist party were dominant and the favourable conditions reflect the fact that Dewa Md. Doblé was a leading public speaker who was generally allied to them. The implications of this dependence of the Sekaha Nyiuh for its stability is examined in more detail below. For control

of this association constitutes one of the prizes of public dominance in the ward.

Apart from this the association shows a number of interesting features. Its membership is fairly localized, coming mainly from the compounds living in the southern part of the ward near the temple; while all but one person come from Pisangkaja. The sole representative from Gagah is a close kinsman of the head. The composition of the association is varied, including both comfortable farmers and poor landless men. It also cuts across the major factions in the ward. (The connexions may be seen by a comparison of Table 6:2 below, with Table 5:10 and Appendix 3 on wealth, and Table 9:1 on factional ties.) The mixed economic background of the members is reflected in part in the decisions of the association about the use of proceeds from harvests. The association maintains a fairly sizeable treasury which is loaned out to members at the rate of 25 kg. of padi (at a cost of about Rp. 15 per kg.) to be repaid after harvest for each Rp. 1,000 borrowed. This is an effective rate of interest of $6\frac{1}{4}\%$ a month, the standard for voluntary organizations, but lower than the alternative offered by the association of a straight 10% a month interest in cash (partly because the group includes non-farmers who present a greater risk). It also makes periodic payments out of capital to members. In 1971 this totalled Rp. 1,500 each; while in 1970 the association made a bulk purchase of shirts, then sarongs, for all its members. This form of distribution is not only cheaper, as goods can be bought in quantity, but in providing the same clothes for all members this also is an ostensible and public index of identity. Despite its origins and size the association is generally agreed to work well as a unit. There seems to be several reasons. The rules require all members in turn to climb coconut trees, so they are treated as entirely equal, regardless of wealth or other differences. Further, work is economically rewarding and even his most vehement detractors admit that Déwa Md. Doblé is a hard-working and enthusiastic head.

The position and organization of the local ward orchestra differs in a number of important features which reveal something of the factors tending towards producing successful voluntary organizations. Before turning to this, however, it will be useful to sketch in the background of the group. Their main asset is a large metallophone orchestra of the type which has come in the last fifty years to be the most popular and generally useful, the gamelan gong kebiyar

(on the history and instrumentation of this, see McPhee 1966: 328-51). This is said to have been owned in the past by the court of Cokorda in Br. Tengahpadang, but to have fallen into disuse as there were no musicians available to play it. This was given by the court to an association of players in Pisangkaja under circumstances which are now forgotten. The exact standing of the association and its relationship with the ward is a moot point. For over 30 years it has been run by I Gangsa·r (NW11) whose great enthusiasm for music has made him the obvious head and whose wealth and character conveniently make him less open to petty corruption or similar defects. The uncertainty over the precise degree of control of the ward over the association is therefore for the present not serious. The ambiguity may well give rise one day however todispute and to potentially conflicting interpretations of who has rights to the orchestra. This is perhaps made further more likely by the great value of such gamelan. The current market price in 1971 was said to be in the region of Rp. 2,000,000, a substantial sum in a small community.

The orchestra undertakes a number of different activities. It plays at official ceremonies of the ward, which consist for the most part in accompanying the various stages of the frequent temple festivals and certain other public rites. It is paid for this at an agreed rate, generally somewhat lower than that which would be accepted by outside groups. It is also available to its members for hire at reduced prices. Otherwise it may be obtained at commercial rates for performances to which the members agree, the fee depending on market factors. During the period between 1970 and 1972, the association spent much time practising in order to improve its rather low standard, and by the end was giving performances in accompaniment to theatre as often as twice a month during peak periods. This is quite frequent by the standards of ordinary village ensembles, but far below that of the great court orchestras or the more celebrated and successful village ones. At the same time the group ventured into such peripheral activities as organizing public cock-fights in order to raise cash. Like the Sekaha Nyiuh, capital is loaned out against interest consistently and in 1971 the association bought complete outfits for each of its 46 members as part of its refurbishment. Unlike the coconut association however, the prime reason for this was that uniforms are expected of orchestras which are for hire. Apart from this the expenditure of the association was largely restricted to running repairs on

instruments. The capital in 1972 stood at Rp. 76,775 after various fund-raising events. This was earmarked for payment towards a new set of instruments, gender wayang, the xyllophones used to accompany shadow-plays. There were none in Pisangkaja and the association hoped to capture a potentially lucrative market.

A comparison between the coconut-collecting association and the orchestra reveals certain interesting differences. Without the formal links to the ward, the orchestra was less directly affected by the political balance in the assembly. Yet there was a curiously complex relationship between the level of collective activity within the ward and the orchestra. The intensification of practice after several years of neglect coincided with the rise of political factions opposed to the nationalists who had controlled the ward from 1965. At the same time, when the Sekaha Gong was being offered work regularly in the settlement and neighbouring villages, the effect was to make the ward as a whole noticeably more active in attendance and more cohesive by general reckoning. Despite this, the group never achieved the consistent sense of solidarity of the coconut-collection association. Whether this can be accounted for by reference to size is questionable, as both groups were large. Nor can this be simply put down to the effect of leadership, for I Gangsar was more popular and trusted than his opposite number. There is, however, one marked difference between the two associations. Whereas the coconut group was self-consciously constituted in terms of the equality of its members, expressed in terms of the generality of the obligation to climb trees; the orchestra was clearly internally ranked in terms of the relative complexity of the instruments and so the status of the members. As I have discussed elsewhere (Hobart 1974b) the choice of musicians for particular instruments is based upon conflicting principles of musical talent often outweighed by standing within the community, so that the composition of the orchestra in a village may well reflect closely the more or less agreed order of the leading families.[4] Be that as it may, the differences in musical ability, or at least the ranking of instruments played, means that there is extensive specialization within the group and careful differentiation of the members according to their instruments. The awareness of the different skills, and different status, of the members appears to be connected with the relative lack of identity and solidarity of the orchestra, despite its organic division of labour. It would seem then that the differentiation

of the membership may affect the working style and cohesiveness of association.

There is some indirect evidence that division of labour may affect the quality of the ties between members. In Tengahpadang there are two sekaha barong, although none of their members are recruited from Pisangkaja, as the associations are linked with temples whose congregations do not extend to the ward. These are groups who are in charge of the sacred puppets (barong) which for various particular reasons may come to be linked to a temple (for the distribution of membership see Table 3:16; and for the sites of barong see Table 3:17). These figures take the form of gigantic animals, or more rarely effigies of deities (see de Zoete and Spies 1973: 86-133). There may be special occasions, according to the tradition of the temple, on which these are brought out, but all emerge for a 35-day month in the Javanese-Balinese year of 210 days, after the holiday of Galungan. During this time they are carried around the settlement and may travel far afield into the countryside accompanied by a small, relatively unspecialized orchestra and members of the group who act as dancers by donning the puppet. The association makes money by being invited to give short dances in wards on their journeys. Like the gamelan gong kebivar in Pisangkaja, the precise relationship between the associations and the temple may be ambiguous, but they tend to differ in that the association members are little differentiated, apart possibly from particularly skilled dancers, unless they possess an unusually large orchestra, such as gamelan angklung (McPhee 1966: 234-55). In Tengahpadang this does not occur for the most part and the associations are markedly more solidary than that in Pisangkaja.

Besides these more or less permanent associations given continuity by their substantial capital investment in metallophone orchestras, there are the generally transient dance and theatre associations which grow up to meet the demand for changing fashions in entertainment that are a marked feature of Balinese village life. If they are particularly skilled or successful, these may enjoy a certain vogue but many flourish briefly at the time of temple festivals and die away. During the past decade there have been a succession

of these. The groups have been formed for a variety of dances: jangèr, a ritual dance for girls; jogèd bungbung, an explicitly sexual dance between a female dancer and invited males from the audience; arja, the previously popular Balinese romantic operetta; and finally derama, a new form of folk theatre akin to the Javanese Ludruk in its innovative, modern themes (see Peacock 1968 on ludruk and de Zoete and Spies 1939 for the Balinese dances, with the exception of derama about which little appears to have been written.). As they have tended to be either short-lived or only spasmodically active, these have not been shown in Table 6:2 as current associational ties, as this would rather overrate their importance.[5] A possible further reason for their instability, apart from the periodic nature of demand, may be their internal differentiation by which a minority have simple supporting roles and so like the orchestra in Pisangkaja, they do not seem to generate much cohesion between the members of the troupe except during the excitement of the actual performance. Unlike the other factors however, cohesion or solidarity is not easily measurable. Its precise status is anyway complex. It is, however, possible to record the participants' views on the state of relations, work conditions, disputes and expressed dissatisfaction of association members, and to check this against observation, which is on what the present comments are based.

The remaining associations may be discussed somewhat more briefly. These are, with exceptions to be discussed, effectively agricultural labour groups although some may take on additional activities. The most popular of these are the relatively small sekaha numbeg, literally hoeing associations, although it is common to find them undertaking the double task of hoeing and harvesting rice. As was noted, the second of these falls within an institutionalized pattern of preferences and rights, so that their existence is qualified by the decisions of superordinate groups. The first, however, is subject only to marginal control and forms the regular activity of the associations.

These associations tend to be similar in their rules, credit arrangements and composition. Funds are produced by two means. First the association makes a charge for its use, according to a fixed scale. Interestingly, the rates may rise after a period of time or fall: so the association headed by the Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE17) charges 8 kg. of padi an hour for the first five hours rising to 15 kg. an hour after that. The other

association does the reverse and their charges fall after three hours from 15kg. to 10 kg. This seems to be directly connected with the size of plots of the influential members; unsurprisingly there are more substantial farmers in Dewa Md. Doblé's group, who benefit accordingly by cheaper labour after the initial period. The second method of raising funds is by a typically Balinese complex of fines for all possible inefficiency and laziness, by which lateness or absence from meeting incurs escalating penalties from Rp. 5 (after 1 metre hoed by the rest of the group!) to expulsion for failure to pay fines promptly. By this means and the loan of capital, within some eighteen months both the current associations owned kitties with over Rp. 20,000; while the Jèro Mangku Dalem's association had invested in a picnic box to give the work an even greater flavour of festivity than it had had before. This group's credit arrangements are also typical. A third of the capital was reserved for borrowing by members only at 15 kg. of padi per Rp. 1,000 (3.75% a month), the remainder was open to all villagers at 12½% cash interest monthly. The balance is between cheap credit allowed to members against the need to increase capital for general purposes.

The associations also have other features in common. They tend to have a higher turnover of personnel than the others. The reason for this seems to be connected in part with the preponderance of political figures heading such associations. Of the three current or recent groups, two have been founded by the political patrons with the largest factional following; the third is run by a leading public orator who is influential in ward meetings and apparently intent on trying to become a political party patron. Inspection of the membership of these associations shows a closer connexion than in the others between factional and associational ties. This may, however, operate two ways: either the two overlap or members of opposing factions may be invited to join hoeing groups led by men who are effectively political opponents in another arena. The degree to which these processes are involved, and the manoevres of association leaders may be read by comparing Table 6:2 with Table 9:1 (which gives the more or less stable pattern of political ties in 1972). In Chapter 5, it was also noted that the use of hoeing teams on one's land produces a lower yield. As an extension to the argument about the use of invited labour, it would seem that political advantage may be balanced against economic loss in the choice of using such groups.

There are a small number of associations which may exist more or less outside corporate spheres of influence. The most fully developed example of this in Pisangkaja also has the distinction of approximating local village ideals the most closely of what a sekaha should be. This is a small association, known as Sekaha Langkih, which was founded in 1950 by a small group of poor villagers mainly from the field huts lying in the irrigation association to the west of Pisangkaja, hence the name. The initial purpose was to make a thatched roof of lalang grass for one person. It developed into a roofing association (sekaha ikat) but as the members enjoyed working together so well, it is said, they extended their activities almost immediately to hoeing, harvesting, cutting lalang and even slaughtering pigs (penampahan cèlèng) jointly on religious holidays, an activity which is normally carried out by action sets specially recruited for the purpose (see below). In 1972 it was still flourishing, although as Table 6:2 shows there has been a certain amount of change in the membership during the twenty-two years of its existence. Its composition is more uniform than most associations and consists of farmers either working tenancies or their own subsistence holdings. It is also distinct for a general policy of dividing up profits immediately and not acting as a credit society like most groups which last for any length of time. So it is distinguished from the others not only in redistributing income rather than accumulating capital, but also in that it deviates from the definition of voluntary associations as functionally specific groups by taking on a wide range of activities. It is interesting therefore that it was said by many to be the closest to villagers' ideals of a sekaha. Whether this reflects a local difference in views or rather the emphasis upon the relationships between the association members is an arguable point. There is, however, some support for the latter view. Villagers would point out how happy the association was supposed to be when working and attributed the efflorescence of activities to their desire to be together. It used to be pointed out that they often sat in the same coffee-stalls and deliberately sought out one another's company. There are other features not mentioned, but potentially relevant. It was the only association the head of which has never been actively involved in local politics and there is a degree of homogeneity in the economic circumstances and life-styles of the members. It is also worth noting that the reputation for being an ideal voluntary organization may itself now influence the membership. Whatever the reasons, the apparently enthusiastic industry of the association at work

is highly regarded by other villagers and by the members themselves.

There are certain other groupings which may be called, or more often call themselves, sekaha. In Br. Siklod, the orchestra and the coconut-collecting associations comprise the entire households of the ward. It is possible to view this simply as the ward undertaking special activities. On inquiry, however, villagers stressed to me that when Siklod bought a new orchestra, the question arose of who would form the association and the demand was so general that they discovered that it constituted their entire membership. Rather different is a small lime cooperative, set up in 1971 by the prince (NE1), Déwa Md. Dobléˊ (SE19) and a traditional retainer of Cokorda Putera, I Keted (NW16), in Pisangkaja. This group called itself a sekaha, for the purchase of lime for building and its resale locally. It was not generally listed by villagers when asked about sekaha and it was financed by the prince alone with the labour being contributed by the others. Finally there is one grouping which was almost universally called a sekaha although this was commonly qualified by a statement to the effect that it was not really so. This was a small band of men, mainly old, who gathered habitually to drink palm wine (tuak) together in the house of I Laba (NW5), whose father was the main tapper in the ward. This small, sometimes despised, but obliviously happy band of tipplers were widely referred to locally as the sekaha tuak. The significance of these different usages will be discussed in due course.

Associations differ then in a number of features including size, type of activity, homogeneity of membership and catchment area as well as the degree of internal specialization and their ethos. In each case, however, they are a means of organizing labour on an established basis to achieve ends which are impossible singly, in such a manner that unlike the labour arrangements discussed in the previous chapter, they tend to accumulate rather than redistribute in the short term. This may require sizeable starting capital as well, for groups such as orchestras, or none for agricultural groups. For their members voluntary organizations may serve a number of uses. For the landless, they provide a channel for investing labour for a visible and direct return, or for a claim over capital in an economy where the market may offer few alternatives; for everyone they provide a source of loans to cover the shortage in cash or rice between harvests or to finance ventures of various

sorts. By skilful management an impecunious member of several such groups may reschedule his debts by successive borrowing. The capital of the association may, by agreement, be pooled to buy productive equipment or luxuries; and finally, it is generally possible to recoup a lump sum in capital on leaving, although associations may have their rules to discourage this. In all these, voluntary associations offer immediate advantages to their members over the permanent corporations. First, as they are normally smaller, each member has a greater chance of influencing decisions and obtaining cheaper credit. (Associations offer credit at generally between 5 and 7% interest a month to members, in contrast to larger groups where the base rate is 10% and bids may rise to 15% due to scarcity of credit). Should the policy of the group differ from his wishes, a person is notionally free to leave and withdraw his labour, although as we shall see there are certain qualifications to this. In general, however, men are not in the position of being obliged to work or contribute resources for ends over which they have marginal control, as in the ward.

Earlier it was suggested that the popularity of voluntary associations and the belief that they form successful work groups might be linked directly to factors of size. For the smaller the group, the greater the influence of each member and the more he is affected by his own standards of work.[6] This brief review of the main groups in Tengahpadang, and Pisangkaja in particular, suggests that there may be other factors which modify simple decision-making models (cf. Olson 1963: 5-65). Although arguments of this type may well be helpful in giving some explanation of the stated preference for voluntary associations as a mode of carrying out activities, rather than regular corporations, it would not in some instances account for the use of groups at all, rather than sets of dyadic relationships. Also it should be clear that size may not be the sole issue, for larger associations like the coconut group flourish, while others like the orchestra are long-lived but less solidary. Here the degree of internal differentiation of members may play a part. The success of the group may be relevant. The jangèr group was highly expert and lasted far longer than the opera club (sekaha arja). The social composition of the members may also affect their work, and groups such as Sekaha Langkih

and the hoeing association of the death temple priest seem to unite in part on this basis. Much also depends on the leadership. There are short-lived associations which founder on the incompetence or chicanery of their heads so rapidly that they disappear almost immediately from public memory. Finally the value placed on voluntary association is such that the prestige of the members, especially its leader, may be heavily involved in its success. It would seem inadequate to explain the dynamics and characteristics of groups entirely in 'etic" terms, where the varied perceptions of the participants may be relevant.

The Political Implications of Voluntary Associations:

Voluntary associations have so far been treated largely in isolation from their social context. There seem to be two ways, however, in which their connexions with village institutions and processes are particularly important. First, in some instances there may be formal relationships of authority between associations and local corporations. Under these circumstances, events and conflicts within the larger group may affect the operation of the association and the latter may constitute an extension of the field of activity. This seems to be particularly important where resources or support are involved, when such associations may become part of a larger political arena. There is a further way in which associations may be invdved in broader social processes, despite formal injunctions in theory separating different types of group in Balinese village society. It will have been noted that associations are confined in terms of their membership to recruiting from definite areas, depending upon the locus of the resource, which are almost invariably coterminous with local wards or their grouping into wider units. So the personnel who comprise the different associations are drawn from a restricted catchment area. As a result, while there is no publicly recognized connexion, the same, or similar, sets of persons are involved in activities in other groups. In a variety of ways, and to different ends, this may provide a link between voluntary associations and other complexes of social relationships in village society.

The connexion between permanent corporate groups and voluntary associations has manifold implications, which reveal something of the complexity of structural articulation and also the processes of social action in Balinese village society. This emerges clearly in the history of the

relationship between the coconut-collecting association and the ward assembly in Pisangkaja, which is examined in more detail below. The constitutional provision by which the ward sub-contracted the work of harvesting temple produce provides the formal framework within which arrangements are ostensibly made. This alone is not however adequate to account for such features as the precise amount of profit to be taken by the association (in this case large), the prior formation of willing members of a group prepared to bid to a certain level, the choice of head, nor yet the stability of the arrangement when made. This must be understood in terms of the existence of competing interests which operate at a separate and different level from the jural rules themselves. These, however, are rarely written, but are given instead an airing in public meeting with the interesting consequence that, as time passes and memories fade and circumstances change, the exact interpretation to be placed upon the rules or the stated conditions of agreement become increasingly open to discussion, dispute and negotiation between the parties involved. This is a general tendency of Balinese village corporations in the region of Tengahpadang, which introduces a permanent element of ambiguity into decisions, but at the same time allows for flexibility. In this way the publicly acknowledged level of discourse in terms of which arrangements are formally made may bear relatively little relationship to the pattern of conflict or the opposition of interests underlying it.

The conflict emerges particularly clearly where there are substantial resources involved and where the existence of institutional ties provides a direct reason for the intervention of outside forces in associational affairs. This may have been by an examination of the history of the coconut association between 1967 and 1973.

Case 5: The dispute over harvesting coconuts

According to informants, who were generally agreed, the ward of Pisangkaja decided to let the set of people gathered by Déwa Md. Doblé (SE19) harvest the coconuts and lalang grass owned by the western temple of the dead, and also gave them rights over the firewood (saang) and grass (padang) growing on common ground near the cemetery. The terms were for the delivery of 200 coconuts every three months and half the lalang every six.

There seem to have been no other bids. The agreement is understood to have been made for a period of five years, it was said later, although no one could actually remember exactly when the arrangement began, nor were its terms written down. At the time the assembly was dominated by factions more or less allied to the Indonesian nationalist party, the P.N.I. who had emerged as the most powerful party in the aftermath of the abortive communist coup in 1965. Dówa Md. Doblé was a leading public orator who was generally sympathetic to the prevailing factions, in part by virtue of kin links (see Diagram 9:1), and it seems likely that this concession was offered in return.

During 1971 (see Chapter 9), the nationalist-inclined factions were defeated during ward elections for public office, and they were also defeated nationally. The dominant faction to emerge was under the patronage of the priest of the temple of the dead itself, the Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE17). In 1973, the two wards, Gagah and Pisangkaja were working together for a temple festival. During a period of discussion, the position as regards the terms under which the association worked the temple property were raised by Kt. Mara (NW7) perhaps the most respected orator in the ward and a close affine of the priest. He asked whether their period of five years were at an end, as he was unable to remember. (The lapse of memory was tactical rather than genuine.) The headmen (the klian dinas and désa) could not recall, as it was before their period in office. The priest suggested that the association be consulted as the time was in fact overdue. Dewa Md. Doblé was forced to concede that this was so, but pointed out that the association worked together well, like a real sekaha and so they should be allowed to carry on.

At this point a younger speaker, Kacir Sengat (NW6) asked whether, as it seemed to be agreed that the period was up, the wards were prepared to accept higher bids. This was referred to the head of the customary village, Kt. Gendul (NW10), who was there agreed it could. (Although he was a powerful patron, generally more sympathetic to Déwa Md. Doblé, they had recently fallen out - a common occurrence between orators and patrons). Kacir then offered off his own bat to form an association which would return 250 coconuts, rather than 200 a quarter. Without pausing to consult the members of the association, Déwa Md. Doblé promptly raised the offer to 300. Déwa Putu Kuat (SE10) a junior orator generally working with Kt. Mara, raised this to 305 (the ridicule implied in the slender increase apparently not being lost on the meeting!). Déwa Md. Doblé asked for time to consult his members who raised their bid to 350 in two days, upon which they were outbid to 355 by I Keca (SW6), another junior orator allied to the priest: for it seemed that the younger speakers all intended to form a new group together.

There are certain small points which may require illumination. The timing of the query shortly after Déwa Md. Doblé had lost the support of a powerful patron might be coincidental, but was curiously convenient. It is also of interest that the priest and Déwa Md. were the heads of hoeing associations which were bitter rivals. Also this case, quoted at some length, shows the way in which factional informal interests and the material advantage of the parties involved is not alluded to directly. Rather it may be introduced obliquely, as when orators raise bids by absurdly small amounts. Apart from this, I think that the ethnography is sufficiently clear on its own account to require little explanation. After a new faction obtains power within the ward, there is a gradual tendency for old sinecures to be reallocated, in each case sufficiently long after the new group has taken office that its reputation is not blatantly tarnished from the start. More to the immediate point, this should illustrate the marginal role of the coconut collecting group's members in determining their fate, which lay with the ward assembly and the association's niche was treated as part of the field of competition. Nor is this particular group necessarily unique in this. The ambiguity of the status of the orchestra in Pisangkaja points to the way in which resources in associations more generally may become prizes within a more powerful political arena.

There is a second and less immediately obvious way in which the formation, composition and dynamics of voluntary associations may be affected by other sets of social relationships in village society. This is related to the widespread overlap of personnel between different groups, so that within a single settlement or ward similar persons are found as members of a series of separate groups. While these may be jurally distinct, from the point of view of individuals these are simply different sets of potential ties based upon incorporation or transaction (Barth 1966; cf. Paine 1976) and so form part of a single field from the actors' point of view. Such many-stranded relationships may be made to converge in different ways.

The complexity of overlapping ties to different associations may be seen in Table 6:2, which gives the full membership of the different voluntary associations which existed in Pisangkaja between 1970 and 1972 and also recently defunct groups. The table distinguishes those persons who were

TABLE 6:2 HOUSEHOLD MEMBERSHIP OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS (PAST AND PRESENT IN 1971) IN BR. PISANGKAJA.

No:	Name:		Economic: Hoeing:			Economic: Other:		Cultural:		Total:		
			SE 17	SE 19	NW 10	Coconut	Langkih	Orchestra	Dance Music	Total 1971	Economic Ties (all)	Total Ties
	NE1	Cok. Putera	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	NE2	Cok. Jangji	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Cok. Putu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Cok. A. Lanus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Cok. A. Nama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Cok. Oka	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Cok. Ngurah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
(H)	NE3	Degdeg	-	x	-	-	-	-	xxh	-	1	4
		Tiles	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
		Tempil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE4	Dw.Md.Gempol	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE5	Kénak	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ex	NE6	Togog	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Tènda	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
ex	NE7	Ni Kt. Repun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ex		Ni Mariani	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE8	Dada	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	2
	NE9	A.A.Anom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE10	A.A.R.Jasa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		A.A.A.Oka	-	-	-	-	-	1	xxx	1	-	4
	NE11	Karda	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	NE12	Lanis	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
	NE13	Kara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE14	Ni Kari	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE15	Badra	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	NE16	Gampil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Gerondong	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Gelèdèr	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE17	Surung	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	NE18	Kingsan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE19	Pica	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1

Table 6:2 2.

	No:	Name:	Economic: Hoeing: SE 17	SE 19	NW 10	Other: Co. La.	Or. D.	Cultural: 1971	Total: Econ	All
	NE20	Kampih	-	-	-	-	x	1	-	1	1	2
	NE21	Sukèn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE22	Jambul	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	NE23	Sujana	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	NE24	Serandig	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
	NE25	Yasa	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
	NE26	Ngembon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Kedeng	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW1	Tagen	-	-	-	1	-	-	x	1	1	2
	NW2	Dw.Kt.Gempul	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	NW3	Dw.Ny.Gempil	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW4	Lasiya	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	NW5	Laba	-	-	x	-	1	-	-	1	2	2
	NW6	Tonik	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Mupu	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
(H)		Kacir	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ex		Jèro Geriya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW7	Mara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Teken	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Kembar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW8	Surata	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Lonid	-	1	x	-	-	-	-	1	2	2
		Gampil	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	2
ex		Ni Kelepon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW9	Mejul	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Rebit	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
(H)	NW10	Gendul	-	-	h	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
		Gelis	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
		Keredek	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HH	NW11	Gangsar	-	-	x	-	-	h	h	1	1	3
	NW12	Dugdug	-	1	x	-	-	1	-	2	2	3
		Belet	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW13	Ni Lungid	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1

Table 6:2 3.

	No:	Name:	Economic: Hoeing: SE 17	SE 19	NW 10	Other: Co.	La.	Cultural: Or.	D.	Total: 1971	Econ	All
	SW1	Tangèn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW2	Tarik	-	-	x	-	-	1	-	1	1	2
		Kenyung	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	SW3	J.M.Désa	-	-	x	1	-	1	-	2	2	3
	SW4	Degdeg Mangku	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Terima	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	SW5	(Ni) A.A.Putu	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	SW6	Rubik	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
(H)		Ni Cenok	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW7	Kartana	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	3	2	3
		Ni Polokan	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	2
	SW8	Neka	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
		Kencan	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
		Mukun	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	SW9	Pukel	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	2
		Mongoh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW10	Munjuk	1	-	-	1	-	1	x	3	2	4
		Digdig	-	-	-	1	-	-	x	1	1	2
		Dugdug	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	2
	SW11	Lembut	1	x	-	1	-	1	x	3	3	5
	SW12	Selem	1	-	x	1	-	1	-	3	3	4
		Tomblos	-	x	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	2
	SW13	Ni Muklen	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW14	Bidel	-	-	x	1	-	1	x	2	2	4
		Dayuh	-	-	-	1	-	-	x	1	1	2
		Sayub	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	1
	SE1	Sama	x	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	2
		Balik	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Lipet	x	-	-	1	-	-	xx	1	2	4
	SE2	Pudet	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	3	2	3
ex	SE3	Suberatha	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Dungka	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	1	1
		Ni Doneng	-	-	-	1	x	-	-	1	2	2
		Bawa	-	-	-	1	x	1	x	2	2	4
ex	SE4	A.A.Darma	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		A.A.A.Plasa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Jèro Jempiring	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1

Table 6:2 4.

No:		Name:	Economic: Hoeing: SE	SE	NW	Other: Co. La.	Or. D.	Cultural: 1971	Total: Econ	All
			17	19	10					
	SE5	Tagen	-	-	x	-	-	1 -	1	2
	SE6	Delep	1	-	-	1	-	- -	2	2
		Keper	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	SE7	Dw.Md.Tagel	-	-	-	-	-	- x	-	1
		Dw.Ny.Laba	-	-	-	1	-	- -	1	1
ex	SE8	Ni Tambun	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	SE10	A.A.A.Jasa	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
(H)	SE11	Dw.Pt.Pandé	x	x	-	1	-	1 -	2	3
	SE12	Rugrug	-	-	x	1	-	- -	1	2
		Séro	-	1	-	-	-	- -	1	1
		Sorog	-	-	-	1	-	1 x	2	1
		Suradnya	-	-	-	1	-	1 xx	2	1
	SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	-	1	-	-	-	1 x	2	1
	SE14	Sandi	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
ex	SE15	Ni Kintil	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	SE16	Kontèng	-	1	-	1	-	- -	2	2
		Gading	-	-	x	1	-	- -	1	2
H	SE17	J.M. Dalem	h	-	-	1	-	1 x	3	2
	SE18	Pageh	-	-	-	1	-	1 -	2	1
HH	SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	-	h	x	h	-	- x	2	3
	SE20	Rantun	-	1	x	1	-	1 -	3	3
		Kaling	-	1	-	-	-	- x	1	1
	SE21	Cekeg	-	1	x	1	-	- x	2	3
	SE22	Dungki	-	-	-	1	-	- xx	1	1
	SE23	Tedun	-	-	x	-	-	- -	-	1
	SE24	Silir	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
		Jontol	-	x	-	-	-	- -	-	1
	SE25	Cekeg	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-
	SE26	Dw.Ny.Geriya	-	x	-	-	-	- x	-	1

Table 6:2 5. (Pondokan)

	No:	Name:	Economic: Hoeing: SE 17	SE 19	NW 10	Other: Co.	La.	Cultural: Or.	D.	1971	Total: Econ	All
	NW14	Ni_Ngambet_	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	NW15	Ni_Sinah_	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	1
	NW16	Keted	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	2
	NW17	A.A.Putera_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ex	NW18	Md.Sila	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ex		Md. Gina_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW19	Ni_Antrog	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	NW20	Reca_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW21	Kisid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW22	Nampa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW23	Dugligan_	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	1	2
	NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila_	-	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
		Dw.Ny.Kelila	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	NW25	Geningan_	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	1	2
		Racik	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
	NW26	Dayuh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW27											
	NW28	Nyèmbèng_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW15	Gomboh_Runti_	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	1	1
	SW16	Sukri	-	-	-	-	1	-	x	1	1	2
	SW17	Darna	-	-	-	-	1	-	x	1	1	2
ex	SW18	Ni_Dehen_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW19	Karda	-	-	-	-	1	1	x	2	1	3
	SW20	Dani_	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1
	SW21	Gomboh_Suti	-	-	-	-	-	1	x	1	-	2
H	SW22	Kemplung_	-	-	-	-	h	1	x	2	1	3
	SW23	Sadiya_	-	1	-	-	x	-	-	1	2	2
	SW24	Longsog	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	1	1
	SW25	Bakta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW26	Kembar_	-	-	-	1	-	1	xx	2	1	4
	Totals:(Current)		7	11	-	34	9	46	-	107	-	-
	All Members:		(10)	(21)	(21)	34	(16)	46	(56)	107	(102)	(204)

Table 6:2 Notes.

Code: H = head of a voluntary association.
( )= not functioning at the end of 1971, either as it was defunct or not yet formed.
ex = excluded from computations as there are no males of adequate age, or the household is normally resident elsewhere and so is unable to participate. This refers largely to widows and migrant workers.

1 = indicates active membership.
x = indicates previous membership, either of a continuing association or of a defunct one. As they are brief lived for the most part, all dance and theatre groups are shown this way.
h = indicates the head of an association.

SE17 = the association of the Jèro Mangku Dalem SE17
SE19 = the association of Dèwa Md. Doblé SE19
NW10 = the previous association of Kt. Gendul NW10, known as the Sekaha Selikur, the 21 association on account of the number of members.
Coconut = the Sekaha Nyiuh
Langkih = Sekaha Langkih
Orchestra = the Sekaha Gamelan Gong Kebiyar.
Dance Music = the various theatre and dance groups combined.

actually members of associations as of the end of 1971, and also those who had previously been members. It will be noted immediately that the frequency with which villagers join voluntary associations is not random or equally spread. In fact, of the 148 households (omitting the 12 marginal ones where there were no adult males, or which were normally absent from the ward) 98, or exactly two-thirds, had some tie, but 50, or the remaining third, did not. Similarly some families tend to join associations far more often than others. The significance of this difference will be examined shortly.

There is another striking feature of the table to which it is worth drawing attention. To the extreme left, households which have provided heads of associations are indicated by the letter H (in parentheses for defunct groups, or retired leaders). It will be evident from the earlier discussion in Chapter 4 (see also notes to Table 4:1; and the extended examination in Chapter 9) that the list of heads is confined almost exclusively to the small political élite of the ward. In particular it includes a broad selection of villagers who are, or have pretentions to become, major patrons to others. It also extends to a number of recognized expert public speakers, although here there is a preponderance of men who seem to be aspiring to public office. At first sight, there are two notable figures missing, namely the leaders of two of the main factions: Cokorda Putera (NE1) and Déwa Md. Nombong (SE13). There are, however, several reasons. Déwa Md. Nombong is now elderly and has only recently returned to the ward after years as a truck driver. Both households are however also notably active in cultural associations where they take leading roles. For reasons which will be discussed in the next section, however, high ranking Satriya families tend to avoid excessive involvement in voluntary associations at all. As we shall see the degree of activity which these patrons show makes them atypical of their castes.[7] Nonetheless, as the table shows, there is a strong tendency for the leaders of vduntary associations to be recruited from the recognized or aspiring political élite of the village.

An examination of the sets of extra-associational ties which exist between the leader of a voluntary association and the various members who join suggests some of the factors which may be involved in recruitment. In the smaller agricultural work teams (it will be evident from a comparison of Table 6:2 and Table 9:1 that) a substantial proportion of the membership are

also political clients of the head or belong to closely allied factions with which relations are being consolidated at the time. This leaves a small number of outsiders. Closer inspection however shows that for the most part these are members of opposing factions who have been invited to participate in the association on the basis of some other tie in common, such as neighbourhood. So in effect the distribution of invitations to join associations reflects the use of a number of alternative political strategies. First it provides a means of strengthening the ties between patron and client and servicing these by the offer of work and credit, within an ethos of companionability. Second it offers a way of establishing firmer ties between allied factions. Third it provides a neutral, indeed valued, ground on which to incorporate opponents and so provide a set of cross-cutting ties. This may have both the effect of counter-balancing factional allegiance; or from the point of view of the potential member may enable him to keep open alternative political links and equally provide a legitimate ground for transferring loyalties. It may be difficult to tell whether a man is merely a member of a rival's group or becoming gradually an active client. It would seem that in large associations, such as the orchestra or the coconut-collecting association, the activity of the group is a more important factor than the pre-existing ties, although subsequently the considerations discussed above appear to operate, if with more weakness. At a different level, viewed against the background of changing political alliances and fortunes, the study of the composition of voluntary associations provides a fascinating reflection of the strategies of political figures; and more broadly an idea of their characters as they counter-balance different tactical options against the less calculated considerations of companionship associated with sekaha.

The extent of choice available to villagers in organizing themselves raises a further interesting question: where tasks may equally be carried out by voluntary associations, or through other forms of relationship, what factors influence the decision of which is used? There are, for instance, some activities like the baking of bricks (nunjel citakan) to make houses which are carried out in some parts of Bali by voluntary associations (Geertz 1959a: 999), but are sufficiently infrequent in Pisangkaja that they are undertaken by action sets (on the terminology, see Mayer 1966), that is a set of villagers invited on the basis of miscellaneous ties for a specific occasion only. There are certain other tasks which may be performed more or less equally efficiently

by different types of grouping. The most obvious example is the slaughter of pigs, (penampahan célén) held early in the morning before major public holidays on which it is customary for households to prepare festive food, often with pork which is not a usual ingredient of the daily diet. As the requirements, let alone the resources, of a household fall far short of an entire pig, villagers may be invited or ask to obtain as share on payment from a villager who plans to butcher. A core of villagers help in the slaughter (mepayon), while others agree to purchase shares (mepatung). This may equally well be carried out by a voluntary association and in Pisangkaja, Sekaha Langkih generally does so; while the remaining families who can afford to participate cluster into discrete groupings. The complete set of ties for all villagers obtaining pork on one of the major holidays was documented and these are outlined in Table 6:3. There is a wide spread in the types of relationship which link butcher and participants. At the same time, over half the organizers were established political figures (the persons in question are given in the footnote to Table 6:3). The types of tie by which actions sets were recruited differ sharply for the two types of organizer. Ordinary villagers recruited help using a high proportion of kin and neighbours, in contrast to the others who relied predominantly upon friends, political connexions or indeed men with whom there was no recognized established tie other than ward membership. The difference in recruitment was so marked that it was significant statistically at 0.1%. Purely cultural activities, apparently completely divorced from ward politics, may become a means to reinforcing or extending ties for potentially political ends. Such single occasion activities show a number of differences however from the repeated use of voluntary associations. The tie has neither the formal status nor the duration of sekaha membership. It is therefore less public and more flexible. So it is common to find that butchering sets change composition each time, while the types of men who organize it are drawn from a similar background.

The use of customary occasions or activities to gather sets of villagers has further implications. The public nature of the events means that men's choice of ties is evident, and equally the success of the venture is common knowledge, particularly for voluntary associations. So these occasions provide an index of the present state of relations and also of the skill of the leader, and so contribute to his reputation. This may help to explain a

TABLE 6:3 DISTRIBUTION OF TIES USED FOR PIG SLAUGHTER (PENAMPAHAN CÈLÈNG) IN BR. PISANGKAJA FOR GALUNGAN: NOVEMBER 1971

Organizer:	Kin:*	Neighbour:	Friend:	Pol. Faction:	V.A.:	None:	Total:
Ordinary Villager:	10	12	4	-	9	4=	39
Orator:	6	6	8	10	-	19	49
Totals:	16	18	12	10	9	23	88

* The classification used here is that given by the villagers. Kin includes both close agnates and affines. V.A. stands for voluntary association. The orators who slaughtered pigs were: I Sujana (NE23); Kt. Mara (NW7) I Keted (NW16); Kt. Degdeg (SW4) together with Dewa Md. Doblé (SE19). The types of tie used by orators differ significantly from those mobilized by ordinary villagers. Leaving aside voluntary association, villagers use kin and neighbours far more than political figures who commonly have no pre-existing tie, or directly factional ones. The difference is highly significant statistically, whether each category is treated separately, or if factional ties are assimilated to friendship or no previous tie. In each case, the difference is significant by the X^2 test at 0.1%.

distinctive feature of butchering sets, by contrast to voluntary associations, which is that the organizers are commonly orators rather than patrons. As their public images tend to be those of conspicuously ordinary villagers and their support stems from their ability to gain popular appeal, it is consonant that they take a leading part in arranging popular events and spreading their ties widely (see Chapter 9). The concerns of patrons take a different turn. Apart from the pragmatic aspects of strengthening existing support and extending influence, leading a voluntary association provides the opportunity of showing a capacity at management, both in organizing an effective and happy team of workers and also acumen and honesty in handling communal funds. The conspicuousness of the position and its consequent effects upon a person's reputation make leadership of voluntary associations an appropriate step in the political career of figures who are hoping to achieve public office, where the requirements are similar. (This seems to have been the intention in part of the younger orators who bid to form a new association in Case 5). Equally, however, the capacity to organize others successfully and to further their interests is critical to a career of patronage. So the decision to try to form a voluntary association, or to take an active part in forming action sets for customary purposes, is a common step in the furtherance of political support. While the participants are principally concerned with the practical consequences of their choices and were only partly aware of the symbolic implications of their acts, the decision to organize work groups of some sort constitutes an effective declaration of entry into, or continued presence in, local political activities. This also helps to account for the absence of the local prince (NE1) as an associational leader; by his traditional position he has both supporters and a political role already. The different sources of political support for different types of role has the further consequence that the types of activity organized may give an indication of the political ambitions of a person. So, it is notable that voluntary associations are led by men who are patrons or with designs on such offices as government headmen or village sub-section head; while orators tend to predominate in arranging temporary cooperative groupings.

In conclusion then, the formation of voluntary associations and to a degree more ephemoral work teams tends to be linked to social processes

occurring in village society. Where such associations control valuable assets, or may provide an important source of support, they are likely to be involved in political competition in other arenas. They also provide a means of developing multiplex ties with other villagers. This may be used more or less deliberately to consolidate existing ties and also to cast the net wider as part of a policy of keeping open political options. Temporary work groups may similarly activate relationships, although apparently more centrifugally. Expressed in these terms, it may appear that villagers are simply engaged in a rationally calculated game. In some instances, from the accounts of the participants themselves, this is partly so. These tactical considerations however are those permitted within the wider values of Balinese society which provide the framework more or less agreed by the actors. The membership of voluntary associations is not defined exclusively by transactional interests which is evident from the point that even where supporters are included, this is selective. Finally, as Parkin has noted, while men may make particular statements by their choices, these are "set in ordered categories of social and personal meaning over which the individual has little if any control." (1976: 164). It is to this issue that I would like to turn in the remainder of the chapter to try and answer some of the questions which have been left outstanding.

The Cultural Significance of Voluntary Associations:

The proliferation of voluntary associations in Tengahpadang takes place within the context of the customary values that are attached to such forms of organization by contrast to other culturally approved or permitted modes. There are certain ideas associated with voluntary groupings of this kind which distinguish them in local thought from other corporations. Further, as villagers have a degree of choice in joining or even forming such organizations, they are making explicit statements of value. While a consideration of the political advantages of leading or participating in voluntary associations have been noted, it is not clear from this what it is about these which makes them particularly suitable. Many of the same practical advantages, if not in many ways more, would appear to follow from leadership of the larger corporations which not only control the main assets of village society but also possess extensive powers, backed by sanctions, to dispose of the labour and resources of their members. Nonetheless these appear to be largely

eschewed by most patrons. In order to understand this it is necessary to examine in more detail the cultural significance attached to the principle of voluntary association.

It is a marked feature of corporate groups in Balinese village society that their constitutions are in a certain sense democratic. In theory each member has an equal say in the decisions of the collectivity, both in matters of policy and in the election of officials to act as representatives of the group as a whole. The rights and obligations of all members are determined by the rules of incorporation and collective decisions and not, strictly speaking, by attributes of the participants in other spheres. While villagers may have similar rights and obligations, prima facie they are not however equal. They are separated by great differences in wealth, ability, caste status and political power. Nonetheless there would appear to be some quality which villagers must share in order to be regarded as possessing equal rights, and in this sense they are seen as equal. Some of the implications of this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 on caste, where it will become clear that the cardinal idea of duty (darma) has both hierarchical and egalitarian referents. The ideology of corporate groups lays a degree of emphasis upon the equality of all members within the sphere of competence of that group. The distinctness of ideas of egalitarianism within local groups and the formal hierarchy embracing all men outside would appear to be related to the traditional avoidance by high castes of village corporations. This is epitomized by the court (NE1 and NE2) which did not join the ward until after the Second World War and the loss of formal authority. Their position is still ambiguous, and they are permitted unostentatiously not to take part in activities which might conflict with caste prohibitions, such as engaging in heavy manual labour or accepting food from communal sources. While corporate group values may have to accommodate this where membership is effectively essential, the same does not hold true for voluntary associations. Here participation is notionally optative, so inclusion carries in village ideals connotations of a deliberately sought identity and solidarity with others. Voluntary associations tend therefore to be seen as egalitarian compared to other groups. It is this feature in part which gives membership of them a special significance.

The egalitarian, rather than simply democratic, implications of associational membership is reflected in a marked fashion in the pattern of recruitment. As Table 6:4 should make clear, the frequency with which high castes join voluntary associations decreases directly with their purity and superiority, whether this is estimated by the frequency of membership ties as a whole or simply by participation at all. In each case the tendency that the higher the caste, the less the participation is statistically significant. The table is arranged, however, to show finer distinctions than this. The aristocracy has traditionally played a recognized role in cultural, especially musical, activities, which fall towards the subtle, or refined, pole in the Balinese classification of behaviour and objects.[8] These are held to be more appropriate than activities which require manual labour or have overtly economic ends. Where the high castes participate in voluntary associations at all, therefore, the higher the caste the more likely this is to be confined to purely musical or theatrical groups in Tengahpadang. This creates an obvious difficulty for local politicians, a sizeable proportion of whom are of high caste origin. It is therefore interesting that these men differ from the remainder by showing a far weaker tendency to confine themselves to cultural associations (with the exception, as might be expected, of the high-ranking Cokorda), as should be clear from Table 6:5. As was mentioned above, it is the small economic groups which offer the most obvious political advantages; so it would seem that political interest may override caste considerations, particularly for the lower ranked Pradewa. Castes differ therefore in the extend and type of associations which they join, a principle which is modified for some political contenders by the benefits to be accrued.

There is one curious feature about the distribution of voluntary associational ties which emerges from a scrutiny of Table 6:2. This is the marked tendency for the two quarters (tèmpèk) in the southern half of Pisangkaja to participate more than those in the north. An estimation of the number of ties involved shows the difference to be statistically significant at 0.1% (see Table 6:6). This is not apparently simply a chance statistical connexion with no meaning; for villagers stress that the two southern quarters are noted for being more active, cooperative and egalitarian. Nor as a glance

TABLE 6:4 THE DISTRIBUTION OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP BY CASTE IN BR. PISANGKAJA (ALL TIES)

	Number of Ties			Households involved			
	Economic:	Cultural:	All:	Active:	Not:	Total:	Exclusions:*
Cokorda	-	2	2	1	6	7	-
Anak Agung	-	6	6	3	4	7	1
Pradéwa	11	10	21	9	4	13	-
Jaba	91	84	175	85	36	121	5 +
Total:	102	102	204	98	50	148	12

* This table excludes households normally absent and widows with no adult male+

High caste households are significantly less involved in voluntary associations the higher their rank. X^2 =11.23 with 3^o freedom; so the difference is statistically significant at 2.5%.
Of those households active in voluntary associations, the higher the caste the less commonly they are involved in non-cultural activities. By the X^2 test, X^2 = 8.328 with 3^o freedom. The chances that type of activity varies with caste is statistically significant at 5%.

TABLE 6:5 THE DIFFERENCE IN INVOLVEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS OF ORDINARY VILLAGERS AND FACTION LEADERS IN BR. PISANGKAJA

	Number of Ties			Households involved			
	Economic:	Cultural:	All:	Active:	Not:	Total:	Grand Total:
Cokorda	- (-)	- (2)	- (2)	- (1)	5 (1)	5 (2)	7
Anak Agung	- (-)	6 (-)	6 (-)	3 (-)	4 (-)	7 (-)	7
Pradéwa	4 (7)	7 (3)	11 (10)	6 (3)	3 (1)	9 (4)	13
Jaba	81 (10)	68 (16)	149 (26)	72 (13)	32 (4)	104 (17)	121
Totals:	85 (17)	81 (21)	166 (38)	81 (17)	44 (6)	125 (23)	148

Figures in parentheses refer to political leaders within the ward, those outside refer to ordinary villagers, that is the remainder.

Among ordinary villagers, however, there is a significant tendency for high castes to join cultural associations proportionately more than low, who are more concentrated in explicitly economic groups. X^2 = 7.862 at 2^o freedom, which is statistically significant at 2.5%. Among political leaders this difference is much less noticeable with X^2 = 4.611, which is not significant at 5%.

TABLE 6:6 THE DISTRIBUTION OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION TIES BY WARD QUARTERS IN BR. PISANGKAJA

Number:	N.E.	N.W.	S.W.	S.E.	Total
Ties	27	39	67	71	204
	66		138		
Households	36	38	37	37	148

The southern half of the ward has far more involvement in voluntary associations. As the number of households in the north and south are equal, they may be compared directly. X^2 = 25.412, with 1^o freedom, so the difference in frequency of joining associations is significant at 0.1%. For households alone, regardless of the number of ties, it is still significant at 5%.

will show is this connected with the distribution of high caste compounds. It is not clear however whether this solidarity is expressed in joining associations, or is inferred by villagers from this preference. There is one intriguing connexion, which is unfortunately hard to prove. The villagers in Pisangkaja show a great concern for the formal rules of purity and pollution in public matters. As I have argued elsewhere (Hobart 1978a), north is the direction of purity and south that of impurity or, perhaps better, the absence of gradations of this kind. It is interesting therefore that the distribution of membership of egalitarian, low caste dominated groups is in the south.

The cultural significance of voluntary associations is not, however, exhausted simply by the implication of their status levelling. Their egalitarian ethos depends in fact upon the freedom to join. Nor are these egalitarian tendencies confined to voluntary associations alone, but are present in varying degrees in other groups. The distinctive feature of groups classed as sekaha in Pisangkaja, and Tengahpadang more generally, is the cultural emphasis upon their optional nature, from which certain implications are argued to follow. As we have seen there is little in common between all those associations termed sekaha, either in terms of their independence, range of activities, degree of solidarity and so forth. It remains therefore to examine the extent to which the dichotomy between voluntary and compulsory groups emphasized in Tengahpadang is borne out by a closer examination of the nature of choice involved.

In order to provide criteria for the examination of the place of volition in the recruitment to corporate groups in Bali it is useful to look briefly at some recent approaches to the problem. In a recent article Brown (1974) noted that despite its frequent use the concept of voluntary association was one of the least examined in contemporary anthropology. He has subsequently elaborated his ideas in his attempt to develop the work of M. G. Smith on corporation theory. Although he is somewhat self-contradictory in places, he makes the point that volition is never unaccompanied by other criteria, or principles of recruitment (1976: 29) and should rather be seen as a procedure for entry (1976: 28-9), which ranges along a continuum from complete absence to overt dominance. It therefore qualifies other principles. At this stage his argument runs into serious difficulties because he attempts to establish universal criteria of voluntariness (which would seem to entail a cross-cultural

definition of freedom and will, independent of cultural conceptions) rather than of a less laden term such as choice. To him, voluntary association is 'an act of joining, a wilful or voluntary affiliation of individuals to social units." (1976: 26). He continues however: 'The volition must be expressed on the part of the person so incorporated, not on the part of some other party." (1976: 26). This definition gives rise to two problems of some significance. First it is a paraphrase and strictly tautologous: voluntary association is the act of associating voluntarily. Second, his elaboration of the notion of 'volition" is placed firmly into the actors' framework. As it is "emic", it cannot serve as the basis for cross-cultural definition, unless it can be shown that all cultures have the same idea of volition, which borders on a metaphysical problem.[9] As we shall see, in fact, the distinction between the observer's and the participants' model is relevant.

The value of Brown's argument, however, is that it demonstrates the separateness between ordinary principles of incorporation and optionality. If instead of trying to pin down 'volition", we examine the nature of the choice and the range of alternatives which are available to the actors, it is possible to distinguish at least three different forms which this may take:

1. the choice of a particular member of a set of similar entities. Here, the choice between different groups performing the same function; for example between one harvesting association and another. The choice is restricted to one of a set.

2. the choice between different sets. Here there is option in the type of means used; for instance whether to harvest using an association, an action set, by reciprocal labour agreement or wage labour.

3. the choice of a particular member of any set or not. Here, the choice is between doing a particular activity or joining, and refraining: as in the decision to play music, sing in an opera group and so forth. Also significantly, this would include the theoretical option of joining, or refusing to take part in the ward.

These alternatives may be represented as:

1. A/A /A

2. A/B/C..N

3. A/not-A

This somewhat abstract scheme has certain uses. It shows the distinction between the different categories of positive choice, as against the possibility of abstention. This latter requires more comment. In his account of sugar-cane farmers in Fiji, Mayer (1956) points out that voluntary associations are close to essential for the Indian growers for the cost of alternatives is far higher. In a similar way, most permanent Balinese corporations have a theoretical choice of membership or not. In Tengahpadang, on marriage villagers are invited three times to join the banjar patus. If they fail to do so by the third time, they are permanently excluded from the group. In the past, this expulsion was a most effective sentence of death. As peasant also point out, one need not join the irrigation association, one merely has to grow rice without water if one does. The scale of voluntariness referred to by Brown carries with it differing costs and loss of utility; and in many cases the alternative is so detrimental that the choice is theoretical. An activity is only voluntary in a 'strong' sense where the alternatives open do not involve substantial differences in utility. This is not a clear-cut distinction, but rests rather upon cultural, or even individual, assessment.

This discussion suggests that the form of choice in such matters as joining associations may usefully be distinguished. There would appear to be a continuum from a 'weak' or theoretical choice, to 'strong', where an activity may be said to be engaged in voluntarily, insofar as a person may reasonably refrain. The other distinctions refer rather to the exact range of alternatives. Where some activity is effectively necessary or essential, but the actor is left the choice of which of a range of types of relationship he may use, it might be better to speak of optionality. If the scope is simply between which of a number of similar groups may be used, the nature of the choice might reasonably be described as minimal.[10] It would appear then that the general anthropological term voluntary association is something of a loose term which covers a number of different types of choice, both in terms of the range of alternatives and of the consequences of choice.

The relationship between analytically distinguishable degrees of choice and Balinese cultural categories is important. In place of the two axes of types of alternative and degree of freedom, there are varying accounts. According to the authors mentioned earlier the term sekaha is used

indiscriminately for all possibilities. In Tengahpadang, however, it should be noted that it is more tightly circumscribed and covers only groups where joining is strongly voluntary, optional or the choice minimal. These possibilities are distinguished categorically from groups to which there is weak choice of membership. On enquiry about sekaha, I was commonly explained the term by reference to its opposite as follows:

Pemaksaan	:	Sekaha
descent group	:	voluntary association

In Tengahpadang, pemaksaan is one of the most common terms used to describe corporate descent groups, and is occasionally used by extension to refer to any corporate group. The etymological justification for this is that the root: paksa means force. One's ancestors, it is argued, are worshipped because one is forced, both in belief and in terminology itself. It should be noted, however, that the root has a range of complex meanings; Korn (1932: 117) points to the existence of regional temple groups, sometimes apparently established by princely decree, which retains the element of coercion, but also notes its use for a group of like-minded people (1932: 118). Finally Liefrinck (1934) notes the existence of groups in north Bali called seka pemaksan: an expression known to my villagers and regarded as a typical north Balinese absurdity!

Without the context and semantic usage it is difficult to determine the significance of this opposition generally. This is not, however, directly relevant to the problem of the classification of groups in Tengahpadang, with which we are concerned here. The universality of the dichotomy does not affect its particular applicability. Whether it is simply an analogy or not, the distinction between descent group membership and voluntary association affiliation brings out clearly the categorical difference which villagers understand as separating sekaha from other corporations, typified by the unchangeable, even if deniable, ties of descent and common substance. The position of sekaha in Balinese cultural categories is brought out even more clearly in another formulation, by which corporate groups are contrasted with

individual friends (timpal).[11] This latter is regarded as a relationship of extraordinary cultural value and it is surprising to find almost no mention of it in the literature on Bali. Friends are extremely highly prized. With them one can give in a truly free manner, where another person becomes an end in himself. The statement that a man is one's friend is an adequate explanation of association under almost any circumstances. The quality of the relationship may be judged from the following example. In 1971 I Linggih (SE3) announced to the ward assembly that he was changing his name to I Dungka. This was treated entirely seriously, although everyone knew that the reason was that he wished to be like his friend, I Dungki (SE22), even in name. Something of this is associated with sekaha by similar opposition to corporate group, and descent. The example of the evaluation of Sekaha Langkih should make this clear. It is also these associations which may help to account for the inclusion of other types of grouping under the label of sekaha.

There are certain implications which follow from the cultural evaluation of sekaha as comprising a single category, distinguished from others by being seen as voluntary in Pisangkaja. Membership of the main corporations is effectively compulsory and participation enforced by formidable sanctions. Within a descent group for instance, inadequate contribution or absence incurs both mundane fines and ancestral wrath. One of the most frequent points made in casual conversation was that giving to kin on ritual occasions was little indication of the true state of feelings as this was enforced; even offerings to ancestral spirits was hedged in by fear of punishment on one side and the hope of material benefits on the other. With a fine sense of the nature of the public good, villagers would uninvited point out that no one would work for the ward unless they were obliged to by the draconian penalties for failure. In contrast to this stood affiliation to voluntary associations which was seen in some definite sense as good, the mark of a proper, industrious villager, an active, good member of the community. It is possible to follow the course of this cultural argument. Only where there are alternatives, can men choose to work with others and for others. Further, only where sanctions on participation are absent can the spirit behind group activity be seen. If this line of reasoning follows the link between villagers' views, then emphasis is being placed noticeably on group participation as a criterion of goodness in

this instance, rather than on a consideration of disinterestedness. Whatever the merits of the particular example, it should be clear that the villagers are engaged in evaluating behaviour and further the motives or intentions which underlie it. That is they are more or less consciously concerned with problems of morality.

This touches upon the difficult field of theories of ethics, over which there is much philosophical dispute (see Hare 1952; Foot 1967; Williams 1972; and Wiggins 1976 for some of the problems, which need not directly concern us here). Anthropological use of the idea of the moral is notably confused, in part because the term is often applied loosely or ignorantly. As Lukes has noted, this may be traced back to Durkheim for whom the moral was inextricably linked with the social by the confusion of several distinct relationships between them (Lukes 1973: 412-21). A more precise use is developed by Cohen (1969b), drawing heavily upon Kant, to distinguish moral relations (governed by categorical imperatives) where persons or activities are ends in themselves from contractual relations (Kant's hypothetical imperatives, see Paton 1948: 25-33) where there are means to ends (Cohen 1969b: 36-7; 1977: 118-20). From this it follows that the moral is that "which cannot be completely reduced to economic or political relations" (1969b: 91) as they are contractual. Moral relations involve the person as a totality and so are symbolic (1977: 118 ff.). This may be seen as a development of Fortes' ideas on the fiduciary, rather than contractual, nature of kin ties (1969: 246-9 especially). Another aspect of Kant, the universality of the application of moral precepts, is examined by authors such as Bailey in pointing out that the moral community for villagers is tightly restricted in scope (Bailey 1966; 1971a), and the universe narrowly defined. It is worth noting in passing that there are problems with the Kantian argument, for as Williams has argued, the distinction between moral and prudential (the hypothetical or contractual) is neither exclusive nor exhaustive (1972: 79-81). Also this view leads to the position that a moral obligation must in effect be contrary to inclination which both presents logical difficulties (Williams 1972: 82-6) and runs counter to ethnographic evidence on its use (McIntyre 1967: 90). The problems of defining morality cross-culturally are formidable.

Balinese criteria for evaluating the moral show a diversity which is instructive, for they include a number of different analytical distinctions made by western philosophers. There are different, at times contrary, grounds for the determination of what is good (becik, in high Balinese, or luwung in low) or correct according to moral law (patut ring darma). Apart from darma, duty or moral law, being applied to caste (see Chapter 8), it also refers to behaviour which avoids harm to others and the excessive expression of individual desire. There are, however, other actions which are thought of in some way as good, and have parallels in philosophic theories, the authors of which are referred to in parentheses. One is good if one fulfils one's allotted rdes properly, and even derive pleasure from that, as in fatherhood (MacIntyre 1967); if one carries out duties or obligations which conflict with one's desires, like working willingly for the ward (Kant, in Paton 1948); if a person or activity is treated as an end in itself, as in friendship or voluntary association (Paton 1948: 32-3); if axioms are applied universally, as when strangers are treated the same as co-villagers or kin (Hare 1963). This list could be continued, but I think that it is adequate to show that there are diverse principles, or criteria, by which behaviour may be evaluated in Balinese village society. It is not relevant in this context to what extent these are well-founded or substantiable (which is a question for indigenous or western philosophers). What is important is that there are several alternative standards against which behaviour may be judged and to which villagers may make appeal, so terms like darma or good may suggest a spurious unity where there is in fact variety and difference.

This is directly relevant to the position of voluntary associations in Tengahpadang. For I tried to show the grounds on which these attain their special cultural significance. Voluntary association may be viewed as somehow good, or perhaps moral, in contrast to the obligatory ties of descent.[12] The diversity of criteria, however, result in the opposite position being equally tenable: where working with kin is valued for fulfilling one's allotted roles. Inspection of Table 6:2 shows that there are certain men with established political reputations who, in fact, studiously avoid voluntary associations and work instead with kin. The outstanding example of this is the distinguished orator Kt. Mara (NW7). More generally it will be recalled that public speakers do not for the most part play a major role in voluntary associations. One reason would appear to be the problem of the motives of the leaders. Nor

should it simply be assumed that such avoidance is simply part of the management of reputations. Villagers are involved in personal considerations of moral choice, the outcome of which over time affects the balance of dominance of particular frameworks of ideas. Balinese conceptual systems are neither unitary nor static, as should be evident from this brief consideration of plural principles of morality. It is this relationship between individual choice and the wider, generally multiple, categories of meaning which may help to explain how there may come to be this local diversity of institutional forms, such as voluntary associations, or distinctive semantic oppositions, as between sekaha and pemaksaan, in different parts of the island while retaining a family resemblance.

Conclusion:

In this chapter the range of voluntary associations found in Tengahpadang has been examined. It emerged that they have relatively little in common apart from being credit societies, a function which is also undertaken by other types of group. Even the extent to which they might be seen as voluntary was shown to vary substantially, for the range of choice and the cost of not participating differed. They play, however, an important part in village society, where associations tend to be included in local political arenas. Both their resources and the extension of ties of support encourage political figures to be active in, and even form, associations. The use of voluntary organizations can not however be explained solely on these grounds. Membership carries cultural connotations of social equality and approbation, so that the choices about participation have wider effects upon social reputations. Here the diversity of referents of the term sekaha is obscured by the sharp semantic contrast between groups which are seen as voluntary as opposed to compulsory in Tengahpadang. The significance of such associations rests partly on the evaluation culturally of ideas of free choice; but it turned out on closer examination that villagers have alternative criteria for the assessment of what is held to be good or right. So the dynamics of voluntary associations are more fundamentally linked to alternative interpretations of different forms of social action.

Chapter 6. Footnotes:

1. Such work teams with little stake in the yield on any plot are noted for speed rather than care. When a ward harvests, demand during the peak period of ripening is so great that many farmers are forced to cut too early or too late. The rules further state that a team does not return to a man's holdings if its work be interrupted. This minimizes inefficient work on small areas, but may leave individual farmers with problems of bringing in the harvest especially as their own, and other villagers' labour, is tied up.

2. This was expressed by villagers as 'hyak, 'sing nyak, pasti." roughly: "wish, do not wish, must." Pasti has a range of meanings from certain, beyond contradiction, doubt or dispute to that which must be by nature. This often-quoted formula neatly enshrined the ambiguity. For the expression may equally cover moral obligation, effective compulsion and the natural order of events.

3. The etymology of sekaha is interesting. The terms se-, and éka both may be used to refer to a unity, or one. In combination however they yield se-éka, a brotherhood, which Hooykaas (personal communication) regards as quite distinct from sekaha (cf. Lansing 1974: 15).

4. This is evident in the composition of the orchestra in Pisangkaja. The prince who was not an unusually skilled musician played the male drum, which is approximately the conductor of the orchestra and the senior instrument. The other major instruments, the trompong and réong, both comprising rows of kettles, were played by I Gangsar (NW11) and the sons of the richest families, respectively. This informal recognition of status differences is strictly against ideas of voluntary association equality - a problem which is discussed below (see also footnote 8).

5. I have also omitted households which contributed only young girl dancers, as these were chosen by the village for their beauty rather than opting to become members. Their position in decision-making and others matters was also marginal.

6. The facilities offered by voluntary associations do not constitute a public, or collective, good in Olson's terms (1965: 14-16). That is they are not made available to persons regardless of whether they contribute or not. So Olson's scale of group size as the major determinant of collective participation is not applicable (see 1965: 43-52). This does apply however to corporations such as the ward. Here activity and membership are enforced by selective incentives both of punishment and exclusion from vital services and by rewards, such as rights to draw credit. It is, however, only the households heads, and sometimes their female partners, who do this and there are many ways in which the ward facilities are a public good. The reason they continue to be provided, where the level of participation is usually as low as possible (for the few moral men who work eagerly see the discussion at the end of this chapter) seems to be that it is in the interests of a small minority of the villagers who effectively control decisions to provide services as

part of their political careers. They thus constitute a 'privileged group" (Olson 1965: 50) within an "intermediate group" (1965: 50) with reasons for ensuring certain services are maintained, not by paying for it directly, but by ensuring that others do.

In general, however, Olson's emphasis on a putatively rational decision-making model omits reference to cultural and indeed individual perceptions and interpretations. It further ignores the point developed in this chapter and the last that choice between alternatives has significance independent of, and possibly outweighing, the utility gained in narrower pragmatic terms.

7. The other apparent exception is Déwa Md. Doblé, a poor man and a low ranking Pradéwa. Here a combination of economic benefit and great political ambition are regarded locally as the reason for his behaviour.

8. The contradiction between ideas of equality of sekaha and the degree to which the sekaha gong reflects village ranking in its allocation of roles is more apparent than real. The ideals of equality are indeed stressed and this is the only setting in which the prince has been publicly corrected for mistakes. This association, however, by its differentiation into ranked roles is somewhat unusual. More important, the formal ideals and rules of the equality of members is distinct from informal summation of roles. The position of the poorer Cokorda (NE2) is more problematic. Their position in corporate groups is effectively somewhere on a continuum between the prince at one end and the low Satriya on the other, depending in each case upon their particular attributes, notably wealth, political influence and ability.

9. The frequency of such confusions has been remarked on by Harris (1969: 577-8). Should emic ideas be found to be universal, they do not necessarily have the status of etic, or a part of the observer's analytical tools. They are simply ideas which seem to be shared by cultures in general.

10. There is fourth theoretical possibility: of single members of different sets between which there is no choice. I do not consider this here as I have not yet encountered a clear case. It does not present problems as my concern here is simply to specify the nature of the variation. The question of whether the Balinese recognize culturally situations in which there is no choice at all is more complex. Descent is so constrained in terms of fixing a person's nature, but even social ties created by descent may be reneged to a certain extent. Caste position set in this way sets absolute limits on upward mobility, but it is possible to fall within the system as a result of decisions which breach caste rules. From the actor's point of view suicide does not permit a final departure from the system, but sets in train an unpleasant series of consequences various conceived.

11. This would appear to be part of a more complex set of oppositions set out on two dimensions by which forms of choice are distinguished from the nature of the constraining entity. So:

	Compulsion	Volition
Group	pemaksaan	sekaha
Person	kantih (?)	timpal

The missing category, of compulsory ties to individuals may vary. In terms of the most common distinctions used in Pisangkaja during my fieldwork, this would be filled by the role of political patron or kantih, seen as necessary, but not always desirable. Depnding upon the nature of the compulsion various other roles might fit here. For instance traditionally the ruler would be one possibility.

12. This formulation is significantly ambiguous. Not everything which is an end in itself is necessarily moral. If the argument runs as I have suggested, it obscures the problems in seeing work in sekaha as moral, which is convenient. The examination of the logical implications and ambiguities of indigenous cultural argument is a field which has barely been explored. This is intended to be the subject of a fuller study.

Chapter 7. Problems in Kinship and Marriage

Introduction

The field of kinship in Bali is sufficiently complex as to merit a work in itself. So in this chapter I would like to look somewhat more specifically at those aspects which have a direct bearing upon village social processes and the ways in which the attribution of meaning to kinship and marriage affects the ties formed. Underlying this there is a more general problem of how to account for the reported incidence and variation in the structure of kin groups and the range of marriage preferences. An examination of the ethnographic material from Tengahpadang shows the existence of forms which raise problems for the models so far proposed. While corporate kin groups are seen as organized according to principles of patrilineal descent, the composition of actual groupings is commonly more complex. The formal structure of descent groups, with the public rules separating different domains, tends to obscure the existence of alternative principles of organization and informal connexions possible between different arenas. In most circumstances, villagers have choice as to the type of kin ties which they may mobilize, while marriage serves to maintain or extend the range of options. Apart from the strategic possibilities inherent in the forging of alliances, as marriage involves exchange in some sense, it has potential implications for the evaluation of the relative status of the parties concerned as much however for control over the transaction as for the value exchanged. So it comes to be a means by which generalized claims to status in village society may be expressed and contested. The more narrowly transactional aspects of this are, however, complicated by the existence of contrary sets of values, so that the significance of particular unions may be open to different interpretations. Underlying this diversity of forms of descent groups and marriage, there appear to be at least two different frameworks. Kinship rules may be transformed, and relationships reinterpreted systematically by virtue of the elegant ambiguity of the terminology. It is the existence of these multiple models which I suggest may account for the variety of forms on the ground.

The problem of the diversity of Balinese kin groups has been discussed in some detail in a recent work by the Geertzes (1975). They note that the existence of corporate kin groups is not found universally among low castes in Bali, but these tend to form or coalesce where patrilineally related villagers have interests in common of various sorts. They argue that such groups have a tendency to internal encystment (cf. Murphy and Kasdan 1959) by virtue of preferential marriage with patrilateral parallel cousins, real or classificatory, while the retention of women through these unions becomes a major status concern. In contrast, among high castes the differentiation of lines by relative status is more marked and between which the marriages necessary to consolidate the group have complex hierarchical overtones. Apart from this, dynastic alliances are forged, as are political links with low castes through the acceptance of their daughters as junior wives. As Balinese social institutions may vary in form and meaning from place to place however, it may be useful in this chapter to expand this account in the light of the ethnography from Tengahpadang which suggests certain variations. For instance, strategic marriages of different sorts which are not necessarily endogamous may be highly developed among low caste groups (Boon 1977: 119-44; Hobart 1977). More generally the focus upon the problems of the formation and structure of descent groups has left the possible significance of matrilateral and affinal ties open for further study. As we shall see, in order to understand the dynamics of kinship in Tengahpadang, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the jural rules and institutional marriage preferences on the one hand, and the uses to which ties are put and the pattern of choices between alternatives on the other. The Geertzes' book makes the further argument that the internal structure of kin groups is commonly expressed in terms of ideas of origin (kawitan) rather than of descent. In the region round Tengahpadang, however, this tendency is reversed. Towards the end of this chapter I shall try to show the relationship between these indigenous ideas. As both emphasize ties traced through males, for convenience I shall refer to these as agnatic and the kin groups as based on a form of patrilineal descent, pending more detailed discussion below.

A close examination of the ethnography reveals the existence of

further principles. The emphasis in terminology and social discourse is upon the corporate dimensions of kinship expressed in particular in ideas about ancestors and a hierarchically ranked series of shrines and temple congregations. Little attention is paid overtly to the existence of extra-corporate networks of ties. In the various contexts in which kin ties are mobilized, however, the groups formed are rarely based exclusively or even predominantly on agnation. In activities ranging from agricultural labour to work for domestic ceremonies, the recruitment of action sets shows a strong tendency towards the inclusion of matrikin and affines, supplemented by neighbours, friends and economic clients. Bloch has argued that this pattern, which is not uncommon, may be accounted for in terms of the greater moral value of agnatic ties. These do not therefore require the same frequent reinforcement as to extra-lineal ties (1973: 75-87). There are problems with this view in Bali. It will be recalled from the end of the last chapter that there are different principles underlying indigenous views on what constitutes morality, so that agnation may alternatively be viewed as uniquely moral or as compulsory and therefore beyond choice and ethical consideration. More practically, there is little evidence that unused ties of agnation will carry the weight of much exchange imbalance after some time. In contexts where trust is crucial, such as in seeking advice or protection, it is notable that villagers turn as often to affines as to agnates, which is reflected in the constitution of factional membership. As we shall see the composition of worship groups at the shrines for agnatic descendants of common ancestors is even more surprising, as a substantial proportion of supplicants are not strictly related by descent while others are clearly present through affinal ties. All this suggests the existence of a bilateral model of kin relations which tends to be disguised by the publicly proclaimed ideals of corporate kin group solidarity.

There is a similarly complex relationship between publicly stated marriage preferences and the observable patterns of choice of villagers in Tengahpadang, which commonly emphasize the importance of non-lineal kin. According to the ideal referred to by the Geertzes, the tendency to

marry within the descent group, epitomized in the marriage of real patrilateral parallel cousins, has the effect both of making agnates and affines the same people and also removing the problems of relative status in marriage with outsiders. Where the group is internally ranked, as they argue of high castes, the room for choice is curtailed accordingly. In Tengahpadang, however, matters are not so simple. It will emerge that these ideal marriages are often scrupulously avoided, for reasons which will be discussed, and not only are kin and affines generally distinct but they may form opposed categories. The social significance of the exchange relationships implied by marriage are complex. It is necessary to distinguish two features of any act of exchange. First there is the estimation of the value given and received, which in this case relates directly to the status of the parties, as in Bali the partners involved in a potential union are identified with the groups from which they come. Second there are the circumstances under which the exchange occurs which tend at times to be overlooked (Paine 1974: 5-10). These refer not to the value of objects of exchange, but to other factors of the choice open to actors and the power which they may bring to bear. There are, therefore, two separable aspects of exchange in Balinese marriages: those of value, which tend culturally to be linked to status in some form, and of power.

These two aspects not only show substantial internal variation but may be articulated in different possible ways, which may provide a framework for understanding the different significance which is attributed to marriage relations in various parts of the island. In Tengahpadang, the position is complex and informative. Descent groups are ranked into major caste categories according to a native theory of innate differences in ritual purity. Among low castes especially, a study of marriages shows the importance of wealth in the estimation of status, so that evaluation may integrate factors of material circumstance and ritual status. Independent of this, there is great variation in the circumstances under which unions are contracted. This varies with the political power wielded by the participants expressed generally in the denial of the opposing party, either by a direct show of force or by the elopement with its women, so that exchange is

converted into an unreciprocated taking. It is here that the articulation between these two principles becomes important. For it seems in many cases that it is the ability to demonstrate power which is seen as being as important as the value of the object in question (here the daughter) and so the status of the family concerned. There are other occasions, however, when the difference in status of the parties is sufficient that the distinct measures of status, or purity, and power are brought temporarily into a single field. As we shall see, when this has occurred in Tengahpadang it has tended to signal major confrontations and the public re-valuation of the standing of the families involved.

This is not to suggest that the formation of marriages reduces simply to a question of power. In acting within a system which proffers a wide range of choices, both as to the relation between the parties and in the form of exchange, actors are once again operating within a framework of meanings so that their choices make statements about their natures. The cultural values attached to these alternatives are such as to make marriage arrangements part of a wider process of evaluation. So shifts in preferences over time may affect the organization of meaning itself. Similarly in the confrontations mentioned above, to the extent that these involve different bases of power, they form part of a process of the evaluation of basic resources.

The variety of principles emphasized in the organization of kin groups and in stated marriage preferences would seem to be encompassable within a more general framework, comprising a number of logically linked alternative classifications. As the argument is somewhat complex, it is perhaps as well to anticipate it in this introduction, so that the reader may see the evidence building up to the conclusion in the course of the chapter. The issue appears to have to do with the grounds and principles by which men are held to be similar to, or differ from, one another. According to traditional ideas, men are organized in terms of the attribute of having common descent (purusa) traced through males, the biological continuity being elegantly expressed by the root: purus, a penis (in high Balinese). This tends to take the form of a more or less continuous, irregularly

branching tree, according to the mythological genealogies of the main groups in Tengahpadang. Where this principle serves to organize groups on the ground, these may be represented in different ways. If the stress is on a property shared by descendants, the result is a bounded group, united by being corporate in the sense of stemming from the same body and so forming a single natural category, commonly known as a soroh. A different picture emerges if the shared property is viewed as being differentiated by degrees of proximity, expressed in terms of traceable, and therefore shallow, ties which leads to the encysted type found by the Geertzes, and expressed in the appropriately elastic notion of kawitan, origin. The bounded version stressing the difference between insiders and others and the polar model incorporating differentiation internally both represent variants of a descent theory, but differing in how it shall be reckoned and so in the types of group to which it gives rise. These tend to imply the notion of shared attributes or substance (purusa). This is contrary to another philosophical idea that a person is a product of his actions or exchanges. According to this argument, men who are similar will enjoy similar circumstances in life. It is significant that this is widely held by the villagers in Tengahpadang to be the proper category from which to choose spouses for children. Each of these (which differ as constructs, being bounded class, polythetic class and category respectively) may be seen as emerging as logically alternative answers in Balinese society to the problem: who is alike?, and the different possible marriage preferences as stemming from a derivative injunction: associate with those who are alike!

The Formal Organization of Descent Relations:

In order to understand the place and significance of kinship in Balinese village society, it is useful to start by an examination of the system of corporate groups, which provide the main organizational framework for extra-domestic kinship, and its most apparent manifestation. The importance of corporate kin groups in general in Tengahpadang is limited. It is questionable whether this is simply as a result of the

formal rules which ban the introduction of one principle of affiliation into groups constituted by another; for there is no simple tendency for the competition in other arenas, such as the ward, to fall along lines of kin group differences. Kinship does, however, provide a conceptually distinct system of ordering villagers. In the region round Tengahpadang at least, this is ideally represented in terms of a characteristically nesting structure of descent groups, focused upon a series of progressively more remote ancestors. The means by which these are designated varies significantly. Commonly the higher reaches are defined genealogically in written mythical charters; whereas below this, relationships tend to be organized by locality in terms of a set of more or less ordered temples and shrines. Finally, between closely related compounds ties are recalled for three or four generations by memory. In this way a common blueprint for the organization of agnatic ties, which at its widest extent may stretch to include groups throughout Bali or even settlers on neighbouring islands, may be adapted to demographic considerations. Appropriately, it is in the middle ranges that the precise determination of ties becomes blurred and represented by local proliferation of temples. At the same time it is at the level of more or less local temple congregations that descent ties are the most elaborated in ritual form.

The most striking feature of Balinese descent groups in Tengahpadang is how much they are formally organized like groups based on other principles, from irrigation associations to voluntary organizations. Each has a formally listed membership and a body of rules (awig-awig) for the conduct of business at meetings and temple work. These consist in large part of details of punishments for failure to attend, pay contributions or fines, and further elaborate the periodic expenditure of members towards temple festivals and the right to demand further taxes for temple repair. The regulations point to the main activity of such descent groups, commonly known as soroh or pemaksaan among low caste families, namely the organization and attendance of annual festivals in special temples owned by the group collectively. These are generally scheduled according to the Javanese-Balinese calendar of 210 days on a ritually prescribed date, the burden of work and contributions being

extracted from villagers living locally, while distant members pay less and treat the occasion effectively as a visiting day. As they are absent, the latter also have less say on the council of descent group members, which consists formally of all households under an elected headman (klian pemaksaan) and commonly with a member chosen and consecrated as priest to conduct the temple rites. Descent groups differ primarily from other corporations simply in that they do not generally undertake work other than on these periodic festive occasions. Nor are there clear distinguishing features about the form of temples, the conduct of ritual or other conspicuous signs of the special bonds which unite members. The organization of ritual in each type of temple is standard, so that apart from the difference in sites it is impossible to tell what type of group is organizing the festival, especially in view of the extensive overlap of personnel.

There are at least two respects in which descent groups differ somewhat from other local corporations. These are in the extent of mythological elaboration of the origins of the group and in the range of sanctions which the temple deity may bring to bear upon his congregation. The descent groups in Tengahpadang each possess a charter outlining the mythical origin of the group, commonly of palm-leaf (lontar) but increasingly being replaced by school exercise books. Depending upon the group and the industry of its leaders, this may deal only with early dynastic history and chart the claims of the group's ancestors to high status as in the manuscript (prasasti) of the local Pulosari temple; or it may be extended to detail the migrations of families, so that the account presents a genealogically unbroken record, albeit of highly questionable accuracy, down to the present distribution of members. The smaller descent group of Dauh have such a manuscript and used the occasion of my interest to have the original palm-leaf typed out, with the intention of charting the latest movements of families. This also served another function. For the original texts are regarded as sacred and normally kept in the ancestor shrine of the temple priest. As these may only be touched normally on the birthday of the goddess Saraswati, the patron deity of literature, when they may in theory be read to assembled agnates,

the copying permitted the updating of the text. Equally important, it allowed the translation of the original from Old Javanese, for the most part unknown to villagers, into Balinese. These ritual and linguistic blocks to documentation of change emphasizes the extent to which these manuscripts tend to acquire religious status in themselves rather than being viewed generally as historical or genealogical records. The alternative of dusting these off to serve as histories, or for the furtherance of status claims, always remains, however, a possibility.[1]

The status of forebears is not purely a matter of mythical record, but they may directly affect the living. Descent group temples are the seat of ancestral deities, as are lower level shrines, which will be discussed shortly. These are commonly referred to simply as the god of a particular temple, such as Batara Indra Kila for the Dauh in Tengahpadang or even as Batara Dauh. Besides this there is a more formal terminology which incorporates concepts to be discussed below. The original ancestor in whom the souls of all his descendants are incorporated in an unspecified way is known as Batara Hyang Guru. These names refer, in order, to the general class term for high deities; to the qualifier for spirits normally used only of beings who have been substantiated and the term guru, which denotes those with responsibility over one, here referring to the guru rupaka, one's progenitors. The Balinese recognize that the term is quite distinct from Batara Guru, one of the names of Siwa, but in certain contexts may amalgamate them. The god of each descent group is therefore known as Batara Hyang Guru, or Batara Dadiya (on the use of this term, see below), qualified as necessary by the specification of the group. Where the local site of worship and the central temple are distinct there is generally a lack of clarity as to whether there are ranked gods or not. Unlike the remote high gods he responds directly to the actions of the living. This may take two forms. First he may be the subject of requests for health, wealth or specific benefits from his descendants made in prayer. Second, and more prominently, he may punish for various offences, significantly all of which are ritual. These are four: failure to offer regularly; failure to attend the temple ceremonies; failure to pay contributions to ceremonies; failure to observe all temple

regulations. Descent group gods are normally thought to send fairly severe punishment for such aberrations. Commonly this takes the form of illness, diagnosed by spirit-mediums in trance (see Chapter 10) and is generally restricted to members of distant temple groups who are the most likely to fail in attendance.

A typical example of illness sent by descent group deities may be seen in the following case:

Case 6: The deafness of the Mangku Pedungan:

> A member of the Dauh descent group, one of several families living in Denpasar (the capital) and a priest of a temple of the founding ancestor (pura puseh) there, was lax in attending the festival (odalan) in Pisangkaja because of the distance. On several occasions he failed to pay his contribution (peturunan) nor came to offer (maturan). He developed a severe fever and went to a local medium in Denpasar who diagnosed failure to fulfil duties adequately at his descent group temple which is why he had been ketimpuran, struck with illness by an ancestral spirit. He was stated to have been memongor, sent just punishment by the Batara Dauh. The fever was sufficiently acute that he lost his hearing permanently. The deafness is widely held to be an indication of just how far he had offended the deity.

There is another aspect to this. Descent groups, unlike other local corporations, do not control tangible resources exclusion from which they can use as sanctions against defaulting or lax members. Their sole means of obtaining continued support from unwilling followers is through ritual sanctions. This may account in part for why the emphasis is upon ancestral deities sending punishment for ritual, rather than moral, offences. Also the severity may be linked to the same reason. For, in general, ancestors are thought to be concerned about the welfare of their descendants and to be beneficent as often as malevolent. In the absence of substantial common resources, the incentives for participation in descent groups tend to be negative (cf. Olson 1965: 51). For this reason it tends to be those corporations with temple lands, such as the Dauh and previously the Pulosari Siangan (in Pura Duur Bingin, see Table 3:17; the land is now controlled by the five eastern wards of Tengahpadang and the worshippers included in the larger Pulosari congregation which worships at Pura Tanjungsari), which are active - both as there are tenancies and

opportunities for patronage, and as it lowers the cost of participation. This problem tends to be less marked among high caste groups who are generally more cohesive in this part of Bali. Apart from serving as a watchdog against attacks on their ritual purity or status, these descent groups seem less vulnerable to centrifugal forces because of their mutual dependence in the face of competition from other aristocratic families for political power and economic position.

The emphasis on descent groups as temple congregations in Tengahpadang is not misplaced, but an appropriate summary of their position. It will be recalled from Chapter 3, Tables 12-14, that there is no simple congruence between the spread of descent group membership and local political or religious groupings like the ward, administrative or customary village. Further as Table 7:1 shows, while in Pisangkaja for example there are two descent groups substantially larger than the others, this is not reflected particularly in a dominance over public positions out of proportion to their numbers. Nor is the relative strength of descent group numbers evident in the political preponderance of leading public figures, such as orators or patrons, although there are occasional mutters about (often self-proclaimed) ideals, such as that Dauh are noted for their capacity in public speaking or that Pulosari are good organizers. The basis of this seems to lie, however, in recent trends. The decade leading up to the abortive coup in 1965 was notable for the powerful influence of Anak Agung men and three Dauh public speakers (two of whom, I Kebet and I Rangin NW8, will feature below, despite their deaths at the time). The Pulosari provided both the government headman and customary village sub-section head in 1971, largely however it seems by chance, as they happened to be supported by a patron who was a Dauh. Even in wards where there is a clearly numerically dominant group, as are the Tangkeban in Br. Tengah, these are not organized but split between the major factions. It might be argued that the formal rules separating different groups may inhibit ingression into other arenas, or even that the suppression of kinship is necessary to prevent public conflict. This may be in some places, but in Tengahpadang there is little evidence to support the view. In other

TABLE 7:1 DISTRIBUTION OF DESCENT GROUP MEMBERS IN PISANGKAJA: 1972.

Descent Group:	Temples: Local	Central	No.of kuren:	% of total:	No.of offices:*	No.of patrons:	No. of orators:**
Brahmana	Bangli	?	1	0.6%	-	-	-
Cokorda Dalem Sukawati	Yéh Tengah	Sukawati	7	4.4%	1	2	-
Anak Agung	-	Sukawati	8	5.0%	2	-	-
Déwa Gedé	Tengahpadang	Tulikup	1	0.6%	-	-	-
Pradéwa Bolo	Tengahpadang	Tengahpadang	2	1.3%	-	-	-
Pradéwa Jati	Jati	Bangli (Ba.)	5	3.1%	2	1	3
Pradéwa Seronggo	Seronggo	-	3	1.9%	-	-	1
Pradéwa Simpar	Tegal Tugu	Tegal Tugu	2	1.3%	-	-	-
Pasek Bendésa Mas	Mas	Mas	3	1.9%	-	-	1
Pasek Bendésa Dukuh	Dukuh	Mas	2	1.3%	1	1	1
Pulosari	Tengahpadang	Besakih (Ba.)	43	26.9%	4	2	4
Pulosari	Peliatan	Besakih (Ba.)	1	0.6%	-	-	-
Dauh	Tengahpadang	Tengahpadang	36	22.5%	2	3	3
Cameng	Tengahpadang	Cemenggaon	15	9.4%	1	1	1
Pasek Gèlgèl	Gèlgèl	Gèlgèl (Kl.)	8	5.0%	-	-	1
Pasek Gèlgèl	Delod Bungbang	Gèlgèl (Kl.)	4	2.5%	-	-	-
Tangkas	Manuaba	-	2	1.3%	-	-	-
Jambangan	Kelabang Moding	Kelabang Moding	2	1.3%	-	-	-
Pasek Prasanti	Tapesan (Me.)	Tapesan (Me.)	2	1.3%	-	-	-
Pasek Kayu Selem	Cebok	-	1	0.6%	-	-	-
Pasek Kayu Selem	Bangli (Ba.)	-	1	0.6%	-	-	-
Batuan	Gianyar	Gianyar	1	0.6%	1	-	1

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Sheet 2. Table 7:1 Descent Groups in Pisangkaja.

Descent Group:	Temples: Local:	Central:	No.of kuren:	% of total:	No. of offices:	No. of patrons:	No. of orators:
Sulang (Pasek Gaduh)	Sulang (Ta.)	Sulang (Ta.)	1	0.6%	-	-	-
No group acknowledged	-	-	4	2.5%	-	-	-
Chinese	-	-	5	3.1%	-	-	-
Totals: (for 23 descent groups; 16 titles)	-	-	160	100.2%	14	10	16

Code: Local temple refers to the regular centre of worship, known as a pura panti.
Central temple refers to the recognized higher level temple at which members worship, pura puseh.
A dash indicates either that villagers did not attend this, or did not know if there was one.
The query is for low caste wife of a Brahmana who did not know what title group she belonged to.
Where a name is repeated for local and central temple, this means that they are the same.

Ba. = in the kingdom of Bangli
Kl. = in the kingdom of Klungkung
Me. = in the kingdom of Mengwi (now part of Tabanan)
Ta. = in the kingdom of Tabanan

The frequency with which villagers travel long distances to ancestral temples does not support the view suggested that Balinese forget their links rapidly (most families have been in Tengah-padang at least 3 generations) nor that they necessarily forge links with different local groups.

* The computation of offices is based upon the main positions with the customary village and the ward. As he is permanent treasurer and secretary (an honorary position by which he is not required to engage in any work) Cokorda Putera NE1 has been added.

** The number of patrons and orators is that used in Chapter 9, where they are named in Table 9:7.

groups the formal rules are not effective in preventing the conversion of assets and ties. More seriously a closer inspection of the economic differences which divide descent group members from one another (a juxtaposition of Table 4:1 which gives descent ties with Table 5:10, or Appendix 3, on details of land and capital owned will show clearly the range of economic fortunes within each of the main descent groups) raises the question of the range of issues over which it would be possible to gain agreement, where interests are otherwise so divergent. It would seem to be only in the rather unusual case reported by the Geertzes, where groups of related metal smiths have something close to a monopoly in making the island's highly valued metallophone orchestras, that interests would substantially concur. Appropriately, they give this as their example of a community with highly developed, solidary kin groups (Geertz 1967; Geertz & Geertz 1975: 72-3).

If descent groups do not play a major role in village society in Tengahpadang, it should not be assumed that they have no function, nor more important, no significance. For the reasons mentioned, high caste kin groups tend to differ; and among the other large groups shared titles provide a common link between villagers from different parts of the island, which may occasionally take on some importance, particularly if they are acquainted from meeting at central temple ceremonies. The broader reaches of common agnation constitute a network of potential ties, based on ideally shared properties, which as we shall see in Chapter 8, is of importance within the context of caste relations.

The Framework of Domestic Relations:

It is at a domestic level that descent becomes an important principle underlying the organization of relationships. It is by reference to ideas of descent, given tangible expression in a simple system of nesting ancestral shrines, that co-residence is ordered, rights to the inheritance of property and succession to office limited and, in theory if not practice, adoption restricted. There is, however, no joint estate, nor are there normally other major resources held by agnates collectively,

apart from a common status expressed in terms of their purity of birth relative to others. As a result there is little to unite agnatic kin who are further divided by the rules of membership of corporate groups, as these treat each household as an independent unit. As we shall see, it is primarily by reference to the possible implications of common origin from a body of ancestors that descent has significance beyond the residential group.

In examining the organization of groups and the transmission of rights in Balinese village society, it is appropriate to examine the precise form of the relationships demarcated in each case, rather than to summarize them simply as denoted by any general system of descent (Needham 1971: 8-13). In most instances the Balinese in Tengahpadang lay emphasis on the connexion between jural males, although in the extension of different rights this may not uncommonly be modified by other principles. There is the further problem in determining how descent is conceived. As we shall see, the recognition of ancestry through males is subject to alternative interpretations which affect the extent of its reckoning, the implications of extension and the form of groupings produced.

Perhaps the most obvious expression of descent is the ideal that the male offspring of a common ancestor should live together. This is encouraged by the expectation that women should move to the houses of their husbands on marriage, while sons in theory remain in the compound of their fathers'.[2] The extent to which these are observed differ. Women have the right to live and be supported by their parents before marriage and retain this afterwards under certain circumstances; for they may return - mulih daha, return as (in the status of) an unmarried girl - or even live uxorilocally (medunangan or medunungan, simply to stay for a time). Of a total of some 400 unions, this latter only occurred in 14 instances, overwhelmingly where the males concerned were without rights and extremely poor.[3] There is one exception to this, which is where a woman is declared heir and is vested with the status of a jural male. The incidence and significance of this is discussed below. By contrast, the ideal that descendants live together within a single compound is less often observed. Indeed it is made somewhat more complex by the uncertain

basis of the general belief that non-inheriting sons have the right to residence in the natal compound. This is enshrined in legal theory, but in many villagers' minds is regarded as depending upon agreement. Of the 34 multiple household compounds in Pisangkaja, 30 are formally based upon ties of common descent; although an inspection of normal daily residence showed this to fall, in fact, to 29 out of 37 compounds, there being a shift in practice in favour of living with affines (see Table 4:4). It is not easy to compute the frequency of the departure of agnates, as part is phrased in terms of adoption or marriage to female heirs and temporary migration. An examination of such joint family compounds shows, however, that these were invariably composed of the sons of a living father, or a set of brothers. The sole exception, appropriately, was the family of Cokorda (NE2) who are all descendants of a common grandfather. There is instead a strong tendency for sons who do not inherit to move out, either by establishing a new compound, or by requesting a portion of the compound land, it there is sufficient (Table 4:2). This trend towards fission is strengthened by the system of inheritance and the problems of domestic authority.

The principles governing the division of property by inheritance in Bali are complex and subject both to a measure of personal preference and traditions within different castes and descent groups. In Tengahpadang, however, there are general regularities. The main estate consists of irrigated riceland, part of which is designated as separate, in total about 1/3rd. of a hectare, and known as laban sanggah, tied fields of an ancestor shrine, which are for the provision of regular offerings to the deified forebears. This land is thought of as an heirloom (pusaka) under the control of a single specified heir and in theory unalienable except with the consent of an ill-defined category of potential heirs. Where the estate held by a man is larger, matters become more complicated as there are no clear rules for division. It is generally felt proper for the other sons to receive about half as much as the heir, which may be interpreted to mean either each son obtains this amount, or all together. Among high castes there are equally varying notions, from a preference for equal distribution between all males to a system known as catur udara, four portions, three of which are retained by the heir, the remainder being divided among the other siblings. For the majority of

families, this is increasingly a theoretical problem in view of the small size of holdings. However, the ambiguity of the rules leaves much the terms of the exact division to the father and it would be reasonable to argue that the lack of definition may contribute to tension and (a largely unspoken) rivalry between brothers.

The principles adopted for the selection of heirs and successors are somewhat simpler, but involve a direct difference between general practice and traditional legal theory. In Tengahpadang a single heir is designated to succeed to any offices of the father which may be hereditary (such as priesthood, although this is qualified by the right of the group in question to appoint successors, see Chapter 3). If a son is elected or appointed to village office, it is also expected that he will have to become a member of the customary village and accordingly he inherits the shrine under normal circumstances. This son remains a member of his father's household and takes responsibility for the care of his parents in old age and the ritual duties to the ancestors. The designation of the heir more generally depends upon birth-order, the preferences of high and low castes being reversed. While certain commoner descent groups may follow high caste fashion, not infrequently as part of a claim to higher status, most select the youngest son. Among high castes, it is typically the eldest son. In the past in dynastic families, where succession to office was at issue, the arrangement tended to be looser in order to choose the most qualified candidate. Once again, it is possible to see that, while this system may have been well suited to finding successors on grounds of merit, it would seem to have encouraged intrigue and dissidence. This is the more so, as the choice of heirs within an agnatic line are further qualified by the status of the women concerned. Among aristocratic families the line of the main wife, or queen (perami), is singled out from those of secondary wives (penawing). Here order of marriage and the status of wife-givers created a degree of flexibility in designation. Among low castes in Tengahpadang it is the children of the first wife (the kurenan marep) who become the main heirs. These general preferences for the designation of a single heir and the ranking of descendants of a man by reference to

attributes of his wives, be it marriage order or status by birth, are only partly reflected in legal theory.[4] This states that all sons of the main wife are equal heirs unless disinherited (pegat mapianak); while any wife may be chosen (subject only to rank considerations among aristocrats) for this purpose. The reasons for this difference are potentially complex and beyond the scope of the present work.

This general statement requires elaboration in the instances where suitable heirs are lacking. The rules are modified for disabilities, such as insanity, in favour of an appropriate incumbent. The problem is more interesting where there are no sons to a couple. The standard solution to this depends upon whether there are children at all, or not. Where there are daughters, it is general for one, commonly the eldest, to be formally selected as heir (sentana). In so doing she is designated as a jural male and is said to meawak muani, have the body of a man. Correspondingly her husband is thought to meawak luh, to have the body (or position) of a woman. The rights of the parties are systematically reversed, for the man has no rights over the property of the family into which he marries, until the death of his wife when he may act as caretaker, but not dispose of any assets. In the event of divorce he is entitled to a half share of any property earned jointly known as harta guna kaya, as is a woman in similar circumstances.[5] The jural subordination of the male in such a marriage reflects the interstitial position of an in-marrying spouse, who is only fully incorporated on death when the conversion into an ancestor begins. For reasons which will become plain, this type of marriage, known as nyentana nyeburin (literally: the jumping-in heir, from cebur, to leap in), is as popular with parents as it is disliked by husbands. Nor is it uncommon among both high and low castes, and accounts for 47 out of the 418 marriages (or 11.2%) contracted by members of Pisangkaja of which at least one partner is still living. As we shall see, this union creates interesting complexities for the computation of forms of marriage with agnates, and more generally raises questions about the definition of descent in Bali.

If agnates are divided from one another by the devolution of property and the absence of a joint estate, they tend to be driven further apart by the structure of relations of authority. Within the compound the heir is vested

with control over the resources and capital of the household and compound. There is no formal means of appeal against the exercise of his authority, although it may be muted by the intervention of the mother. Jointly the parents exert extensive control over their children as long as they remain part of the household. The most powerful sanctions are the control over resources and the use of the curse. The danger of being cursed (kewastonin) is considered to be very serious, especially when uttered by the mother - in part because it often threatens the extinction of the line it is less used by men. Its results are automatic and do not depend upon the agency of ancestors, who would not in any case normally destroy their own descendants. It is particularly effective in Tengahpadang, as a result of a famous case which, although it happened some fifty years before my fieldwork, was sufficiently well recalled that villagers could give the exact words according to their statements.

Case 7: The curse on the prodigal son.

> When I Genten returned home from the ricefields in the evening, according to informants, he was given a plate of rice by his mother. He is said to have objected to the food and thrown it away. Upon this his mother cursed him, at the same time striking the table, which makes such a statement irreversible. The curse was to the effect that he and his descendants should fall into irremediable poverty.
>
> Part of the reason this is recalled so well by villagers is that I Genten's father was one of the wealthiest men in the village. From that time, it is said, the family began to lose its rice fields steadily, exacerbated by the gambling of I Genten's son, I Jambul NE22. There is evidence that this account of massive loss of lands is correct. The records available since 1949 show that I Jambul had lost over half a hectare of riceland and a hectare of dry fields (the last piece of which was about to enter pawn as I left: on the land records, see Appendix 3.).

Accordingly dissension takes the form of avoidance, by simply remaining quiet (nengil-nengil) or running away (ngambul-ambul) for some time lasting from days to months. In general sons and fathers are thought mutually to feel hostility (merasa pedih). After marriage, however, the position of the father is weakened except over the heir, because each household becomes an independent and equal member of the main corporate groups. So the pressures on agnates to separate after marriage are encouraged by the

status they attain.

By contrast with the tense relationships expected, and from observation not infrequently encountered, between agnates the ties between women are thought to be especially close. Villagers express a preference for daughters over sons; and the relationship of mother and daughter is held to be particularly good, to the point that it may put strain on the latter's marriage, where she is encouraged to return if she wishes, often by both parents. It is perhaps in this light that the occasional provision of a dowry should be understood. This is given by a small minority of rich families to favourite daughters (e.g. NE1, NE15 and NW10), not to the couple but as the daughter's inalienable property (harta gawan) to protect her against dependence upon her husband.[6] The ties between women tend to give rise to culturally stereotyped forms of tension and accusation. Women are widely thought to cooperate not merely in the entirely legitimate activity of raising pigs for profit, but also the illicit siphoning off of household resources through the sale of milled rice in small but regular quantities, taken to market concealed in baskets under fruit or other goods. My attempts to check this suggest that these accusations are not without substance, and villagers point with grim satisfaction to cases of baskets being spilled to reveal rice. The position of in-marrying women in this varies. On the one hand they may exacerbate the tensions between compound agnates and further division by their conflicting interests which may lead to accusations of witchcraft between women, or of agnates' spouses. On the other hand the issue should not be reduced simply a question of property or authority; for perhaps more often, despite these pressures, daughters-in-law are assimilated into the core of women who in effect control the compound and displace men. This parallels neatly the conceptual division between domestic roles as:

women : men :: inside : outside :: private : public.

This opposition between the closeness of women and the tension between males receives cultural expression in the belief that all ties between or through males are hot (panes) that is dangerous and leading to disruption or unhappiness. In contrast ties through women are cool (etis), good and auspicious. This is derived in popular exegesis from the identification of

men with fire and so the god Brahma; while women are linked with water and the deity Wisnu. This folk ontology is not irrelevant, as it is connected with contrasting interpretations which are possible of relations of kinship and marriage.

This brief consideration of the relationships through which residence, the inheritance of property and succession to office are ordered, shows something of the complexity of the transmission of rights and how agnatic ties work in practice. It remains to examine how these forms are articulated with the conceptual framework of descent and the terminology in which it is expressed. This is phrased in large part in terms of a cult of ancestral figures, but in such a way that it may give rise to somewhat different models of descent in the minds of villagers.

The organization of agnatic relationships is perhaps best understood in terms of the process of extension and segmentation. As we have seen the devolution of property and the problems of remaining under parental authority combine with the democratic structure of Balinese corporate groups to encourage joint families to split. Sons who do not inherit tend to move out to establish new compounds. The old may also be divided - this process of division being known in high Balinese as kèsah, or more commonly as kisid or pekaad in low, in the sense that a family will say that it has kisid from another, meaning split from, but also to have one's roots there. These households remain linked by traceable ties of descent to the parent compound which gradually becomes elevated to the status of core or origin-point (kawitan), or as simply the focus for all families descended from common ancestors there. This is expressed ritually in terms of shrines; for the new house must have a simple household temple for the worship indirectly of common ancestors, which turns in due course through death into the site for its own deified forebears. This is known as a sanggah kemulan taksu, a domestic temple containing a shrine of origin (kemulan) and a witness or mediator between men and the gods (taksu). As the original compound becomes the focus of a number of these either the shrine area is enlarged, or a new one may be added, with the status of sanggah gedé (or sanggah pemugeran), a big shrine. This extension is never undertaken simply on the decision of villagers,

but by ancestral fiat expressed through mediums, commonly when consulted about illness or misfortune.

The degree of this expansion tends to be set by the extent of Balinese genealogical knowledge. For low castes this commonly extends as far as the great-grandparental generation of the senior generation, or only to grandparents among the less interested. The position in high caste families varies. Dynastic genealogies are of great political importance and are traced and written down. This has two aspects. On the one hand it links the dispersed present generations to a single source; but also this may be extended back to purely mythic figures. The prince in NE1 can trace his ties to the other Cokorda Sukawati, but further back through the three lines of Cokordas to one of the great Hindu trinity, Brahma, the god of fire himself. Among the lesser families, those outside courts (jajaran), the depth of genealogies tends to approximate that of commoners. So the majority of descent ties are encompassed within a genealogical span of some four or five generations from the children. As the relationships between seceding households and the original line, represented by the sanggah gedé, are usually known with some precision this suggests that a soughing-off process occurs some three or more generations after separation. There are many such adjacent compounds with the same descent title and a vague idea of previous connexion in Pisangkaja (see Table 4:1). It is however below this and within the sanggah gedé that effective descent is recognized. Bearing in mind that its depth is shallow, I shall refer to these for the future as lineages, as they are based on known agnatic ties; and shall call the wider local temple congregations based on putative connexions local clans. Above this the whole group with a single descent title, known in Tengahpadang as a dadiya, may conveniently be referred to simply as a clan. These are in part terms of convenience and should not be taken to imply that the model of kin relations fits some universal standard (Barth 1973; Geertz and Geertz 1975; Needham 1971).

This order may be represented in terms of a hierarchy of ancestors. This is not the place to engage in a discussion of the problems of the definition of ancestors in Bali in any detail, which has been undertaken in part elsewhere.[7]

The Balinese pay ritual attention to a class of deified forefathers, classified as agnatic ascendants, in exactly the same way as to other classes of deity (déwa and batara, terms which may be used synonymously, but normally in ascending order of status). These are internally differentiated and serve as the focus for different levels of inclusiveness of agnatic ties. After death the shade is a mere pitara (pitra), who is converted by a series of rites (pitrayadnya, see Hooykaas 1975; Hobart 1978a) into pure deified spirits (hyang-hyang). These are distinct from the ancestral deities worshipped in local temples, who are a higher category as they are known as Batara, that is high god, of a particular temple. Above them as the focus of the clan is the original ancestor of the entire group, a Batara Dadiya or Batara Hyang Guru. So the three main levels of lineage shrine, local clan temple and clan temple, have different grades of deified ancestor, as it is generally understood in Tengahpadang. The main difference of Balinese ancestral spirits is that, for a variety of reasons, they are not generally individualized after death. First, as the Geertzes have noted, the use of teknonymy is linked in Bali to concern about the use of personal names (autonyms Lévi-Strauss 1966: 192 ff.) of those in elder generations (Geertz and Geertz 1964); more seriously perhaps, there is a logical problem. According to folk belief, the dead are reborn direct into the patriline and identified specifically by mediums with the souls of ancestors. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult for a single named soul to be in two states simultaneously. So these are generally grouped and receive ritual attention at the appropriate shrine. As Boon has shown, where divisions occur within a descent group, this may be articulated by reference to named structurally significant dead forebears (1974).

The beliefs about the intervention of ancestors in the affairs of the living give an important clue to their relevance in the organization of descent. They do not in any way respond to the moral behaviour of their descendants, nor can they be invoked by the heir to a shrine to support his authority over junior agnates. Control of kin in this way may however be achieved indirectly, where a person in his lifetime promises or threatens consequences to the living (usually a specific person) when they die. For example, I Tagen (NW1) has a bad relationship with his eldest son's wife and has told her

he may be a powerless old man now, but he will repay all her unkindness when he goes kedituané (up there). Equally ancestors may help the living. I Gangsar's wealth (NW11) is said to be due to a promise given by a loving grandmother before her death. In general however, the ancestors respond to the degree of ritual attention which they receive and prove either benevolent or malevolent depending upon the conscientiousness of their descendants and their wealth, so they desire what is appropriate (sané patut), neither more nor less, in offerings or attendance on festival days. Failure is likely to induce the ancestors to send illness (diagnosed as ketimpuran, to be made ill) or misfortune (buwut, evident in poverty and quarrelling) which may be diagnosed by a medium, as the symptoms are more or less standardized (see Chapter 10). Equally they may bring peace and prosperity as a blessing (iyasa). The beliefs in ancestors then do not serve to maintain agnates as a domestic group, or even urge solidarity in any particular activity. They have the effect rather of defining a category of related persons who are obliged to remember ties by the regular performance of rites. So the lineage shrines (sanggah gedé), like local clan temples, tend to provide through joint ritual a formal framework for the ordering of recognized descent ties.

So far, I have spoken somewhat simply of descent as the principle of inclusion into the system of kinship groups, domestic or ritual. It should be clear that in Tengahpadang this is represented conceptually in terms of the transmission of the right of membership through males, and includes females before marriage or after divorce. The extension of rights of residence, inheritance and succession are also passed ideally between males. It has been argued that the possibility, and indeed occurrence, of tracing ties through women in the absence of males is an indication of what might loosely be termed ambilineality (Geertz 1959a: 998) or bilaterality (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 190-1), a problem to which we shall return. Examination of the terminology and jural status of the partners shows, however, that these women are converted into men conceptually and legally. It may be argued that this can be seen as an extreme instance of patriliny, so extreme that biologically defined sex is ignored or overruled in the interests of jural continuity. It has also been suggested that the possibility of changing

descent group as a result of the ruling of spirit-mediums (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 77-8) contradicts the notion of membership being determined by descent. As I have not found a case of this in Tengahpadang, and so have no material on the frequency with which this occurs, it is difficult to interpret fully. In the reference to this it is significant that the idiom used by mediums is of a mistake in one's origins and "true progenitors" (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 78). The assumptions about descent are retained to the point that mistakes must be corrected to avoid the mystical and material dangers of wrongly reckoned ancestry. The operation of kin ties shows the extent to which they may be incompassed in a model of agnatic descent.

There are, however, problems in exactly how descent is conceived of and so the form taken by groups formed on its basis. The ethnographic material from Tengahpadang and from the work of the Geertzes near Klungkung show interesting differences. The former tends to emphasize an ordered nesting structure of descent, which gives rise to a series of demarcated groups, within which relationships are between persons defined as similar, of a single kind.[8] The latter seems to lay more stress upon shallower categories with progressive internal differentiation, where degrees of similarity ensure its continuance. It would appear, however, that these may be seen as variants on a more general model. This would seem in each case to emphasize the classification of villagers according to their ties through males, that is by purusa (it will be recalled this is related to purus(a), a penis), or agnatic descent. Variation emerges in the extent to which attention is paid to the hierarchical classification which this may involve as opposed to its planar division of kin into groups. There is a further aspect. While descent is a principle by which individuals may be classified together, this allows of different emphases depending upon how the similarity is conceived. The difference is reflected in a significant fashion in the terminology used of descent groups. If descent is taken as distinguishing like from unlike, it produces a simple bounded class of persons who are equal and alike, but different from others. The word for local temple congregation in Tengahpadang appropriately is soroh, meaning literally: a category or a single kind. It is the general word used to refer to agnates. If however descent allows for division on its own scale into progressively

more alike, the result is the tendency to encystment recorded by the Geertzes. It is singularly appropriate therefore that the main term for defining groups is not soroh in Tihingan but kawitan, origin. Rather than designating a single undifferentiated class, its relativity encourages progressively finer discrimination. Somewhat more speculatively, categorical distinctions into like and unlike would appear unambiguous and definite, which may be reflected in the common alternative for soroh in Tengahpadang, namely pemaksaan, that which is obligatory. The notion of origin, in contrast, generates polythetic classes (Needham 1975; Tambiah 1973: 191-4) where there is complete option on which individual(s) may be selected as foci. So it would seem that the principle of descent is elaborated in terms of two axes. First, descent may be traced to a variable degree over time; second, and more important, it may give rise to different types of grouping.[9] It would seem that the different processes of group formation in Balinese society may be linked to, or explained through, the cultural recognition of the logical possibilities of the variable concept of descent or origin.

Kinship in Action:

Having outlined the structure of descent groups and the models which underpin or express the rules, it is interesting to turn to a close inspection of the actual composition of groups which are recruited using kin and, in particular, to those mobilized on the basis of descent. It will become apparent that on almost all occasions, especially among low castes, a high proportion of the members of groups (or action sets) are affines or bilaterally reckoned kin, and in some contexts include a number of out-marrying agnates. The polarity between aristocracy and commoners in the emphasis on types of kin tie emerges even more clearly in the pattern of adoption. While this is exclusively according to agnatic descent among high castes, it is overwhelmingly biased towards matrilateral kin among ordinary villagers. An investigation of the terminology used for descent groups is revealing at this point; for it shows that unlike the concepts, which are clearly distinguished, group terms are almost invariably bivalent, so that they may refer to a bilaterally reckoned kindred, while the terms formally, and often etymologically, imply descent. It may be argued that

the divergence from the ideal should be seen and understood simply as a 'normal' deviation from any prescription in the light of everyday contingencies. This position is, however, unsatisfying on several counts. It leaves the factors speciously vague, or if specified usually multiple, and largely undemonstrable. It tends to imply a dichotomy between ideal and actual which is not always substantiated conceptually. Further it is possible to argue, following Gellner, that "all actions are based on a rule or maxim" (1974: 79). Finally, as I shall try to show, it is inelegant and the deviations may more economically be understood in terms of a separate, co-existing model which stresses the cognatic recognition of kin. Agnation and cognation then stand as culturally alternative ways of structuring a field of ties.

There is certain formal evidence for the existence of non-lineal estimation of kin ties. The most striking feature is that Balinese kinship terminology for reference and address is classical Hawaiian with slight modification to distinguish sex in persons older than ego up till the third ascending generation, but its complete absence for all persons younger by age within generation and in descending generations. The significance of this will be discussed elsewhere.[10] The relevant feature here, as almost every author on Bali has noted, is that the terminology makes no attempt to distinguish lineality but is bilateral in emphasis. It may be transformed to allow some recognition of filiation however by the simple suffixing of 'uli muani', from the male (on the male side), and 'uli luh' (on the female side). In this way it may be converted into a rough system to fit the needs of agnatic reference. Nor is this a formal curiosity. Although I did not enquire into ethnogenealogical methods, in collecting genealogies by open question as to kin, the results were usually bilaterally reckoned equidistant through mother and father and their parents. In what follows I shall argue for the existence of a less formally developed cognatic model. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that where it is to this alternative model that I am referring, I shall call the relevant ties cognatic or bilateral. Where however I am discussing the agnatic model I shall talk of lineal as opposed to affinal ties and shall specify if these latter are matrilateral or affinal from ego's point of view as necessary. The stated preference for patrilateral

parallel cousin marriage which would link persons both lineally and affinally does not present a serious problem. First the incidence of this is very low in Tengahpadang; second these multiplex relationships may be evaluated differently by stress upon different strands (cf. Cohen and Comaroff 1976: 95-102) depending upon the framework of interpretation adopted.

In Tengahpadang there are a number of regular occasions when sets of people are organized to carry out various different kinds of task. These may range from economic to ritual activities, but all involve a substantial amount of work, and so usually a large body of participants. There are also certain festivals held by villagers for which attendance and offerings from persons outside the household are required. The exact basis on which help is recruited,or attendance organized for religious worship, is complicated and varies significantly according to the type of event. The most important of these were documented in detail during fieldwork, to provide where possible a complete survey of participation during a given period for each household in Pisangkaja. The major economic activity, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, is the work on preparation and planting of irrigated rice. A 100% survey was carried out of the ties used during the regulated (kertamasa) cycle beginning in January 1972 from clearing stubble until the completion of planting. The part played by women in processing the main crop of rice is often ignored, but forms one of their main activities in the threshing and milling. This is commonly carried out by small teams of workers for one another or for wealthier households. The entire nexus of ties used in the first six months of 1972 was also documented. The most important regular ritual occasion when labour is required domestically is in the preparation for the annual festival (according to the Javanese-Balinese year of 210 days) for the ancestors in each house temple (odalan sanggah). At this time, whether or not the temple is a simple origin shrine (sanggah kemulan taksu) or a lineage shrine (sanggah gedé), it may attract a variable number of persons who come to present offerings and often to pray. For this, it was possible to carry out a survey of only 36 of the compound shrines, which is almost exactly a third of the total. This was stratified to ensure a reasonably balanced mixture of shrine types, compound owners and field hut dwellers,

rich and poor families, and finally of political leaders and less involved households. The results are summarized in Table 7:2. This omits less frequent ceremonies, where the number was too small to generalize, or activities like slaughtering pigs, which have been adequately discussed in other chapters. In general features it will also be apparent that these are largely similar.

There is an interesting discrepancy, with a terminological twist, between collective representations of the basis of these groupings and their actual composition. Ideally, and in common parlance, such sets are conceived of as being organized generally, whether for economic or ritual purposes, through the use of agnatic ties. The terms used in this context however, such as penyamaan or semeton, have ambiguous connotations. As we shall see in due course, they may be applied to kin reckoned cognatically or even to affines. So in public discussion, the recruitment of work ties may be expressed in the general language of descent, but range to permit the inclusion of others. Clearly, the ambiguity of the key terms raises the question of whether the inadequacy is in translation, and the composition of groupings thought of as being cognatic rather than agnatic in the first place. This is questionable on two grounds. First, when I checked such statements by specifying laterality (by the simple formula: uli muani, uli luh? on the male or female side ?) the standard, and apparently unreflective, answer was that it was, of course, on the male side. This was not uncommonly followed by a short explanation of the nature of descent for an ignorant outsider. The second reason supports this. The ideal of using agnates is, in fact, adhered to with varying zeal by some of the leading families, where once again choice comes to have wider symbolic connotations about status. It is perhaps relevant that this tendency was found in rites such as for the purification of the ricefields (ngerasakin), or for the formal visiting of another family to request the daughter in marriage (mesuaka or mepadik). By contrast to the more frequent activities examined here, these are notably public occasions where the composition of the group is open to scrutiny, whereas the former are routine or take place in the privacy of the compound.

TABLE 7:2 OVERALL RECRUITMENT TO THE MAIN WORK AND WORSHIP GROUPS IN PISANGKAJA: 1972.

Activity:	House-hold:	Agna-tes:	Non-jural patrikin:*	Affi-nes:	Neigh-bours:	Clients:	Other:	Total:
Agricultural labour:	98	69	-	168	56	52	138	581
	(16.9%)	(11.9%)	-	(28.9%)	(9.6%)	(9.0%)	(23.8%)	100.1%
Rice milling:	88	20	-	41[1]	65	-	20	234
	(37.6%)	(8.5%)	-	(17.5%)	(27.8%)	-	(8.5%)	99.9%
Ancestor shrine preparation:	103	18	6[2]	15	5	1	1	149
	(69.1%)	(12.1%)	(4.0%)	(10.1%)	(3.4%)	(0.7%)	(0.7%)	100.1%
Ancestor shrine attendance:**	-	38	62[3]	11	-	4	-	115
	-	(33.0%)	(53.9%)	(9.6%)	-	(3.5%)	-	100.0%

* This refers to agnatic kin who have married out and so are no longer jurally members of the descent line. It also includes agnatic kin who have been adopted into a different lineage.

** This refers to persons who bring offerings, maturan, to an ancestor shrine. As members of the household do not do this, they cannot be included for comparison.

1. This includes, for convenience, three instances of matrilateral kin.
2. This includes 2 agnates who have been adopted into other lineages.
3. This includes 4 agnates who have been adopted into other lineages, and 16 relatives of agnates who have married out of the lineage, and who do not belong to the household of the out-marrying person.

Note: In calculating agnatic ties, members of the same household are treated as agnates, as the task of work may be delegated to other members acting as substitutes.

The great range and variety of the types of tie which can be used by villagers emerges clearly in the organization of agricultural work groups. Three types of kin relationship are widely found. There is the source of domestic labour which not only contributes 98 out of a total of 581 ties used, that is nearly 17%, but also tends to bear a heavy share of the total work as it is the unit of consumption as well as theoretically of production. During the season studied, a total of 69 agnatic ties were called upon. These were split more or less exactly equally between compounds members (32) and non-residential agnates (35) with a mere two villagers being recruited by local clan (soroh) alone. What is more important, however, is that in all these ties constituted only some 12% of the total. They comprised less than half the number of affines, who formed the largest single category with 168 out of 581 relations used, and over one quarter of the total. Perhaps even more important, although not shown on this table, affines and sons tended to be the most often used kinsmen, commonly helping in each of the major stages of cultivation. As it is, the number of affines invited tops the combined household and agnatic support. Perhaps the most striking feature, however, is the high proportion of the work force who are not recruited by kinship at all. 246, or over 42%, ties were not between kin at all, although almost all these were confined to within the ward (see Table 5:20).[11] As might have been expected from the discussion in Chapter 5, neighbours form a source of labour, as do political clients, each contributing 9% or over, of the total. Similarly the value attributed to friends (timpal) noted in Chapter 6, receives some numerical confirmation here, for they too account for 56 out of the category of "Other" ties, or again over 9% of all ties. (The remaining component of this residual category is 51 villagers, or 8.8%, with whom there was no known tie.) So, while kin account for slightly over half of the agricultural assistance given, the lion's share falls on affines rather than upon agnatic relations.

The organization of threshing and milling which is almost exclusively a women's activity might at first sight be thought to involve quite different types of relationship. Examination, however, suggests that the distribution of ties falls fairly neatly between the male activity of agricultural labour and the joint task of ritual preparation. The proportion of work carried out by women within the household rises, perhaps unsurprisingly to slightly over a

third. Even though the category of agnates here includes for convenience ties between women married into a single compound, it is still less than half the proportion of ties recruited on the basis of affinity or matrilaterality, which accounts for some 17% of the total. Outside the domestic unit, it is interesting to note that kin ties as a whole seem to be of less importance than neighbourhood, which is responsible for over a quarter of all work relationships. This raises a more general question about the significance of kinship in the activities of women, or in their lives more widely. At first sight the organization of rice work, which accounts for a substantial proportion of time in village women's lives, seems to corroborate the popular view. Both men and women tended to emphasize that kinship as a whole was a male concern; whereas women's relationships were said to be far more localized within the household or immediate neighbourhood, apart from ties between mothers and daughters or sometimes sisters. This corresponds with the concern of girls, and their parents, that on marriage they should not move too far away. Among low castes this seems to play an important part in whether the girl and her family agree to a marriage proposal or not; whereas among high castes considerations of status and strategy tend to counterbalance this (see Tables 3:2, 3:3 and 3:4.).

These work ties are not directly connected with institutions of descent and therefore it is perhaps not entirely surprising that they fall across a broad spectrum, where interests of different kinds may influence to choice of individuals. It is instructive, then, to turn to the examination of more narrowly defined descent group contexts, epitomized in activities centering on ancestor worship. The relationships through which personnel were recruited to prepare the altars and elaborate offerings for presentation to the ancestral spirits during the rites, are laid out in Table 7:2. The independence of households which have left a compound is strikingly illustrated. The burden of work falls largely on the household of the heir to the shrines, which contributed nearly 70% of the labour ties. The other households in the compound are under no specific obligation to help, although they may choose to do so. This emerges in the 18 ties through

which agnates helped, all of which were of co-resident families. There was no single instance of a descendant of a given line assisting once the compound had split. While this fits with the account given above, nearly 20% of ties remain unaccounted for. Although they are by definition members of different lineages, almost the same number (15 or 10%) of affines and matrilateral kin turned up to help as did co-resident agnates; while there is a degree of cooperation between neighbours, supplemented by occasional assistance from clients and friends who account for the remainder. So although this is an activity concerned solely with the welfare of particular descent groups' ancestors, outside the unit immediately responsible for the conduct of the ritual, more connexions are used with villagers who are not formally members of the descent group than are.

While assistance in rites, however particular, may fall within the category of mutual help, it is the actual worship at ancestral shrines which provides the manifestation of the ties of agnation postulated by ideas of common descent from deified forefathers. As we have seen, it is primarily in ritual that such conceptual schemes are substantiated, in the absence for the most part of common interests in property or tangible resources. In view of this a close examination of the actual pattern of attendance or worship at ancestor shrines shows surprising features. There is one point which should be noted first, however. A distinction is drawn by the Balinese between the household which own the shrine and is responsible for the conduct of the whole ritual and those who bring offerings (maturan) thereby recognizing their links with the ancestors. This may take two forms. Normally it consists in bringing several trays of offerings (banten) to be presented to the deities who take the essence, (sari) leaving the material form (lungsuran) to be eaten by the worshippers. This is followed by prayer to the ancestors (mebakti) and the acceptance of holy water (tirta) from them made by a member of the household. A minority of those who attend, however, bring offerings, but for reasons to be discussed in a moment do not accept the relics of offerings or pray. The final row in Table 7:2 examines the relationship between the head of the household and the visitors to the ancestor shrine on the festival day. Household members have not been calculated in this, as they are not formally

included in maturan and their pattern of prayer during the rites is variable. This is a matter of personal predilection rather than ritual obligation, as they are represented by the head of the house.[12]

The extraordinary feature of attendance at ancestor shrines is that only one third of those bringing offerings are, jurally reckoned, agnates. The remaining visitors all belong to other lineages and are not ritually subordinate to the ancestors at all. In fact they may include women who have married into higher castes and are strictly forbidden to eat the remains of offerings to lower deities or to pray to them, although this latter is not always observed. It is this general category of persons who have left a lineage in some way, together with their kin who form the largest proportion of worshippers, 62 persons out of 115, or over 50%. Of these, 36 are women who have married into other lineages, or men who have entered nyentana unions and have the status of women. A further six worshippers belong to the households of persons who have married out of the group; while for the remainder there is a large number of married daughters and grand-daughters of the former, and other sundry kin. Besides this there are also a few villagers who were by birth members of the lineage, but who have been jurally adopted into others. Two attended themselves and two were represented by their wives. While it is clear that these various categories possess traceable ties to the ancestors of various sorts, this does not apply to the remainder. There were four political clients among the congregations assembled and further 11 affines (nearly 10% of the total). Nor were this last confined, as are clients, to the worship groups of powerful villagers, but were more or less evenly spread throughout the sample. While attendance at ancestral shrines is expressed in the language of descent relationships, it should be clear that the composition of congregations differs from the stated ideal.

The evidence raises serious questions as to the adequacy of the models so far discussed. Over half the ritual congregation consists of persons who are not members of the purusa according to the reckoning of descent in Tengahpadang. Nor are there any secondary rules or principles which recognize the right of non-lineage members to attend. The distribution of attendance draws attention to two features. First, it would seem that the

position of members of the lineage who are females (sexually or jurally) married into other families is ambiguous. Both they and adopted kin may reasonably trace ties to their lineages of birth. This further suggests that the jural and ritual incorporation on marriage and adoption, when the departing person formally takes leave of his ancestors and assumes those of his new compound, is not regarded as complete, but leaves residual links. Even allowing the substitutability of members of a household, where others attend in place of the out-going person, there are still 31 worshippers, or over a quarter of the total, who cannot trace their ties to the shrine by agnatic descent. Further elimination of clients who may be viewed, as do the Balinese, as demonstrating their subordination to their superior in dramatic ritual form, still leaves an uncomfortably large number of 'deviants'. It would be possible to dismiss these as simple aberrant instances despite the problems this involves. A second feature of the distribution of relationships in ancestor worship suggests however a more elegant solution. If these action sets are regarded not as agnatically based, but being formed on cognatic lines, the composition of worship groups appears more easily explicable. First, nine of the eleven 'affinal' ties stand to the head of the house in the relation of bilateral kin, as the marriages are in previous generations. Second a consideration of the proportion of kin who attended of the total number living within reasonable distance shows that the percentage of non-lineal kin is almost as high as that of lineal. Of a total of 46 agnatically linked households, 38 (82.6%) came to worship, while 71 (including nine 'affines' in Table 7:2) out of 98 locally resident households of cognatic kin (72.4%) managed to attend. The larger total of non-lineal kin is a product of the greater number of lines involved, as these include both parents through the mother and also the father's mother. So a simple cognatic model accounts for an overwhelming proportion of the attendance and further suggests a close correlation between this and the known extent of kin.

So the composition of work groups and even action sets for concerns which are, in theory, exclusively agnatic suggests the existence of an informal alternative model. This is not, however, confined solely to

the recruitment to temporary gatherings, but further to the tracing of ties in practice. This may be seen from a brief examination of the selection of heirs for adoption. Where there are no children, the rule is for once apparently unambiguous: "Yèning 'ten ngelah pianak, yèning pacang ngerereh waris, mangda pinih nampek sakèng purusa," if one has no child and is looking for an heir, that (it should be) the nearest from the male side (according to the purusa). Even legal theory concurs with this accepted formula in Tengahpadang, with the sole modification that proximity is not an overriding criterion, provided the heir is an agnate. Given this clear prescription, it is informative to look at the choice of relationships through which children are adopted, which is laid out in Table 7:3.

Table 7:3 The Relationship of Adopted Children to Parents in Pisangkaja.

	Agnate	Cognate (via nyen-tana)*	Cognate/ Affine	None	Total
High Castes:	6	-	-	-	6
Low Castes:	2	6	9	1	18
Total:	8	6	9	1	24

* this is the category of relationships which are in no way agnatic jurally, as they consist of the children of men who married out of the descent line in nyentana nyeburin. They are, however, connected by direct biological links between males.

While high castes adhere to the rule closely, there is marked deviation among ordinary villagers, to the point that the choice of agnates becomes marginal. Instead the majority of adoptees are chosen from non-lineal kin. These are taken more or less exactly equally from the families into which males have married out as nyentana, and daughters in ordinary fashion. Two children were further selected through affinal links, by taking the offspring of a wife's natal family. So, while high castes follow the publicly stated ideal, low castes tend to deviate substantially in preferring bilaterally

related kin or even affines. Further while the high castes resemble ordinary villagers in tending to form groupings for work or ritual according to multiple principles of inclusion; in matters where the recognition of common status is concerned, as in adoption they maintain the ideal with no contravention. So the evidence suggests strongly the existence of a countervailing model to the ideal of agnation, emphasis upon which varies according to the wider implications of the principles concerned.

This complex arrangement of ostensible ideals and partly latent alternatives is reflected in an interesting manner in terminology. It should be clear that the deviations cannot be explained in terms of the notion of purusa alone. It is equally apparent, however, that place of birth or origin, kawitan, comes closer to an appropriate image provided that this is not traced solely through jural males. It is significant therefore that the term may be used in two different senses. It applies first as an indicator of the locus of ties of purusa; but it is also used to refer to one's relation to different compounds from which all one's socially recognized forebears came and so to which one is filiated. Kawitan is thus a generally ambiguous term which refers in the first instance to agnatic origin, but which has alternative referents. So it becomes possible to state that persons attending ancestor shrines are kawitan in one sense, while their composition is by kawitan in the other. This ambiguity runs systematically through many of the Balinese terms for groups or action sets of kin, with the result that it is possible to refer to a gathering of kin by a single terminology, but recruit this according to two entirely separate models.

There are several terms for groupings of kin in Bali. These are worth a moment's inspection. The most rigorously unilineal is seturunan (from the root: turun in high, tuwun in low Balinese) to descend, an interesting parallel in analogies with English as it means literally: one descent. This is found for example in swearing oaths, where false utterance extends the risk of punishment to the entire group of male descendants in perpetuity. It is, however, very close to the class noun keturunan, referring to the category of all persons who can trace ties of filiation from a given person. This may be specified by adding sex restrictions (uli muani, uli luh, discussed above) to produce in fact a

patrilineally reckoned descent group, or a matrilineally traced group. While the possibility of this latter is therefore recognized, it seems to be of marginal importance, being mainly used to stress features in common from a single ancestress through females, such as witchcraft. The terms are however sometimes used interchangeably when referring to groups gathered on a particular occasion, so that seturunan and keturunan are confused with one another.

The other terms demonstrate equal, but different, problems. Perhaps the most used is penyamaan, which is an ill-defined word with something of the implications of 'family'. (This latter in English is now on occasions used among westernized Balinese where penyamaan was employed before.) It is often contracted to its root: nyama, which refers to older relatives, whether by birth-order or generation, and may be employed in combinations. So the standard term of address, or indeed reference to descent group members with a common temple is 'nyama maksaan', a contraction from penyamaan pemaksaan, which is thought to be too clumsy. So a non-lineal term is often used with or without a qualifier to refer to agnatic relatives. More awkwardly, it is equally the core of another common expression, nyama beraya. Beraya refers to the category of people whom one knows and treats as equals (see also Boon 1977: 125), so nyama beraya justaposes the term for kin and for equals. In Tengahpadang it is used as a term to designate fellow-members of the ward with the implications that they are both equal and like kin, according to fairly standard local exegesis. There is a further interesting interpretation of these terms to which I shall return in the conclusion.

The evidence for the argument that there is a latent bilateral model underlying Balinese kinship ideas is not based purely on the inspection of action sets. It is also founded in terminology. The words lingsehan and seterehan are both used to refer to a cognatic category and again may be used in ritual contexts, here for cursing. Lingseh is a single ear of padi with all its seeds, grown from a single seed. This extends to include at least third cousins, after which precise reckoning of ties is thought to be unknown; at which point the term changes to wargi, distant kin (without

the hierarchical implications attributed to it in Tabanan, Boon 1977: 125). Between these there is a further category called tigehan traced to fourth cousins (mindon ping tiga, literally second cousins times three) of relevance for contributions to major rites, such as tooth-filing marriage and cremation. None of these terms in Tengahpadang takes on unilineal implications, but refer normally to kin reckoned cognatically. Bilateral principles of reckoning are clearly understood in all these, but there is no general term to refer to such a principle in Tengahpadang, the nearest being laad, literally traces, to designate all non-lineal ties. It may not be irrelevant that the only sanskrit term here, purusa, is the only one which is unambiguously unilineal; while all the austronesian terms from kawitan through have bilateral connotations in some way.

This brief examination of terminology tends to bear out the ethnographic material on the use to which kinship ties are put in practice. In general groups show a strong bias towards the inclusion of bilaterally reckoned kin and affines in all work. More surprising, the congregations formed for ancestor worship include a high proportion of ex-lineage members and their descendants, together with bilateral kin. This may be, and indeed is, expressed by the participants in a terminology which incorporates substantial ambiguities. The terms used to designate and recruit agnatic kin also extend to include other categories of person. The neat circumscription of recruitment to ancestor worship groups, together with the field of reference of common kin terms suggests that, rather than see the deviation as unordered, it represents a shift towards an alternative model evident in both terminology and action. The alternatives were clearly apparent in a contrast between high and low caste choices of kin for adoption, where patrilineal models stood opposed to cognatic. During the discussion, little attention was paid to the place of affines, or even unrelated persons, who form part of the congregation or gathering for most work groups. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I would like therefore to look at the place of marriage in village society and to see whether it throws any light on the nature of these models, and how the choice involved in marriage links kinship to other fields of social differentiation.

The Place of Marriage:

For various reasons marriage is a complicated subject in Bali. On the one hand, it forms part of the study of formal kinship logic, on the other, as an exchange it links kinship to wider social contexts. The former lies outside the immediate scope of this work and raises problems of its own. As I shall try to show in the following, and final, section it is useful to distinguish analytically between formal preferences and their interpretation within a framework of meaning and action. So it is at marriage as a relationship of exchange that I would like to look briefly. In particular I would like to explore two aspects: the choice of partners and the conditions under which alliances, in a loose sense, are forged. In the absence of prescriptive rules, the possibilities are open for Balinese to marry various categories of agnates and kin. As these have attributes other than their kinship status, there may be different sets of criteria which cut across one another. Further it is possible to lay emphasis upon the exchange involved in marriage and the conditions under which it takes place, which may qualify the nature of the value exchanged. The extent of choice therefore results in marriage having significance within a broader framework of culturally recognized values. Some of these seem to be connected logically with models of kinship in ways which will be examined towards the end of the chapter.

Before turning to the ethnography from Tengahpadang, it is useful to review briefly the arguments which have been put forward to account for the stated marriage preferences of the Balinese. The classical view is that marriage to the patrilateral parallel cousin, real or classificatory, is the ideal; while sister-exchange and hypogamy are banned. These were incorporated neatly by the Geertzes into their model of the optative formation of groups focused on common origin. The greater the emphasis laid on corporate kin groups, the greater the concern with endogamy both for reasons of status and cohesion. So marriage to the father's brother's daughter was one pole of a scale of increasing kin distance between spouses and simultaneously of declining marriage preference, by which marriage within the lineage was better than within the local temple group, then within the community than with outsiders. The heirarchical implications were

developed further among high castes, while the taking of women of other groups could be included within an ideal of hypergamy, but the loss of women had hypogamous connotations (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 117-52). The stated prohibition on sister-exchange may be viewed as an extension of this, as it prevents the mutual exchange of women even between close kin. This general argument has, however, been criticized by Boon on the grounds that it ignores the importance of extra-descent group marriage, especially among low castes (Boon 1977: 119-44). Nonetheless their material provides a clear example of a coherent system, which as we have seen may be incorporated within a wider framework.

The other main recent author on Balinese kinship is Boon. He proposes a tripartite set of positive marriage standards: sacred (descent group endogamous), romantic (exogamous elopements by mock capture) and strategic (inter-temple political) unions, as a single field of alternatives. It is into sacred marriage that cousin unions fit. He argues that the mythic marriage of twin brother and sister forms an ideal forbidden to men, except to very elevated high caste families, the nearest alternative being the father's brother's daughter. He notes, however, that this may be regarded, as I pointed out, as a dangerous, "hot" union (1977: 136-40) and so in practice a weaker form, marriage to the second collateral on the father's side, is commonly regarded as safer - the model being one of proximity to a sacred, but dangerous, ideal. This is not the place for a detailed exposition of these ideas which are highly interesting. They pose certain problems, however, which are relevant to the present argument. First, his triangle of positive marriage standards (1977a: 121-30) is neither necessarily exclusive nor exhaustive, as we shall see when we turn to the ethnography.[13] Second his view of sister-exchange and the mutual exchange of women being forbidden is neither borne out by the ethnography from Tengahpadang, nor does it fit other parts of his argument. If ideal patrilateral parallel cousin marriage is followed through with any degree of system, the ties in ascending generations become multiple, so a parallel cousin may equally be a cross cousin traced by a different route. Most seriously, however, his argument about sacred marriage faces the awkward problem that, while in the purusa the first cousin is considered dangerous and the

second cousin less so, the analogy of diminishing sacredness does not work, as the third cousin is again dangerous, the fourth reasonable and so forth, as Boon notes but does not develop further (1977: 132).[14] My point, however, is simply that internal contradictions in preferences and prohibitions, together with the extent of ethnographic variation, make it difficult to construct simple general models. It would appear that there may be different preferences within a single area and that rules may be emphasized, ignored or argued away, depending upon the model of kinship which is dominant in a particular place, or among a particular group.

This survey has necessarily been very brief, and so somewhat simplistic but it provides a useful background to the examination of the ethnography from Tengahpadang. While the various preferences discussed all occur in some form, their status may change in different contexts; and in many instances the stated ideals occur marginally, or appear to be avoided. The comparison with the Geertzes' community of Tihingan is instructive. For both there and in Pisangkaja, villagers are differentiated according to membership of different corporate groups based on descent. Yet the former shows a high proportion of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage and descent group endogamy; whereas in Pisangkaja the evidence suggests that this is of marginal importance. This may be seen from a glance at Table 7:4. In Tihingan, marriage with the actual father's brother's daughter accounts for 7.4% of all unions, and with second and third agnatic collaterals for a further 7%. In contrast, in Pisangkaja there were only six jural patrilateral parallel cousin marriages out of 418 unions, (or 1.4%), while there was only one between second and third agnatic collaterals (or 0.2% - if 2 unions which were also with MBD are included, this rises to a total of 3, or 0.7%). To this might be added a further 3 diverse close agnatic marriages, which brings the grand total to 10, or 2.4%, as against 14.4% for Tihingan (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 96), that is 6 times larger than in Pisangkaja. These figures raise questions about the view that second cousins in the male line are necessarily preferred. The incidence of marriage is lower than for first cousins, despite their greater number (and there was no single instance of such unions between third cousins). There is also a problem with the argument that father's brother's daughter marriage is undertaken only by

TABLE 7:4 Close Kin Marriages of High and Low Castes Reckoned Jurally and by Sex in Pisangkaja.
(based on all unions with at least one partner still living: total of 418 marriages)

Union:	High Caste		Low Caste		Total			
	Jural	Sexual	Jural	Sexual	Jural	%	Sexual	%
Father's brother's daughter:	2	2	4	6	6	10.5%	8	14.0%
Mother's brother's daughter:	5	4	4	4	9	15.8%	8	14.0%
Father's sister's daughter:	-	-	2	3	2	3.5%	3	5.3%
Mother's sister's daughter:	-	1	6	3	6	10.5%	4	7.0%
Other first collateral agnates:*	2	3	1	1	3	5.3%	4	7.0%
Other first collateral kin:*	2	1	7	7	9	15.8%	8	14.0%
Father's father's brother's son's daughter:	-	(2)	1	5	1	1.8%	5	8.8%
Other second collateral kin:**	1	1	20	16	21	36.8%	17	29.8%
Totals:	12	12	45	45	57	100.0%	57	99.9%

* This is a loose category which includes the following: marriage of kin with a common grandparent, through a grandmother (misan di cambera) or grandfather (misan lèn dadong) who married twice; marriage to the child of a first collateral, a permitted misgeneration union known as ngempu raré, to nurse a child; finally an odd union ostensibly of a man with his father's second wife's daughter, effectively a sibling marriage (made by NE1). As the father was an in-marrying nyentana and the daughter was adopted, this was not as close as might at first seem.

** This includes, apart from mixed second cousin marriages, misgeneration marriages with second collaterals.

individuals whose spiritual superiority is thought adequate to combat the mystical dangers. It is the case that such unions were contracted by leading families (most notably NE1; NE18; NW7; SW3; SE3; SE17, see Table 7:9 for full data) but this was almost invariably between the most timid and ineffectual children who acceded to their parents proposals (atepang rerama see below) and lacked the courage to elope. Such marriages seemed to be more a reflection of reputation-building by powerful families than an acknowledgement of mystical concerns, at least in Tengahpadang.

There is, however, one problem which deserves closer investigation. So far I have been discussing marriages between kin related through males, through ties which are not just sexually traced, but also involve the appropriate jural status. The high proportion of men in Tengahpadang who marry out of the household with the status of women, means that it is useful to note the differences between those marriages which involve the recognition of ties traced biologically and those traced with reference to the jural status of antecedent generations. These are laid out separately in Table 7:4. As none of the patrilateral parallel cousin unions discussed above are traced through ties consisting of women as jural males, the paragraph stands correct (as we shall see however the opposite is common). There is, however, a substantial difference in the frequency with which sexually and jurally reckoned unions occur. For example, there were six instances among low castes of marriage traced by sex with the father's brother's daughter; but only four of these constituted a lineage endogamous unions, as the other two involved men marrying out of the lineage in nyentana marriages. This figure is more striking still for second collaterals on the male side, where 4 of the 5 sexually traced ties were through out-marrying men. The result is that the frequency of ideal patrilateral marriages involving lineage endogamy appears far higher than it is. By this means, some appearance of following public preference is kept, while in practice minimizing its occurrence. Among low castes, the incidence of all forms of jural patrilateral cousin marriage (5 cases) is less than half the ostensible number (11 cases). There is another aspect to this. The difference suggests the value placed on linking the

families of out-marrying males back with the original line, despite their lack of jural position within the lineage.[15] Allowing a slight bias for unions where there is a positive preference, it will be apparent that the frequency of cousin marriage tends to be equally distributed, so that the incidence in Pisangkaja suggests that the designation of kin marriage in practice should rather be between any kin than among agnates in particular.

There are one or two points which are worth noting about the difference in frequency with which certain marriages occur, especially between castes. Granted that they comprise less than 20% of the population, high castes tend to an agnatic model more closely than do commoners. They also avoid the marriage to father's sister's daughter which returns a woman to the group from which she came and so would connote equality between descent lines. The importance of this proscription seems noticeably less among low castes. The informal preference stated by villagers for non-lineal kin marriage is borne out to a fair degree by the evidence; especially in marriages linking kin who do not belong to lineages standing in the relationship of having given women to one another in the previous generations. The sample is so small however that fractional differences are best treated with caution and emphasis laid instead on the remarkable scatter of marriages with kin in a wide range of categories among low castes in contrast to high. So the unit of preferred marriage in practice seems to be close to an agnatic group among aristocrats, but within a category of kin reckoned cognatically for commoners.

This difference is reflected more strikingly still in an examination of the overall pattern of marriage within Pisangkaja presented in detail in Table 7:5. This lays out the relationship between marital partners and the frequency with which this is correlated with different kinds of exchange arrangement. The table is divided into four sections, in order to be able to distinguish marriage within categories which recognize the same status from those between categories. Among high castes this is by title, whereas among low it extends to the whole caste category of sudra (or jaba, outsiders). Hypergamous and hypogamous unions will be considered in more detail in Chapter 8; my main concern here is to examine and contrast high caste

Table 7:5 Kin Status of Partners and Form of Marriage in Pisangkaja.
(based on unions with at least one partner still living: total 418.
The temple group is the local clan; dadiya the wider title group.)

Same Caste High-High	temple + kin	dadiya + kin	kin only	temple only	dadiya only	no tie	total
agreed	10	5	-	8	11	-	34
eloped	2	-	-	6	3	-	11
forced	5	-	-	-	-	-	5
	17	5	-	14	14	-	50
Hypergamy: High-High & High-Low							
agreed	-	1	-	-	4	5	10
eloped	-	-	3	-	2	17	22
capture	-	-	1	-	-	1	2
puri orders	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	-	1	4	-	6	24	35
Hypogamy: High-High & Low-High							
eloped	-	1	2	-	-	6	9
puri orders	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
caught in flagrante	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	-	1	2	-	-	9	12
Total for high castes	(17)	(7)	(6)	(14)	(20)	(33)	(97)
Same Caste: Low-Low							
agreed	16	1	45	21	3	74	160
eloped	6	-	12	6	2	74	100
capture	1	1	3	3	-	11	19
mock capture	1	-	3	2	-	4	10
forced	10	1	6	-	-	9	26
puri orders	-	-	2	-	-	2	4
caught in flagrante	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	34	3	71	32	5	176	321
Grand Total:	51	10	77	46	25	209	418
	12.2%	2.4%	18.4%	11.0%	6.0%	50.0%	100.0%

As marriage exchange is negotiable, this table is only approximate

Table 7:6 The Frequency of Approved Marriages in Pisangkaja.*
(based on material from Table 7:5)

Relation of Partners:	Low Caste No.	%		High Caste** No.	%
Clan tie only:***	26	13.3%	28.1%	23	46.9%
Clan and known kin tie:	29	14.8%		21	42.9%
Kin tie but no clan tie:	54	27.6%	42.3%	-	-
No tie:	87	44.4%		5	10.2%
Totals:	196	100.1%		49	100.0%

* Approved tie is taken here to mean marriages to which the parental generation has agreed on both sides. This consists of marriages which are listed in Table 7:5 as: agreed, mock capture and forced. The significance of these terms is discussed below.

** In order to compute the distribution of high caste marriage which are approved, it is necessary to extend the sample to include hypergamous marriages, as some of these are agreed to. No hypogamous marriage falls into this category. It would, of course, be possible to add hypergamous marriages equally to the low caste totals, but this would misrepresent the balance in exchange.

***This table uses the widest possible unit, the dadiya, clan or title group. This is in part for strict comparability between high and low castes. For low castes the unit should perhaps be the local temple group, as examination of the few cases in question suggested that the clan status was marginal to villagers' concerns. Therefore in the text the figures and proportions are also given by excluding the columns labelled "dadiya" and "dadiya and kin" in Table 7:5.

Table 7:7 The Connexion between Clan Endogamy and Approval of the Marriage in Pisangkaja.
(for low caste unions only)

	marriage within the clan	marriage outside the clan	total
Approved	55	141	196
Disapproved	19	100	119
Total	74	241	315

By X^2 test, approval is significantly more likely within the clan than without at 2.5%

Table 7:8 The Connexion between Kin Endogamy and Approval of the Marriage in Pisangkaja.
(for low caste unions only)

	marriage between kin	marriage where no known kin ties*	totals
Approved	83	113	196
Disapproved	23	96	119
Totals	106	209	315

* This refers to known genealogical ties, but excludes local clan or wider group ties.

According to X^2 tests, approval of marriage is significantly more likely than where no known ties of kinship exist. The test is highly significant statistically at 0.1%.

marriage patterns and low, for these emphasize the different spread of approved ties and so may be linked to the argument about the indigenous models of kinship.

In considering the frequency of marriages of villagers linked by different kinds of tie, it is important to note that not all of these meet with the approval of the parental generation, that is those with authority in familial and descent group affairs. The forms of exchange will be discussed in more detail shortly. It is necessary here to note two features. First, that the form of arrangement in marriage exchange is not always beyond dispute and is subject to rival claims of the two sides. So Tables 7:5 and 7:6 are only approximate - the main unions over which there was disagreement as to their circumstances are given in Table 7:9; but there is clearly sufficient consensus as to make study worthwhile with a certain amount of caution. Second, certain marriage forms indicate parental agreement and are listed as "agreed", "mock capture" and "forced", the remainder generally connote that one or both sets of parents objected to, and actively opposed, the union. In discussion, it will be useful therefore to contrast the main forms of agreement with 'capture' and 'elopement' which are the main circumstances under which girls are married in the face of parental protest, the other categories being marginal. There is one further problem. Even where there is agreement, this is open to two different interpretations. On the one hand, family elders may actively encourage or even initiate a marriage; on the other they may disapprove but be constrained in expressing this where the relationships between the parties makes public discord unseemly. This is particularly common within descent groups, where to refuse permission to marry is effectively to deny the moral bonds between agnates. As Table 7:7 shows, approval of a marriage is significantly more likely if the partners are from the same clan than if they are not. The union is more likely still to be approved if the persons involved are kin, regardless of whether they are of the same clan, as Table 7:8 shows, even though there is not the same public pressure. In neither case is it possible to be certain of private reasons; but this is only partly relevant as we are

principally concerned here with public acceptance or refusal, with the implications which it has for relationships between actors or social groups.

With these problems in mind, it is interesting to return to Table 7:5. Among high castes, it will be clear that, even allowing for hypergamous and hypogamous marriages with lower castes, the frequency of clan endogamy of all kinds is far higher at 59.8% than among low castes, where it is less than half this at 23.1%. Nor are all these unions approved, despite the pressures to accede to marriage within the descent group. 11 (or 22% of) marriages within the same clan took place where the couple were obliged to elope, among high caste families. A similar proportion is found among low castes, where 19 out of 74 marriages within the clan, or 25.7%, were disapproved of. This raises the question as to whether it is possible to account for the pattern of public approval of marriage simply in terms of considerations of common descent group membership, or common status, if close on one in four unions of this sort reach the point that descent group solidarity is ignored and opposition openly expressed. So, while high castes show a far more marked tendency to marry within wider title groups or clans (dadiya) than do low castes, approval of such unions is far from automatic. It would seem that other factors are involved beyond simple common membership of descent groups and the shared status which this confers.

The questions which were raised earlier in the chapter as to whether descent groups provide the sole, or main, model for the organization of kinship and marriage reappear here. While high castes tend to adhere to rules of descent group endogamy, less than a quarter of low caste unions are within the clan and only one in five, approved or otherwise, takes place within the local temple group. So descent group endogamy accounts for a minority of marriages. This invites the question of whether there is any other form of relationship within which marriage occurs frequently. An inspection of Table 7:6, which details the distribution of approved low caste marriages, shows certain suggestive features. Marriage within the wider clan, where no traceable ties exist, accounts for only 26 cases, or 13.3% (for the local temple alone and omitting dadiya ties, this drops to 23 cases or 12%) almost exactly the same as between clansmen who are also kin with

29 instances or 14.8% (27, or 14.1% within the local temple). In stark contrast to this, the number of marriages between kinsmen who have no agnatic tie at all is 54, or 27.6%, which by itself is over a quarter of all approved unions (omitting dadiya ties, the percentage rises to 28.3%). In other words, kin unions whether within the descent group or not, comprise 42.3% of the total, that is nearly half; in contrast to descent group ties which account for barely 28%. So the total number of descent group marriages, whether between kin or not, is effectively the same as the proportion of extra-lineal kin ties alone. Among low castes then, villagers agree publicly to marriage as often where there are only cognatic kin ties, as where there are bonds of common temple, or clan, membership; while kinship alone accounts for a far higher proportion of approved unions than do descent group ties. It would appear then that commoners recognize a bilateral kindred in so far as they are prepared to agree publicly to marriages within this category as often as they do between agnates. In fact, it may be argued that, as over 3 out of 4 (76.1%) approved marriages with some pre-existing tie are between known kin, it is cognation rather than descent which provides the dominant model for kin endogamy.

While this may help to account for the pattern of approval in kin unions of all types, the discussion still remains seriously incomplete. Almost half (44.4% in Table 7:6; 45.5% if dadiya are excluded) the marriages to which ordinary villagers agree publicly are between persons with no descent or bilateral kin ties at all. The villagers themselves offer a view which is a possible explanation not only of this, but also of the problem left unaccounted for earlier as to why some descent group endogamous unions are vetoed by families. In private certain men are prepared to concede that wealth is the critical factor in the approval of senior family members. Parents are concerned that their daughters should marry into households which can provide for them; while the wealthier rebut the attempts of poorer families to place their children more fortunately. Exceptions to this occur not so much through the need to engage in ideal forms of marriage as, with the preference for marrying within a small geographical area, the pool of available partners is small

and so richer families are thought then to be prepared to accept in-marrying persons, men or women, who are noted for their hard work and modest requirements. In this, it is not so much the household itself which is important but rather the family as a whole. In a small number of instances, this extends beyond the compound where these remain so closely allied that they are seen as sharing resources. This happens in four families: NE15 & 16; NW11 & NW22; SW3, SW4 & NW25;[16] and finally SW8 & 9. It is possible to test this popular formulation of marriage preference for marriages where the wealth of the parties is known precisely. As this is a strategic folk model, I have followed the criteria which they use: riceland and dry fields (estimated at half the value of the former) and salary for the few villagers with secure, permanent employment such as officials and priests). The results are highly suggestive. For marriages which were approved by parents, there was a correlation with the amount of wealth, ignoring the linked compounds mentioned above, which was significant at 5%.[17] Allowing a token 25% of the wealth owned by those linked compounds, the correlation was significant at 0.1%! It would appear then that villagers' views are largely substantiated, even to the point of their observations on closely related compounds which act as a joint family. Wealth appears to be an important consideration in marriage choice and the extension of parental approval.

It would seem to follow then that both wealth and kinship play important parts in determining actual marriage preferences among low castes. This raises the final question of the extent to which, in kin unions, it is wealth rather than descent or kinship that influences the conferment of approval. Returning to the approved marriages where wealth is known, but restricting these to kin unions shows a correlation between approval and wealth, even without adjustment for linked compounds, which is significant at 0.5%, using Spearman's Rank Correlation test.[18] The number of cases of common descent without known kin ties was too small for testing, but the connexion between the wealth of the partners in the few instances was exceptionally close. Similar trends occur on comparing relatively equality of wealth with approval or objection for kin marriages. Nor is the picture different for tests on the effect of descent group ties on approval.[19] In each

test it is wealth rather than descent or kinship, where these do not coincide, which tends to emerge as the dominant factor in determining which marriages meet with, or will be proclaimed with, approval. This raises an interesting problem. How does it come to be that both wealth and kinship seem to play a part in establishing marriage preference? The answer which is possible at this stage must remain somewhat speculative. If villagers marry those who belong to the same economic stratum, then in the next generation, as the landed wealth of families on the whole changes reasonably slowly, those with similar resources are likely to consist in no small part of affines (cognatic kin to the succeeding generation). The significance of this possibility will emerge more fully in the final section in the consideration of whether the model which is alternative to descent is based ultimately on cognation or features beyond kinship altogether.

So the evidence from Pisangkaja suggests that the preferences in the choice of marital partners are more complex than ideal statements imply and do not rest easily within a framework ot agnatic descent. The contrasting models referred to earlier are reflected in part in the difference between high and low caste marriage patterns, as these tend towards the dominance of different forms. Among aristocrats, marriage is predominantly within the descent group (Table 7:5); while traditional political alliances within a region or kingdom, and concern for preserving the integrity of status leads to geographical dispersal of ties (Table 3:3). Among ordinary villagers, by contrast, descent group endogamy is overshadowed by preferences for marriages with kin or according to economic considerations. These positive tendencies bear an interesting relationship to different models of kinship. Descent stresses the difference between insiders and outsiders, either as a categorical distinction or by progressive differentiation. The incorporation of outsiders causes problems. As we saw they are neither included completely in ideology or practice until death (as the ancestor worship congregations showed). Further they may emphasize lines of cleavage within the compound and create differences of status between agnates: both as in ideal terms they constitute a union inferior to descent group endogamy, and as according to indigenous theories of conception they may lower the status of their children.[20] Marriage within the descent group

therefore avoids the dangers, practical, metaphysical and logical of taking in outsiders, while marriage with agnates serves further to reticulate the group and counter fissive tendencies. In the version of the model which stresses differentiation of descent lines, complications of status arise. This is reflected in Pisangkaja in the absence of father's sister's daughter marriage among high castes, who adhere more closely to this model of descent, and to the complex of endogamous unions with which it is associated. The alternative model of an unclearly bounded bilateral kindred would appear to be linked with entirely different preferences. Marriage with kin produces multiple converging ties, where choice of the alliance is also reaffirmed. Kin, or affines, provide the reliable core of help in work (Table 7:2) and general support (see Chapter 9). This is strengthened by the preference for local marriage (Table 3:4) which produces a pool of kin who are close socially and geographically.[21] Alternatively, this model may be expressed in terms of economic strategies in marriage of one's children as well as possible. If this is carried through as systematically as tests suggest, the result is endogamy within an economic stratum, which overlaps with a kindred the less the change of fortunes. It would appear then that there is a tendency for different forms of marriage preference to be connected to different models of kinship.

The Significance of Marriage as an Exchange:

In the last section we examined some of the factors involved in assessing the relative value of different potential partners for the purposes of marriage alliances in Balinese village society. It became apparent that considerations of status, work assistance, wealth and possibly such structural concerns as *reticulating existing kin relations played a part* in determining the relative desirability of partners. From another point of view, however, it was noted that approval of marriage had a public face as well as a private one; so that endorsement or refusal of invitations of marriage were choices within a system of values, such that the actors' decisions carried significance beyond the mere personal approval or not

of a particular tie. The emphasis upon the symbolic nature of choice, which has been discussed in previous chapters, is highly developed in marriage and elaborated into an explicit terminology. There are two aspects of this of some importance. First the various forms of marriage arrangement carry different moral implications which reflect upon the reputation and status of the families concerned. Second, marriage analytically constitutes an exchange in Bali, in the sense that a person, but rarely goods, are transferred between two parties who subsequently stand in a named relationship. This will be discussed in more detail below, for it involves the question of the relative status of those who give and receive. Accordingly there are different possible interpretations of the relationship and it is in the implications of recognition or denial of exchange that part of the complexity of Balinese marriage arrangements lie. Finally it will be recalled that it is useful to distinguish two dimensions of exchange: value given and received, and the circumstances under which exchanges occur or not. As both aspects are involved in each exchange, the question of value, or often status in Bali, is influenced by features, such as power, independent of the objects exchanged. The presence of choice of partners and the form of exchange imbues marriage with symbolic connotations over and above tactical considerations. It is to the various facets of this problem that I would like to turn in this section.

There are several recognized and named forms of marriage exchange found in Tengahpadang, each with its own special significance. The villagers lay emphasis upon the moral aspects of this, although as we shall see their ideas permit of interpretation in practice in a number of different ways. The different forms of marriage arrangement are systematically distinguished in terms of the parties who agree to, or dissent from, exchanges. So, as in the discussion of voluntary associations, there is concern with the freedom of choice and its moral value. Marriages may therefore be graded according to the extent of agreement between the parties concerned or the amount of force involved. This is not merely an academic distinction for the circumstances are recalled long after and may have far broader repercussions. In order to understand how this works, it is useful to examine each of the

named forms in turn and their significance to the villagers in Tengahpadang.

There is general consensus as to the ideal marriage arrangement. This is known as mepadik (to go officially to ask for someone's hand in marriage), or popularly in Tengahpadang in a form which stresses the self-abasement (ngesor) in the approach known as mesuwaka, to beg, supplicate or look for something urgently. In this form, the parents on both sides agree to the marriage, adung-adungan rerama (agreement between elder relatives). This form shades into another: atepang rerama, where the families on both sides force their children into marriages against their wills in order to cement an alliance. This is normally found among wealthier or more powerful families, where children are pushed either into father's brother's daughter unions (in all but one instance - between Cokorda - these were by atepang rerama in Pisangkaja) or strategic marriages between rich compounds. It is also only among such households that the necessary threats are available to coerce cooperation and such marriages meet with general open disapproval among villagers. The mode of eliciting the difference between these is illuminating. The question normally asks if the marriage were good, luwung. To an affirmative reply, there is a further enquiry as to whether the couple were happy with one another, pada-pada demen. So mepadik is classified as a good marriage, as all parties agree. For this reason it is common for unions forced by parents to be represented as such when discussing the matter in public. To the positive evaluation of mepadik (or mesuwaka) should be added the implication that the parties consent to the statement of the status relations between them. The difficulty will emerge later, however, that there are different possible interpretations of this relationship, which introduces a degree of negotiability. It remains that this is the proper form of marriage, except between castes. So it is the aim of families wishing to present themselves to the world as good villagers that the majority, or ideally all, their marriages should be of this form. Despite the pressures a fair proportion maintain (or better perhaps maintain that they maintain) the ideal. This may be seen from Table 7:9 which sums up the claimed form of marriages for each compound in Pisangkaja.

The most common alternative form of marriage to mepadik, and one which serves as a check on attempts by parents to force through undesired matches, is elopement. This is widely known in Bali as ngerorod, to flee. In Tengahpadang, however, this refers to the rite of separation by which the couple each leave their natal compounds and go to a third unrelated one, as they enter a state of mild ritual impurity. Elopement is known here simply as melaib, to run away. The man is said to steal the girl, ngemaling anak luh.[22] As any other form of theft it is a bad act against the victim as it denies the proper social relations between them. Inversely, the girl is said to mekidihang awak, to give herself (in low Balinese; nyerahang raga for high castes). Apart from the connotation of throwing oneself away as a woman, the idiom of theft is extremely apposite, as it raises the question of whether an exchange has really taken place from the point of view of the participants. It is therefore commonly found where the differences between families is such that they cannot both agree to the union of the grounds of discrepancies in wealth, status or personal emnity. The symbolism is carried further in marriage between castes. Except between Cokorda and Anak Agung who belong to the same clan, agreement is theoretically impossible (see Table 7:5, the five cases of agreement where there is no tie were mainly between poor Pradéwa and commoners). So marriage is phrased in terms of elopement regardless of the informal approval or not of the girl's parents.[23] That this is a means of minimizing the relationship of in-laws emerges in the ritual in marriage traditionally found between high castes (notably Anak Agung and Cokorda) and commoners, where the girl is married not to the man, but to a pillar (adegan) in his compound and visiting the girl's parents or ancestral shrine is ignored. The classification of such unions as elopement suggests that this may have connotations of minimizing the emphasis upon the exchange involved.

There is a very important form of marriage, even if not very often encountered, which seems to take this denial of relationship and elevate it to the point that the form becomes as important as the tie which it denies. It is often stated that true marriage by capture in Bali is illegal (sometimes with the implication that this is a recent change, e.g. Boon 1977: 121;

although royal edicts and village laws suggest that this was, in theory at least, severely punished in the past). This is a confusion between what ought to be and what is. In fact it would seem to be the illegality of the forcible seizure and abduction of a woman against her will, foreshadowed in the myth of the Ramayana in the rape of Sita by the demonic king of Sri Lanka, which gives this marriage part of its special significance. Such marriages normally take place by the suitor supported by a body of strong, or even armed, young men seizing a girl and taking her to his compound, or to a place of hiding. She will be detained there forcibly if necessary by the men remaining around the walled hut in which she is kept. It is not uncommon for women under these circumstances to cause extensive damage to the hut in their efforts to escape. So this is quite distinct from the tame elopement, which may be referred to as capture for reasons of saving face, reported elsewhere (Boon 1977: 121-7 Geertz and Geertz 1975: 109-13), and has different implications.

It is necessary to distinguish two types of capture, as do villagers. For although in action the two appear similar, they have markedly different consequences for social relationships. The first is an extreme form of atepang rerama, the second may be designated as capture in a more serious sense. Where a girl steadfastly rejects the advances of a suitor whom her parents think suitable, recourse to more violent means of persuasion is possible, especially between rich families or where the alliance is felt to be particularly desirable. As there is the danger that the girl may elope given the chance, her parents may secretly connive with the suitor, or give him to understand that there will be little more than token resistance if he carries her off. This is generally known in Tengahpadang as ngambis, from the root: ambis, to pull or take by force. The violence stems from the resistance of an individual to an otherwise socially desirable union.

The position in true marriage by capture, melegandang, is somewhat different. This is normally understood as being against the wishes of both the girl and her family, so the violence constitutes and infringement of the rights of other villagers and a direct confrontation.

(Where a girl is simply seized and the parents subsequently decide that this is a suitable union ex post facto, villagers normally classified this as ngambis. It is the conflict between families which is crucial.) This capture and rape is liable to provoke retaliation, apart from being against ward regulations. The offended family is entitled to summon the police who, in Tengahpadang, are on permanent duty in the settlement. In view of this it is necessary to explain why there are at least twenty cases from Pisangkaja alone (the figures vary slightly depending upon the claims of unions to be by capture, mock capture or parental force, as we shall see), why it may well be successful, and why outside intervention is infrequent. I shall argue that it is the illegality and conspicuous demonstration of superiority over others, together with its denial of the exchange involved in marriage, which makes this union a powerful symbol.

There are two highly uncommon forms of marriage which deserve brief mention. Secret liaisons between young people are not infrequent, although not openly endorsed. The veil of tactful ignorance which normally descends on such goings-on may be deliberately lifted where there is hostility, and the family or ward is called upon to apprehend the couple in flagrante delicto hence the name of kedapetan, to be caught. The procedure is usually for the couple to be forced into instant marriage which serves not only to maintain the semblance of public decency but as a sanction which involves the ridicule and shame of the couple. Two boys from Pisangkaja were caught in this way by Br. Siklod who objected to the ingression of outsiders. Similarly, when I Kebet (NW8), a celebrated orator with communist leanings, was caught committing adultery with the wife of a Cokorda (NE2), they were married on the spot, so out-casting the girl and shaming the man for being too bold, wanèn - the aim of the operation. The court may also directly involve itself in the affairs of villagers, normally in the interests of public morality. As Table 7:9 shows, the family of the prince (NE1) have stepped in where the activities of flighty girls have become too blatant and the families powerless to control them, a most humiliating condition. So, for example, a servant, I Cedor (SW15) was ordered to marry two sisters from NW5; and another, I Geledet (SW23),

to take a high caste servant girl in the court. The court ordering hypogamy appears at first surprising. Such girls are, however, unlikely to be acceptable to any high caste man, as they are permanently polluted and their low status is confirmed by down-grading and being dissociated from the family.

So villagers in Tengahpadang recognize a number of different forms that marriage exchanges may take which vary in the extent of freedom of choice or coercion and whom this affects. This is summarized for convenience in Diagram 7:1 below. The extent of the agreement of the male's

Diagram 7:1 Terminology of Marriage Exchange and Agreement

	girl	girl's parents	boy	boy's parents
general agreement (mepadik)	agree	agree	agree	agree
mock capture (ngambis)	x	agree	agree	agree
arranged (forced) (atepang rerama)	x	agree	x	agree
elopement (melaib)	agree	x	agree	(agree)
capture (melegandang)	x	x	agree	(agree)

parents is moot in certain forms and is indicated in parentheses. Obviously, where no one agrees no marriage is contemplated. The frequency with which these various types of exchange are claimed to occur by the families concerned is given in Table 7:9, together with the instances where there is dispute between villagers.[24] Agreement emerges as the most common form, followed by elopement. The frequency with which different forms of exchange occur vary between families. Generally there is a connexion between the standing of a family and the form of marriages which it contracts, in part because the standing is calculated by others by reference to marriage. The higher the proportion of general agreement and the less the frequency of elopement, the more proper

TABLE 7:9 THE DISTRIBUTION OF MARRIAGES BY COMPOUND IN PISANGKAJA.
(based upon marriages with at least one partner living)

	No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy:		Marriage Form:							Mobility:				Comments:
				DG	Kin	a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	
P	NE1	Cok. Putera	Cokorda	4	3	3	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	
*	NE2	Cok. Jangji	Cokorda	11	3	7	6	-	-	1	-	1	8	2	-	-	girl caught in flagrante with orator from NW8
o	NE3	Degdeg	Pulosari	4	3	2	6	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl married Anak Agung claimed c but mc with NW7
	NE4	Dw.Md.Gempol	Pradéwa Jati	3	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	
	NE5	Kénak	Cameng	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NE6	Togog	Gèlgèl/ Kayu Selem	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	capture of girl from Tengah-padang
	NE7	Ni Repun	Chinese	-	-	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	chinese married balinese girl
	NE8	Dada	Pulosari	2	2	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	capture of FBSD from SW22
	NE9	A.A.Anom	Anak Agung	7	3	5	4	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	2	-	girl ran away with balinese in Bangli
	NE10	A.A.Jasa	Anak Agung	5	4	5	3	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	1	-	
	NE11	Karda	Gèlgèl	2	3	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NE12	Lanis	Gèlgèl	2	4	3	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	captured BWZD from SW19
	NE13	Kara	Pulosari	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NE14	Ni Kari	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
p	NE15	Badra	Cameng	1	1	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NE16	Gampil	Cameng	2	4	8	4	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	disputed a/e with NW18 disputed a/mc with Gagah disputed c/a with NE21
	NE17	Surung	Cameng	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Sheet 2. Table 7:9 Marriages in Pisangkaja.

	No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy: DG	Kin	Marriage Form: a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	Mobility: High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	Comments:
H	NE18	Kingsan	Cameng	3	4	6	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl taken by Tengahpadang disputed mc/c
	NE19	Pica	Cameng	1	3	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	man taken from Gagah in mock capture: stated as parents(f
*	NE20	Kampih	Cameng	1	2	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NE21	Sukèn	Pulosari	2	3	4	2	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl taken by NE16, disputed a/c
	NE22	Jambul	Cameng	2	-	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
OH	NE23	Sujana	Batuan	-	1	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl captured from Pakuduwi; failed capture from same place by Sujana
H	NE24	Serandig	Dauh	1	-	1	-	1 (2)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl captured from Gagah; girl captured by Gagah; disputed mc/c with SE2
	NE25	Yasa	Dauh	1	1	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl taken by Pradéwa
	NE26	Ngèmbon	Dauh	-	-	-	4	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl taken by Gagah
o	NW1	Tagen	Bendésa	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
o(H)	NW2	Dw.Kt.Gampil	Pradéwa Jati	3	1	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	girl ran off with chinese in Bulèlèng
O(H)	NW3	Dw.Ny.Gempil	Pradéwa Jati	3	2	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl married into NE10
pH	NW4	Lasiya	Bendésa	2	4	3	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW5	Laba	Dauh	1	3	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	2 loose girls married off to SW15 on orders of NE1; ran off with Pradéwa girl from wife of A.A.A.Jasa SE10
o	NW6	Tonik	Gèlgèl	-	2	2	5	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	(1)	girl married Brahmana in Bangli; suspected fall since but not proven publicly
O*	NW7	Mara	Dauh	2	4	2	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	Mara captured girl from SE17

Sheet 3. Table 7:9 Marriages in Pisangkaja.

	No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy: DG	Endogamy: Kin	Marriage Form: a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	Mobility: High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	Comments:
	NW8	Surata	Dauh	1	5	5	9	–	–	2	–	1	–	–	–	1	Kebet caught in adultery by husband in NE2 (Cokorda), forced marriage by ward; Bros Kebet & Rangin married 10 women (7 by elopement)
p	NW9	Mejul	Dauh	–	2	7 (1)	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	girl married chinese in Bulèlèng by agreement
PHo	NW10	Gendul	Pulosari	5	8	10	1	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	Gendul captured girl from Taro
	NW11	Gangsar	Pulosari	1	2	1	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	girl taken in mock capture from NW10 (FFBDSD)
	NW12	Dugdug	Pulosari	2	3	4	1	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	NW13	Ni Lungid	Pulosari	1	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	SW1	Tangèn	Pulosari	1	2	3	1	(1)	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	girl taken by A.A.Pageh, SE4, disputed ɛ/c
	SW2	Tarik	Dauh	2	1	4	2	(1)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	girl taken by SE17 by capture
*	SW3	J.M.Désa	Pulosari	2	3	–	1	(1)	–	5	–	–	–	–	1	–	girl captured by Déwa Gedé court in Triwangsa
H	SW4	Degdeg	Pulosari	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	
H	SW5	A.A.Putu	Anak Agung	2	1	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	
	SW6	Rubik	(Tangkas)	1	1	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
H	SW7	Kartana	Pulosari	2	5	6	4	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	ran away with Pradéwa girl kin of wife of SE10; capture of girl from SE25; Kartana eloped with poor girl from SW20 who agreed to union
Ho	SW8	Neka	Dauh	1	3	3	2	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	girl from NW25 mock captured Mukun eloped with poor girl from SE12 who agreed to it
	SW9	Pukel	Dauh	–	1	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
o	SW10	Munjuk	Pulosari	6	2	5	3	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	

Sheet 4. Table 7:9 Marriages in Pisangkaja.

	No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy: DG	Endogamy: Kin	Marriage Form: a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	Mobility: High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	Comments:
	SW11	Lembut	Kayu Selem	-	4	4	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	Father and son both captured women from SE18 against will
	SW12	Selem	Pulosari	6	-	9	4	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl taken by J.M.Dalem SE17
	SW13	Ni Muklen	Pulosari	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SW14	Bidel	Pulosari	4	4	6	1	(1)	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	capture of girl from SE25 disputed c/a; son caught in flagrante by Siklod ward
po	SE1	Sama	Pulosari	4	3	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE2	Pudet	Dauh	2	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl capture from NE24, disputed c/mc; girl given to Gagah in mock capture
p*	SE3	Suberatha	Dauh	4	6	8	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl married local punggawa (Gusti); girl captured from Désa Jungjungan disputed a/c
H	SE4	A.A.Darma	Anak Agung	5	5	2	8	1	-	1	-	-	4	2	1	-	girl captured from SW1 disputed c/e; girl eloped with Javanese; another married Pradéwa SE19
	SE5	Tagen	Pulosari	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE6	Delep	Tangkas	-	4	1	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE7	Dw.Md.Tagel	Pradéwa Simpar	7	-	4	7	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	girl taken by A.A. NE9; girl eloped with low caste man from Gagah
	SE8	Ni Tambun	Chinese	-	-	(1)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	chinese girl taken by low Satriya
	SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya	Pradéwa Bolo	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE10	A.A.A.Jasa	Anak Agung	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
o*	SE11	Dw.Pt.Pandé	Pradéwa Seronggo	4	2	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	

Sheet 5. Table 7:9 Marriages in Pisangkaja.

	No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy: DG	Endogamy: Kin	Marriage Form: a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	Mobility: High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	Comments:
	SE12	Rugrug	Dauh	1	4	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	agreed to union of girl to SW7 but refused by them
P	SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	Pradéwa Jati	3	3	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
	SE14	Sandi	Cameng	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE15	Ni Kintil	Gèlgèl	-	3	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE16	Kontèng	Pulosari	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl married Pradéwa SE7; Kontèng failed in capture against girl from NW26
P*	SE17	J.M. Dalem	Dauh	4	4	3	3	2 (1)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	priests, father and son captured girls from SW2 & SW12; girl captured by NW7
	SE18	Pageh	Pulosari	-	1	1	-	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl captured by SW11
O	SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	Pradéwa Jati	5	3	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	gave two girls to Déwa Gedé from Triwangsa and Tengah-padang; eloped with girl from SE4 (Anak Agung)
o	SE20	Rantun	Dauh	1	5	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE21	Cekeg	Pulosari	3	2	3	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl married into SE4
	SE22	Dungki	Pulosari	2	4	3	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	man caught in flagrante by ward of Siklod
H	SE23	Tedun	Pulosari	2	4	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SE24	Silir	Cameng	4	3	5	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	ran away with Pradéwa woman married into SE7
	SE25	Cekeg	Sulang	-	3	4	4	(2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girls captured by SW7 and SW14, disputed as e/c & a/c
	SE26	Dw.Ny.Geniya	Pradéwa Bolo	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	

Sheet 6. Table 7:9 Marriages in Pisangkaja.

	No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy: DG	Endogamy: Kin	Marriage Form: a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	Mobility: High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	Comments:
	NW14	Ni Ngambet	Dauh	1	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	Priest married divorcée and lost office
	NW15	Ni Sinah	Bendésa	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
o	NW16	Keted	Bendésa	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW17	A.A.Putera	Déwa Gedé	3	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW18	Md. Sila	Chinese	-	-	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	chinese took girl from SW15
	NW19	Ni Antrog	Gèlgèl	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl taken by NE2 Cokorda
	NW20	Reca	Pulosari	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW21	Kisid	Cameng	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW22	Nampa	Pulosari	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	mock capture of girl from Gagah
o	NW23	Dugligan	Cameng	1	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila	Pradéwa	4	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
*	NW25	Geningan	Seronggo Pulosari	3	3	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl taken in mock capture by SW8
	NW26	Dayuh	Prasanti	3	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	NW28	Nyèmbèng	Prasanti	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	servant girl from SW19 given against wishes on orders of NE1 on asking by NW28
	SW15	Gomboh	Bendésa	1	4	3	3	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	servant obliged to marry 2 girls from NW5(reputedly sexually loose) by NE1
	SW16	Sukri	Jambangan	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SW17	Darna	Gèlgèl	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	SW18	Ni Dehen	Jambangan	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Sheet 7. Table 7:9 Marriages in Pisangkaja.

No:	Name:	Descent Title:	Endogamy: DG	Endogamy: Kin	Marriage Form: a	e	c	mc	f	p	k	Mobility: High Up	High Do	Low Up	Low Do	Comments:
SW19	Karda	Gèlgèl	-	5	3	3	1 (1)	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	girl captured from Gagah, disputed a/c; girl from SW15 given on asking from NE1; girl captured by NE12
SW20	Dani	Gèlgèl	-	2	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	girl taken by Pradéwa SE11
SW21	Gomboh	Gèlgèl	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
SW22	Kemplung	Pulosari	1	4	3	1	(1)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl captured by NE8
SW23	Sadiya	Pulosari	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	servant from Gagah forced to marry promiscuous Anak Agung servant girl on orders of NE1 despite nyerod bangsa
SW24	Longsog	Dauh	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
SW25	Bakta	(Pulosari)	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	caught in flagrante with wife of Anak Agung of NE9
SW26	Kembar	Dauh	1	-	1	1	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	girl captured by Tengahpadang disputed b/c (capture in fact unlikely)

Code:
* indicates family who have carried out jural (and sexual) patrilateral parallel cousin marriage.
DG = descent group (here clan, dadiya)
Kin = traceable kin tie cognatically.
High = indicates higher ranking group in exchange
Low = indicates lower ranking group in exchange
Up = hypergamous union
Do = hypogamous union
Marriage Form = recognized type of marriage:
a = approved
e = eloped
c = capture
mc= mock capture
f = forced
p = orders of puri (NE1)
k = kedapetan (caught in flagrante)
P or p = major or minor patron respectively
O or o = major or minor orator respectively
H = headmanship (of ward or village sub-section) held at some time
(H)= headmanship held only very briefly

the reputation of the compound. Mock capture and arranged unions are more equivocal. While they suit the ends of parents, they deny choice to the couple involved and are generally somewhat frowned upon. Capture, as we shall see shortly, stands in a class of its own.

This discussion suggests that there is variation in the extent to which different forms of marriage are held culturally to establish a relationship of exchange between families. So some seem to emphasize this, such as mepadik, general agreement; while others, especially elopement and capture in different ways, minimize or deny this. This raises the question of the evaluation of the relationship between wife-givers and wife-receivers which has been left till this stage because of its complexities. In the literature, perhaps the most common view is that of inter-caste marriage in which the position of wife-giver is properly inferior (see Boon 1977 for a statement of this in some detail). There are certain difficulties with this argument in its unmodified form, not least the example cited of the court NE1 ordering a high caste girl to commit formal hypogamy. An examination of the terminology of affinity is informative for the complete absence of a distinction between wife-givers and receivers in formal reference terms.[25] In fact in Tengahpadang the relationship between the parents of a couple is identified specially by the term warang (also used of a joint, as between stones laid for a floor) which applies mutually. The lack of serious imbalance is reflected in villagers' views noted above that families which marry should be of the same economic standing or otherwise similar. Finally there is a widespread, if diffuse, sense that those who receive women are in the debt of, and owe respect to, the family from which they came.[26] This may be seen in the frequency with which the kin of a woman who has married out may go to worship at her ancestral shrine (see Table 7:2), out of respect for the family or as villagers put it, as they feel shame (lek) towards the mother and father for the gift which they have received and can never repay. So the relationship between the families involved in marriage is not quite as simple as is sometimes suggested.

These different aspects contribute further towards the complexity of the meaning of marriage exchange in Tengahpadang. It also suggests the extent of variation possible in different contexts, in different parts of the island or between different social groups (a broader model of exchange

preferences for these last will be examined in detail in Chapter 8). It should also be clear that which aspect is stressed in exchange may vary between models of kinship. In Tengahpadang the high castes with more developed notions of differences created by descent also tend to emphasize the superiority of wife-takers; while commoners who tend generally more towards a bilateral model seem to regard marriage more as an exchange between equals, as we noticed in the previous section. Nonetheless, whatever the dominant emphasis the other features tend to appear as resonances and add a further dimension to the complex of meanings involved in marriage choices. So it is possible in a marriage to which two families agree, for them to differ in quite how they interpret the agreement. In this light, elopement attains a new significance as it suggests a means of avoiding the issue of relations formed by exchange. The phrasing of marriage between castes - even if agreed informally - as elopement may be seen as a method of circumventing the ambiguity inherent in the relationship of warang. The inferior caste in this case is termed warang di cokor (literally: at the feet, and so lowly). The rule against such marriages being agreed may perhaps be seen as a means of minimizing the recognition of an exchange relationship between such parties with the consequences which that entails. This may be used deliberately to show disrespect to others. The celebrated and feared orators I Kebet and I Rangin (NW8) between them married 10 wives, all but three by elopement (one noted above was when I Kebet was caught committing adultery with a Cokorda woman), a neat summary, it seems of their supposed reputation for bravado and recklessness.[27] So the ambiguity of exchange relations in marriage, and the possible significance of their depreciation, adds richness to the range of interpretations and meanings which these may have for villagers.

These various options represent permutations of the dimensions of exchange, of the values and circumstances of the parties, compounded by cultural ideas of the gift somewhat shadowily present. Within this framework, elopement may express a set of logical inversions of agreement and its connotations, but as such it remains part of the system as a semantic field. There is, however, one type of marriage which seems in some ways to stand apart, as it denies both the idea of exchange and the moral status

of others as members of the community. In marriage by capture, the differences in wealth and power between the parties come to dominate other considerations and to add a further set of semantic possibilities. On the one hand, it is a means of expressing publicly the extent of power and support possessed by a family that they can defy others, and the community itself, and in so doing further their standing through successful confrontation. On the other hand, it is a flagrant violation of the rights of other villagers and of all the values of cooperation and self-effacement stressed within egalitarian corporations. It is this which contributes to its particular significance, while at the same time setting those who commit it apart. It is interesting therefore to examine the circumstances under which it occurs and those who engage in it, as part of the field of marriage choices.

Perhaps the simplest means of approaching the complex question of the dynamics of marriage by capture is to look briefly at two contrasted ethnographic examples. The first deals with one of the few failed attempts and allows us to consider what went wrong. The second looks at the capture of the daughter of a leading family and how this signalled the start of the shift of political balance within Pisangkaja. Both are instructive.

Case 8. I Kontèng's failure to obtain a wife:

> I Kontèng (SE16) is a poor farmer who is the tenant, and client, of a wealthy, but not politically powerful Pradéwa from Br. Triwangsa. He was greatly attracted to Ni Gèloh, the sister of I Dayuh (NW26), both of whom were greatly opposed to the union with a poorer man. (Three of I Dayuh's sisters have remained spinsters as he regards the suitors they have had as not up to the standard he would like. It is his force of personality which has kept them from eloping.) So I Kontèng determined to seize her and went one day with his brother, I Gading and hid in the rice fields near her compound. When she came out the brothers carried her off forcibly by a circuitous route. As they were about to enter Pisangkaja, they were overtaken by an irate I Dayuh armed with a madik (a sort of machete) who forced them to release his younger sister. They did not dare to resist, as they were only two of them and unarmed against I Dayuh who was both extremely angry and prepared for violence.

Case 9. The successful abduction of the death-temple priest's daughter:

In 1938 when he was about 20 years old, Kt. Mara (NW7) decided that he would like to marry the daughter of the old priest of the western temple of the dead. They belonged to the same clan, the Dauh, but the priest owned substantial land at that time and had further rice fields belonging to the temple, while Kt. Mara was heir to less than a third of a hectare. Further the priest belonged to one of the most influential village families and I Mara to a simple family, so he refused to agree to the marriage as did his daughter Ni Kacang.

Accordingly, Kt. Mara decided to capture the girl with careful preparation. While she was visiting another wealthy Dauh compound, I Tarik (SW2), she was seized by a body of four men, chosen for their bravery and strength, and heavily armed. She was whisked off across the countryside to the settlement of Keliki some kilometres to the west. She was taken to the house of a high caste man who was the friend of Kt. Mara and hidden there. A man from Yèh Tengah nearby happened to be there and went to report to the priest who immediately gathered a force of 20 able-bodied men from Pisangkaja, accompanied by a few clients of his from Yèh Tengah. They went straight to Keliki, but discovered that the compound was guarded by a phalanx of men armed to the teeth and led by the perbekel (administrative head) of Keliki who was a friend of I Mara. So the expeditionary force was obliged to retire, in the face of superior numbers.

The next day, following the confrontation the perbekel's troops accompanied Kt. Mara and his friends to the border with Tengahpadang where he made his way discreetly to the house of his brother's wife's father who lived in Br. Tengah and had a large number of supporters to help protect the compound day and night. The men who had abducted Ni Kacang then went back to Pisangkaja formally to present themselves at the girl's parents home to request her hand in marriage (ngeluku). By this time the priest and his wife were seriously concerned about the welfare of their daughter so they felt obliged (according to the views of participants on both sides) to receive the party. They requested to see the girl and were permitted to do so alone by coming down to Br. Tengah. The priest remained adamantly against the marriage and wished to call the police to have Kt. Mara arrested for assault and rape, but was dissuaded, on grounds which are not entirely clear, by other villagers. He then demanded compensation to the tune of 57,000 kèpèngs, or old Chinese coins (the exact value at the time was hard to establish). The matter dragged on for forty-five days with a defense force ensconced in Br. Tengah throughout. Finally, as Ni Kacang had by this time become adjusted to her fate, the prest was under great pressure to forego his threats both from the villagers who wished to end the dispute and danger to the ward (not as far as I could gather particularly the clan) and from his family who wished to see the girl again. So eventually the marriage was grudgingly acceded to. The girl died two years later in childbirth, and relations remained cool between the two compounds until after the death of the old priest. The new incumbent, the grand-son of the priest and (deceased) wife's brother's

son of Kt. Mara is on very good terms with him and they are a leading political patron and orator respectively.

The difference between these two examples gives some idea of the factors which play a part in the success of capture. I Kontèng lacked the organization, physical support and political backing necessary to carry out an abduction or failing that the bravery to stand and fight. Kt. Mara possessed all these to the point that he was prepared to issue a challenge in effect to a far more ostensibly powerful family. During the confrontation which followed the two sides were given the opportunity to show the political power they could bring to bear, in terms of the number and devotion of the supporters they could muster, their skill at manoevre and not least their determination. Obviously if these are the concerns of the participants then calling in outside help is in effect an admission of defeat, as it implies that the victim both lacks the political support to defend himself and the grace to give in when faced by defeat. That blood is not more often spilled is therefore apparently surprising. Closer examination shows that many captures are by rich and powerful families of the daughters of weaker villagers who have little capacity to fight back, and to whom the advantages of such powerful allies is sooner or later pointed out. Further the similarity of appearance means that often mock capture is represented by the male's side as if real capture, although it lacks the danger of confrontation. The precise representation of marriage forms may vary in different contexts and between the two sides as Table 7:9 shows. In view of the intensity of feelings aroused, even this does not seem an adequate explanation. The extent of Kt. Mara's preparations suggest an answer. First the captor has the advantage of controlling the item of value. Second, and perhaps more important, capture is undertaken when it is likely to succeed; that is it reflects changing political fortunes and may skillfully be used to further them. The loss of his daughter signalled the decline of the old priest and, as we shall see in the next case the rise of a new focus of power in the ward.

There is a further aspect to the problem. Surprisingly few marriages by capture fail and the threat of violence is rarely, if ever, realized. Despite the constraints, if capture is so potent a means of

furthering political position, villagers would be in a continual state of suspense about their daughters' welfare. It is questionable whether this restraint can be accounted for solely by pragmatic considerations of potential loss for failure (Bailey 1970: 86-109). I Kontèng's attempt was treated widely with amusement rather than anything more serious. The failure of I Sujana is more instructive. His father (NE23) was joint government headman of Gagah and Pisangkaja and an emissary of the king of Gianyar, but his political reputation declined sharply with his loss of office about the time of the Second World War. Whereas I Jirna succeeded in taking a woman by capture from the settlement of Pakuduwi, when his son as a young man tried he was forced to surrender the girl when a large body of villagers turned up to claim her. The family's political ambit had contracted. It is noticeable that capture only occurs within the community which recognizes a person's social position. The ability to take women in capture should perhaps be seen as much as a manifestation of a person's power, as a means of achieving it. This coincides with indigenous theories of power, (ke)sakti(an), in which bravery and violence are products of this quality rather than its causes (see Worsley 1972: 20 & 37). This view is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Here it is interesting that two of the symptoms of sakti, sexuality and violence, are qualities displayed noticeably by orators (see I Kebet and I Rangin above) and members of leading families, respectively. Reflection on Kt. Mara's abduction of a bride suggests that this is not merely a cultural idea of little practical import. As his family lacked wealth or political position, his main resource was his bravery and personality from which he gained support. This view of power helps to explain some of the more puzzling features of the form and incidence of marriage by capture, although it should be noted that a theory of force as the manifestation of power, rather than its source, may easily be adapted to explanation ex post facto of the reverse.

In order to be able to examine more fully the importance of forms of marriage exchange and to see the central part it may play in linking the evaluation of status in certain contexts with the changing pattern of political power, it is helpful to introduce one further example. This is part of a series of confrontations beginning in effect with Kt. Mara's abduction of

a bride, followed by the celebrated incident of the same man's underpants to be discussed in Chapter 9 and ending finally with the deaths of I Kebet and I Rangin in the aftermath of the coup d' état in 1965. In a series of escalated challenges, the family complex of Dauh in NW7, 8 & 9 rose to become one of the leading forces in the settlement, largely through the idiom of marriage. This emerges in the following case:

Case 10. The recapture of Ni Kelepon from the court of Tengahpadang.

I Kebet in 1953 had succeeded in carrying off the wife of Cokorda Putu (NE2) at great risk to his life. Shortly afterwards, however, the family was involved again with Cokorda over I Kebet's sister's daughter, Ni Kelepon, a very beautiful young girl. She became attracted to Cokorda Raka, from the court in Tengahpadang and in order to avoid the impression that there was a formal plan to elope, she was waylaid by some friends of his and taken to the Puri Sarèn Kangin. The Cokorda immediately called the administrative village head, to ask her to confirm that she had gone willingly, which she did.

Shortly after, a massive delegation arrived from Pisangkaja headed by the two orators, I Kebet and I Rangin, the remainder of the family from NW8 and a large body of supporting villagers. They were told that Ni Kelepon was there of her own accord and had in no way been forced. Her mother begged to see the girl once more before she was finally taken away from her and asked them to grant this as a mother's final request (the details of this were corroborated by several of the party who attended). The Cokordas duly complied upon which her father seized her and threw her down from the high pavilion where she was hiding. She was promptly picked up bodily by the family and supporters and whisked back to Pisangkaja with no further ado, and no resistance from the surprised aristocrats. She was married off almost immediately after to a wealthy commoner in Br. Tegal.

This series of events was not without its consequences. Some years later the Cokorda's brother stood for election for administrative village head against I Rangin and a Déwa Gedé, the Cokorda losing heavily and I Rangin narrowly. Shortly before this too, the court in Pisangkaja obtained a degree of revenge when Cokorda Putu's elder brother more or less publicly seduced I Kebet's sister's daughter (see Chapter 8, Case 11.).

So it appears that marriage (or seduction) may be intimately involved in confrontations between villagers which may have, or subsequently develop more or less explicitly political overtones. What is of particular interest is

the way in which the previous heirarchyof status is open to challenge where sufficient support or reputation exists. Balinese ideas of status, as will emerge in the following chapter, are not defined solely in terms of power, but also ritual purity. It is noticeable that these two successful confrontations involve victims who are ritually purer, by caste and by consecration as a priest. As we shall see, in fact the themes of purity and power are linked to alternative frameworks of values, so that such confrontations are connected at a higher level with alternative sets of concepts, which are partly logically articulated. More practically the apparent increase over the last forty years of such conflicts is connected with the weakening of the political power of the traditional élite, where in the middle ranges in particular a disjuncture between purity and power is emerging in their incapacity to fend off attacks.

In these changes marriage appears to be of particular significance, as exchanges involve the inextricably linked dimensions of value and power. In the two cases examined, agreement between parties of different status was not forthcoming, while the result was in the end decided by the conspicuous display of power, in both support and violence. The two examples show importantly different features. In Kt. Mara's abduction of the priest's daughter the show of force to obtain a prized object which would not have been offered in an agreed exchange is clear. Few captures succeed, or are even tried, against leading families at their peak of influence. This in part underlies the distribution of attempts at capture listed in Table 7:9. So the family of I Serandig (NE24), who had previously been incumbents to the headmanship carried out two captures, but in their subsequent economic and political decline, were successfully deprived of a daughter. The ability to retaliate is evident in the death temple priest's family. After the loss of a daughter to Kt. Mara, they successfully made off with the elder sister of I Tarik (SW2), who had assisted I Mara; and subsequently the young grandson, and successor to the office of priest, captured a girl from a solid village family (SW12). So capture represents a complex balance of expressing the changing position of power relations and actively moulding these at the same time. The other case is more complicated. It was in effect an elopement, and is widely regarded as such. However, by skillful reinterpretation this was used as means by the rising family of Dauh to further their political

fortunes and to control the alliances of their women. In going to the Cokorda as they did, they were effectively treating this as a case of marriage by capture and accordingly through the effective display of force converted an elopement into a confrontation which they won. The result seriously detracted from the influence of the court of Cokorda and added to the standing of I Kebet and I Rangin. Once again, it is the blending of status and power in marriage exchanges which seems to offer special opportunities.

This last case brings out an important, and often overlooked, aspect of social behaviour, which will be examined in detail as the theme of Chapter 10, that is the negotiation of meaning. In the previous section the statistics on marriage arrangements were only developed to a certain point, on the grounds that the forms were based on claims made by families. While in the majority of instances there is agreement between the sides, and in most of these it corresponds with the actual course of events, it is not unusual to find disagreement, as should be clear from Table 7:9. For the most part this consists simply in rival versions of what happened as part of the claims of families to build reputations of various sorts. So it is not infrequent for mock capture to be represented as full capture, in certain contexts, generally to the annoyance of the wife-givers. By maintaining ambiguity between the two, or switching versions, villagers can obtain some of the aura of power without incurring the opprobrium associated with direct capture. Other combinations, particularly involving capture and general agreement or elopement, are also found. There is however another way in which this representation of claims may work and directly affect the outcome of marriage. This was seen in the case of Ni Kelepon. The ability to switch interpretations of the event in the middle of discussion was critical to the success of the villagers in carrying the girl back home from the Cokordas. In order to do this, it was necessary for the elopement to be translated into other terms; for it would have been a most improper action to snatch the bride of a prince otherwise. Events were reinterpreted as being a capture, which was helped by the presence of a support party who accompanied the girl. It was the ability to be able to control the meaning given to the events which transpired that constituted one of the main assets of the villagers. The system of marriage exchanges is not simply one of fixed, clear-cut categories into which events can

infallibly be slotted, but rather a more fluid order which may be negotiated between the participants.

With this in mind, it is interesting to turn finally, and briefly, to the claims which villagers make in marriage exchanges, or which are forced upon them by others. Table 7:9 lays out the frequency with which different compounds have engaged in the different forms of marriage exchange and also the number of descent group endogamous unions (calculated by reference to the widest grouping, the clan or title group) as well as kin marriages, whether within the clan or not. Finally the table includes the number of hypergamous or hypogamous unions contracted. Like kin marriage and exchange forms these provide a further index of status, or its loss, especially where hypogamy occurs, and this will be discussed in more detail in looking at caste. The table also indicates to some degree, the extent to which families are successful in carrying out various strategies. So among high castes the higher the proportion of descent group endogamous unions, the more they retain their status unimpaired.[28] Kin marriage, by contrast, has the effect of linking related compounds further and preventing the dispersal of ties, so reticulating relations within the lineage, or kindred, depending upon whether these are contracted with agnates or not. Again a few families indulge in the ideal patrilateral parallel cousin marriage (indicated by an asterisk), although this is more or less confined to wealthy or powerful compounds. Examination of genealogies shows, however, that there is a strong tendency not to retain all alliances within the span of existing kin ties, but to diversify so as to include unrelated families of influence or wealth among low castes in particular. The most enthusiastic proponent of this is perhaps the family of the village temple priest (SW3) where arranged marriages are the norm. So there is a range of alternative strategies by which marriages may be used to protect status, bind together agnates or kin, and extend links to desirable allies. This depends, however, upon the ability of the family to control its children, and their marriages, the measure of which is given in the proportion of unions which are agreed, arranged or by mock capture. Balanced against this calculated approach is the feeling that children should morally be left free to choose their mates which is reflected in the absence of coercive forms

of exchange (cf. also Boon 1977 on romantic marriage).

There is another aspect to marriage. While alliances may be viewed as a scarce resource to be controlled or not depending upon the attitude of the elder generation, the choices made have wider symbolic and moral significance. The calculated forging of useful relations by the village temple priest's family must be balanced against the approbrium incurred by systematically forcing their young into marriages they do not wish. This is still more so in marriage by capture. As Table 7:9 shows (especially in combination with the distribution of wealth given in Table 5:10 or Appendix 3) this is effectively restricted to the economic and political élite of the ward, most notably in families with a history of public office or influence through patronage. Against this must be reckoned the loss of reputation as good villagers which goes with the conspicuous show of superiority, although this may be equilibriated to a degree by the other marriages. For this reason, as will become apparent in Chapter 9, different types of political leader tend to contract distinct forms of marriage. Rather than labour the point further, especially where different choices may be open to varying interpretation, it should by now be clear from this last section that marriage choice in Bali takes place within a complex field of strategic possibility compounded by a range of symbolic and moral values.

The System Reconsidered:

In the course of this chapter I have tried to show that the range of forms taken by groupings based on principles of kinship cannot easily be explained in terms of a single model in the minds of the participants. The mobilization of kin for work and ancestor worship do not easily fit within a model of agnation. The pattern of marriage preferences equally suggested the presence of other considerations, as did the distribution of choice of adopted heirs. It is possible simply to view this as a deviation from the ideal, either not in need of explanation at all, or just as the 'natural' operation of ill-defined interests. It is, however, possible to explain

much of the variation more elegantly by recourse to the existence of alternative ideals or preferences. As we saw, these tended to emerge from a comparison of high and low caste patterns, which appeared to range along a continuum. An ideal as I intend it here refers simply to a particular, more or less coherent set from the different possible logical interpretations of generally ambiguous concepts, given in Balinese culture, and in terms of which they attempt to understand and order the social world about them, and in so doing change it. Further, as I shall try to show very briefly in this final section, these interpretations may be seen as logically linked alternative possibilities. These do not have to be regarded as historically derived from the set of rules and preferences embodied in any formal system of kinship 'logic', even if it were possible to establish what this is. The historical origins of the Balinese system would appear to be plural, containing influences from both India and of more Malayo-Polynesian hue, and are now largely a matter of speculation.

This may be shown by a brief examination of the possible transformations of the rules from one model, or interpretation, of kinship to another. We shall see that the bounded class, or progressive differentiation, view of descent and also a cognatic version can, and in daily life, do cope with the rules by systematic reinterpretation, suppression or simple negation. The positive rule of cousin marriage in the kawitan version takes the classical form of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage, as is clear from the high incidence reported by the Geertzes. In the soroh variant, this is re-rendered simply as any marriage with agnates (28.1% in Table 7:6). In the cognatic model, which for convenience I shall refer to as the penyamaan version, it is marriage with any cousin, or bilaterally reckoned relation (27.6% of agreed unions with extra-lineal kin alone, or 42.3% in all, see Table 7:6). In each case the transformation is made easier by the absence of lineality in the terms for cousins, misan, or kin, penyamaan or keturunan. In a similar way the rule for adoption which we noted existed in different formulations, may be phrased as: take the nearest agnate, take any agnate or take any kinsman respectively for the three variants in the order given above. It will be recalled that the first two are the two versions of the rule

stated, while the third is the observed practice among commoners.

It is possible in a similar fashion to reinterpret the discussion about the implications of males marrying out as jural females. It is possible to argue that, in the absence of male descendants, to go to the trouble of creating a jural fiction such that the sexes are systematically reversed is an index of extreme patriliny. This would fit both versions based upon descent in some form. As the Geertzes have argued, however, from a different point of view, this might equally be seen as a tendency in practice towards cognation, in that a fair proportion of compounds are continued through women if traced biologically. The same approach may also be applied to apparently unequivocal negative rules, such as the ban on direct exchange of women. Apart from the problem which I noted that systematic patrilateral parallel cousin marriage tends to convert matrilateral and patrilateral relatives into one, with the attendant danger that it becomes possible to trace reverse exchanges, examination of the data shows that this proscription varies between versions. While, among the high castes who follow the kawitan model of systematic differentiation most closely, the father's sister's daughter is avoided whether traced biologically or jurally, this is not so among commoners where the incidence is similar to that with other cousins. In kin marriage, it will be recalled that low castes tend to follow a bilateral model. What then happens with the one union that most authors agree is strictly forbidden - sister exchange? There is in Br. Tengahpadang in fact a case of this occurring. Enquiry among high castes yields the reply that this is prohibited and would not have been permitted in the days of the kings. Low caste accounts differ, however. It is argued that this marriage is not prohibited, but rather is considered dangerous and hot (panes), like father's brother's daughter marriage and others through males. So between descent and cognatic variants, a proscriptive rule becomes transformed into a recommendation. As the reference to cousin marriage shows, between the models there may be recourse to different theories of metaphysics to justify different positions, or preferences.

It would appear then that the various rules and preferences of the Balinese kinship system may undergo systematic translation between what would appear to be three main variants. This leaves still the question of how these are related. The Geertzes have suggested that the kawitan model may be an earlier stage in a developmental cycle which leads to a looser group with less encystment or ultimately collapse (1975: 67-76). This does not encompass, however, the bilateral variant, although as we saw the notion of kawitan may be read lineally or bilaterally. By way of conclusion, I would like to propose a possible means of linking these three, for which there is a certain amount of ethnographic evidence. If one starts with the hypothesis that kinship in Bali is concerned with establishing which people are alike, it is possible to see these variants as refractions of different ways of estimating likeness. People may be alike through socio-biologically reckoned reproduction, which may be traced through males, through females or through both sexes.[29] Culturally continuity through women refers mainly to the transmission of witchcraft. If this is traced through males instead, it produces a category of persons all descended agnatically from an apical ancestor, who form a bounded class of like beings, the connexion being expressed in somewhat vague theories of identity, as in the expression that they are megetih abungbung, of a single measure of blood, or as sharing some dimly understood substance in common. This likeness can be qualified, however, by a consideration of whether all descendants are equally alike. Either they are, or are not. If not, then the obvious model tends to be of progressive differentiation from a centre or core, kawitan, in which an ideal member defines a polythetic class. Alternatively, if likeness is reckoned through both sexes, the result is an unbounded category of the kindred with progressive distancing the further the common forebears. The logical possibilities of likeness would appear to be represented in the different models, together with a shadowy counter-part traced through women alone.

Marriage preferences may also be interpreted in this way. There are two obvious possibilities. There may be a preference for marrying like, or for marrying unlike. Let us take the second first. Given the somewhat vague theories of conception, a systematic injunction to marry unlike will have the effect of destroying the original category by introducing outsiders.

This is certainly thought to happen among high castes who adhere more closely in Tengahpadang to the agnatic models; and successive marriage with commoners results in a sliding status confirmed by the use of lower birth-order names. In the next chapter, it will emerge too that such marriages are generally tactical rather than ideal. If alternatively one marries like, then the preferences are for descent group endogamy, for close patrilateral cousin marriage and kin marriage respectively.

So far this remains largely a logical exercise in the absence of ethnographic data to support a concern with likeness. There is, however, some rather intriguing material which supports this schema. The extensive terminology of descent and filiation, commonly with the prefix se-, one, suggests directly the concern with identity, or class similarity. In more practical manifestations, it can be seen in the rule which forbids high caste men to marry low caste women if they are pregnant, on the grounds that the paternity can never be established beyond any possible doubt. More interesting, there is a well-established theory which opposes that based on some form of shared substance or nature by birth. This is enshrined in the well-known Balinese theory of the law of karma pala, the fruits, or effects, of action. According to this, a person is the product of his previous actions which determine the circumstances into which he is born. So men with similar social and economic positions in life are so because of the similarity of their past actions. This second theory avoids certain rather obvious problems of the first, and is the one to which villagers sometimes draw attention to explain how, if all agnates are really alike, they differ in inherited characteristics and achievements in life. For the theory of karma pala neatly avoids this difficulty, and leads to the conclusion that those who are truly like one are those who are not necessarily related by birth at all.

It would seem then that there is support for the different possible interpretations of kinship in Balinese indigenous metaphysics. A consideration of these requires modification of the cognatic versions however. There is nothing in the argument which states that these people must be related in any way; rather they should be similar in life circumstances. It should be immediately apparent that the most striking preference among low caste

villagers was, indeed, to marry into the same economic stratum, to the point that this assumed priority over marriage with kin. It was pointed out how over time, the two categories tend to overlap. There is also an interesting and suggestive, if not conclusive, piece of terminological evidence. The term nyama, contracted from penyamaan, refers to kin; while there is a broader category of persons who are designated terminologically as equals, beraya. Marriage is commonly said among villagers properly to be with nyama beraya, a composite term, literally meaning something like kin-equals, or perhaps better kin (who are) equals, or perhaps equals (who should become) kin. Whatever the relevance of this, the cognatic model stands in a relationship of logical inversion to the others. According to the agnatic models, because men are (agnatic) kin they are alike, in the alternative because they are alike, they should be kin.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I have argued that it is useful to examine the documented variation in forms of kinship grouping and marriage in terms of more complex models of descent and filiation than might at first seem necessary. However, the deviation in the formation of action sets, most notably for ancestor worship, and the principles underlying the choice of adopted heirs, suggests that a simple model of descent or of origin alone will not suffice. This view was reinforced by an examination of marriage preferences which differed radically between high and low castes and suggested a possible connexion between caste status and the preferred model of kinship. The choice involved in marriage in Bali raised further problems which linked the pattern of decisions with other aspects of villagers' roles than just their kinship position. The range of possibilities of marriage permitted the formation of different strategies, from the reticulation of existing kin ties to the expansion of kin networks to include potentially useful economic or political allies. As before however the choice between culturally recognized alternatives gave these manoevres a symbolic aspect. This was compounded for marriage by the existence

of two distinct but linked features of exchange: value exchanged and the circumstances of the transaction, so that power came to influence the allocation of valued resources, here measured in part in terms of status. Further complication was noted in that the relationship between givers and receivers could be evaluated in several different ways; and also the circumstances under which marriage exchanges occurred could be represented differently. So the values attached to different forms of marriage tended to be open to negotiation between villagers as to their precise interpretation or meaning.

Footnotes

1. That is if they have not been eaten by ants, a not infrequent fate of long-neglected manuscripts. Boon (1974) has argued that, with governmental pressure to emasculate political parties, descent ties are becoming increasingly important in urban areas such as Tabanan. This did not seem to have had any effect by 1973 on Tengahpadang, where they remained largely ritual groups. The interest of the Dauh in their history was probably contingent. The priest was helping me to type out the original and asked for some extra copies as it was not in good repair. The two men who helped were in fact a Dauh and a Pulosari. It is difficult to say with certainty, but my impression was that their interest in the text was for its curiosity value, somewhat like a very old family photograph album, rather than from an acute awareness of the status implications.

2. The use of the term "rule" is avoided except in a loose sense. It is difficult to state in precisely what sense the term would be used here. It is more convenient, and I suspect accurate, to refer to preferences, expectations or the observed incidence, in view of the different connotations of types of rule (Searle 1971: 41-2) which require careful distinction.

3. There are two exceptions: I Kicèn NE26 and I Tunjung NW9, both of whom occupy this position as they are officials posted away from their natal villages.

4. The account of legal theory relies in part upon the publications of, and conversations with, Ida Bagus Ngurah Adi, a court judge and legal scholar with perhaps the greatest knowledge of this field of any living Balinese. The difficulties in determining the relationship between these systems rests upon several factors. First, preferences in village life are not static but change over time; second, formal legal theory rests upon written texts showing Indian, or Hindu, influence which differ among themselves and are of questionable relevance to villagers, except perhaps in the past when their cases were brought before high courts presided over by high priests. Finally, as we shall see, the rules are open to interpretation in different ways.

5. There is one way in which an in-marrying male may come to gain rights. This is where the woman runs off with another man and so loses her place as heir. This is known as ngutang kepatutan and happens on occasions. I Dugdug (NW12) became head of the compound in this fashion. This points to how affines can jurally become agnates. The parallel process may happen where a man dies and a woman re-marries in situ. The couple do not have rights over the property, but where the children from the first marriage are very young, and there

is no agnate around, their position is stronger in practice than their legal rights would suggest. I Longsog (SW24) became a member of the Dauh clan in this way, as a result of his father living uxorilocally with his mother who had been widowed by the heir. His father's original descent group was Bebandem but he was living in a Dauh compound (SW9). It is pointed out as the only case of known mixing of descent groups and is felt to be wrong (see below).

6. Bridewealth is never paid in Tengahpadang (but see Case 9 below, for an attempt to buy back a daughter), nor can I find any evidence of this being so at any time in the remembered past (cf. Belo 1936), which extends back into the last decade of the pre-colonial period. The only instance was when I Tunjung (NW9), the policeman from north Bali where brideprice is reportedly found, wanted to pay I Mejul for his daughter. This aroused great amusement in the ward, and great horror in Mejul, who is said to have thought he was being asked to sell his daughter.

7. See Boon 1974. Some of the problems in Fortes' classic definition (1965) discussed in Freedman 1966 and Turton 1972, are relevant to Bali.

8. The use of hierarchical taxonomies (Needham 1975) applied to descent offers a simple means of deriving hierarchically ranked classes.

9. The intersection of these axes would yield a four-part typology (Conklin 1964: 40-1):

	descent traced fully	descent traced partly
simple bounded group	Tengahpadang: Dauh	Pulosari
internally differentiated group	Dynastic Families	Tihingan Smiths

Some possible candidates for inclusion within this classification should be fairly evident from the ethnography already referred to.

10. It is possible to integrate almost all systems of reference into a single model, the principles underlying which not only fit Balinese cosmology, but also appear to throw some light upon formal marriage rules. It is too involved to be discussed here and the present account stands without it.

11. The difference of totals between 556 and 581 is made up of 25 invitations to voluntary associations. For simplicity, these have been listed under 'Other', and treated as a single tie, as the Balinese see the bond of sekaha as predominating over any other ties which individual members might have.
There is a more general point about my reference to the numbers or proportions of types of kin tie used. As should already be apparent, the reckoning of ties of kinship and marriage is extensible and open to varying interpretation as to what constitutes proximity. Agnates may be confined to the lineage or broadened to include local clan mates or even beyond on rare occasions. Similarly affines may be traced through more than one marriage. So in each case the extent of the total field of ties of each kind is generally far larger than the number of those recuited. Given the somewhat elastic definition of classes of relative, it is not possible to state simply what proportion of a particular class is mobilized. When I refer therefore to there being more members of one class of kin than another, it should be understood that I am focusing on the ties used not the proportions of what is in effect a fairly open field. Where it is this latter which is important I shall specify the factors which define the extent of the field accordingly, as I do for instance in the numbers of households related agnatically and cognatically within a given locality (the settlement) for attendance at ancestral shrine festivals.

12. It is possible for more exact comparison, therefore, to include 36 in the first column under households, and to recalculate the percentages accordingly. It should be noted, however, that this is strictly in breach of Balinese categories.

13. There is a further problem. In emphasizing that romantic marriage is part of a cultural nexus of values which stress the ideal of love, Boon is forced to adopt the Indonesian term cinta. He gives no word in Balinese at all, for the simple reason that, as my enquiries suggest, the Balinese do not have a suitable term for this. The closest approximations tend to have different connotations, which range from pure sexual desire or lust, to tresna, which is love in the sense of loyalty, as felt by subjects for a good king. While I would not wish to argue that ideas must necessarily be reflected in specialized terminology in any culture; there may be problems in seeing as a crucial cultural concept something which the indigenous people have no term to express.

14. It may be possible to integrate these various features within a single model of the sort mentioned in footnote 10 above; but this is a matter of the 'logic' of formal rules rather than the type of model which I am proposing here. On cousin marriage, for instance, it should be noted that Balinese ideas on numerology may not be irrelevant. Odd numbers are held in many contexts to be dangerous to ordinary men (four children, as specified in the four-part system of fratronymy, is the appropriate number for low castes; while the five which is ideal for high castes is

dangerous for them). In contrast, gods are commonly ordered in classifications of odd numbers: as in the trinity, trisakti or trimurti; the panca-déwa, the five gods of the cardinal points (and centre); or the nawa sanga, for the full system. This suggests the possible conceptual inversion of heaven and earth:

god	:	man	::	subtle (spirit)	:	gross (matter)	::	undiffer-entiated	:	differ-entiated	::	odd (numbers)	:	even (numbers)

15. What this might say about the status of out-marrying men in terms of indigenous theories of nature and substance - for instance whether like women, they are held to be cool rather than hot - requires more investigation. My preliminary enquiries suggested that the Balinese were a little muddled on this point.

16. Since then there has been a quarrel between Kt. Degdeg (SW4) and his brothers, the Jèro Mangku Désa (SW3) and I Geningan (NW25), reported in Case 2, in Chapter 2. At the time marriages were contracted this had not yet occurred; and even now they attempt to keep the matter private.

17. The sample is based upon 74 marriages within the ward formed since 1949 when reliable land records are first available for Pisangkaja. The need to document all assets for this test has unfortunately meant that it has had to be confined to the ward. My initial enquiries into unions contracted with persons beyond ward boundaries suggests that a similar pattern exists, although a fairly clear element of political alliance is evident among approved unions. The agreed marriages in the sample, those which are 'agreed', by 'mock capture' or 'force', number 45. The connexion between wealth and agreement was tested using Spearman's Rank Correlation Test. Land was estimated to the nearest 1/100th. hectare, while salary in cash was converted, for convenience, into capital terms where the employment was effectively permanent and secure. The salary was converted into the equivalent amount of rice-land necessary to guarantee the same value in cash or rice. The values for the test then are:

Unadjusted:	25% adjustment for linked compounds:
n = 45	n = 45
R = 0.314	R = 0.532
t = 2.169	t = 3.76
t at 43^{o} freedom = 2.02 significant at 5%.	t at 43^{o} freedom = 3.55 significant at 0.1%

18. Using the same sample as for the footnote above, but restricted to kin unions of all sorts, the values were:

n = 27
R = 0.534
t = 3.16

t at 25^{o} freedom = 2.80
significant at 1%.

19. A simpler test than Spearman, based on goodness-of-fit between wealth and approval is revealing. For kin marriages where there is no common descent tie, the frequency of approved or disapproved unions measured against wealth, equal or unequal (if there was a difference in land holdings of half or more) gives:

	Agreed	Disputed
Equal wealth	19	3
Unequal wealth	8	12

X^2 = 7.89 with 1^o freedom which is significant at 0.5%.

It was not possible to test descent group membership where there was no kin tie, as the figures in all but one square were negligible. The only measure which gave anything remotely resembling a large enough sample was a test for all equal wealth marriages (less than 50% difference between partners) examining the relationship between agreement to the union or refusal against the presence of descent group ties only (i.e. with no kin tie) or no tie at all:

	Agreed	Disputed
Local clan only:	12	2
No tie at all:	8	2

X^2 = 0.03 with 1^o freedom. This is not remotely significant.

These tests are clearly crude and are intended to give no more than a rough idea of possible trends. The data themselves are sufficiently crude as not to merit more elaborate techniques. It must be recalled that approval is a matter which may be disputed in some cases, with different sides giving different interpretations. The measure of land gives no index of the quality, nor the harvest yielded which would be known more or less exactly by villagers. It also excludes such considerations as the known industry of the potential partner, their level of consumption and so forth. It also omits such considerations as beauty or even the size of pool of partners at any time. In spite of how primitive the test is, it does suggest that there is some truth in the villagers' claim that land is of overriding importance, or salary where this is reliable.

20. In a general way, the status of children depends upon that of their parents. The two theories of conception which allow and deny women a part in procreation respectively, may be argued to support marriage choices in different ways. The hypothesis of joint procreation clearly encourages differentiation by the status of the woman and serves to legitimate sons by wives of the same status, especially among the aristocracy, where office is at stake. It may of course also be used to justify a bilateral model of kinship, on the grounds of demonstrable ties to both sides. Equally the theory of exclusive male influence in procreation may be turned in different ways. As it stands, it may be used to protect the descent group from being weakened by marriage to outsiders by denying them a role at all, which permits strategic alliances with other groups without affecting the nature of the descent

group. It may equally support a preference for completely free choice on the grounds that it is completely irrelevant to the continuity of the descent group whom one marries, and so become compatible with marriage between equals, or within a kindred.

21. The result is a number of villagers with whom one has ties of varying degrees of closeness according to personal predilection. One might refer to these as comprising a kindred or recognition, and of cooperation as does Mayer (1960: 4), but these are vague and changing from the point of view of the villagers, who are normally concerned with a small and fairly stable set of ties with persons with whom they work regularly.

22. Rarely it is the man who elopes. This occurred in two cases, in SW7 and SW8, in each case where the boys ran off with attractive girls of poor family against the wishes of the males' fathers. It is infrequent because of the extent of the authority of fathers over their sons the threat which they may wield to cut off access to land, and finally the stresses which might build up in a system where residence is patrilocal after marriage.

23. In the past it was common among court princes simply to order parents to bring their daughters to the palace. The device for avoiding this was for parents to make small, but visible, scars on their pretty girls, so making them cacad, no longer ritually pure, and so not fit for a prince or any high caste person. The demonstration of sexuality and power fitted classical Balinese ideas of the role of princes, discussed below. It is not irrelevant that the last time the court in Pisangkaja ordered a peasant family to deliver their daughter to them was in 1952, a year before events led to their loss of reputation examined below.

24. These figures, which represent the account given by each family after systematic enquiry and so refer to claims, differ from those in Table 7:5, which are based on the most likely versions compiled with the assistance of past headmen and other knowledgeable villagers. The two sets do not therefore correspond exactly, especially as the former is based upon the claim of each party (in some instances one being from outside the ward and therefore not included), and the latter upon the unions contracted.

25. Boon reports the term wargi, in Tabanan as referring to the role of wife-provider (1977: 125), although Korn has noted that there is more than one interpretation given of the term (1932: 150-1). The word was in everyday use in Tengahpadang to mean distant kin, defined as those beyond third cousin reckoned bilaterally and with no connotation of superiority or inferiority, as it is a mutual term of reference.

26. More tangibly, this may be expressed in agricultural work, where fathers are thought to be entitled to ask for help fairly freely from their daughter's husbands, and often do so.

27. The evidence of great sexual potency implied in having many wives has broader cultural significance, as it is a sign of great internal power, (ke)sakti(an) (cf. Anderson 1972, on Java). In many ways the sexuality and violence associated with leading figures may be seen as a demonstration of their power; while at the same time it may serve as a claim to it. Such claims are not made lightly, however, as they must fit what is known of a person, or else he is vulnerable to ridicule and shame.

28. The possibility of forging unions with leading low caste families suggested by Boon (1977: 124-6) is notably absent even from the marriages of the court in Pisangkaja. Taking junior wives seems to have been more a matter of personal predilection, combined with the public demonstration of power in being able to order others to hand over their daughters, discussed above.

29. Where the social and biological reckoning of parenthood differ, the Balinese find themselves in something of a dilemma. In one probable case of adultery which is thought to have led to the birth of a child I was often told that one could see the similarity (in looks and character) between the son and his 'real' father, that is his genitor.

Chapter 8. Caste and the Wider Order.

Introduction:

In discussing kinship, it was noted that the recognition, and extension, of ties was constrained by the question of similarity, whether of natural kind (soroh), origin (kawitan) or in action. In this chapter I would like to look briefly at some of the broader implications of these ideas of shared qualities for the relationships between groups and the ways in which these may be represented. Descent, however conceived, provides the criterion by which status is formally determined in a wide range of contexts, and political authority is justified or routinized. The Balinese have developed ideas of ranking, couched in an elaborate and diverse terminology. This is generally expressed in terms of a theory of innate characteristics transmitted by descent or birth, and maintained by the careful control of exchanges. According to this, persons and things are evaluated by their differential possession of purity, which is often understood as being in some way a property or substance with moral connotations. Differences of status correspond then, and indeed in theory derive from, differences in purity which entail corresponding rights and obligations for those categories which may variously be distinguished. In its formal expression this indigenous idea bears a fairly close resemblance to Indian theories of caste difference; although in practice it is modified to a varying extent by alternative theories and interpretations. The distinctiveness of groups within this sytem is maintained by a more or less scrupulous regulation of exchanges as to the purity of the items involved. So choice is restricted and actors left little freedom of expression. This formalization of communication (Bloch 1975a) seems to be connected with the importance of status in Balinese society, not least because it determines access to most traditional public offices and legitimates the system of traditional authority. While this classification of the world extends to include power, there is an alternative model, more developed but less coherent, about the nature and acquisition of power, earthly or mystical, which is largely separate from moral considerations, but justifies the occupancy or seizure of political

position. Nor only are the two theories linked in complex ways, but they also rest upon concepts defined such that they permit divergent interpretation or even the addition of new possibilities.[1] This provides the system of status ranking with flexibility and allows for change.

In the literature, the Balinese system of ranking has commonly been referred to in terms of caste (Lekkerkerker 1926; Liefrinck 1927; Korn 1932) and so it is convenient to retain the term here in view of the historical and cultural parallels. More recent views, however, have questioned how close the similarity is between Indian and Balinese caste, while conceding formal parallels in varying degrees (see especially Geertz 1959a: 996-7; 1967: 221-5; Geertz and Geertz 1975: 6-7, 21-3; Boon 1977: 145-85). They point at times to other possibilities, including in particular Polynesian influence, but its precise nature and relevance must await further documentation. In this chapter I do not propose to dwell at length on definitional problems, but rather to introduce new ethnography from a more traditional part of the island which, among other things, suggests more extensive Hindu influence than has sometimes been allowed. This is not so much in terms of stratification (see Leach 1960: 1-10; Barth 1960: 113-46; de Reuck and Knight 1967: 1-165), as in the form of symbolic interactions (Berreman 1967: 50) and the cultural expression of differences (Dumont 1967: 28-38). The Balinese versions of Hinduism lay emphasis upon the primacy of ritual purity as the principle underlying the differentiation of all beings, rather than wealth or power. Also religious authority is widely held to be separate from political and properly to encompass it, although we shall see that there is a rival model where the two are in part combined. This seems to have had relatively little effect on the hierarchy in which Brahmana, at least those who were priests, were seen clearly as the superiors of the ruling political élite (see Dumond 1970: 65-79). Perhaps as important, the pattern of exchanges between Balinese castes suggests the existence of ideas that the substances involved are graded in value and affect the composition, spiritual and material, of those so engaged. There are certain transformations between this and the scheme proposed for India (Marriott 1976), but the retention of coherence if anything argues for the validity of the argument in certain contexts at least. Whether or not it is useful to designate this as a model of caste,

there appear to be similarities in certain critical aspects of exchange relations.

This system, which at first sight is apparently highly theoretical, is of use in understanding traditional relationships between castes in Tengahpadang and the form of their more recent change. It will be recalled that in the last chapter the distinction was drawn between two aspects of exchange: the value given or received, and the circumstances of the transaction which include considerations of tactics or power. According to the ideal, the positions of different castes and the pattern of exchange are constrained by an elaborated theory of morality, not open to negotiation. Examination of the ethnography shows, however, the direction and content of exchanges is open to a degree of influence from extrinsic factors. Once again this appears to be the most marked for that critical index of value: the actors themselves. So, over the last sixty years in Pisangkaja there has been a shift from marriage between castes being exclusively hypergamous towards a small, but important, number of hypogamous unions. These attain especial significance because, with the reversal of normal exchange values, they affect the status of the parties concerned. In this way each of the aristocratic title groups, in order of ascending status, has been involved in a series of confrontations both among themselves and with powerful commoner families. This trend is apparently less developed in centres of courtly influence; and more important, from the limited data which I have available, does not seem to have extended to the highest caste of priests. In the region round Tengahpadang, Brahmana, especially those who have been ordained, occupy a position of inordinate respect. In the absence of detailed ethnography for earlier periods, it is not possible to state with any certainty in exactly what way the situation has changed over the years since the collapse of formal aristocratic authority, although it seems likely that the positions of the two highest castes have diverged further. What is worth noting, however, is that ideas of purity, epitomized among men by high priests, are such that they seem capable of expressing these changes within traditional terms.

The possible influence of power and diverse evaluations of ritual purity do not appear entirely to be innovations, but are contained in part in traditional ideas. These deserve brief mention, for they suggest that

traditional Balinese theory was not as monolithic as might appear, but consisted of more or less coherently argued alternative frameworks, logically articulated with one another in ways which will be explored towards the end of this chapter. In the elaboration of ideas of ritual purity, each caste category was assigned different and complementary duties, darma, within a complex system of morality. Power was firmly classed as being the exclusive domain of the ruling caste of warriors but was ideally contained by injunctions as to its use and proscriptions against it becoming an object of desire. The problems of this theory among others was that, being moral, it was essentially proscriptive, categorical and lacking in explanatory force. It did little to account for the existence, qualities and incidence of power in its various manifestations. Appropriately therefore there seems to have been another set of ideas, possibly less consistent and (perhaps because) it was in part esoteric, about the nature and control over power, sakti. This was commonly conceived of as supernatural in origin and was expatiated upon in texts to provide a justification for the choice and actions of power-holders. While a theory of morality subordinated the use of power, a largely amoral, descriptive, indeed expository, theory explained how to recognize or obtain it; both in differing ways invoking natural, or supernatural, justification for their rival views. While traditional morality depreciated power, another view seems to have glorified it.

There is a further dimension of some importance which contributes to the flexibility of Balinese ideas. Purity and power are complex notions, capable of varying interpretation. There is notable lack of clarity in everyday opinion and extensive ambiguity in texts about the precise nature of power: how far mundane can be distinguished from supernatural power; whether it is an attribute of men, or rather they the instrument of it (see, for example the discussion of its place in dynastic chronicles in Worsley 1972: 20-49); or the extent to which it is logically prior to, and independent of, its effects. In daily life sakti seems commonly to be thought of as a property, or gift (pica) from the gods, assumed or inferred for the most part ex post facto.[2] Ideas of caste duty and purity are equally difficult. The term darma has several referents in Balinese, the most immediately relevant being on the

one hand caste duty, on the other universal moral obligation. So it may be invoked both to support the traditional hierarchy and as the basis for an entirely separate system of moral grading. Purity is more complex. It is commonly treated as if it were a property or substance widely present in the world, the relative concentration of which in itself justified social position. It may also be used quite separately as a term of evaluation or judgement on the quality or significance of the actions of fellow-beings, in which exchange or behaviour and motive are not fused but rather contrasted. It will be immediately apparent that key terms, such as purity and power, have a complicated, at times confused, logical status, being simultaneously evaluative, attributive and substantive. In the course of this chapter, I shall argue that it is this logical incoherence which contributes to the diversity of interpretations found in Balinese society.

The System in Outline:

There are a number of difficulties in providing a coherent account of the organization of traditional social ranking in Bali. This has undergone extensive change since conquest and early records, both indigenous or colonial, present a partial view. While most Balinese social institutions, as we have seen, have been subject to change in various ways, relations based on caste have been radically undermined in more than one way. The political system which underpinned the traditional order of rank came to an end early this century with defeat at the hands of the Dutch; and its economic bases, as we noted in Chapter 2, have been effectively destroyed over the last half century. The ideas of hierarchy on which caste was based have aroused antipathy on the part of the Dutch colonial, and later Indonesian republican, governments. Some of the core institutions, such as compulsory palace service (Haga 1924b) and graded obligations and punishments according to caste status (Liefrinck 1917: 151; Korn 1928: 497) were drastically cut back and then abolished; while the more blatant practices from the immolation of high caste widows to the death sentence for miscaste liaisons (Adatrechtbundels XXIII: 389-99; Wink 1934) were legislated against.[3] Whatever the precise impact

of these various changes it is clear that the place of caste in contemporary Bali is likely to differ substantially from the pre-colonial period and that correspondingly care must be taken in general statements about its nature and characteristics.

There are also grounds for caution in estimating the importance of textual sources on traditional political and rank relations. Court chronicles, as we noted in Chapter 2, seem to have served in part to legitimate the political order of the time or, if there be any parallel with Java, to paint a picture of the ideal order in its absence (Ricklefs 1978). These accounts appear to elevate the reputation and position of the ruler to whom they were dedicated, or for whom they were written, rather than provide a detailed record of the relationships between castes or the practical problems of kingship (see Berg 1932; Mahaudiana 1968; and Worsley 1972 for the fullest account of the duties of kings and other estates). Brahmanical treatises on caste, such as the Widi Papincatan,[4] dwell primarily on the strict obligations and prohibitions placed on religious officiants. While its general theme was fairly well known to more educated villagers in Tengahpadang, its precise injunctions were not. Such texts are potentially important sources of information, although their value is limited by the absence of complementary accounts of how caste worked in practice.

A further difficulty stems from the tendency to assume that there was a traditional "system" of rank as such. The evidence available suggests in contrast that there was a maze of practices varying across the island, depending upon the proximity to centres of high caste population, more or less clearly organized in terms of a complex of laws or customs, dependent in part upon brahmanical texts and princely edicts (see Liefrinck 1917, 1921; Korn 1922 for the latter). As we shall see, there are grounds for thinking that these may have been both structured and interpreted according to models which differed in their basic principles and so to the construction of the "system" to which they gave rise. I would suggest that it is this which may underlie the 'flexibility' (Boon 1977: 147) and inconsistency of the terminology and regulations concerning caste amalgamated in Korn's summary (1932: 135-78).

There is the further problem that attempts to define the Balinese ideas of ranking have commonly based themselves on the presence or absence

of particular forms of institution commonly supposed to exist in an ideal version of caste in India, rather than giving much attention to the principles underlying differentiation or the process of exchange in social relationships. This emerges in perhaps the fullest early account by Lekkerkerker entitled (translating from the original Dutch) "The Caste System in India and on Bali" (1926), which suffers somewhat from trying to compare two generalized "systems", based on inadequate, and at times inaccurate, ethnography. The account notes the existence of extensive similarity in social institutions, but points out that the system in Bali was not developed so exhaustively, as it lacked such features as caste councils, hereditary pollution due to occupation, or a clear division of labour at the village level. Little emphasis is placed upon the relationship between castes; and his conclusions as to the differences are weakened by his model of India. For instance, not all members of castes necessarily undertake their appointed occupations; nor does the pollution shared by persons of a single caste derive directly from performing this, but from the grading of the occupation by which the group is designated (Mayer 1968: 341). Similarly, dispute over the precise position of a group in the hierarchy which may occur in Bali (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 21) does not invalidate it, where the disagreement and claims are made within the language of caste ranking. While Bali clearly differs from India in many features of the ethnography and in the contexts where caste predominates over other principles of social grouping (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 21), it may be more appropriate to consider the principles on which the evaluation of differences is based (see the discussion in Leach 1960; de Reuck and Knight 1967; and Dumont 1970) or the pattern of exchanges (Berreman 1967; Marriott 1976; Inden and Nicholas 1977). In general the discussion of the forms of Balinese ranking have been bedevilled both by the existence, often not acknowledged, of different possible frameworks of definition and by a tendency to compare generalized models of India with specific ethnographic materials from Bali.

More recent discussion has raised interesting questions about the nature of Balinese rank and its relation to India. In their writings, the Geertzes have suggested that the three higher castes may conveniently be set against the numerically dominant (some 90%) low as gentry and commoners (Geertz 1959a: 997; Geertz and Geertz 1975: 6-7). This

brings out something of the political and economic relationship between courts and villagers, and the cultural division between centres of excellence and popular practices. It reflects perhaps less well the relationship of Brahmana priests to the rest of society or the differentiation within caste categories by which the agnates of a prince may be working peasant farmers. Something of the complexity, and possible ambiguity, of Balinese ideas comes out in their observation about "the Hindu concept of 'caste'" that "the Balinese themselves, less interested in precision, nonetheless use it to explain their own system to themselves." (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 6). This question is taken up briefly by Boon who notes the possible Dutch influence on rigidifying caste rules (1977: 146-7). He goes on to consider the exportability of Hindu ideas and concludes that by Bouglé's definition, the Balinese lack separation of castes and have division of labour only in a very restricted sense at the level of caste categories (warna). He notes, however, that they do have hierarchy and a clear distinction of status and power, although he does not develop the importance of ideas of ritual purity (1977: 148-9). Part of the problem is that it is not always clear as to exactly what period is being discussed and it may not be wise to see the system as unchanging. In this chapter, after a brief resumé of the formal outline of caste, I would like to turn to introduce some new ethnography from Tengahpadang which suggests the continued importance of ideas of caste, ritual purity and power in contemporary social action. The apparent difference in views is partly to be explained by the difference in areas of field work. Gianyar, as was remarked in Chapter 2, is one of the oldest kingdoms and Tengahpadang a rural area in contrast to the more urban settlement of Tihingan, dominated by smiths who are noted for their heterodoxy (Goris 1960d), or the modern town of Tabanan.

There are various different sets of categories, not all coordinate, by which the population of Bali may be ranked. The dominant ostensible model is terminologically derived from Hindu caste. The basic units are agnatic descent groups, the clans or title groups discussed in the last chapter, so that in some respects caste comes to be the external aspect of descent. There are ordered according to a grand classification known as the caturwangsa, four peoples, or caturwarna, four colours, or types.

These are further grouped into the three high castes, triwangsa, comprising Brahmana, (K)Satriya and Wèsiya in descending order of status, and the Sudra who are the low castes or commoners, making up some nine-tenths of Bali's population. These are said in the literature to be twice-born (dwijati), and once-born (ékajati) respectively, although they are terms which are rarely used in everyday life, at least in 1970. The order of ranking within these broader caste categories is open to a degree of dispute and rival claims. While position at the apex is generally agreed, at the bottom this may also be so, as in Tengahpadang,[5] or apparently be disputed, as in Tihingan and the neighbouring wards. The concern is often with relative position rather than formal caste category. In the middle ranges of Satriya and Wèsiya there may be competition as to relative position and dispute about broader caste category. This is especially among groups which have traditionally been ranked somewhat low but where access to office has spurred claims to status. In contrast to India there are no descent groups clearly distinguished as untouchable, although there were occupational groups, such as potters, indigo-dyers and arak-makers, which were set apart and known as candala or meléca. Korn has argued that these were merely under a temporary occupational injunction as they were said to heat the ground (1932: 167), but Hooykaas has suggested (personal communication) that they were in-marrying and ostracized as no one wished to have contact with them. As they disappeared some time after conquest, it is not possible to make detailed enquiries of them as to the relationship of occupation and rank.

There are certain other divisions recognized by the Balinese although, in some instances there is dispute as to their exact referents.[6] Korn notes the existence of a classification of men into utamaning utama (highest of the high) high priests and princes, utama unconsecrated Brahmana, madiya for ordinary Satriya, and the Wèsiya and Sudra as the lowest, nista. In another version Brahmana alone occupied the first category and Satriya the second, making it an effective replication of the caturwarna (Korn 1932: 140). The utama:madiya:nista tripartite classification is very widely found in diverse contexts to grade large:medium:small; here apparently converted into a four-part system notable for its grouping of office-holders as distinct from

ordinary caste members.[7] There is further more common set of distinctions, widely used in Tengahpadang. This grades Balinese as follows: geriya ordained Brahmana priests and their families; jèro (or sometimes Dalem, used to refer to the highest castes of Satriya), literally inside, for royal aristocracy living in palaces; jajaran the remaining high castes living outside special enclosures; and finally jaba those outside, the most common appellation for Sudra and the mass of the populace.

The classical Indian varna (warna in Balinese) is the most general system of classification and the formal conceptual framework within which Balinese operate. It is this which is most widely used in daily life to distinguish the major status divisions, although it is not considered entirely appropriate to place unconsecrated Brahmana within the class of jajaran. The distinctive feature of these alternative classifications is that they permit the discrimination of the holders of office and power from ordinary caste members, and so provide the possibility of emphasizing the division of priest or prince from populace.[8] Whatever the version, the warna system provides an all-embracing classification in which everyone has their position ascribed by virtue of birth into a particular descent group, while other taxonomies recognize individual achievement or succession to office by persons within the appropriate category. (As was noted in Chapter 2, the emergence of a powerful leader from the wrong caste may require the stretching of categories. The point at issue is not the regularity with which leaders happen to spring from suitably placed descent lines, that is those of previous office-holders, but the social framework of values within which this is incorporated.) Change of status is only possible through, or at least requires as well, the mobility of the descent group as a whole. In popular thought, there is also no possibility of improvement of status through reincarnation which is a closed system confined to a single descent line.[9] In this respect the Balinese allow less mobility than Indian theory. The only escape permitted from one's position was by effective social death in becoming a wandering hermit (brahma nukla cari) beyond the bounds of society living off roots and the remains of others' meals (paridan) and by dressing in cast-off clothes or leaves. It is a role often referred to by villagers and as greatly respected as a means to personal salvation

(moksa) as it seems seldom to have been assumed. So the basic units of the warna system are descent groups which are ordered hierarchically, despite some dispute over relative position. These may further be classified into overarching categories with some precision at the extremes and less in the middle. These kin groups, or clans, it will be convenient to refer to as castes; where these are very large and divided into named sub-groups, such as among the Pradéwa (see Table 3:12), one might speak of sub-castes. This usage differs from that suggested for India (Mayer 1960; 1968), but Balinese groups do not have the same highly ordered local or regional structure.

The various caste categories differ significantly in the traditional definition of their appropriate social and religious functions, which are laid down as part of a complex, differentiated, moral code stating their duties (darma). As caste differences are based on descent group membership, it will already be clear that these are not normally designated by the names of traditional occupations. There are certain exceptions, such as Pasek Bendésa who properly provide the heads of customary villages (the bendésa). The Balinese do not, at present at least, possess a developed jajmani system of reciprocal rights and services. There are, however, traditional occupations which are more or less strictly reserved for particular caste categories. The emphasis in Bali is not so much on hereditary occupations as concern with the continuity with, or transactions in, substances of differing quality, evaluated on a scale or relative refinement and so purity. This tends to set limits on the range of permitted, or approved, activities the higher the caste category, or even the position claimed by a caste within its warna. So the Widi Papincatan lists a vaste range of forbidden occupations and activities for priests in particular.

By general agreement the highest category is that of Brahmana, which comprises five ranked descent groups. These are in descending order: Kemenuh, Manuaba (the village near Tengahpadang), Kenitèn, Mas and Antapan, mostly the names of villages in the heart of traditional Balinese culture in Gianyar. The hierarchy is justified in a myth in which the original Brahmana culture hero, Batara Wau Rauh (literally: the god who has just arrived, also known as Dang Yang Nirata) marries two Brahmana women, as principal and secondary wives, then a Satriya woman, followed by a Bendésa girl, then a low caste servant girl - this mythic polygamy being an inversion

of the expected monogamy of high priests - producing five families of progressively descending status. The small number of Brahmana is no reflection of their importance. They have the exclusive right to become consecrated as high priests, pedanda. These are of two named types and traditions, the so-called Siwa priest, pedanda Siwa and Buddha priest, pedanda Boda. These differ significantly in their dietary prohibitions and are classified in a series of binary discriminations into senior but relatively spiritually ignorant and impure, as opposed to junior but more enlightened and pure; by which the Buddha priest has few food taboos but is held to be somewhat purer.[10] In practice, however, Buddhist influence has largely succumbed to Saivite and the two orders differ now mainly in certain doctrinal and liturgical details (see Hooykaas 1964; 1966; 1973b; 1973c).

The Brahmana specialized in knowledge of archipelago sanskrit and old Javanese (popularly known as kawi). As this was the medium in which texts were written and transcribed, they possess a large measure of control over the dissemination of traditional knowledge, embodied in the truly vast mass of religious, literary and didactic materials of Javanese and Indian origin but continued by Balinese scholars. (Some idea of the number and range of these may be gleaned from Pigeaud 1967, which is concerned primarily with Java. The full diversity of manuscripts in Bali is still undocumented.) Equally, many important roles connected with the broadcasting and interpretation of traditional culture, such as shadow-puppeteers or craftsmen in the finer arts, are associated with Brahmana, in theory if not now always in practice. Perhaps their most obvious role however, is as priests.[11] They were responsible for the performance of almost all the great rites on the island, sometimes with the assistance of specialized priests of lower caste to handle the more contaminating aspects of the event (see Hooykaas 1964b; 1964c). These included ministration at the great annual (or even centennial rites of Éka, Dasa Rudra, see Bagus 1974) festival at the central temple of Besakih to ensure the welfare of the island and its people, as well as for the preservation of the realm at state temples (pura penataran). Select priests officiated on behalf of, and acted in the capacity of advisors to, princes, in their role as bagawanta, royal priests; although it seems likely to judge from present recollection

that this relationship may have served to tame them. Finally the study of jurisprudence and so the office of judges in high courts fell to them. So it seems that in the Brahmana was vested a great deal of ritual authority, stemming from their mastery of traditional sources of knowledge and their monopoly over the highest forms of ritual practice. Perhaps more important, they presided over the transmission and creative development of the whole tradition of religious and scholarly literature and served as its main interpreters.

The second caste category, which consists of those descent groups claiming the status of Satriya, is larger and less clearly bounded. These have already been discussed at some length in Chapter 2, where the proliferation of royal courts in outlying villages was examined. They held the traditional and in theory exclusive right to become kings, (raja) and regional officials (punggawa) as well as providing much of the personnel for subordinate offices, down to lesser positions of courtiers and hangers-on. These last, according to memory, were said to be much given to intrigue and were most unpopular with the peasantry. In Tengahpadang, it seems that a high proportion of the poor families in Br. Triwangsa migrated from the court centre in Gianyar to attach themselves as courtiers. It was from the Satriya that warriors were traditionally recruited; although in effect this seems to have meant mainly military commanders and a small body of supporters. For no small part of the routine fighting seems to have been left to humbler, low-caste soldiers on foot. In its definition of potential rulers, Balinese caste theory differs in some versions from the Indian, in that the Wèsiya are often amalgamated with Satriya (see below), or treated as properly subordinate administrators and officials. This may in part be an adjustment to the situation in which most of the kingdoms outside the triangle of ancient court centres of Klungkung, Bangli and Gianyar, are held to be Wèsiya by the high ranking Cokorda clan (itself divided into ranked sub-clans, or sub-castes), while these rulers of the outlying kingdoms claim that their kin groups rank as Satriya. I shall have more to say about this in a moment. In other accounts, such as those current in Tengahpadang, where office is firmly controlled by groups which are generally agreed to rank very high, the

Wèsiya retain their traditional function of organizing trade and the circulation of value. While aspiring groups may dispute their position as between these two categories, there is complete agreement as to their relative standing. It is precisely this which leads to the ferocity of status claims and counter-charges.

Finally all those mentioned agree that the Sudra, or jaba, are the lowest category in the scale. They were traditionally allocated the duty of serving the three higher categories, being obedient to their orders and, as Geertz has put it, of serving in the periodic rites of state as "supporting cast, stage crew, and audience." (1973a: 335). Their main function was as peasant farmers to provide the agricultural surplus necessary to support the élite, through the provision of services to the palace or in war. Finally, with the proximity of court and village, they were involved in cultural activities such as music and theatre, although it is not entirely clear how much this was directed and dominated by higher castes, or was traditionally equally the preserve of ordinary villagers. In virtue of their small numbers, the high castes especially the Brahmana formed a minority in most communities and were completely absent from others, notably in the more mountainous areas. They were not, however, undifferentiated and in the various kingdoms special descent groups tended to be singled out for specific functions such as gusti, emissaries of princes;[12] bendésa, village headmen; sengguhu, "exorcist priests" (Hooykaas 1964b); and pandé, metal smiths of various kinds, about whom more will be said in due course.

The different caste categories were, and are still, seen as related to one another according to a variety of mythic and moral schemas. There are a number of different legendary accounts of how the various castes emerged from, or came to be associated with, an original figure such that their relationship is expressed in terms of the organic unity of the body. The one most frequently cited in Tengahpadang incorporates the distinctive features of the similarity of Satriya and Wèsiya and the demographic balance of castes, by identifying the Brahmana with the head, the Satriya as the right arm, the Wèsiya as the left, and the Sudra as the lower body, torso and legs. The parts of the body with which castes are associated may be varied in different versions, depending upon the extent of difference desired. They

all, however, place the Brahmana in the position of the head and the Sudra lower and identified with brute features, such as legs. So the quality of different organs is reflected in the division of labour of the body which is used as an analogy of the differentiation of social groups.

This ideal system of complementary social roles is elaborated in a theory of ranked codes of conduct (darma) which are peculiar to each category. This is far from being esoteric or specialized knowledge and ordinary villagers in Tengahpadang could, and would, adumbrate a fairly substantial list of injunctions. The following, gathered from the customers in a small coffee-stall in Pisangkaja, is reasonably representative:

Brahmana:
1. should follow the six moral precepts (see below).
2. should never frequent places of dubious worth (such as coffee-stalls or cock-fights), nor should they gamble.
3. should always be dressed in an appropriate fashion.
4. should strive always to maintain a state of ritual purity - suci.
5. high priests, pedanda, in particular should know wédas (here apparently meaning holy texts, especially for rites), mantras (ritual formulae) and wariga (calendars and the computation of auspicious days).

Satriya:
1. should set a good example to their subjects.
2. should protect their domains.
3. should be brave, and courageous in war.
4. should be fair and just to their subjects.

Wêsiya:
1. should engage in commerce and organize the market. (Having produced the stock answer, they were puzzled as no one could think of a Wèsiya who was engaged in trade. Only the prince NE1, behaved like a merchant and he was a Satriya. The stall decided that they were usually ministers, patih, to princes and so should follow the code for the latter.)

Sudra:
1. should follow désa kala patra[13] (roughly that which is proper in time and place, often understood in daily contexts to mean the rules of the ward and désa adat)
2. should behave as befits a human being (manut ring tingkah manusa).
3. should work hard, in the rice fields, repairing roads or buildings belonging to the king and so forth.
4. should be obedient to higher castes, especially the king.

Having established the basic list to their satisfaction, the villagers went on to develop the code befitting a ruler.[14] The conduct proper to a prince or Satriya was that on which informants almost invariably waxed the most lyrical. One item not usually included by commoners, but referred to by higher castes, was that it was the darma of Sudra not to understand (nor enquire about) darma. The full range of meanings of this term is complex and will be discussed at greater length in due course.

This is not, however, the end of the code of conduct expected of the various castes. There is a further set of precepts which all men, regardless of status, should endeavour to observe. Villagers usually referred to six which they knew, but often said that there might be more. These were also stated specifically to be the first duty of Brahmana. They are:

1. good speech
2. good thoughts
3. good actions
4. good use of objects and persons
5. good work
6. having one wife and being sexually faithful[15]

It was widely felt that the higher the caste the greater the obligation to adhere to these and the more serious the breach.

The question remains of the extent to which the scheme outlined above is ideal, or actually forms the basis for the organization of social relations in appropriate contexts. It is difficult to judge its validity in traditional form for caste has changed greatly. At least, the legal enforcement of caste regulations has been all but abandoned; many practices have been forbidden; the loss of authority and land, with the emergence of a new bureaucracy, has had effects upon the position of the two middle caste categories; and the gradual impact of a market economy has led to the diversification of occupations. Nor is it so easy to check the model against the historical record which is notably patchy and lacking in the detailed ethnography useful for close analysis. This has further been impugned by Boon (1977) and while his scepticism is a valuable and necessary corrective, his conclusions tell us almost more about the observers than about Balinese history. Certain features however seem reasonably clear. The Balinese operate consciously

with a model based upon a version of the Indian caste system (Geertz :& Geertz 1975: 6). There is a division of labour between the main traditional roles, at least at the level of caste categories (Boon 1977: 148): Brahmana retain the exclusive right to become high priests (pretension to priesthood carried with it the death penalty); rulers were recruited exclusively from the category of Satriya extended to include Wèsiya, although certain low caste groups, such as the pasek seem to have had the right to the apparently important, but somewhat obscure, office of pemadé in Gianyar (Korn 1932: 287ff). In Chapter 2, it was noted that there was a degree of mobility in the system, by which lower Satriya in Gianyar came to power. In general, however, such movement led to a change in position for the descent group not an individual. How far this extended seems to be a matter disputed among the participants.

Perhaps the most glaring discrepancy is in the position assigned to descent groups classified as Wèsiya. While the kingdoms in the traditional heart of south Bali were dominated by rulers and local officials who by general agreement ranked as Satriya, by the time of the Dutch conquest the remainder were under the sovereignty of families who are often categorized as Wèsiya by the traditional core of Cokorda. This might seem a radical departure from the theory. I would suggest, however, that in fact this is not so on several grounds. First, the Satriya and Wèsiya are often classed together in terms of their expected traditional roles and are further grouped together in the classification of utamaning utama (at least in Tengahpadang) for those who hold office. Second, in the pre-conquest period and even after, the successor to the kingship underwent the great rite of enthronement, Biséka Ratu (for an outline see Swellengrebel 1947), by which his entire person was purified and so elevated to the level (tingkah) of Cokorda, so making this not only the title of a particular Satriya descent group, but also the title of all rulers. In this way each incumbent to the office of king (raja) attained the status of high Satriya - as the Balinese put it, if not by birth then by offerings (banten). Most important of all, however, all such families tend to claim the status of Satriya, commonly by reference to dynastic myths, while their political

opponents may well proffer a more lowly evaluation. In other words caste category is the idiom of claims to office and legitimacy, while rival ascriptions are part of political competition. So ideas of caste would seem to apply despite the apparent classification of some rulers by others as Wèsiya. It may be argued that what is significant in the competition for office is not the dispute over the exact position on the scale of any particular family, but the agreement among the participants as to the criteria and the framework within which claims are made. So it would seem that there are grounds for thinking the formal model of caste is not irrelevant. The form which this has taken and the principles upon which it is based will be examined in the remainder of this chapter.

Caste Relations in Tengahpadang:

Tengahpadang was chosen as the site for fieldwork in part because it lay a little way from the great centres of court influence further to the south of Gianyar. There used to be a high priest living in Pisangkaja (on the site of the present compounds SE7-12), but the line is thought to have died out towards the end of the pre-colonial period. The last pedanda is believed to have gone mad. It is possible that this is in part responsible for the widespread view that for some reason Tengahpadang is dangerous and unsuitable for high priests: certainly by tradition in many of the temples they do not perform the central rite of ngaturang piodalan during the annual festivals for the deities. The local palaces are small and live on dwindling resources, both economic and political (see Chapter 2). There is, however, a reasonably large and mixed high caste population, comprising 94 out of the 700 or more households, and 13.3% of the population (Table 3:15), predominantly Satriya from one of the two high ranking dynasties, but with two marginal households of Brahmana and more substantial gusti, who are ranked generally as Wèsiya. There is also a sizeable population of smiths (pandé) who regard themselves as somewhat apart from other groups, the significance of which will emerge in due course. Lacking strong brahmanical influence and without powerful courts, Tengahpadang is regarded generally as somewhere towards the middle of the scale between such centres of high caste influence as Ubud

or Payangan and the purely low caste settlements further inland. So it is not noted for the strictness of its observance of caste rules in the present; but against this, lying off the main roads, it is thought of as rural and so to some extent traditional.

Against this background it is interesting to examine the extent to which different types of caste rule are observed and the changing pattern of relationships between different categories. Even a cursory inspection suggests that many diacritical features of caste difference are retained and that inter-caste relationships are carefully structured. In some ways the question is not so much as to whether the Balinese here observe caste rules, as to the range of contexts in which caste is the dominant, or a recognized, principle. At first sight, it appears partly constrained to those aspects of social relationships which lie outside the ambit of the main corporate groups, while within them democratic principles prevail. As was noted in Chapter 6, however, this is only partly the case and the precise extent to which notions of caste difference interfere with the theoretical similarity of group members tends to be a field for delicate negotiation and adjustment affected by the importance of differences in other areas of social life. More detailed enquiry suggests that ideas underlying the differentiation of villagers by caste are developed to a fine degree; while at the same time the range of contexts in which such differences are recognized is changing.

Something of the complexity of the considerations involved has already been discussed in the examination of occupational differentiation in Chapter 5. While the Balinese lack a full system of graded complementary services linked to the traditional division of harvest, there are ideas of the ranking of occupations and special arrangements for the payment of ritual services. Different forms of work are graded on a scale of refinement and coarseness which is correlated with position in the caste hierarchy (Table 5:11 and the following discussion there). According to the villagers, in the past the range of activities in which high castes would indulge was more limited still. In the present division of labour services are paid in cash between villagers. The position of the court, however, is somewhat different. The families of traditional retainers (parekan) include a range of specialists, from carpenters to builders who perform tasks on command for the court

without any direct payment. In return they occupy farm tenancies (Table 5:10) and will be allocated a share over and above their normal division according to the amount of their work by the court. This is not fixed but depends on the prince and forms part of a more open arrangement by which servants in need may simply come and ask for rice. In the larger palaces this system is far more extensive by which client villages may be asked to perform large services, such as carve elaborate frames for orchestral instruments or assist in ceremonies. There is no immediate return, but the villagers may request favours from the court. When one village required a barong macan (giant puppet in the form of a tiger), a very expensive item, according to my sources it was organized and given to them by their traditional patron in Ubud. The relative imbalance of services and gifts in this system is difficult to evaluate. There was a check against abuse in the past in villagers moving away, or changing patronage. More recently the pressures operate on the courts which still play important regional political roles. It is by their relative generosity that they maintain or extend influence and much of their wealth is channelled into such relationships.

The position of ritual practitioners is also a little different in some ways. Ordinary villagers have limited contact with high priests who come mainly to perform the central rite (ngaturang piodalan) in the festivals of certain temples, to officiate at cremations and who may be asked for advice on exceptional matters. The court may invite them to conduct certain rites for them also. The tie between priests (siwa) and their clients (sisiya) whether individuals or whole communities is one of some symbolic importance, but tends to be overshadowed in practice by the ties with ordinary temple priests (pemangku). These are the effective general ritual practitioners of village society, conducting household and village rites and providing advice on religious and more varied matters. They are also far more numerous and approachable than the high priests who are set apart and represented as part divine. Both priests may also be healers learned in traditional texts (balian wisada or usada), while there are also lesser healers (balian) and specialists in the more polluting rites of birth and death. All these are compensated for their services in a similar fashion.

This takes the form of an offering or set of offerings to the officiant who has been invited. The nature, number and value of these is scaled according to the hierarchy. These are offerings (banten) which are used in other contexts and contain edible items, with the addition of a special gift, known as a sari, of cash. This ranges in value from Rp. 500-1,000 for a high priest, to Rp. 5-10 for a pemangku. (The computed cash value of the offering as a whole was between Rp. 1250 and 1800 for a high priest; Rp. 120-125 for a pemangku; anywhere from Rp. 45-200 for a balian depending upon their knowledge and the matter in hand). While temple priests and healers generally make a part of their living from these services, the acceptance of such gifts raises more complex questions. As we have noted, the acceptance of gifts is open to varying interpretation: from according an honour to the giver to being a subordinate. Appropriately high priests normally live off farms (ideally it was said 1-2 hectares in size) worked by tenant farmers. While some accept the offerings, others do not but only waft the essence towards themselves, but return the gift or offer it to some deserving party. In this way they avoid the complications of receiving. The two practitioners with the highest reputation in Tengahpadang - a high priest from Padangtegal to the south, and a textual expert (a Cokorda) from Payangan to the east - were treated, and I suspect genuinely held, in great veneration for their refusal to accept any compensation for their services. In sum then, the Balinese may lack the equivalent of a jajmani system but the organization of services shows a distinctive recognition of considerations of reciprocity, purity and the status of the gift.

There are also certain relatively fixed indices of caste difference. Apart from high priests who are marked out on both ritual and everyday occasions by special dress (Friedrich 1957; 66-70), as are temple priests in their habitual white, there is little difference in apparel. To the Balinese, however, there are differences in appearance: high castes are often thought to be lighter-skinned and more physically beautiful. They are also expected to behave with greater restraint and grace, although such ideal constructs are recognized to vary to a degree in practice. Death provides one of the main occasions on which differences

in caste category, and sometimes descent group as well, become clearly evident. Castes differ in the length of the mortuary pollution they are bound to observe which increases the less the intrinsic purity of the person (as will be discussed, the Balinese system dwells not just on relatively impurity, but stresses the positive side of purity as well). They also differ according to sumptuary rules as to whether they may transport the dead to cremation in funerary biers and the number of roofs (tumpang) said to represent the roofs of pagodas, (mèru), and also the form of cremation vessel. These various differences are summed up in Table 8:1. There are a number of interesting features. The mortuary pollution of high priests is less than for other members of their caste, which does not apply for ordinary priests. In Tengahpadang, all Pradéwa and Déwa Gedé are classed with Gusti in their observance of pollution on death (sebel) which restricts the person affected from entering places designated as pure, such as temples. The Pasek Bendésa are also singled out as being different from ordinary low castes and from the Pulosari who claim high status and are entitled to use the bull as a crematory animal, the standard index of high caste. The size of the symbolic Mount Mèru on the funeral bier differentiates castes even further. No lower caste groups are permitted this in Tengahpadang, although some claim they are entitled to use them. This provides an unambiguous differentation of castes, not only firmly placing Satriya below Brahmana, but separating all their constituent groups in turn.

As the world is classified according to the purity of the objects within it, these may affect the purity and so status of men. So for instance the wood appropriate for use in the buildings of different castes varies (the details are documented in the manuscript Asta Kosali(ya) which has not yet been fully transcribed or translated in its various versions. Food and language form important diacritical features of different castes, as they are held to affect the persons concerned. As these tend for the most part to be items involved in exchange between castes, they will be considered below. It should be noted, however, that the classification of raw and cooked foods in Bali has been very little examined.[16] In general, the higher the caste the greater the number of food prohibitions, particularly

Table 8:1 Diacritical Features of Caste Difference in Mortuary Ceremonies in Tengahpadang.

Caste:	Mortuary Pollution: (days)	Roofs on Bier:	Cremation Vessel:
Brahmana:			
Buda priest:	5 days	padmasana †	Bantèng (bull)*
Siwa priest:	9	padmasana	Bantèng
unconsacrated:	9	11	Bantèng
Satriya:			
Cokorda:	11	9 †	Bantèng
Anak Agung:	11	7	Bantèng
Pradéwa:	15	5	Bantèng
Wèsiya:			
Gusti:	15	3	Bantèng
Sudra:			
Bendésa:	15	-	Bantèng
Pulosari:	42	-	Bantèng
Gèlgèl, Batuan, Dauh, Jambangan, Sulang:	42	-	Singa (Lion)
Tangkas, Prasanti:	42	-	Pancaka**
Cameng:	42	-	Gajahmina**
Kubun Tubuh:	42	-	Macan (Tiger)

* the colour depends upon marital status: young persons who have never been married are entitled to white (here: putih kuning) as they are ritually purer; others are designated by black.

**The gajahmina is a mythical animal, part elephant part fish; unfortunately I did not see a cremation with a pancaka.

† high priest's bodies are carried on special open biers, known as padmasana, lotus-seat. Their close association with Siwa sets them apart from ordinary mortals and according to Swellengrebel (1960: 63) the absence of roofs indicates their freedom from the cycle of rebirth.

† high Satriya are entitled to have their biers preceded by the mythic snakes, naga-banda, the symbolism of which is complex (Korn 1960: 136; Friedrich 1957: 88 for the myth).

on the consumption of meat, so that the pedanda Siwa is under very strict dietary constraints, while significantly as we shall see, the pedanda Boda is less encumbered (Goris 1931). These figures are absent in Tengahpadang, where the more important food restrictions concern Satriya. Most of these are common to all Balinese, but are held more serious in the breach for high castes.[17] All high castes are forbidden jahir, a fish, and kidang, a small deer from which they are thought mythically to have received milk and appears to be linked with the deer which symbolized the dynasty of Majapahit in Java from which they claim descent. They avoid eating these, which are said to produce a feeling of revulsion (seng ati). The same terms are used for food which has come into contact with impurity in any form. These are notably resem, ritually polluted and effectively inedible for high castes; kumel, dirty and ritually polluted, but less so than resem, but this also makes the food inedible, although lesser aristocrats may throw only the affected portion; finally, if there are evident impurities or dirt (often here from the earth), it is daki and should be thrown by high Satriya. Temple priests in Tengahpadang in each case observe stricter rules or purity than even high Satriya.

The forms which impurity can take in food requires fuller consideration as part of a study of classification. It may just be worth noting the complexity of forms of pollution. Coughing or sneezing render all food in the area resem and will be eaten knowingly by no one. Slightly less intense feelings occur if the food is sniffed by a dog or cat, if faeces or money (especially pis bolong - chinese coins used in death rites) touch it, if a chicken flies over it or any garment which has ever been worn below the waist passes over it, or if touched by hands which have not been washed before, it is resem. Should the left hand touch food the same occurs, but it is reversible by the general purificatory formula (mantra)'nunas lugraha' (to beg for grace). A hair falling on food makes it only kumel and falling on the ground daki. Priests and high ranking Satriya should touch no food to which any of the above have happened, among others it depends in part upon wealth and sensibilities. These rules are fairly closely adhered to; although the wife of the prince (NE1) was observed eating food which had fallen, when she thought no one

was looking. When this was learnt, it was felt that it was her own choice if she wished to degrade herself. It aroused fairly strong feelings, for there are many low caste villagers who would not deign to ingest food as polluted as that. The notional separation of castes has, in practice, the other face that it depends upon the strictness of observance of persons regardless of caste. To strive to attain a level of purity higher than the station to which one is born is not necessarily inappropriate, but to fall below is reprehensible. The higher the caste the more onerous the observances.

The majority of restrictions placed on members of higher castes derive, however, from their place in a system of exchange. Those items most strongly affected are notably: food, language and women, while physical contact of various sorts is also subject to rules. The problems may be seen by a quick examination of restrictions on transactions of edible stuffs. It is commonly stated that Balinese food prohibitions concern only ritual food. That which has been offered to deities (surudan) or more generally the remains of food which has been consumed by some being, non-material or human (lungsuran in high Balinese; carikan in low), is potentially highly polluting, so that acceptance connotes complete deference.[18] Offerings at ancestral shrines forms the archetypically dangerous food, although any kin group temple and commonly by extension temples of origin (pura puseh) are avoided by high castes. This extends to holy water (tirta). Even in acceptable temples, a minority of purists in Tengahpadang, will not take holy water made by the priest if he is of lower caste, but insist of being given the ingredients to make their own. Ingestion of such food in any form results in the complete and irrevocable decasting of the consumer to the status of the deity of the shrine involved. There is no means by which such an act can be reversed. Correspondingly at state temples of leading aristocratic families, acceptance of lungsuran, or holy water, symbolizes subordination (this was noted for the administrative village head of Tengahpadang in Chapter 2.). The pollution of such food is however removed completely if it passes through the market. It was suggested in Chapter 5, that this may be connected with the relatively high status of money on the scale of purity. This does not however account for the pollution of food by direct contact with money noted above. It would appear here that physical contact should be distinguished from transaction.

As an object, money is dirty because of the hands which have touched it; as a measure of value, it is not material at all.

Closer examination shows however that the consumption of food outside contexts specifically designated as ritual is also subject to restrictions. This is suggested in the first instance terminologically in the common use of the word lungsuran to embrace both remains of offerings and ordinary food. To accept the remains from another's plate is normally confined to genealogical juniors within a household (at the widest the compound), or to a wife from her husband. The rules for eating from a communal dish are more complex. On the one hand to take food with the hand from a shared dish (marid keparid, saling carik) connotes equality (Geertz & Geertz 1975: 129); on the other the grades of status difference may be sufficiently developed as to leave few in this class. In Tengahpadang, high castes maintain that one should not eat any such food which has been touched by a genealogical junior, including one's own wife, let alone outsiders. Whatever the ideal or previous practice, as villagers observe, this is now thought to be rather stringent, and is adhered to mainly by Satriya Dalem, in this case Cokorda and Anak Agung. What is apparently less often recorded, in part it would seem because it is implicit and taken for granted rather than expressly formulated, is the caste rules concerning cooking. For most high caste families, this poses little problem as cooking is performed by the women of the house who are either of the same caste by birth or incorporated (and purified) through the marriage rite. In the courts which employ low caste servant girls such as NE1 the position is more complex. Detailed observation showed that such girls were used mainly for the tedious work of preparing raw ingredients while the cooking was undertaken by high caste women. It was generally secondary wives or high caste servants, usually Anak Agung and so somewhat lower but of the same broader group, who bore the brunt of work in the kitchen. In the past a further reason is given for this, namely the fear of poison being introduced into the meal, a very widespread fear when accepting food prepared by those outside the family.[19]

The act of consuming food may be subject to similar constraints. This is widely performed alone and seems in some contexts to be regarded as a private act, a topic on which I would like to do more research as it

touches on the question of incorporating items exchanged. While there are occasions such as temple ceremonies when communal meals are prepared, they are not always eaten in public. The portion of food for high ranking persons is carried to their compound where it is consumed privately. Among royal families the taking of meals is generally subject to tighter restrictions. In courts, there is commonly a high pavilion raised such that the food and participants are placed above the heads of all others, so that they may not remain superior, but effectively invisible.[21] According to a servant from the royal court in Gianyar, at the time of fieldwork the food was still carried by a servant, properly of the same caste, on top of his head (elsewhere never below the level of the nose). As the prince should not ideally be observed eating by persons of lower status, in powerful courts the servants sit behind their master, often outside the building entirely.

In Pisangkaja concern with the source of food appears not to be restricted exclusively to Cokorda or Anak Agung. A survey of the clientèle of the various food stalls in the ward showed a strong tendency towards the clustering of high castes. These were predominantly Pradéwa, as Cokorda in particular tended to avoid consuming food in public, although the lesser ones would take coffee: a practice from which the prince stayed notably aloof, so that he would occasionally come to sit with others but not take refreshment. This tendency is in fact sufficiently marked that the preference for high caste villagers to eat at stalls at which the food was cooked and served by high caste families was highly significant statistically (the chances of this result being reached by accident being less than 0.1%, see Table 8:2). This cannot be explained simply by reference to family connexions, although it was clearly an incentive for high caste girls to cash in on prevailing dispositions, for a high proportion of customers had no kin ties to the stall-owners. It will be noted however that, in the pattern of observed acceptance of meals, there is a substantial proportion of high caste people, mainly Pradéwa, eating from low caste hands. This may be explained by two factors. First, stalls recruit custom in large part on the basis of neighbourhood and to refuse to eat from a neighbour breaches another ideal. Second there is a well-developed view that one should not eat at the same place, but rotate custom. This may be explained either in terms of helping villagers to make a living, or in order to avoid the impression of partisanship

Table 8:2 The Distribution of Custom at Food Stalls in Pisangkaja by Caste in 1972.

Status of clients	Status of Stall Owners (and cooks)*		
	High caste	Low caste	Total
High caste**	31	35	66
Low caste	53	169	222
Total	84	204	288

X^2 = 13.14 at 1^o freedom this is significant at 0.1%

* the distribution of food stalls is given in Map 4 in Chapter 4., including the caste status of the owner/cook.

** this is largely Pradéwa with a smaller number of Anak Agung. Cokorda do not eat in public as a general rule, although the members of NE2 would take coffee.

(or less often stated, openly showing the fear of being poisoned). It would appear then that Balinese ideas of the possible consequences of food consumption, commensalism and cooking are more elaborate than is often credited. Alongside this body of more or less clearly articulated rules, however, there is a certain scope for personal predilection in how closely these are observed, especially for lower ranking triwangsa but less so for those locally ranked as Satriya Dalem. The extent to which this flexibility is a traditional trait rather than the product of social change is open to question. According to villagers the present freedom is recent and has followed the loss of power by the courts; but the existence of a degree of choice in commitment is a feature of many Balinese institutions.

The principles guiding physical contact between castes are also fairly simple and, at least in contemporary society, again flexible within certain limits. For instance there is a certain recognition of motive, by which accidental contact is distinguished from deliberate assault. While the latter is an offence which results in the pollution of the high caste party, the sanctions and payment of repurification, depend upon the circumstances

and considerations of justice, as will emerge in Case 11 below. Pollution between castes due to physical contact or proximity are also linked to more general indigenous ideas about the differentiation and processes of the body, and also the division of social space in terms of purity. As has been discussed elsewhere in greater detail, relative position by height and towards the north (to which the east may be assimilated) connote the closely linked qualities of relative status superiority and purity (Hobart 1978a). Appropriately the body is also organized such that the head is the highest and most pure part; while excretions are marginal and polluting, most notably menstruation. The organization of behaviour in most contexts is governed by these principles within the family in the ordering of domestic activities and in public.

So the rules of contact between castes tend to follow more general concerns of the Balinese with movement in space. Under normal circumstances, ordinary villagers do not come into close physical contact with high. In courts and contexts where caste relations are explicitly involved, relative status is commonly marked by relative head height and direction, such as the rare occasions when different castes sleep in the same compound. Those lower are required to be in a ritually less pure direction and on a lower level. There are, however, occasions when the emphasis is upon the equality of members of a group or community, as in public meetings or coffee-stalls. Here villagers sit at the same level, although it should be noted that there is tendency for high castes to sit towards a purer direction, while on leaving inferiors bow their heads. In matters of direct contact a high caste person may touch a lower freely; but inversely the lower should not make contact with the higher above his waist and must scrupulously avoid the head. (In this way when young men who are close friends are walking together, it is possible to tell caste difference by the arm of the superior round the neck of the other, who places his hand round the higher caste man's waist.) Where contact is essential for some reason, the general purpose purificatory formula "nunas lugraha", is adequate. In courts, low caste servants properly sleep in a ritually inferior part of the compound, as do high caste women during menstruation. Female low caste servants are required to leave the court altogether for the time of their periods as they pollute the

compound otherwise. Certain objects retain the relative impurity of humans, particularly clothes. Within groups, the garments worn by women are polluting to men (for which reason they are used to protect ricefields, see Chapter 5); across caste boundaries, it is forbidden for higher ranking persons to put on any item of wear used previously by an inferior; while the reverse is common and is used widely to signal relative superiority both of caste and in patron-client relationships. The breach of these rules of contact pollutes the higher person and lowers him to the status of the other party. This position is temporary and is annulled by a purificatory ceremony (merascita) containing special purificatory offerings (tebasan perascita), the rite being paid for by the person adjudged guilty. This varies according to the severity of the offence and the status of the parties: for an ordained high priest the complexity and cost of the purification is colossal (see Korn 1960: 150-1; the same scale was given to me during fieldwork).

As the position of high priests has been touched on, it is a suitable point to note the existence of a special category of persons who are not formally distinguished in the caste hierarchy but who are treated as if they were at a special level. All ordained ritual officiants are singled out from the ordinary members of their caste.[21] They are raised and set apart by special purificatory rites, commonly known as mediksa for high priests, mewinten for ordinary temple priests. This increases their purity from its normal level appropriate to the particular caste. This must be maintained by the observance of relatively rigorous prohibitions in all exchanges. The temple priests (pemangku) in Tengahpadang are dressed on all ritual occasions in white (or yellow for certain garments, the colours being determined by complex considerations of purity and identity with deities) and are set apart from others in food exchanges and contact. They eat only food which is pure (sukla) and has not been offered to deities (except those in their own ancestor shrine) and may wear no garment worn by anyone of whatever caste. For the breach of any of these rules requires the complete repurification of the priest, to be paid for by the offender. Certain minimal conditions of purity are enforced by the rules which prohibit anyone with physical defects (mala) from becoming priests. They are also expected to observe a wide range of moral and ritual

rules, from the avoidance of contact with death to the ban of extra-marital intercourse, cock-fighting or properly going to public food-, or coffee-, stalls. The position of low caste priests in terms of the caste hierarchy is interesting, as opinions differed at the time of my fieldwork. According to high caste villagers, the purest temple priest is nevertheless inferior to the meanest high caste person; in popular thought, however, they are graded variously according to their observance of the rules mentioned above. So the evaluation of behaviour and motives provides an alternative framework by which persons may be ranked across caste lines. As we shall see, this discrepancy in views would appear important.

One of the most interesting forms of exchange which directly involves questions of caste is language. A great deal has been written on the distinctive features of this in Indonesian societies which are distinguished by the use of distinct vocabularies of respect, sometimes and perhaps better known as language levels (Stevens 1965) or speech levels (Poedjosoedarmo 1968; for Java see also the account in Geertz 1960b). Possibly in view of the incursion of Islam in the societies studied, the link between language as a medium of exchange and the existence of ritual pollution is not mentioned. In its general features Bali shares the main features of distinct lexical levels and the rules of address according to the status claimed or accorded the hearer, but with the additional feature that this is not a matter of respect alone, but of caste obligations. The use of incorrect levels, even if a single relevant word, is enough in theory to result in the pollution of the person addressed or referred to. In order to understand how this functions it is necessary to look very briefly at the caste implications of language.

It is obviously not possible to describe fully here the complexities of the use of language levels in Balinese which must await a future publication. Without wishing to enter into a detailed analysis, it should be noted that language levels serve to differentiate and evaluate villagers in several non-coordinate ways. Not only do they distinguish between persons on the basis of caste, genealogical status, age and sex; but they also mark off special roles, such as public office-holders, but most importantly persons who have been consecrated, mainly priests. They may also be used to indicate

respect and significantly the evaluation of a person's ritual purity. At the same time, the higher the level the greater the respect, but also the further the social and affective distance imputed. The use of language levels in Bali has many facets and can be used to convey a wide range of distinctions. Precisely which are implied in any particular exchange is often obvious, but the scope for nuances is enormous. While key terms are given a fixed minimal level, there is extensive room for variation of level, by which slight undercutting or exaggeration may be used to hint at a plethora of possibilities, from grudging respect to ridicule. Here it will only be possible to note the brute differences in levels and their relevance to formal exchanges between castes.

The critical feature of the recognition of levels of speech is the reduplication of vocabularies of terms which are graded on a scale, in Bali governed by the evaluation into relative refinement (alus) and coarseness (kasar). The terms for important items differ accordingly in each level, while less usual or critical ones may only have one form and be common to the language as a whole. The number of levels generally recognized in Balinese is problematic and varies according to the source, indigenous or scholarly. Essentially there are two very extensive vocabularies, known as refined language (basa alus) and ordinary speech (basa biasa), each of which covers a wide range of objects and attributes. In many instances there is little apparent relationship between the lexeme in high and in low, the former often having a connexion with Javanese or sanskrit, the latter commonly being peculiar to Balinese or Malay, the difference being illustrated in the respective terms for road: marga (margi) in high, jalan in low. Generally the level of a word is evident from its sound - the drawn-out elegant high language contrasting sharply with the more clip or even gutteral low-as in the terms for eating, merayunan, miyunan or ngajengang (in descending order of refinement) as opposed to ngamah in ordinary speech, or kariya in high and gaé in low, both meaning work. Between these, there is a very restricted level middle or market language (basa madiya or basa pasar), with only some 30 terms, used in incidental contact with strangers, or before the relative caste status of the parties is established. Below all these there is a not insubstantial vocabulary of

vulgarity or obscenity (basa kasar) many of the terms being used legitimately of animals but being insulting if said of humans and polluting if said of high castes or priests of any kind. Partly separate from this, there are special terms which may be used to elevate others, known as singgih, commonly with reciprocally self-abasing equivalents, referred to as sor. There is some disagreement over whether these should be regarded as separate levels (van Eck 1876) or simply respect terms (Kersten 1970).

The important feature of language is that speech exchanges affect the ritual purity of the persons concerned. Each level is graded in terms of its intrinsic purity, such that the more refined the level the superior the gift offered, the coarser the word the more pollution it carries. As a result minimal standards are set for all language use between castes, such that if a word below a certain required level is uttered, the effect is instantly to pollute the person about whom it is said, whether he is present or not. As with contact a certain recognition of motive softens the apparent austerity of these rules, in that small children, idiots and linguistically unskilled anthropologists are partly exclused unintended error.[22] The system is also made more flexible by the requirement that certain key terms, generally concerning parts of the body, its functions and closely identified objects, be of the appropriate level; while slippage is permitted in other words. The extent of this varies according to several axes discussed above, including also the power of the recipient - Cokorda are invariably addressed as systematically as possible in the appropriate level - and the knowledge of the speaker. Lexical and syntactical forms in high Balinese are complex and language rules must make allowance for the inadequacy of native speakers. As we shall see in the next chapter, the sheer problems of fluency in the elliptical, elaborated forms of address in high Balinese directly affect the workings of social life and political power.

The connexion between lexical levels and ritual purity has some interesting consequences for the patterns of speech both within and between castes. The highest language of all is reserved for addressing gods: properly old Javanese or sanskrit, although in some of the remoter mountain villages (or common peasants in the ricefields) high Balinese is the limit of their

knowledge.[23] Below them in descending order, more or less, come high priests, then princes together with ordinary Brahmana, the various grades of high caste, low caste priests (distinguished by the use of the reference term dané (middle Balinese for him, his etc.) in contrast to Ida, for all high castes) and ordinary villagers. Apart from priests, where the language is kept fairly constant, the degree of slippage from the level of key terms depends on a complex blend of evaluative criteria and knowledge discussed above. Within castes the key terms must be retained in theory as they are the indices, or sources, of purity; variation being achieved in other terms. The position as regards the language used by caste superiors to inferiors, however, is more complex and cannot simply be assimilated to a scale of increasing coarseness the greater the status difference. Satriya may use remarkably coarse language when talking to commoners or about them; especially to their servants, they not infrequently resort to abuse and expletive. Brahmana who are yet more distant should not use such coarse terms and high priests in particular are often noted for the careful modulation of their language. The problems raised by this will be taken up shortly. Finally, in Gianyar at least, the language used between high priests and princes is remarkable for its almost symmetrical nature, outside those key terms which differentiate caste status (for instance, to sleep is mekolem for high priests, but the lesser mesirep for Cokorda). While this betokens mutual respect, it also implies mutual distance.

This complex system is retained in remarkably coherent condition despite the various pressures, ideological and practical, of post-conquest Balinese society. Generally the elevation of language varies with proximity to the traditional heartland of the island and with the impact of the outside. So Bulèlèng in the north, the capital under the Dutch, and Badung in the south, the new centre and locus of tourism are noted for the relative absence of refined language which is retained particularly in the eastern kingdoms. The system has also survived the period of communist party influence, roughly from the late 1950s to 1965 in Pisangkaja. This period is instructive on several grounds. Some of the leading members of the communist party were of very high caste, so the drive towards the

abolition of status distinctions assumed an interesting form. In the move to abandon titles, rather than be addressed as "Anak Agung" or "Cokorda", or "'Gung Aji" even "Cokord' aji" (the addition of the term father, to produce a quasi-teknonym); they were referred to as "Pak Agung" or "Pak Cok' ", the Indonesian colloquial term for father with the Balinese addendum of a modified title, or else birth-order name. As the villagers who informed me of these usages pointed out somewhat sardonically, this did not actually infringe caste rules as the title was retained or substituted by high not low fratronyms (Raka rather than Wayan, for first-born and so forth). Since the collapse of the communist party in 1965, the use of these forms has disappeared; although villagers say that over the decades the levels demanded by high castes are declining.

This period is also interesting in furnishing a case study of the breach of caste rules of contact and probably speech, under limiting conditions. For it concerned a young Cokorda from NE2 who was a leading member of the communist party and so in theory committed to an ideology denying the importance of caste differences, under circumstances where there was provocation for the offence:

Case 11: The case of the adulterous aristocrat:

> It may be recalled from the previous chapter that the family of low caste orators from NW8 had caused the court embarrassment by I Kebet's seduction of a married Cokorda woman and their eventual discovery. Five years later in 1959, when the strength of the communist party in Pisangkaja was reaching its peak, it seems that one of their foremost members, Cokorda Agung, the elder brother of the man who was cuckolded by I Kebet began an affair with Ni Darni, the daughter of I Kebet's sister. It is widely thought that his interests were both personal and revenge upon the family of Dauh. The liaison was very generally known as the Cokorda seems to have made little attempt to keep it quiet and the woman's husband, I Kara (NE13), was teased about it by other villagers. So he decided to try to trap the visitor and lay in wait with the stem of a dapdap tree. He succeeded in catching the Cokorda in bed with his wife and set about him with his stick. Cokorda Agung did not retaliate but put his hands around his head to prevent damage (although dapdap is not a hard wood) and to avoid being struck and so have to be completely purified.

Whatever transpired, it was agreed that Cokorda Agung had been assaulted deliberately (whether verbally or physically) and was sebel, polluted to the level of jaba, commoner. There was no question that the full rite of merascita raga, purifying his body, had to be performed. The problem came that I Kara had caught him committing adultery with his wife. In Tengahpadang there is no very clear rule for the procedure under these circumstances. Traditionally, the court used to summon all the high castes in the ward for a conference as to the appropriate action to be taken for an infringement of caste rules - the one occasion when all high castes seemed to act as a unit. It is not clear whether such a meeting took place in this instance or not. The general guideline is that where the high caste party had committed a fault reckoned as clearly more serious than that of the offender, then the outcome is in the balance, although there is no general indication of which way the matter will be decided. (Perhaps in part because two different theories of morality are being juxtaposed: the recognition of the possibility of commensurability is itself interesting.) Nowadays the court prefers to refer the matter to the ward. In this instance however the Cokorda did not wish to press the charge and performed the ceremony in its entirety at his own cost. Even at the height of the communist party movement, it is interesting that caste ideals overruled political ideology.

This is an extreme case and although such offences are infrequent, they may occur for far less. In a recent example, which in fact concerned a priest rather than an aristocrat, the priest of the eastern temple of the dead. When a villager in Br. Tengahpadang used a word in basa kasar about the priest because he was several hours late to perform a domestic ceremony, he was obliged to pay for the priest's entire repurification. As the example above shows, however, considerations of justice affect on whom the sanction shall fall; but to even the most republican view it does not seem to be in question as yet as to whether the rite is unnecessary.

This discussion does not exhaust the forms of exchange between castes which are subject to regulation. Perhaps the most important of all is the form of exchange which involves the actors themselves as objects within the system - that is in sex and marriage. Here, more than in any other field regulations and beliefs proliferate, not always without contradiction, to the point that only the briefest outline can be given. The variety of rules and terminology in Tengahpadang alone would require more space

than can be allowed in this thesis. Marriage between castes and, especially among high castes between ranked lines, becomes a complex matter of status balanced as we shall see against political considerations. In Tengahpadang I have, however, not been able to find evidence to support Boon's suggestion that these latter may weigh sufficient that a family of "overlords sometimes allowed outstanding lower ranked houseyards to receive a superior woman in marriage." (1977: 146-7).[24] The only examples noted were where the girl had behaved herself in such a manner that she was unacceptable to any high caste man (see Table 7:9 and the discussion in Chapter 7). Rather relative caste status or purity seems to have been a matter of the greatest concern to the point that, unlike other forms of exchange, intention or motive was irrelevant. Girls in the region round Tengahpadang, who were raped by the Japanese, lost caste although it was universally agreed that they were in no way compliant. It will emerge instead that the retention or loss of women between castes seems to have been one of the main ways in which the traditional order was expressed and by its inversion subsequently challenged.

The more common form of marriage between castes was hypergamous, where a woman of lower caste was taken by a man from a higher group. In contrast to the reverse, this is marked by the absence of elaborate terminology, the girl simply being said to have dados mekel, roughly: to become of substance (the complexities of bekel have been noted briefly in Chapter 5). The extent to which her status was changed by such a union is problematic. In part it depends upon whether she has borne children or not. In the former case she is entitled to cremation according to the level of her husband although not, should they die at the same time, in the same cremation animal. If she is barren, properly the low caste wife is cremated as a commoner. It is said that this is one reason traditionally why they might immolate themselves on their husband's funeral pyre, thereby retaining status. Otherwise the position of an hypergamous women is not particularly enviable. Apart from occupying the station of secondary wife (penawing) they tend to be treated in an inferior fashion somewhat akin to servants,[25] their ambiguous status being reflected in the use of middle Balinese for key terms rather than the refined language used of aristocrats not only by villagers but by the woman's own children who

address her, as do other members of the family, as any commoner while she must use refined language to them. Her position is reflected also in the status of the children which is lower than those of high caste wives of the same husband. It is thought that successive marriage of aristocrats with commoners over two or three generations effectively lowers their caste. This is the reason given for the position of Anak Agung, who are thought to be of Cokorda ancestry but from commoner wives. From the genealogies available, I have been unable to trace such a transition and cannot determine the extent to which the representation is accurate, or justifies other forms of relationship. Where Anak Agung marry low caste women however, their offspring are designated by lower birth-order names and if they repeat the pattern of marriage, come close to merging into ordinary commoners, at least from the aristocratic viewpoint.

Unsurprisingly the attitudes of low caste parents to their daughter entering an hypergamous union vary. There are those who say that they are pleased that their daughter has been honoured, while others note the problems for both child and themselves. Attitudes seem largely to depend upon the more concrete issues of the wealth and power of the high caste family and their treatment of the girl. As was noted in the previous chapter, the normal practice in marriage is elopement, which reduces the emphasis upon exchange and stresses instead the taking (ngambil) by the high caste; the asymmetrical relationship of status being evident in the modification of terminology with the girl's parents being said to be at the feet (warang di cokor) of the others. This symbolic subordination is normally found in practice; for high castes seem in part to avoid marrying into lower families of greater wealth or influence. There are further problems for the girl's parents in that the parents must address their own child in higher terms - including address as jèro, insider - than she them; she may no longer pray to her ancestors, or help in menial tasks around the house. Finally, unless she is divorced, she may no longer pray to her parents (sumbah) on their death. In Pisangkaja, unless pragmatic advantages outweigh these losses, hypergamous unions are not greatly desired by most villagers, who prefer their daughters to 'marry their own kind'.

The possibility of the reverse relationship, between a woman of high status and a man of lower caste, is the subject of great concern and elaboration in terminology, sanctions and beliefs about the fate of the persons involved. It also implies serious disgrace for the high caste family and potential loss of prestige for the wider title group. During the pre-conquest period such hypogamous unions seem to have been rare as they were punished by death (normally by immersion in the sea in a sack, according to informants), only commuted to banishment for life from the island and fine subsequently under the Dutch (Wink 1934). It was only after Independence that hypogamy, or hypokoity, became more frequent in Pisangkaja and, as we shall see in a moment, has taken an interesting and highly structured form over the years. In order to understand its importance, it is perhaps useful first to look briefly at the ideas which surround it in local thought.

Hypogamous relationships are subject to rather different viewpoints by high and low castes. In terminology, however, the union is clearly disapproved. Classically, it may be known by the sanskritic term of pratiloma, as opposed to hypergamy, anuloma. More generally the woman is said to susud bangsa (high Balinese), or having fallen being referred to in low as nyerod bangsa, to drop caste. They are assumed to " 'sing pedalema kulit", to have no affection for their skin (implying something like their natural rank, the term has so far defied my attempts at a full analysis) for they "jeg nyoplosang raga", throw their bodies around. Such a liaison is also classified according to the difference in caste category between the partners, usually in terminology involving a dog (the commoner) climbing over the shrine or seat of a pure god. The girl is obligatorily cut off from her family in ritual, through not always in daily exchanges. No member of her natal family may eat with her for fear of being permanently decasted (ketebah).[26] She may not in death be prayed to (sumbah) by natal kin nor can receive the holy water (tirta pengentas) necessary to secure the passage of her soul safely to the other world (see also Hooykaas 1973b). In parts of the island in fact on death the body is simply thrown into the grave-yard and left. The unions involving such women are too recent in Tengahpadang to know what will happen when one dies - villagers were uncertain. According to high caste informants there was the general feeling that suitable punishment would be meted out in hell or in one's fate in future incarnations, popular

opinion considered that the girl was punished enough by her loss of position and shame, and by being reborn a commoner for evermore. They agreed though that the offenders, known as wang (wong) pantèn could not enter heaven and that the man would be punished in hell by having a red-hot bar of steel driven through his heart so that he would be reborn as a weakling (the inversion of the bravery he showed in his previous life), with a cough and a weak heart. Such speculation on personal fate is, however, hedged about with caution, for as the Balinese would remark, they have little direct evidence of what befalls the soul in the afterlife.

At the time of my fieldwork, however, the attitude of villagers to such unions differed according to their caste status. High castes uniformly regarded the possibility with horror for it was felt that whatever the action against the girl, it could not erase the shame (nyalit in high; lek in low Balinese) incurred by the purusa. For a man of lower status to act in this way was felt to be tulah, too brave or assertive (it has connotations of walking backwards or being upside down - a reversal of the proper order) and to make him impure, cendala, a general term for the effects of the breach of caste rules on the perpetrator. Commoners however had rather different ideas. Not only did they see nothing bad in this, but viewed success with some pride. To make off with a high caste girl was to be bani, brave in a good sense (while agreeing this would have been foolhardy previously) and showed off one's personal qualities if one could make a girl of high birth throw herself away out of desire. High caste women are also generally thought to be more beautiful than commoners, a vague but tenaciously held idea, so the prize has added attractions.

There are certain further beliefs about unions between castes which are of some interest as they confirm the relationship between groups in some instances, but complicate the position in others. For instance certain types of marriage, such as that between a Cokorda male and a Brahmana woman (dayu) are particularly hot and dangerous (panes). So also is the marriage of any Balinese male with a Chinese girl, the reverse being cool (etis). The explanation generally given for this latter is that the Chinese are elder siblings to the Balinese: a formulation which makes them materially superior

but spiritually inferior (see also Jackson 1978). All marriage between castes is held to be hot, while marriage within is cool. Appropriately hypergamous marriages are less dangerous than hypogamous; but the beliefs about the offspring of such unions reverses the evaluation. While the children of de-casted women are held for the most part to be ordinary commoners, the ambiguous status of hypergamous brides is reiterated in the position of their children.[27] These are widely known as bengkiwa, the name of the hybrid produced from mating two different species of duck (a male kekirik and female bèbèk, although a little contrarily the former is more or less useless and impure, while the latter lays eggs, and provides meat which is sufficiently pure to be used in ritual). The mixture has an ungainly mixture of traits and absurdly short legs. Like illegitimate children (bebinjat) they are thought to have bad characters, to become easily dissolute and good-for-nothing. It is possible that this reflects concern about marginal beings between categories, or the product of their inappropriate combination, a view which is supported by ideas of the anomalous nature of multiple births among men (see Chapter 10). Against this, it excludes the children of hypogamous unions, does not explain why above all any marriage with a Brahmana woman by inferiors can only yield disaster, and why particularly twins of opposite sex should be singled out as anomalies more than others.

The nature of marriage between castes is not just a matter of the formal operation of aseries of classificatory principles. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that exchanges have two prominent dimensions. The effect of pragmatic considerations and the demonstration of, and competition over, political power tend to influence the ideal patterns of exchange of value, in this case of persons in marriage. It is perfectly possible that other forms of exchange are also the focus of such disagreement. Marriage seems, however, to play a particularly central role in disputes, not only it would seem as it involves an exchange of the actors themselves, but also because its consequences are peculiarly visible and perduring. The nuances of the use of language levels in speech exchanges between castes is by their nature largely significant at the time of utterance but the effects of marriage are generally clearly evident (and may be recorded in the ethnography) years afterwards. So whatever the changes in other forms of transaction, the pattern of marriage tends to provide a clear index of the relationship between castes and its change.

Table 8:3 The Distribution of Marriages between Castes in Pisangkaja. (This table is based upon all recorded unions of villagers living in Pisangkaja at the time of the match, whether one or both partners, living or dead. This extension is desirable in view of the importance of the changes.)

		HYPERGAMOUS MARRIAGES Females from:							
		Brahmana	Cokorda	Anak Agung	Déwa Gedé	Pradéwa	Gusti	Jaba	Hypergamous unions
HYPOGAMOUS MARRIAGES	Brahmana		-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Cokorda	-		13	1	1	-	4	19
	Anak Agung	-	1		-	8	-	6	14
	Déwa Gedé	-	-	-		2	-	1	3
	Pradéwa	-	-	1	-		2	12	14
	Gusti	-	-	-	-	-		1	1
	Jaba (includes Chinese)	-	1	4	-	5	-		0
									52
	Hypogamous Unions	-	2	5	-	5	-	-	12

Marriages above the diagonal refer to hypergamous relations between a male of higher caste and a woman of lower caste; relations of hypogamy between a male of inferior status and a female of higher caste are recorded below the diagonal, the relative difference in status being indicated by the number in the appropriate square.

This table extends to include marriages of persons living in Pisangkaja whether living or dead to enable the full extent of inter-caste marriages to be revealed. It does not extend, however, to marriages contracted by villagers in Pisangkaja made before moving to the village, or after having left. This is designed primarily to sort out secondary wives taken by in-marrying Cokorda males contracted before moving as sentana to the ward. In this case neither partner was from the ward and the woman did not move to join her husband but stayed in his compound of origin, if not divorced.

The distribution of marriages between different castes in Pisangkaja is laid out in Table 8:3, for all known unions in which one member at least was living in the ward at the time it was contracted. The majority of these follow the preferred arrangement of hypergamy which is over four times as frequent as the reverse (81.3%). It will be apparent that the dominant trend is for a caste to take women from that immediately below it, with the exception of the Pradéwa who have taken more wives from low castes (jaba) as there are few Gusti in the settlement, or even the region (see Table 3:12 and 3:15). There are, however, no exchanges between Anak Agung and Déwa Gedé; in part it seems that while in Tengahpadang, it is generally agreed that Cokorda rank highest, it is not entirely clear how their junior lines are placed, especially now that the Déwa Gedé and off-shoots of Cokorda both carry the same title of Anak Agung in daily use. Also by virtue of this difference between royal lines (Déwa Gedé) and others (Pradéwa), the Déwa clans seem to be similarly distinguished. It should also be clear that it is the lower ranking Satriya

Table 8:4 The Change in the Pattern of Inter-Caste Marriage in Pisangkaja up till Fieldwork: (± 1910-1972).

(This table is based upon the same recorded unions as Table 8:3)

Time Period:	Equal Status:		Hyper-gamy:		Hypo-gamy:		Total:
pre-1930	23	53.5%	19	44.2%	1*	2.3%	43
1930-50	18	41.9%	21	48.8%	4	9.3%	43
1950-72	32	62.7%	12	23.5%	7	13.7%	51
Totals:	73		52		12		137

* This was during the 1920s after the abolition of severe penalties by the Dutch and involved a Pradéwa girl of poor family running away with a Chinese in Bulèlèng in the extreme north of the island. It was only in the 1950s that girls belonging to Anak Agung or Cokorda castes were taken in hypogamous unions; before that it was confined to the lower-ranking Pradéwa and the poorer families there.

have lost more women in hypogamous unions than the high ranking royal lines. The table has, however, been restricted to omit the marriages of Chinese except where they involved hypogamy (so omitting one union recorded in Chapter 7) and marriages between people who lived at some time in Pisangkaja but not at the time the union was forged. This only leaves out one marriage of significance, where the mother of Anak Agung Putera (NW17) recently ran away with a Chinese from Tengahpadang. This was the effective culmination of her slow decline into poverty from being the heir to one of the few remaining wealthy courts, largely through gambling (see Appendix 3, and the discussion in Chapter 2). However the Déwa Gedé (Anak Agung Putera's title, it will be recalled, is strictly Déwa Gedé) and Cokorda, who are the incumbents of the local courts and retain a measure of political power, have been less affected than the lower ranking aristocracy.

This overall picture may be made more illuminating by examining how the pattern of marriage has changed over the period for which records are available. In the period before 1930, as far back as genealogies will extend, that is for the most part roughly twenty or thirty years, the prevailing trend was to primary marriages within the caste and a large number of secondary unions with wives of lower status (44.2%). There was only one instance of a hypogamous marriage, of a notoriously wild Pradéwa girl from a poor family (NW2) who eloped with a Chinese during the 1920s, after the heavy sentences for this offence had been lifted. During the following two decades the number of hypogamous unions rose, but these were still confined to the poorer Pradéwa who had few sanctions against wilful daughters. In the last period of slightly over twenty years, the proportion of hypogamous unions rose again. Several of these were from members of the poor family of Anak Agung who moved from SE4 to the newly developing commercial centre of Kintamani in the mountains, where the girls eloped with men working locally. It also included, however, some marriages within the community which were of far greater significance, to which we shall return in a moment. There is a further point of interest in Table 8:4, which is the decline of hypergamy and the rise of caste endogamy. There seem to be two processes involved here. With the decline of the power and wealth of the courts, the pattern of taking on several low caste wives largely ceased (aided by the fact that the

heir to the court NE1 for two generations was a woman, so the man was a sentana). It is also possible that in the final period the sense of threat to the traditional status order may have led to a degree of retrenchment and consolidation.

The relevance of hypogamous unions is perhaps best seen within the wider context of different forms of marriage and the political changes within Tengahpadang itself. Some instances of hypogamy seem to be of relatively little significance, such as I Bakta (SW25) or I Silir (SE24) running off with married high caste women, where affection seems to have been the prime motive force, although the disgrace to the high caste family is not lessened much thereby. In other instances however the loss of women to lower castes seems to have had wider repercussions. In order to understand these, it is useful very briefly to review the political history of Pisangkaja. It will be recalled that up till about the end of the Second World War, the headmanship of the ward was occupied by a villager who was a client of the court (NE1) and more or less an agent of princely authority. The events connected with the change which occurred, involving Kt. Mara (NW7), are discussed in Chapter 9. From 1955 on, the influence of the communist party increased, led by the Anak Agung and opposed by the Pradéwa, with the Cokorda caught in between. In 1962, there was a direct confrontation over the office of administrative village head involving the Cokorda from Tengahpadang, I Rangin (NW8) as a more or less overt communist party candidate and a Déwa Gedé from Tengahpadang who was strongly committed to the nationalists. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the Cokorda lost heavily and I Rangin carried the two western wards, but not the bloc of five to the east. So, during the period between the end of the war and the abortive coup in 1965, the main high castes were in competition, against the general background of their gradual economic and political decline, which culminated in 1972 in the loss of the last office under their control, the headship of the administrative village.

Against this backdrop the pattern of marriages is interesting. This has been discussed in part in the previous chapter where we noted the successful rescue of their daughter by the powerful Dauh family of NW8

from the Cokorda of Tengahpadang and the challenge to a leading family by their cousin Kt. Mara (NW7). The history of marriages between castes at this period adds a further dimension. In 1952 the head of the court, Cokorda Mayun (NE1), ordered a family of commoners in Tengahpadang to hand over their daughter to him to become a secondary wife. A year later, the court was involved in inter-caste relations again, but this time in reverse when I Kebet (NW8) was caught committing adultery with a married Cokorda woman from NE2. In 1954, the same family was involved in the confrontation discussed already with the Cokorda of Tengahpadang. In 1958, four years later, after the influence of the communists had grown, the family of Anak Agung most involved (SE4) were faced by the elopement by one of their girls with a Pradéwa, the orator Déwa Md. Doblé, from one of the most influential, if poor, families. This is to date the only hypogamous union between the two castes. In the following year, a Cokorda belonging to the communist party was engaged in extra-marital activities, recorded in Case 11. This had the effect of bringing shame indirectly upon the family of Dauh in NW8. It also happens that the husband of the girl involved, I Kara (NE13), was a strong member of the nationalist party. So the pattern of marriages and liaisons during this period followed interesting lines.

There seems to be an order in these exchanges, although it is not possible, especially after the event, to tell how far these were purposive.[28] Apart from the particular relationship between the individuals concerned, the choice has symbolic connotations, here largely concerned with purity and caste ranking. These exchanges have however two dimensions, so that in addition relations of power serve to confirm or challenge the existing order. Choices of partner within the ideal framework of caste are channelled according to theories of status and purity. Where the disjuncture of status and power reaches the point that the latter cannot be brought to bear to support the former, as was the case in Pisangkaja, it is possible to challenge the position of persons or groups, or perhaps the system itself. Up till the 1950s, the loss of high caste women had been from low Pradéwa families and it is questionable whether the opposed dynastic family of Cokorda would have gone to great lengths, even if it could, to prevent this loss of face. As late as 1952, the court gave a conspicuous demonstration of its power in ordering a commoner

family to deliver a girl to them. By this time however they had lost control of the ward to other sources of influence, notably the lineage of Dauh. A year later this seems to have become a direct challenge in the adultery of I Kebet, which it is agreed resulted in great loss of prestige if a Cokorda could be cuckolded with impunity by a commoner. The following year the other family of Cokorda in Tengahpadang suffered similarly. On a somewhat different axis the leading Anak Agung family were issued a challenge by their dynastic and party political opponents, the Pradéwa, who eloped with one of their women. The subsequent retaliation by the Cokorda in part failed. In each case the pattern of exchange of women was influenced by the balance of power between the parties concerned. In the later instances this seems to have had a direct effect in reversing the expected flow of value with concomitant consequences on the evaluation of the groups concerned.

There are two further points worth brief mention. First, while the hypogamous and hypergamous activities of the high castes seem to have been aimed at confirming or challenging position within the existing framework of values; the ends of the low castes in so far as these were articulated appear more complex. On the one hand a poor family of Dauh raised itself in ten years from insignificance to become perhaps the most feared, if not universally respected, in the ward and even settlement by virtue of challenges phrased within the idiom of caste. On the other, from early on (as we shall see in the next chapter) they had gained political support largely by organizing and promoting the interests of common peasants. In this case their membership of the communist party may not have been entirely fortuitous and it would appear that, in the later stages at least, they may have been partly aware of the wider consequences of systematic confrontations with higher castes. The second issue concerns the problem of the extent to which the aristocracy actually lost prestige in these disputes. This is not an entirely clear matter, but is open to divergent interpretations on the part of those involved. This is linked to the wider question which will be taken up in the remainder of this chapter of precisely what is being symbolized in Bali in the caste hierarchy and the relative importance of ritual purity as against political power.

In retrospect then, in this section I have tried to show that the Balinese ideas of rank in the settlement of Tengahpadang are fairly highly developed and still an important framework for the evaluation of behaviour and relations of exchange. Castes are distinguished by certain attributes, notably those connected with occupation and the forms of mortuary ritual. More important, the relationships between them, especially forms of interaction such as food exchanges, ritual or otherwise, language, sex and marriage, all come to play an important part in defining the heirarchy. As such exchanges also involve questions of the relative power of the parties concerned, however, they are potentially open to redefinition, which may have broader repercussions.

Purity and the Moral Order:

In the last pages of this chapter, I would like to look briefly at some of the ideas underlying Balinese ideas of ranking. This is a vast and complex topic to which I can do no justice in the space available. There are, however, several reasons why it is useful to touch on this in the present context. First I have referred in the discussion of the ethnography to a number of cultural themes without however having given these any systematic attention, nor linked these with the more general question of caste and its relevance in Bali. In the course of description it has been convenient to introduce the notions used by villagers themselves such as ritual purity which is important to their ideas but has only been mentioned in passing. There is the further question of the place given to power within the hierarchy and how these two ideas fit the wider cultural and political order. The relevance of this to the general argument developed in the thesis is that it would appear that, in Bali at least, the organization of rank cannot easily be explained solely by reference to a single criterion or system of ideas, but that it seems to be interpretable in several different ways. In this section therefore I would like to examine some of the ways in which Balinese ideas on ritual purity are worked out and how this manifests itself in a particular moral order based on ideas of inequality. This system incorporates the distribution of political power and makes it subservient to the moral order. In the final section we shall see that this leaves a certain amount of the ethnography, particularly on the attributes

of kingship and the nature of power, unexplained. It also fails to account for the existence of forms of evaluation of behaviour, and ideas about what is held to be pure, which cannot comfortably be contained within the original framework. There are various ways in which these views of purity and power are linked through mechanisms for the transformation from one to the other, and devices for reconciling them hermeneutically to one another.

As the villagers in Tengahpadang express it, the world may be integrated into a single overall scheme. Within this not only castes, but also gods and spirits, as well as lower forms of life such as animals, have their place. In the same way objects, especially those which may be used in exchange, tend to be graded. This is done according to a scale of classification very widely reported for the societies in this part of Indonesia (see for instance the description in Geertz 1960b: 231-2), based upon differentiation by coarseness of refinement, the degree to which something is kasar or alus. This extends not only as we noted above to language but is used very widely to order things and persons according to criteria of materiality or grossness, as against immateriality or subtlety. The principles of how things come to be placed where they are requires more study. In part this classification is implicit and accepted rather than the subject of easy delineation, but nevertheless provides one of the most frequently heard modes of evaluation in conduct and exchange. It appears also that this scale of refinement corresponds closely with the estimation of the degree of purity of something, so that in one of its aspects, purity comes to stand as a synonym of refinement. An example of this was seen in the evaluation of language levels; another is the conduct expected of persons of differing purity, broadly the purer supposedly the more refined. As we saw in the last section, the higher in the caste hierarchy, the greater the danger of pollution by coarse matter, whether in food, speech or by contact. So the higher their position the more care men must take with the content and partners of their exchanges, which reaches its acme in the precautions taken by high priests and in the state of temples where communion with deities occurs. Similarly the more elevated, nor only the greater the danger of pollution, but the extent of purification required in the event of breach. If a child climbs into a high place in the house little happens, in a temple it pollutes it so far that the great and very costly rite of Malik Sumpah must be performed. Striking a commoner requires the payment of a small fine of Rp. 50-100 (Appendix 2); striking a high priest is almost

unthinkable and redress for offences to them may take months or years of ritual (see Korn 1960: 150-1; informants gave accounts very similar to those enshrined in the texts of the Widi Papincatan and Siwa Sasana). While exchanges affect the status of actors, equally one should be able to tell the degree of purity of a person by his actions and exchanges (cf. the Javanese ideas in Geertz 1960b: 232).

These ideas seem to bear some correspondence with the types of indigenous theories of exchange in India proposed recently in the works of Marriott, Inden and Nicholas (Marriott 1976; Inden 1976; Inden and Nicholas 1977). Adapting the argument of Schneider in American Kinship (1968) it is suggested that the distinctive or defining features of Bengali (Inden 1976: 9-10), and more generally Indian (Marriott 1976), kinship are shared natural substance and a particular code of conduct. Unlike the American example where it has been argued that blood, or natural ties of consanguinity, are distinguished from love, expressed morally or legally through marriage; it is suggested that in India the two are seen as conjoined so that "natural substance and moral code are and should be inseparable" (Inden 1976). Castes differ, and may be graded, by reference to the nature and purity of their substance and so the appropriate behaviour expected. The composition of persons within this system is partly the product of their parents (principally the male), and the state of their soul, but most interestingly is built up out of their exchanges. Humans are seen as changing according to the nature of their transactions, which may be measured in terms of the quality of the substance, and so the code, involved. This substance-code is graded on a scale from the gross (sthula) to the subtle (suksma). Persons are not integrated, unchanging 'in-dividuals', but divisible or 'dividual'. As Marriott points out, in this system there is a direct connexion between an actor and his act, so that person and exchange may not be separated dualistically (1976: 109-11).

There are certain features in this account which appear to have parallels with Balinese ideas. It should be noted that the relationship of actor and act is defined in the Hindu law of karma, the implementation of which has been referred to on several occasions earlier in this work.

It is also clear that in exchanges of food and speech, the actors are affected by the nature of the objects or entities which they receive. As we have also noted the Balinese have a widely used scale for the evaluation of the relative subtlety of items in exchange, expressed in terms of refinement and coarseness. It will also emerge shortly that there are clear ideas of different codes connected with particular castes. The further idea that castes are in some sense kinds, or genera (Inden 1976: 12) is reminiscent of the common term for Balinese clans, soroh - a kind (in low Balinese; tunggal in high). Where they appear to differ is in lacking, in so far as enquiries in Tengahpadang were able to elicit, a highly developed notion of substance shared in the way described. There is a vague sense that purusa (an important term in this theory of substantive transactions, see Inden 1976: 24-5; Marriott: 1976: 110) may connote some substance in common, but this is not developed exegetically by villagers to a great degree, so far as I have been able to determine. There is a further difference, in that the Indians see caste, in the sense of jati, as computed by the amalgamation of human substance with three others, those of worship, territory (désa) and occupation, the combination of which defines the appropriate codes for each group. In Bali, as we have noted, occupation seems of less importance, whereas the code fitting to a particular territory (désa see Inden 1976: 16-20), contracted here effectively to the settlement, provides not so much another dimension of conduct as an alternative; while worship tends to be organized separately again, not just through a link of high priest as teacher (guru) and followers (sisiya, cf. Inden 1976: 17) but by each group worshipping directly through its special site. The Balinese seem to have taken a multi-dimensional Indian model and transformed it in terms of their prevailing modes of classification, which tend to represent elements as oppositions (complementary or polar, see Hobart 1978a: 5ff.) in numerologically based taxonomies (Needham 1973; Swellengrebel 1960: 36-53). Here the Indian elements of human jati and désa as country, appear to have been partly transformed into an opposition between wangsa, (or warna) the caste system, and désa, village society with its democratically organized corporations. We shall return to this in due course.

In view of the existence of certain similarities, it is interesting to

examine a little further the model of exchanges between castes which Marriott develops. He argues that there are four possible permutations (or tactics) in the exchange of this substance-code. For convenience, his diagram is included below (Diagram 8:1). In the 'optimal' arrangement only the pure is acceptable, so that only pure can be given out. The result is a very high level of purity, achieved by stringency in exchange and the refusal of all potentially polluting matter. The inverse of this is the 'pessimal', where one accepts what one can get, but as this will be what others reject, it will contain a high proportion of gross, or impure, substance. Correspondingly one has only limited amounts to give which will be sufficiently pure as to be acceptable. Both these alternatives are asymmetrical, as they involve a preponderance of giving over taking, and the reverse, respectively. The alternatives are symmetrical in that either one both gives and receives or does neither. In the 'maximal' possibility one maximizes the number of exchange relations, with the consequence that one is taking in both pure and impure, but typically these are given out in

Diagram 8:1 Marriott's Permutations (Tactics) in Ranked Transactions

(from Marriott 1976: 122, reproduced intact, with caste positions added for India (above) and Bali (below).)

High Rank

OPTIMAL (Brahmana)
Asymmetrical (Brahmana)
exchange

give + - receive



MINIMAL
Symmetrical
exchange

(Vaiśya)
(?)

MAXIMAL
Symmetrical
exchange

(Kṣatriya)
(Satriya & Wèsiya)

PESSIMAL
Asymmetrical (Śudra)
exchange (Sudra)

Note: the ? in the Balinese position of minimal, symmetrical exchange will be filled in, in due course of argument.

different directions. The final option is the 'minimal' one of engaging in as little exchange as possible, and when obliged to do so, only in relatively pure form and in balanced exchange.

This logical permutational system is seen by Marriott as generating the exchange strategies ideally adopted by the four clean caste divisions in India. Before turning to examine the extent to which this can be used to understand Balinese exchanges between castes, it is useful to note two minor points. First Marriott refers to his schema as one of tactics in a game of choice. I prefer to see these as logical possibilities deriving from the nature of differentially evaluated substance. Accepting only the worst is hardly a tactic and raises the question as to whether the idea of competition which tactic implies is intended. Second the sheer complexity of the social divisions in Indian communities makes this model appear a little theoretical. Interestingly, this is not an objection which one need raise for Bali. It should by now be evident that to the extent that the Balinese have adopted an Indian model of caste, it is one which has been imported and taught in a somewhat generalized fashion.

With this model in mind, it is interesting to turn to the pattern of Balinese exchanges to see what light, if any, is shed on the ethnographic material. I would suggest that, at a certain general level, it corresponds quite well with the major features of caste differences and illuminates certain aspects of behaviour and apparent inconsistencies evident in the account to date. The 'optimal' possibility is clearly adopted by Brahmana, most notably the high priests, who accept only the purest from those below. Earlier it was noted that respected priests did not accept gifts at all, thereby giving but not receiving and so not putting themselves in danger of receiving anything impure. (That this is theoretical should be clear from the fact that they must obtain their basic staple of rice from tenants: I have not had the chance as yet to enquire into the cultural explanation of this.) Meanwhile priests give to everyone in the subtle forms of knowledge and the word of the texts (wédas, see Korn 1960: 134-6; his prayers are often known simply as mewéda: the parallel with Bengal in the place of the Vedas is interesting, see Inden 1976: 16). They have the most direct (but not exclusive) access to the gods, for

which they use not Balinese, but the higher (more refined) forms of Old Javanese and sanskrit. The 'maximal' pattern of exchanges is typified by those of the Satriya who are part of networks comprising both superiors (priests) and inferiors (populace and peasant farmers, or servants). The good part is offered to Brahmana in providing the wherewithal for rites and possibly other forms. It is the removal of gross matter however which is particularly striking. For it is traditionally the commoners, most notably the servants and client villagers, who receive the gross products of princes, in the form of their anger and the insulting language noted above. They also are regarded as the proper outlet for aristocratic sexual lust, although according to the ideal conduct of castes it was noted this is not approved. The recipients of this coarseness occupy the 'pessimal' position, as they accept a wide range of things, including food, obloquy and violence from their masters. In return they have to provide (gross) labour on the land, which transforms it into the purer rice (the problem in this idea of transformation will be discussed below). The exchange which they can hardly avoid making, and so which must achieve an acceptable form, is speech. It will be recalled that in language there was the paradoxical feature that the lowly gave exceptionally pure forms to those above, but received in return highly polluting language from Satriya, but interestingly not from Brahmana. Why this should be so is not easily explained by reference to a simple ladder of relative purity, but fits well with a theory of differential patterns of exchange. It is not that commoners wish to receive insulting and defiling words but return refined ones, as that they have little option given their place in the system.[29]

It is the fourth possibility in Marriott's scheme which at first sight causes the greatest problems, but on closer examination it suggests that the model may have some applicability to social processes rather than merely fit by virtue of formal parallels in otherwise empty classes. The difficulty is simply that noted above to the effect that Wèsiya in Bali are generally assimilated to the same, or a similar, general class as the Satriya and do not engage in trade. This last need some comment. Marriott notes that such items as grain, money and metals are relatively subtle, so that in the 'minimal' strategy one attempts to limit dealings

with the outside world to these. This extends also to a great concern with the loss of women in marriage, so that they show "concern with a tight-knit marriage community" (Marriott 1976: 127, quoting Beck 1973: 233; he goes on to note the separation of smiths, merchants etc.). This clearly does not fit the Wèsiya in Bali and would therefore seem to throw doubt on the applicability of the model even at this highly theoretical level.[30]

A return to the ethnography and a consideration of the distinctive features of the exchange relations of groups in Balinese society shows that there is one which approximates this 'minimal' strategy very closely in certain respects. These are the various types of smiths (pandé) mentioned earlier. One of the most striking features of all ethnographic accounts of them is the degree to which they isolate themselves from the rest of the hierarchy in refusing to submit to brahmanical ritual, to the point that they appoint their own priests (empu) to supervise their religious activities and often will not accept holy water from high priests, and according to Goris (1960d: 295) may even have separate graveyards.[31] Their exchanges with the outside cover a carefully restricted range, being confined to dealings in the metals they work for money, and grain from tenant farmers (Geertz 1967). Two further features in the account of the village of Tihingan which is dominated by smiths might bear a little consideration. In their discussion of endogamy, the Geertzes note that it is Tihingan which produced very high incidences of dadiya marriage (1975: 99-103 especially), and where the loss of women was regarded as particularly serious. This corresponds with Marriott's observations on the expectation of groups pursuing 'minimal' options. There is another subject which might merit inspection again. The Geertzes have noted the generality of use of teknonyms in Tihingan (Geertz 1967: 220) and suggested the generality of its occurrence and importance (Geertz & Geertz 1964; 1975: 85-94). Now the problem arises that, while the existence of teknonymous forms of naming were known in Tengahpadang, they were used with extreme rarity (only some three or four old men used regularly to be addressed or referred to in this way), villagers preferring birth-order names (fratronyms), kin or pseudo-kin terms or simply personal names (autonyms), or not uncommonly a mixture of all three. There was one group however which seemed never to indulge in this, but stuck rigorously to teknonyms -

these were the smiths. It would appear that personal names, like women, are subject to tight control in exchange. So the ethnography of the Geertzes bears out the hypothesis of the special position of smiths but simultaneously suggests that there may be problems in generalizing from a group apparently engaged in 'minimal' transactions. It is perhaps appropriate that Geertz's account of Tihingan suggests the relative unimportance of caste and ordered exchanges between groups (1967: 221-5).

So, at a somewhat general level, there seems to be a correspondence between the discrete exchange possibilities and the ideal, and often observable, features of the main caste categories. The fit is not however a formal one, in the sense that classes have simply been adapted from an Indian model to Bali with no concern for the processes of exchange between them. This emerges clearly in the inclusion of Wésiya in the 'maximal' position but the introduction of a new group, the smiths, in their place. So far the discussion has been confined to the pattern of exchange of items graded in terms of their refinement and no mention has been made of the code which is supposed to inhere in these exchanges and to affect the actors. It will be recalled that earlier in the chapter the existence of distinct codes of conduct appropriate for each caste category were clearly recognized at the village level. It was not clear, however, that these were seen as part of a wider system of transactions in substance, nor subsequently did it prove easy to discover developed notions of a composite substance-code (datu, possible related to the term dhātu given by Inden 1976: 16 for bodily substance, in Bali refers to gold or valuables). It is possible such ideas exist but they do not appear to be strikingly developed in Tengahpadang. So the Balinese seem to recognize a degree of order in exchanges, graded by reference to their refinement and so purity, and also have ideas of codes appropriate to castes, as well as distinct ones valid within a given territory (désa) as in Bengal, but without the same elaboration of the substantive aspects of exchanges. There are certain concomitants of this in the range of meanings which purity may have.

Balinese ideas on the proper code of conduct for castes are expressed by reference to the notion (apparently of Hindu origin) of darma. The range

of referents of this term are complex and cannot be considered in detail here (on the complexity of the term in South Asia, see O'Flaherty and Derrett 1978). In Tengahpadang, in daily discourse there are three common meanings of darma: the duty attached to each kind of being (and perhaps inanimate objects as well) in the world, but mostly especially those with whom the Balinese come into regular contact: gods, the castes of men, and animals or spirits; general principles of morality according to which all men may be judged (these two have been referred to earlier in the chapter); finally it is popularly used to denote the ideal of self-control, of not losing one's temper under provocation - if being insulted, beaten, hungry or suffering the adversities of fate. This last was articulated to caste duty in two interesting ways. First, it is said to be easier for the rich and rulers to have darma (in sense 3) as they neither suffer material wants nor subjugation to authority; further however it contradicts the idea of darma (in sense 1) by making self-control the ideal and so implicitly condemning the violence and aggressiveness of Satriya. The relevance of this should emerge shortly.

In these popular senses darma is a moral term, used to evaluate the behaviour of persons and to commend certain standards (Hare 1952; 1963). There are certain problems with this formulation to which I shall return in a moment. Applied to caste, however, it does lay down clear duties to be followed by members of each category. The Brahmana ought to study the wédas and perform rites to maintain the welfare of the realm; the aristocracy are required to govern, keep order and fight off enemies, as well as provide the organization and provisions for the performance of the appropriate rituals; the Wèsiya either assist the ruler or in theory organize the circulation of value; the Sudra are required to work hard and not understand morality, but accept it as propounded. Each caste is given a different and complementary set of duties, such that if each acts according to his particular code the kingdom will run in an orderly fashion.

There is, however, a rather obvious problem with designating this system of interlocking duties moral. First they establish and confirm a system based upon hierarchy, and leading to social inequality, as good; further in so doing, they appear to run foul of some of the most widely

accepted definitions of morality, which derive from the Kantian view that for a maxim to achieve the status of being moral, it should not apply to just one person or group, but should properly be applicable to everyone, that is it should be universalizable (Paton 1948: 84; Hare 1963: 15ff). The point of caste duty is precisely that it should not be so. This does not necessarily disqualify it however. For the western philosophical views on morality carry implicit assumptions about the equality of men (see also Dumont 1970). The view that a prescription should apply in all cases does not in fact eliminate Balinese caste duty, as the universe within which it is intended to apply is not humanity but a given kind or caste (a somewhat similar point is made by Gellner 1974a). The reverse side of this, however, is that in some sense kinds are sufficiently different that they cannot be compared.

There is a further sense in which the Balinese caste theory is somewhat Kantian. This is in the emphasis upon performing an action as an end in itself, rather than as a means to an end (Paton 1948: 19-22; Cohen, A. 1969b: 36-7; see also Parkin 1976). It will be noted that in the elaboration of caste duties, the emphasis is upon the action to be carried out, not the end. So it may be argued that Balinese are behaving in a moral fashion with the framework of caste in so far as their activities are not means towards personal ends. There is evidence that this distinction is recognized in the Balinese traditional literature. As Worsley notes, in the Ramayana and the Babad Bulèlèng emphasis is laid upon the obligations of the king to redistribute the surpluses which he has accumulated by virtue of his position (1972: 48). Only in so doing is he behaving in accordance with the proper code of conduct. Wealth is not for the enjoyment of the king but "should be saved and spent only on useful purposes for the maintenance of temples, hospitals, resthouses, roads, dams, for the enjoyment of the army, and for the sustenance of teachers and ascetics." (1972: 45). Awareness of the possible ambiguity of actions according to caste ideals seems to be reasonably well developed in Tengahpadang. Where the fulfilment of caste duties became a means to other ends, usually gaining wealth, those involved were open to indirect censure and gossip. High priests who were unwilling to perform rites

unless they expected a large cash contribution in their offerings were avoided, not simply because of the cost, but as they were not then really priests. More immediately, when the prince in Pisangkaja (NE1) opened a shop, villagers said that they felt it was their duty to buy there and support their lord, rather than buy at somewhat lower prices in Br. Tengahpadang. After a year however, it gradually began to dawn that there was no return to the public from this new enterprise on the part of the prince who was accumulating solely for his own benefit, rather than redistributing part in a traditional manner. After this custom fell off noticeably; for villagers argued that if he no longer felt his obligations towards his subjects, it was hard to expect them as humble commoners to continue theirs (discussion was in an idiom remarkably close to the textual ideal, see Worsley 1972: 77). Geertz (1963b) noted something very similar in popular expectations of redistribution in industries launched by Balinese aristocrats using traditional caste ties.

There is a further feature of traditional theories of caste morality which it is useful to mention in passing. This is the place which they allocate to the tenure and exercise of political power. Among the seven obstacles to the king realizing his proper code of conduct the Balinese version of the Ramayana includes not only "greed roused by wealth", but also "recklessness because of one's great power (sakti)" (Worsley 1972: 44, the theme is reiterated in the Babad Bulèlèng 1972: 48). The proper ruler should "model himself upon the behaviour of noble people (sadhu) who sought no material advantage, pleasure or fame in what they did but strove only to protect the religious and moral law (dharma)." (1972: 43). Failing so to do not only led to the collapse of the kingdom, but effectively entitled the populace to overthrow the king (1972: 66, 77). The problems created by the distribution of wealth and power seems to have been clearly recognized and there is great stress laid in the texts upon the theoretical subordination of political power within the moral order of caste.

So Balinese ideas on caste extend beyond a simple system of status ranking. The social hierarchy is seen as stemming from, or is at least expressed in terms of a theory of, the wider order in the universe. The known world is further classified by the degree of refinement of material

and intangible elements, which in turn is closely identified with a scale of evaluation of relative purity, seen as much as a natural as a religious condition. Across a broad range the items of exchange between actors are evaluated according to this scale, and are held more or less directly to affect the nature and position of those concerned. The direction and content of approved exchange is ordered in terms of a general theory of the proper code of conduct between castes, which allocates specific codes to each according to its position in the classification. At times this appears to stress differentiation by criteria of relative purity; at other each category is seen as of an inherently different kind. Recent work on India has proposed models of caste relations which have been examined and bear a similarity to Balinese ideas, particularly in the ordering of exchange and the connexion with a differentiated code of conduct for each recognized group. There is an interesting difference, however. The Balinese seem to possess a similar ostensible or formal system but to differ in certain key postulates and categories. The concept of substance-code appears to be less developed, at least in so far as I was able to establish, although purity is portrayed as substantive in certain contexts (see below). Balinese gradations of the world lack the same explicit theory of substances. It is perhaps unsurprising that the models argued for India of multi-dimensional combinations of different kinds of substance appear to have undergone transformation. The inter penetration of ranked bodily and territorial substance appears instead at times as a categorical division based upon the semantic opposition between court (or caste) and village (or désa); while the nature of the permutation itself appears of a different order. Rather than social groups being defined by combinations of substances in a relatively stable manner; the existence of social institutions, and their defining rules, is seen as appropriate (patut) to a specific place (désa) and time (kala), and so capable of internal transformation. The difference between caste practices across the island, or at different historical periods, is not a cause for concern; for these should be fitting according to adat, a complex notion which permits of a large measure of human initiative and so creates an inherently mutable code.

Models of Caste:

In the main body of this chapter I have been concerned with a brief examination of the form of caste ranking in Tengahpadang and the nature of exchanges between the categories so delineated. It appeared that these could not be entirely accounted for by reference to simple ideas of social status or prestige, as they seemed to involve reference to more complex cultural ideas, such as the relative purity and refinement of actors and objects in the world. I then tried to show that some of these features could be examined usefully in the light of recent work on indigenous cultural models developed for India. This by itself is however inadequate. At least as it may be applied to Bali there are problems in a transactional theory of purity. While some of the difficulties may be elucidated in the course of further research, others seem to be central and it may be argued that the inconsistencies are essential to the working of the system in Bali. Finally it is questionable whether a theory of caste purity by itself provides an adequate "model of", or "model for" the relationship between groups (Geertz 1966b). It tends to be a somewhat static view of how the world ought to be, which is only partly capable of accounting for how the world is, and how it changes. In Bali, ideas of purity seem to coexist with, and to be complemented by, theories of power. In the final pages of this chapter, I would therefore like to turn to some of the problems in indigenous theories and examine briefly the possible relevance of alternative models of social relations.

The first set of difficulties concern a transactional theory of caste. As we have already noted, this would appear in Bali to operate without an explicit, developed notion of substance. There are other aspects which also remain a little unclear in the original formulations. Marriott, for instance, lays great emphasis on the scale of subtlety being defined by reference to the relative power of transformation of the elements graded, so that more refined substance-codes are capable of greater transformation (1976: 110). In his account however the exact nature of this transformation is not developed in detail; nor is it entirely clear whether this is an indigenous notion, complete with terminology, or a necessary postulated process on the part of the analyst in order to account for the observed features. If transformation is a key aspect

of the native model, one might reasonably expect to encounter evidence of its elaboration in terminology and elsewhere. Further, in order to understand the nature of the system, it would appear to be necessary in a complete theory of the consequences of differential exchanges over time. As one example, land is capable of absorbing relatively gross labour and transforming it into purer grain: but what happens to the grossness which would appear to accumulate in the land itself? Also high priests officiate at cremations, while the corpse is still relatively polluted. Contact with death is strictly forbidden for ordinary temple priests (pemangku) as proximity alone breeds contagion. The purity of high priests would appear endangered in transactions of such a dubious kind.[32] It is not always clear how far such transactional models are intended as systematic indigenous explanatory frameworks, rather than as simple, partly coherent taxonomies (see Das 1977: 4).

Balinese ideas of caste generally depend heavily upon the notion of purity (kesucian). Close examination shows, however, that the term not only has a number of different possible meanings, but that it appears to straddle several different types of classification between which there are important logical differences. While the Balinese apparently recognize one cardinal cultural concept of purity not several different ones, the contexts of its use are sufficiently diverse as to suggest that its coherence lies primarily at a linguistic level. That it is not a simple term within a single semantic field is implied by the existence of at least twelve different terms, each with a distinct and separate set of referents (some of the main ones relevant in matters of caste were noted earlier) for its opposite, pollution. There are at least three different ways in which purity seems commonly to be understood and which cannot always be mutually reduced with satisfaction. It serves to designate a full member of a bounded class; it is a substance or property of objects; it is an evaluation of that which is good and to be commended. In the first sense, it distinguishes ideal members of classes from marginal, or incomplete, ones in certain types of taxonomy (Tambiah 1973: 191-2, on the importance of the difference between hierarchic and key taxonomies and so on the status of anomalies). In some contexts the marginal is associated in some way with power (Leach 1976: 62), so purity and power form linked contrasts in a single field. In its second sense purity is closer to a substance

which may be communicated, commonly in Bali through water or other agencies; it may however appear more as a property of things and be used accordingly as a description, like being red. Finally there is a third sense in which it is used by the members of the society to judge and approve certain kinds of behaviour. These three may be linked in indigenous exegesis, but this does not remove the need for an analytical recognition of the differences in their use. Rather than argue that this is simply an example of polysemy (Turner 1967: 50-1), itself a regrettably polysemic notion, I shall suggest that an examination of the different logical statuses of the term may further our understanding of the concept and its function.[33]

There is a range of contexts in which purity is used to refer to the proper members of classes of objects. So it allows the distinction between clean and dirty (daki), said of food which has fallen on the floor and so has transgressed spatial boundaries, whether or not earth or other matter (that is dirt) visibly adheres to it (Douglas 1966). This is not the place to consider the problem of why the opposite of dirty is pure in some contexts (e.g. food, the living as opposed to corpses), but not in others (e.g. washing), which raises the question of whether purity even in the first sense alone forms a unitary category of matter out of place. The loss of purity, suci, within a temple by the occurrence or ingression of something inappropriate, however, is known as state of cemer. It is quite distinct from other states which stand in contrast to relative purity, as in the marginal state of the recently dead, sebel; or the pollution of birth, kumel. These terms are not mutually interchangeable, but indicate different types of transgression of boundaries. So death causes temples to become sebel not cemer. Finally mutilation of the body, however slight, causes it to lose its purity and become mala, a device which it was noted was used to disqualify daughters from royal concubinage. The pollution of birth and death is associated with supernatural power, but not apparently the others. On this semantic axis, purity and power are directly opposed.

One of the most common senses in which the term purity is used in Bali is to refer to the action of ceremonies or the transmission of certain substances. The rite of mewinten by which a candidate is turned into a

temple priest (pemangku) is thought directly to change his level of purity and his natural composition in some way. The communication of attributes is often represented in tangible form, as in the act of wafting (nabtab) the essence of offerings towards one's body. The process is particularly clear in the act of lustration to remove impurity from persons and ritual sites (melukat) using purifying holy water (toya penglukatan). At a later stage, after the removal of impurity usually known as leteh in these contexts, it is common for worshippers to be given pure (suci) holy water (tirta) from the gods with which the face is washed, the head anointed and then which is drunk (each three times). Purity is communicated by direct contact and ingestion, much as if it were a substance or a property contained in other substances. It is also commonly represented not as a special ritual entity or attribute, but as a part of nature (Hobart 1978a). The difference between seeing purity in this second sense as a substance or as a property is not always clear. While a temple priest may be seen as physically altered in some way by his rite of ordination or after ritual purification during the performance of a ceremony, on other occasions he may be described as pure, much as he might be described as tall, dark-haired or bearded. When Balinese refer to a particular word or speech as being refined, or a shirt as unworn (sukla) and so pure (suci), it is much as if it were a property of the act or object. Purity in this sense, where it may usually be translated as suci (occasionally as alus, refined) comes close to being a natural substance or quality, like redness (cf. Moore's idea of goodness as a simple indefinable, nonnatural property, Moore 1903).

There seems however to be another and at least partly distinct sense in which the term for purity is used. This is when it is used by villagers to evaluate behaviour or motives. All temple priests are purified through the same ceremony and are subject to similar prohibitions on exchanges of food, speech, women and so forth; yet villagers do not see them all as equally pure, for it is said that they may differ in the purity of their thoughts (the terms here are complex and need fuller examination - the opposition is sometimes expressed as suci ben banten, pure through offerings, as against suci ring pepinehé, pure in thoughts). This may form part of a set of distinct

evaluations. For instance, it was agreed that the priest of the eastern temple of the dead was the purest, but he was also thought to be unintelligent. Estimation of purity in this sense may be by the degree of conformity to certain ideals of behaviour, especially the control of physical desires, expressed and achieved through the practice of meditation in some form (the terms used were generally tapa, meditation, and berata, asceticism, sometimes treated as one). It may however take a more complex form as in the estimation of the motives of persons behind their actions. When the high priest from Padangtegal refused to accept the money offered to him, or a vehicle for a lift home as it was past midnight and he had been working since dawn, there was great interest in whether he might be doing this to further his reputation or because he was 'really pure'. They concluded from his unostentatious acts of self-abnegation that it was the latter. In this last sense, the pure may be identified with the good (becik in high; luwung in low) as opposed to bad (kaon in high, jelé in low) and become in a certain sense a more or less explicitly moral term.

The latter two senses of purity deserve a little further comment and contrast. The tendency to treat moral qualities as if they were objectively identifiable properties, or even substances, is not uncommon in different cultures, including our own. Gellner notes a similar proclivity in north Africa in the use of the term baraka (enough, plenitude, blessedness 1973b: 40) which he points out is an evaluative term treated as if it were descriptive, and is further regarded as if it were the name of a stuff (1973b: 42). In this, it resembles Balinese notions of purity. Simply because this tendency may be widespread is not however a reason for neglecting to distinguish the different ways a term may be used, as this incoherence may be a vital factor in its cultural significance. As Gellner notes, it may be the logical inconsistency of a concept which endows it with "the appearance of external, given and indeed authoritative reality" (1973b: 43).

This is a useful starting-point for the further examination of the cultural significance of such key concepts as purity, which gain no small part of their importance from their capacity to bridge logically different fields. Some inconsistencies rapidly become apparent on inspection.

A substantive theory of purity runs into difficulties in Bali when one considers the exchanges made by certain classes of person, such as the Buddha priest, pedanda Boda. Unlike his counterpart, the pedanda Siwa, he is not under the same strict food taboos, yet he is purer spiritually in important contexts such as mortuary pollution. It will be recalled that in the myth of Gagak Aking the appetite of the founding ancestor ran to all manner of things, including corpses. It almost seems that it is his capacity to remain unaffected in his composition despite his exchanges which is important here. The problem of shared nature by virtue of similar exchanges also creates problems in Bali. It is perfectly possible for two brothers of common parents who are ostensibly engaged in similar transactions with the environment to differ in the evaluation of their purity by others, to the point that it cannot be accounted for within a framework of the transaction of substance. It is not possible in Bali, as it may be in India, to refer the matter to the substance of the soul, because position by birth is the product of earlier actions and its subsequent explanatory force is directed towards more tangible and unaccountable occurrences. The Balinese themselves use such examples to point to the non-substantive nature of purity, in certain contexts where they may need to note the inapplicability of the former.

The problem of whether purity may be seen as a property or not raises more complex and interesting questions. Hare has noted that part of the confusion in recent philosophy stems from the fact that evaluative words, among which we might reasonably include purity as used in Bali, have a measure of descriptive meaning (1963: 21-9). He notes the important feature that value words have additional characteristics to others in that, having designated something, they have the further implications that this is to be commended or imitated and so actively mould behaviour. There is another aspect to them. This is that as standards change so may the type of behaviour to which they refer. There are two consequences of these features which are relevant here, one somewhat technical, the other of more general interest. The use of descriptive terms, such as orange, may be given a definite referent such that, short of phsiological incapacity or wilful contrariness, it is commonly possible to agree upon use. The Balinese refer to ripe papaya (gedang) as kudrang biasa, ordinary orange.

Once their system of colour categories had been learnt, it was possible to tell with some accuracy what would be designated in this way and what not. Something similar pertains to value words, but the possibility of different standards of judgement exist. According to high caste theory, any Satriya no matter what his behaviour is purer than even the most conscientious low caste priest; this is open to challenge, however, from low castes using universal criteria of morality, by which the order may be reversed. There may well be different views from a number of participants as they emphasize different evaluative criteria. This raises a further problem of some interest. This is whether the term pure can be used to compare different castes at all; and whether to say of a Satriya and a priest (Brahmana or commoner) that they are both good or pure, is simply to state that they are close to ideal members of their respective classes as a good farmer is to a good hoe (that is, it is an attributive not a predicative adjective, see Geach 1956, quoted in Williams 1972) or whether it connotes some commensurable evaluation. It is the former which is implied in the notion of different kinds and is necessary to support a fixed, immutable hierarchy. If castes may be ranged along a continuum, however, then they must have something in common. To the extent that this can be expressed in terms of purity, this is liable to become commendatory, or prescriptive (in Hare's sense), and so confuse neat divisions by positing generally desirable ideals. The opposition of these two will be noted in the caste sense of darma, as against the other two of universal darma and the value of self-control. The possibility of the comparability of men emerges as an issue in questions of caste, somewhat as that of similarity, or likeness, was seen to underlie kinship in traditional Balinese culture.

It would appear then that the Balinese concept of purity (suci or kesucian) is used in ways which suggest the existence of logical inconsistencies. This is not simply a matter of having a fan of meanings, but goes deeper into a confusion of categories which are recognized as distinct in other realms of discourse, or where an analytical distinction is necessary to understand its varying semantic or philosophical functions. On various different axes, the notion of purity manages not only to run together the substantive, the descriptive and the evaluative; but also the natural and the cultural (with water as the metaphor, as well as the vehicle (metonym ?), and even the embodiment of,

purity); and further obfuscates the question of what are the conditions of likeness and comparability or difference. However elegant the indigenous exegesis by which these senses may be linked,[34] and their transformations represented as logically entailed, these involve - as I have tried to show - certain basic inconsistencies.[35] Not only would it seem that such concepts gain part of their peculiar force from this internal incoherence; but one might go further and argue that it is the various possibilities of logical inconsistency which determine their classificatory functions, and the form of cultural argument. This suggests that a close analysis of the use of indigenous terms and their logical status may provide an important field for further anthropological study.

The development of Balinese theories of purity and refinement are such that they provide a means of organizing human behaviour and classifying the phenomenal world. They are not, however, the only theories which do so and alternatives exist, although for various reasons these tend to be less publicly proclaimed. In Tengahpadang the most important of these is a complex set of beliefs about the nature and distribution of power in the world. The extent to which this is articulated and systematically elaborated in local thought is in part unclear, as ideas on this form what is essentially secret knowledge in two respects. First the textual tradition of writings on power involve beliefs in the efficacy of the word such that communicating them to untrained persons involves danger to the latter, often expressed much as if they were exposed to something which they had not learnt to handle. Such literature takes many forms (see for instance Hooykaas 1978; also 1974b: 85-128; and 1979). Second much of this power is considered to take a dangerous, potentially evil form and so most villagers will admit to having no knowledge of it. In this guise it comes widely to be equated with witches (léyak) - the Balinese recognize a distinction between the capacity of manifesting such powers directly, which may conveniently be termed witchcraft, and through the use of medicines or particular implements which is the province of dubious experts (balian) and may be referred to as sorcery - and with power (sakti) of a destructive kind, pengiwa (from the root: kiwa, left). Although this last accounts in local thought for most manifestations of supernatural or inexplicable capacities, it is neither necessarily the most exegetically important

nor powerful. Counter-balancing the forces of pengiwa are those of protective magic, penengen (from: tengen, the high Balinese for right) commonly wielded by the special class of expert mentioned earlier who are versed in texts. Quite apart from this traditional rulers are widely believed to possess extraordinary powers and at the apex of this system stand the gods from whom these gifts emanate. Such power is essentially amoral, or at least largely unaffected by issues of morality in its origin and use. So ideas of purity and power roughly stand to one another as ideas of how the world ought to be to how it is.

Balinese theories of power provide an alternative interpretation of the nature of the world to those enunciated in public ideas of morality. These two form partly complementary explanations and models: the theory of purity offers an ideal to be sought; theories of power describe things as they are thought to be and explain how to attain one's ends. These concepts of purity and power are also related at another level, as should have become clear in the discussion of the forms taken by purity. In its first sense, purity emerged as identified with the full members of classes in a taxonomy, power as connected in some way with marginality. This requires slightly closer examination. In the recent writings of such scholars as Douglas (1966; 1975) and Leach (1976), great emphasis has been laid upon the importance of boundaries in space and taxonomic classes in the definition of marginal forms. The dirt or anomalies so produced are seen generally as containing power, or being dangerous in some way. Douglas has recently qualified and developed her argument about the different ways such marginal entites will be evaluated by a society (1975: 276-318); while Leach has characteristically stated his position with little equivocation as: "power is located in dirt" (1976: 62; the italics are from the original). These recent re-statements seem to have paid little attention to the growing complexity of our understanding of the nature of classifications. As I noted earlier, Tambiah (1973: 191-2; drawing upon Conklin 1964) and Needham (1975) have drawn attention to the fact that taxonomies with bounded categories, and so margins which may be transgressed, are far from being the sole form of classification. In Leach in particular there appears to be an underlying analogy (in the Kuhnian sense of paradigm, see Masterman 1970) of categories being some sort of mechanical construct, such that if a boundary is displaced, it produces tension releasable as power (like elasticity). Whether this is so

or not, it is questionable whether the relationship between power and boundaries is necessarily simple.

The problem of the link between classification and power, both of which are notably complex, possibly multiplex, notions, may be seen in a brief examination of the Balinese ethnography. The difficulty is simply that sometimes the crossing of boundaries appears to be connected in some way with power, at others it does not. Nor is it shown beyond question that the connexion is necessarily causal, that is that bridging taxonomic divisions is the source or origin in some way of the power. In Tengahpadang, there are contexts in which marginality is clearly associated with power, normally in the form of witchcraft. The impurity of corpses, humans who have recently crossed over from the category of the living to the dead, is closely linked with witches. The graveyard is traditionally thought of as the centre of their activities and villagers paint gory verbal pictures of witches gathering at night to feast upon the remnants and offal of the body, in a fantastic world of reversal where hands and feet taste like bananas; the lungs are treated as flowers and stuck behind the ears; the cadavers of dogs are thought to be jackfruit and so forth. The other point of transition between life and death is also linked with witchcraft: at birth, mothers who are witches smear a little of the blood released at birth (see Hooykaas 1974b: 85-128, on the classification of birth substances into the brothers of man, the kanda empat, linked with such other forms of power as barong) across the child's mouth which constitutes his initiation into questionable practices. The difficulty arises however that on detailed enquiry villagers did not think that witches could cause death, nor that death was the source of their power. Equally, in birth the use of blood was a gesture rather than actually having much effect. Witchcraft was associated with marginality in these contexts, but the very real power which they believed to have neither came from death nor resulted in it. There are other activities which involve impurity and crossing boundaries, from the contagion of food to the desecration of temples, but none of these seem to be remotely connected with power in native thought.

In fact, the connexion between power and marginality appears to be somewhat tangential. There are three main ways of obtaining power,

or sakti. The first and perhaps the most potent of all is to be born with it as a natural quality, a quality with which great princes are endowed. Second it may be learnt through study of texts, of which there is a large literature. This provides the source of knowledge of the highly regarded balian usada (wisada), who are often highly respectable high or low caste priests. Finally, and most popularly, it is the gift (ica) of a god, most commonly Batara Dalem (alias Batari Durga, or Batara Sakti) but in different villages there are often temples other than the temple of the dead (pura dalem) with which it is associated. In Tengahpadang, the most frequented site is the Pura Bolo (see Table 3:1[7]). There is a regular procedure for praying at the temple (nakti possibly derived from nyakti, the verb form of sakti) and asking for a gift from the god. Whether the wish is granted or not depends in part upon the capacity of the person concerned to persevere and not be put off by strange manifestations; partly upon a co-incidence of the wishes of the worshipper with that of the god (this is developed briefly below). It is difficult to see in what way most of these can be termed marginal activities or involve the transgression of boundaries. The most publicly celebrated form of sakti among humans is that possessed by great and glorious rulers and the gods themselves are the source of this. The manifestations of such power include notably the ability to tamper with the natural course of events and to do things which ordinary men cannot. The power involved in sakti may well be a capacity to overcome boundaries which exist in normal circumstances. So, in Bali at least, it would appear that what there is in common between transitional areas or times such as birth and death and power is not that the former causes the latter, but that they are both contexts where marginality may be, or is, evident. That is graveyards, the conceptual thresholds between life and death or perhaps better between flesh and spirit, are appropriate sites to be associated with sakti, the power to cross normal boundaries.

So far the term sakti has been translated loosely, because the problem in its definition are many, and once again seem to have a bearing on its role in Balinese culture. Something of the difficulty of interpreting the notion is evident in the range of meanings which Worsley finds it necessary to use in his translation of the Babad Bulèlèng. This is the chronicle recording the rise of the ruler of Bulèlèng, I Gusti Panji Sakti,

the king who is recalled in folk tradition in Tengahpadang for having laid the nearby countryside to waste during his wars. Apart from occurring in his title, sakti appears variously as 'might', but of a special sort perhaps, as it is signalled by the appearance of a shining flame from the fontanel of the new-born child (Worsley 1972: 20); a latent quality indicated by the capacity to perform extra-ordinary deeds and by the possession of special weapons (1972: 25-6); as "a latent power which threatens the existing harmony and legitimate order" but which appears to have "pervaded his being from outside himself." (1972: 37); then again simply as "power" (1972: 39), of apparently a mundane kind when included in a list of material desires (1972: 44), or in being able to kill enemies (1972: 45). It may further be manifest in objects connected with the king, such as his sword (keris) or club, to the point that the legitimacy and power may reside in the weapon rather than the person (1972: 25). To this van Eck (1876) adds the meanings of supreme, super-natural power or gifts; and van der Tuuk (1897) notes that it may include being especially lucky as well. So it seems to refer at different times not only to strength and power, but also supernatural power treated as a gift, attribute or undefined entity, and upon which legitimacy is based, but which may also threaten the existing order. If one adds to this the uses noted already in Tengahpadang in activities connected with witchcraft and protective magic, its range of apparent references becomes even more bewildering.

One of the reasons that sakti may seem to be a complex idea is that the origin, nature and manifestations of power itself are complicated problems in almost any culture. In village thought in Tengahpadang its source is relatively unproblematic, for it is widely regarded as stemming from the gods as a gift, or in the form of knowledge. Its nature is a little more complex, as it may be treated more or less as temporal power, but commonly carries further connotations of being supernatural, although quite what this implies is somewhat unclear. In other contexts villagers see the two as being quite distinct and reserve the term sakti for the latter, and nowadays use the Indonesian term kuasa, for political power or authority. It is certainly in the sphere of traditional kingship and relations of authority that terminology receives its greatest elaboration in daily life. The

manifestations of power may also present problems. It may take the form of strength, or evident support; but at times may be used to explain success precisely where these are lacking (this was discussed briefly in Chapter 2). It is commonly thought to strike terror into those against whom it is directed, which is why kings are believed to have sought it to help control their subjects. In popular imagination it is, however, perhaps most widely associated with the ability to perform normally impossible activities, from assuming different shapes (of which there is a complex hierarchy from the relative commonplace forms of monkeys, sows or fire, through motor vehicles to ogres (raksasa) funeral biers and so forth) to burning trees, lifting gigantic weights and summoning up diabolical forms. An interesting feature is that in use in Tengahpadang at times it came close to referring to the power which enables a cause to produce an effect (cf. the discussion on classical Indian philosophy in Potter 1977), especially where the connexion is not obvious. Its attainment in Balinese thought is, however, at noticeable odds with the methods used for its ascription. It is understood as given or learnt before it may be evident; whereas in practice it is normally invoked ex post facto to explain the otherwise inexplicable or attributed to persons to account for their success.[36] As such it provides a conveniently polymorphous set of ideas by which the Balinese can account for how things came to be, although not always how they ought to have been.

Balinese theories of purity and power have little formal connexion, but it is interesting to note that the ideas themselves are related in a variety of ways, and even given a degree of logical articulation in certain cultural concepts. We have already noted that purity and power, in a supernatural form, might be argued to be linked through the classificatory distinction into complete and marginal members of bounded categories. According to Balinese moral codes, power is treated principally through the desire for it, which is regarded as a sign of weakness or ignorance, so that hermeneutically purity encompasses power. Earlier in the chapter in the discussion of exchange relationships between castes, it was noted that the pattern of transactions approved in terms of relative purity were always potentially open to interference or reversal depending upon relations of power. There are further

certain constructs and institutions through which purity and power are made to appear reconcilable and as flowing from a single source. This emerges in Balinese ideas, and in the ritual, of kingship and the assumed characteristics of gods themselves. In a reconsideration of the ceremonies surrounding the enthronement of Balinese monarchs, based on material from Gianyar collected by Schwartz, Swellengrebel argues that the rite of Karya Mabiseka Ratu constitutes a purification of the incumbent by which he acquires the qualities of the gods themselves (1947: 21). In his analysis of the ceremony, he argues that the king comes to stand in a special relationship with the gods and his spatial position suggests identification (literally and figuratively) with Siwa himself: in this way he becomes a god on earth (1947: 20-1). In the purification of the king, through his person purity and power come to be conjoined. There is another aspect to this, which concerns the attributes presumed to be possessed by the gods themselves with whom the king is identified. Gods in Bali are distinguished particularly by being both pure (suci) and powerful (sakti) although they may not manifest this latter because of their purity. In the institution of divine kingship and in the characterization of the gods, purity and power are seen as united, so that the world of what is, and what ought to be, become one.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I have tried to examine Balinese ideas of status ranking with particular reference to the ethnography recorded in Tengahpadang. It was suggested that, in this fairly traditional part of the island, ideas of status ranking seemed to involve ideas of hierarchy and purity, expressed in the division of society into caste categories within which the basic units were the clans discussed in Chapter 7. It became apparent that these were distinguished by certain special attributes, but more importantly in the ordered relationships between castes, especially in food, language and the field of sexual relations and marriage. With the decline of the power of the courts, it was apparent that not only had it become hard to enforce some of the main ideals, but that some of the central institutions, such as marriage, had become a field in which conflict between the traditional aristocracy and

aspiring village families was fought out. Whether this was seen as primarily instrumental or symbolic, depended upon the view of power which was being adopted. The discussion of the ethnography had suggested the value of a somewhat closer inspection of ideas about purity and power. It was argued that indigenous transactional models of exchanges between castes, expressed in terms of purity, were applicable to a degree to Bali and even helped to account for the behaviour of groups such as smiths. There was the further implication that generalization from one group within the system was potentially hazardous. Balinese models of purity or refinement differed from Indian in several respects, including ideas of substance and the basic categorical frameworks, the Balinese version notably building change into its definition. Finally, the notions of purity and power were analysed in a little more depth. It became clear that these provided the bases for alternative and partly complementary models of relations of rank and authority. The extraordinary versatility of the core concepts underlying these, however, were partly a product of their ambiguity and logical inconsistency. Ideas of rank depended upon notions which were logically, and possibly metaphysically, complex.

Footnotes to Chapter 8

1. The result is a set of non-coordinate divisions which may be explained by reference to one or both models. These include not only a division into classical caste categories, but others discussed below which single out office-holders, or contrast princes with subjects, or priests with the laity.

2. This is not as paradoxical as it sounds. Theory tends to stress possession of qualities as a precondition to their manifestation. Texts and stories tend to treat sakti as evident to others to a varying degree. According to ideas of morality for instance, gods who are all thought to possess this, should not use it. There is a long tradition of debate, particularly between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmaṃsaka and Buddhist schools of philosophy (see Potter 1977: esp. 63-6); and the subject merits far closer attention in Bali than it has received so far.

3. Boon (1977: 146-7) has argued for the fluidity of the traditional system during the pre-colonial period. How far he intends this argument to be carried is not always entirely clear. The accounts of differences in caste rules recorded from early records by Liefrinck (1917) were very close to the memory of my oldest informants in Tengahpadang. It is important to distinguish in exactly what features the flexibility lies.

4. The version of this which I possess is from the Gedong Kirtya Liefrinck-van der Tuuk in Singaraja No. IIa 62/1. I am grateful to Dr. Hooykaas for helping me to a copy.

5. In Pisangkaja a mixed collection of low caste informants somewhat surprisingly showed little disagreement about their relative rank order; largely I suspect because it was not viewed as of much concern compared to the major distinctions across caste lines. It is also possible that competition was muted by the strong sense of mutual solidarity within the ward. For what it is worth the order given was :

   Pasek Bendésa
   Pasek Gèlgèl
   Pulosari
   Dauh
   Cameng

   Only the main groups were known at all.

6. Boon (1977: 146) sees this as a confusion brought about by the fatal combination of Dutch administrators and Balinese pedants. These terms were, however, known in Tengahpadang and their flexibility suggests rather the existence of alternative principles of ranking.

7. This tendency towards tripartite divisions was often extended within caste categories. So Satriya are reported to have been divided into satriya dalem, pradéwa and pungakan (a convenient division in Gianyar but one suspects not elsewhere) and similar distinctions were said to hold among Sudra.

8. It is perhaps here that it could be argued that Polynesian distinctions are being drawn, although this division might appear more general.

9. There is of course the possibility of the reincarnation of the souls of hypergamously married women. It is very interesting therefore that examination of the pattern of soul identification shows no instance of this among my records for high caste families. They seem to be quietly forgotten and suppressed which would follow from their position and treatment during life. This is made possible by the tendency for mediums to give a general class statement such as "pernah kompiang" - a member of the great-grandparental generation. Close identification tended to be careful about the status of the soul.

10. This is related to the myth of Gagak Aking which is worth recording briefly as it becomes of relevance later. As it was told to me by the villagers:

> There were two sons of Batara Guru (Siwa) who were sent off to meditate. The elder, Gagak Aking climbed to the top of mount Sumèru while his brother Cok Baksa (sometimes Sarwa Baksa) stayed at the base. Gagak Aking ate nothing and lived entirely from sustenance from heaven (of unspecified nature), while his younger brother lived near a stream and bloated himself on whatever came floating down - from corpses to faeces. He grew fat on this diet while his brother became thin. As a trial of his children, the god appeared as a tiger to the elder brother who pleaded for mercy, saying that he was lean and tasteless, but if the tiger were hungry his brother was fat and would make a better meal. The tiger disappeared and rematerialized at the bottom where the younger sibling was busy cooking. He saw the tiger and told him that he was preparing food and other matters would have to wait. When he had eaten, Cok Baksa asked the tiger what he wanted and was told to climb upon the latter's back. They passed Gagak Aking who followed the procession clinging to the tiger's tail and when they reached the gate of heaven, he was shut out. The younger brother therefore learned all the mantras, formulae, to become a priest, while the elder brother managed to hear some through the door; but his knowledge was less complete. Eventually the two became the ancestors of all Brahmana, but the Buda priests who are the descendants of Cok Baksa know more formulae and may eat almost anything. While the Siwa priests are officially senior, they know less and are spiritually inferior, but must observe strict food taboos as ascetic practices.
>
> Some of the functions of this myth are obvious, although it may have further tantric significance. In the present context it is important to note the difference in dietary strictness but the lack of connexion with relative spirituality, or purity.

11. There are religious offices open to castes other than Brahmana, but these are few. They are lower in position and so in the scale of ordination. The principal are: r(e)si - open to Satriya only; sengguhu - restricted to the clan of the same name; empu - the general purpose priests of smith castes (see below). The position of pemangku and balian wisada is open to any caste but the latter are commonly already priests.

12. Gusti is commonly treated as a descent group title associated with Wesiya. It is also however thought of in Tengahpadang as a traditional political office. So a Sudra may act as the gusti of a prince as an emissary on some matter, according to my informants. The title is polyvalent (see Boon 1977: 152-5).

13. This is a formula which is quoted very often and to which a range of interpretations is given. The terms refer to désa, place (or customary village), kala, time, and patra, the meaning of which is obscure in this context. (It refers to a painting among its meanings. These do not include the idea of vessel as in India.)

14. One of the most repeated statements on matters of proper behaviour was that it was the duty of triwangsa, but particularly the prince to set an example. If he did not, it was argued, how could ordinary, stupid villagers be expected to behave? The members of the stall were agreed on what was expected of a king or prince, they used the term here of Satriya Dalem, royal satriya. The fluency with which the views were reeled off suggests that they are a widely found representation in the area. It began:

mangda ngerereh rabi asiki; mekarya contoh ring panjak; mangda Ida suwéca ring panjak; dana ring panjak; mebaos sané becik; memargi sané becik; mapikayun sané becik; nganggé sané becik; mekarya sané becik mangda panjak bakti ring sesuwunan Ida Sang Prabu.

that he should seek one wife; to set an example to his subjects; to be provident to his subjects; to give generously to his subjects; to be good (proper) in speech; to do what is good; to think (desire) what is good; to use what is good (or use things for their proper ends); to carry out good works (act properly) so that his subjects will worship the king.

15. The formulation of these suggests possible Buddhist influence with the addition of a typically Balinese specificity after the general designation. The difference between this universal code and the caste-specific ones is developed later in the chapter.

16. This is intended to be a subject of study during my forthcoming research.

17. Undesirable foods include: dog, domestic cat, civet cat, sow, horse, snake, ricefield frogs and banana flowers. There is little clear sense of strict prohibition and it is not certain that the reasons for avoidance are all connected with classificatory schemes of nature rather than in some cases other associations.

18. The terminology is properly fairly complex. Surudan (high) refers strictly to used offerings; lungsuran (high), carikan (low), to any food of which the essence (by gods) or substance (by men) has been taken in whole or in part. Keparid or paridan is thought properly to refer to offerings used in pitrayadnya, the cycle of mortuary rites. If offerings have been used for wafting their essential qualities to men, na(b)tab, they are known as tataban. These are opposed semantically to sodaan (high - from soda), wadaan (from wadah in low), pure food given to guests. These fall within the general category of unsullied, sukla.

19. I am not clear in how far an explanation such as Douglas's would work where she proposes that the body represents society and the danger to it follows from the symbolization of potential social disruption (1970: xxvii). In some instances at least the poisoning seems to have been real. I am not quite sure how Douglas's categories work in this case.

20. The significance of directions is the theme in Hobart 1978a.

21. There is a rite smaller than the ordination of a priest (mewinten) known as mewinten bunga, to be consecrated with (by) flowers. The shadow-puppeteers (dalang) may undergo full mewinten, or by flowers alone; while all healers and traditional experts (balian) are mewinten bunga. It is also occasionally found among trades such as builders or smiths and may be undertaken by heads of important groups like the customary or administrative village. The head of the perbekelan before 1972 was said to have been consecrated.

22. Views on this vary: most agreed, however, that pollution for priests would be automatic which suggests multiple considerations may be involved. Obviously if no one overhears this then, as the Balinese happily point out, few men are prepared to do anything. The question of whether pollution occurred or not was rephrased in terms of whether it was known to have happened. There are techniques for circumventing these restrictions, known as mesesimbing, which have a certain peculiarly Balinese flavour. It is possible, if done carefully, to curse or use foul language towards an object close to, but not directly related to, an opponent - as when one makes to trip up over a dog and yells obscenities at it, but intends to remarks to someone standing by at the time.

23. The attempt to be extremely respectful may have amusing consequences. Dr. Hooykaas reports having been addressed on occasions as Batara - high god, protector. My own designations were appropriately more humble.

24. Although I have not been able to find such alliances in genealogies from Tengahpadang, it is clear that pragmatic considerations could lead to a situation where this would be held desirable. The problem is more obviously the cultural expression of this. As I have noted in previous chapters however, the interpretation of particular acts or exchanges may be open to multiple culturally approved forms. This is particularly true of the gift, which was discussed in Chapter 7. From this point of view the lower family would be placed in a position of greater endebtedness. This can also be expressed in terms of an indigenous model of the substantive and moral implications of exchange, discussed below in terms of gifts (see Inden 1976: 98-100).

25. Their position is clearly somewhat better if they are the only wives. Low caste girls can more easily be divorced, however, without shaking the complex web of political alliances between aristocrats.

26. This is known as withdrawing mesidi kara, a phrase which for villagers means reciprocity, but is given more complex interpretation by high priests.

27. This touches again on theories of conception. It will be remembered that the one often used by high castes sees the seed of the male as important and the woman as a bed on which it draws for nourishment, what Inden (1976: 94) has called the " 'seed and field' theory". He notes that in Bengal properly the field should be of an appropriate quality to take the seed and that where differences of caste occur (within the varna) if the woman is suitable in all other respects then it may be possible for a man "to transform a woman of lower clan rank into a proper wife" (1976: 98). They then become one substance and the union is thought indissoluble. Clearly there are both parallels and differences in Bali. A girl must be physically perfect to marry a triwangsa (hence the slight scarring to prevent abduction). She should also be a virgin (daha) and so retains the purity of a child in large measure (decreased somewhat through menstruation - child marriage is unknown and the possibility when mentioned from India regarded with abhorrence on the grounds that the freedom of the child would be infringed and that it is simply too young). This is a most convenient doctrine at the least in this context. While marriage within the warna but to women of lower rank does not cause loss of qualities, the break-off point is vague. On other matters they differ sharply. Nowadays at least there seems to be little idea of a substantive rather than a legal bond between a marital couple and a significant proportion of marriages end in divorce rather than death. Further there may be more than one model. In Chapter 2, it will be recalled that a Déwa king wished to take a Cokorda girl as wife, which is within the caste category; the Cokorda refused on the grounds that this was hypogamous.

28. The almost perfect synchronization with political changes inclines me to the view that the participants were clearly conscious of the potential significance of what was going on. The timing was too often immaculate, as in the successful Pradéwa elopement with a girl of Anak Agung status. A year or two later (see Table 3:8), the Anak Agung and the communists were too entrenched to be able to be attacked with impunity and the local position of the Pradéwa and nationalists in Pisangkaja too weak. Whether these disputes should be seen as confrontations in Bailey's sense, or as confirmations of changes, depends upon the interpretation of the basis of the caste system and the nature of political power. As there were no Brahmana of significance in the settlement, it was not possible to tell how far they would have been affected. The focus here seems, however, to have been mainly on the traditional locus of power.

29. One has to see a villager flinching under the impact of basa kasar, however light-heartedly intended, from a prince to realize that the words are unacceptable to lower castes too. The use of basa kasar is theoretically punishable between commoners. In Pisangkaja ward rules provide for a fine of Rp. 25 and an offering scaled according to the caste and so the pollution caused (see also Appendix 2.).

30. The problems obviously remain of looking at these optional possibilities in daily life in such mundane matters as the classification of food, on which very little work has been done to date. The Balinese have a highly developed set of ideas on the relative heat or coolness of foods, documented in the text, the Taru Pramana. The extent to which dietary practices vary among non-priestly groups in daily life requires investigation. I am not suggesting that Marriott's model is valued under all circumstances. My argument in this thesis has been that it is rare for any single system to prevail without alternative.

31. There seems to be a degree of variation between different groups of smiths in different parts of the island; perhaps in accordance with Balinese notions of adat (see below). In Tengahpadang they remain a largely separate group. Goris makes the further point that in view of the extent of Hindu influence in their mythological charters they cannot simply be considered a relic of some postulated pre-Hindu society (1960d: 296-7). Their position may therefore perhaps be better explained by the type of account put forward in the text.

32. The problem appears to exist in India as well to judge from recent work (still unpublished) by Parry on the Mahabrahmans of Benares, whose role includes identifying themselves to an astounding degree with the corpses of those due for cremation.

33. Das (1976: 114-31) raises the interesting question of the relationship between the Durkheimian dichotomy of sacred: profane, and purity. Unfortunately she then tries to pin it down to a single possibility, rather than consider that the two may be articulated in more than one way, depending upon the categorical framework within which purity is being investigated.

34. For instance the ingredients of holy water (purity as substance) may use elements which are perfect class members (purity as classificatory position). However not all these latter are pure in sense 2, let alone in sense 3.

35. Consider as a further instance the shift from a substance-based definition of the purity of the pedanda Siwa to the more complex mode of evaluating the position of the pedanda Boda, by which the only two members of a single class of pedanda (high priest, of Brahmana birth and fully ordained) are singled out particularly for their possession of purity, but in such a way that this may be seen as quite a different quality, and reduces the value of the classification to formal criteria.

36. The Jèro Mangku Dalem Kauh had tried to nunas ica from the god of his temple and studied to become a balian wisada until dissuaded by his wife. No more seems to have been made of this until several years later he became the leading patron in the ward from 1971 on. After this he was increasingly referred to as Jèro Mangku Sakti. The change of appellation is perhaps not fortuitous or without meaning even if it was often light-hearted, as it seemed.

Chapter 9. Ward Politics and Public Debate

Introduction:

In this chapter I would like to turn to the organization of social relationships in the ward and the discussion of public matters in its assembly. Earlier we saw that the various corporate groups in Balinese village society tend to overlap substantially in their personnel, which permits credit or support to be converted informally between them. This may be used to innumerable ends, but in many instances involves persons of the same community, as this is where interaction is most intense and social relationships most complex for ordinary villagers. The group which most closely approximates such a community is the ward, its position being made more important by the wide range of functions and the extensive authority which it may have, and has grown to have in Tengahpadang. Accordingly, influence over its decisions may be viewed as a valuable, if not entirely licit, prize not merely for self-protection but also for the furthering of personal interests, through ties to elected officials and intervention in collective deliberations. This is achieved in part through factions, which are blocs of supporters organized through ties of patronage. Their influence, however, is largely indirect as the democratic constitution of corporate groups prohibits the open expression of factionalism. The expression of socially approved values and the pursuit of sectional interests tend in Tengahpadang to be identified with distinct arenas of political action.

After the discussion of the organization of informal groupings, I shall turn to a more detailed consideration of the process of public debate and suggest that its importance has sometimes been underestimated. The complexity of local law and procedure is designed in part explicitly to safeguard collective and individual rights and results in public debate, in which all important issues are formally decided, being dominated by a few expert speakers. Factional interests are presented in appropriate form by orators in alliances of varying stability with political patrons. The relationship between these two roles is complex and complementary. Patrons are engaged in exchanges

which may involve the recognition of new assets or forms of conversion. Far from being mere mouth-pieces, orators have a large measure of control over the meaning which is placed upon events and proposed courses of action. This ranges from choosing between accepted alternatives to fairly radical innovation. While patrons typically explore the possibilities offered by the environment, it is orators who are mainly responsible for debating its cultural significance. The kaleidoscopic relationship between these offers a clear example of the articulation of formal and informal exchanges and also the evaluation of alternative ends and means. More broadly a detailed examination of the roles of patrons and orators permits the exposition of some of the processes and constraints in the interpretation and negotiation of social structure and cultural values. In the last section I shall argue that this negotiation centres on the interpretation of core concepts, the relation between which is expressible in terms of a range of indigenous ideas akin to propositions. The validity of established institutions tends to be articulated by reference to such ideas, but their implicit assertion is open to question and challenge in a variety of ways. This theme will be developed further in the following chapter.

The organization of relationships of patronage is complex, as it may have a number of different forms and goals which are analytically, if not always empirically, distinct. The simplest and most universal type of asymmetrical, dyadic relationship in which villagers are involved is what may conveniently be termed 'domestic patronage', as its main focus is exchanges concerned with the household and its economy. It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that the distribution of irrigated riceland and other basic productive resources is such that something in the region of half the villagers depend in varying degree upon others for their access to subsistence produce and that this led to the establishment of asymmetrical relations of exchange of food for labour or services. In a community of peasant farmers there are other resources, the need for which may lead to similar types of tie. These are often less tangible but equally valued and include notably advice and help in dealing with a wide range of problems both practical and organizational, in which villagers turn towards the more experienced and able, especially such men as officials who are thought to

have more knowledge on customary or bureaucratic matters. Such relationships are, however, open to differential evaluation by the parties concerned. While they involve the exchange of items like knowledge in return for labour or support which are commonly differentially ranked, they also touch upon the question of differences in power and the ambiguity inherent in gifts. Domestic exchanges may provide their own rationale, or they may be turned to wider political ends. The participants may disagree about what is happening and what it connotes. While the patron may emphasize his command over a following, to the extent that it involves a desire for power over others it may be construed as a weakness and a breach of village ideals. The potential diversity of interpretation of social relations provides an important dimension of social action within the ward. The scarcity of the resources controlled by domestic patrons means that inegalitarian overtones are often present in such ties, but it does not determine the range of meanings which may be placed upon these by villagers.

On a wider stage, however, political activities are often ordered according to ideas of patronage. The traditional model for this seems to have been the various sets of ties between princes and peasants, not just arranged around the tenancy of farm land, but extending to other forms of clientage and service ties (see Chapter 2; also Geertz & Geertz 1975: 23-5). As the political system has changed and the courts declined in Tengahpadang, so the sets of relationships and the content of exchanges have become increasingly susceptible to alternative evaluation and as new resources and opportunities for their exploitation are recognized, these are open to inclusion or omission in local arenas. In the place of traditional aristocrats, villagers are emerging who by virtue of their positions or contacts in high places are able to offer benefits, old or new, to villagers. These seem to centre largely, as in the past, upon the protection of persons and property, increasingly by intervention with the appropriate authorities, in return for political support when required. As the source of the benefits grows more remote, villagers have less control over them and act more as brokers. To those below, however, they present themselves as the key figures and are seen and referred to as patrons. The number of men with such contacts

is small and their followings correspondingly large. These may be based on direct ties to villagers, but a substantial proportion of their clients are themselves domestic patrons who commonly bring along their own dependents. So villagers, in Tengahpadang at least, are commonly involved in a complex web of ties of patron-clientage. As the assets often have their origin outside the village itself however, the position of patrons depends in no small part upon their ability to impress one particular meaning upon exchanges.

This system of relationships and exchanges is in certain respects entirely independent of the various local corporations. It seems, however that, at certain points, the two overlap. With the decline of the courts, village wards (banjar patus) appear to have taken on a wide range of functions, in part as they have also become the lowest rung of the administrative hierarchy, vested with extensive powers. It is here that much representation is required by villagers and the ward is sufficiently small that patrons may be effective. It is primarily at the level of local administrative units, where officials depend upon popular support for election that villagers may exert influence: above this, appointments are controlled by the central government. The skill of such village patrons lies in their ability to locate assets which they may use to fulfil exchanges with their clients. It also requires them to deal with the ward assemblies, which in Tengahpadang have become formidably powerful decision-making groups.

Balinese wards in Tengahpadang are corporate groups with a wide range of legislative, judicial and administrative functions, and extensive authority over the persons and property of their members, reinforced by sanctions which are recognized as legally binding by the courts. They each possess a body of customary law, and a constitution generally unwritten, by which the authority of the group and the rights of members are ensured. The complexity of these is such, however, that they have the somewhat contrary result that only a minority of villagers are expert in the procedures and precedents, and these tend to dominate the course of debate in which all decisions of importance are taken. Factions under patrons are therefore generally prevented from pursuing their interests publicly, and require representation by orators. This is achieved through alliances between

individuals by which factions support orators in meetings and the latter argue for the interests of the former in culturally approved forms. Such ties are distinguished by both complementarity, in which different political activities are undertaken by different roles, and by opposition as each attempts to minimize the influence of the other. The extent to which wards develop this pattern seems to vary both according to the plurality of patronage and the range of powers with which it is vested.

The clarity with which political processes may be seen in the various wards of Tengahpadang permits the examination of certain interesting features. The organization of ties within factions seems to have an effect upon the form in which issues are presented. Further, in recent years these have tended to go through their own developmental cycle from more or less egalitarian levelling coalitions to reveal an internal hierarchy. Perhaps more important, the existence of two linked political arenas shows the complex relationship between creating support, articulating interests and their public representation and evaluation. It also seems that the complementary relationship between these arenas parallels other culturally recognized cognitive distinctions.

Apart from this there are certain analytically apparent differences in the institutionalized forms of exchange associated with the two arenas which are reminiscent of those discussed in earlier chapters. Typically patrons are associated with transactional relationships where both the contents and the terms themselves are negotiable (Parkin 1976: 171-4); while orators are confined to what is at first sight the reiteration of culturally approved and standardized forms. Patrons are generally concerned primarily with the instrumental possibilities of social relationships and values; whereas in contrast orators are mainly active in public meetings where the emphasis is upon establishing the cultural significance or moral worth, of events and actions. So the distinction noted in the introduction and examined at some length in Chapter 8, between the world as it is perceived to be, with the various ends to which means new or old may be put, and the world as it ought to be in which elements have significance as part of a broader set of meanings, is partly replicated in the difference between the two political arenas. On the one hand there

seems to be the various ways in which the environment may be used; on the other the various forms in which it may have meaning in itself. While these may be analytically distinct (in the sense of means and ends), they are obviously connected; for both the means and goals of transactions form part of a wider set of meanings, while the assertion of culturally accepted values may in certain instances be directly, or incidentally, instrumental. For instance, patrons in choosing between means to ends which are to their advantage are also making symbolic statements by their choices of both, which may influence their public reputations in as far as these are known - for which reason their operations are largely secret. Orators equally in supporting a particular argument, based on recognized cultural values, may turn this to private benefit. The difference between these two rests then upon whether they form part of an instrumental system of means and ends, or not. It is also possible, as I shall argue briefly, that these two dimensions of social exchange are connected with basic differences in the categories through which the world is perceived and ordered.

This argument is somewhat complex and theoretical; and is in fact only partly necessary as the ethnography may be described leaving such extrapolations implicit. It may be useful to note these more general problems in passing, however; as they bear on some recent theoretical discussion, in which Balinese material has been quoted, about the existence of multiple frameworks of meaning and action within a single society (Bloch 1974, 1975a, 1977; Cohen, A. 1969a, 1974, 1977; Parkin 1972, 1975, 1976; as representative of English contributions to the debate). Of particular relevance, Bloch (1977) has examined the problems involved in providing a satisfactory theory of social change. As he points out the models used tend implicitly to involve actors' perceptions and have difficulties accounting for how they may change their own terms of reference. Or else the mechanisms of change are in a form so alien that it is unclear how they are recognized or obtain meaning for the participants. He posits therefore a dual framework, with a culturally specific model and a separate one based on universal criteria of rationality within each society. A similar distinction has been drawn by Parkin (1976) who argues for the existence of different registers within which exchange may take place, ordered by what he terms 'altruistic' and 'negotiable'

ideologies - in the latter the rules themselves being open to negotiation. The views differ in that for Parkin the level of transactions within a society is treated as a different indigenous cultural model which is not necessarily universal. This approach is particularly suitable to the analysis of the Balinese material; not only as the means and goals of utilitarian exchanges have value, even if negative, within the moral order broadly conceived, but also they stand in a close cognitive relationship to one another, such that they form the two dimensions of exchange (or forms of value).[1] In each it is possible to have different versions of how best to explore resources and to interpret actions, which I have construed as frameworks of explanation or interpretation. It is the plurality of these in particular, which I have been concerned to explore in this thesis.

In the first part of the chapter I shall look briefly at the transactional aspects of relationships within the ward before turning to the analysis of debates. In particular I would like to discuss the question which has been relatively neglected of the extent to which orators are in fact trapped within a static, preordained system of values in which they are merely agents in the mystification of mundane interests. Close examination of their activities suggests that orators have a degree of influence over the ascription of meaning to actions or events. This raises the question of the nature and extent of their freedom. Much local debate concerns issues about which there are accepted interpretations, although we shall see that there are occasions when this is successfully challenged. More often proposed courses of action are open to more or less standardized evaluations. On rare occasions however, remarkable creativity is apparent in the way cultural ideas are blended or radical shifts proposed. Within these last fall perhaps the events surrounding the court's loss of control over the ward of Pisangkaja, and how the same group rethought its own basic principles and constitution during fieldwork which will be discussed briefly. It seems to be primarily in the application of existing concepts in new contexts, or their semantic re-arrangement, that changes of meaning occur in this field of discourse. It becomes clear that meaning itself is negotiable and in a fluid relationship with instrumental concerns and out side pressures, such that politics is not just a bear-pit of dirty dealing but also the language of public thought.

The Formal Organization of the Ward:

The wards tend to be the groups with the widest range of functions and the most extensive authority over their members in Tengahpadang. Perhaps more so than such corporations as the irrigation association, descent group or customary village, the sphere of competence of the ward is loosely defined and its activities consequently variable in scope, depending upon circumstances and the interpretation of its importance by members. As the Geertzes have noted (1959a: 993-5; 1964: 95-6; 1967: 210-9) it does not correspond simply to an all-purpose village community, if such a group exists anywhere. In Chapter 3, I tried to show the complexity and even confusion of the principles of incorporation of local groups, so that while the ward may recruit its membership primarily by residence, there is a tendency for it to be defined in practice as having sovereignty over a territorial domain of somewhat ill-defined boundaries. Further, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the various corporate groups in village society tend to have an informal local bias, whatever the formal distribution of their membership. Despite the differences in their histories, the wealth and status of their members, each ward in Tengahpadang undertakes a similar range of functions and is constituted along fairly similar lines. The authority vested in the ward, by virtue of which it is able to enforce observance of its laws and demands for labour or contributions of money from its members, stems in part from its position as the minimal unit of government administration, but also from its legal status. For the decisions of the ward as a community-in-council are binding in Indonesian law, with its general respect for _adat_, (custom is perhaps the best translation here), unless they conflict with the basic principles of the Indonesian state.[2] The extent to which these legislative powers are used seems to vary depending on complex factors some of which will be discussed later.

Relatively little is known of the precise history of the wards in Tengahpadang before conquest. Subsequent accounts also vary in their estimation of the relationship between local courts and wards according to the context and the status of the speaker. It seems generally that aristocratic influence was powerful, both through family members who lived outside the palaces (the _jajaran_ mentioned in Chapter 8) and by the

selection of headmen approved by the courts. These often were or at least became princely clients, so that the rivalry of dynasties was carried down to control of local wards. The extent of this influence waned following the Independence of the state of Indonesia and the courts, which had previously not participated directly in the ward, gradually all became members although, as we have noted, with somewhat anomalous status. The progressive disappearance of locally dominant families, with the fractionation of control accompanying it, seems to have been an important factor in the emergence of competition within the wards: a phenomenon less obvious in the peripheral hamlets, where dominant men are still quite widely found.[3] The challenge to the power of the courts in Tengahpadang began, appropriately, in Pisangkaja and according to almost all informants reached a head through the activities of Kt. Mara (NW7), which are discussed later for the light which it sheds on the political creativity of orators. It seems not to have been until about this time that the dual structure of the ward was formally recognized or inaugurated, when the expansion of population was such that not all villagers owned compounds (karang désa) any longer (the dates may be seen to some degree from the election of separate klian désa, see Table 3:8). The activities undertaken by the customary village sub-section (banjar désa) are largely ritual, the distinction between this and the ward (banjar patus) comprising all households, being partly elided by the Balinese themselves (see Chapter 3). Despite their differences, the formal structure and informal organization of the wards is largely similar; although as we shall see their sphere of competence extent to rewriting their own constitutions so that a degree of variability is built into their structure.

The precise range of functions undertaken by these wards may vary slightly even within Tengahpadang, although the general list seems to be fairly standard across south Bali (cf. Geertz 7959a: 994). This depends upon the internal state of relations within the group and the diligence and capacity of the headmen. The greater the amount of activity, the closer the ward is to the ideal according to villagers, against which must be balanced the heavier load upon the members. In Tengahpadang, wards are responsible for general guard duty and for policing the territories, however defined, under their jurisdiction. This extends to protecting

the persons and property of members. Routine matters may be left in theory to a group of youths who constitute a civil guard (HANZIP; see Case 4) under the control of the government headman and administrative village head. This was a body initiated by the government, but of little relevance to the villagers who used traditional methods of guarding the ward, in which the whole group would turn out appropriately armed on the sounding of slit gongs (kulkul), the different beats of which signalled emergencies ranging from fire to theft and murder. Apart from this, much of the activity is taken up with maintaining public works from repairing roads and paths, to building bridges, public pavilions and so forth. Routine cleaning of public places or exacting tolls on bridges is a source of employment controlled by the ward and generally offered to poorer families (see Chapter 5). The ward also organizes and pays for rites in all temples in which it is a unit of worship (this may be the banjar patus or the banjar désa - see Table 3:17) and carries out the annual purification of Nyepi (see Goris 1960c: 95-6; 1960a: 119-22), and arranges the cockfights which accompany such rites. One of its main, and special, functions is the collective organization of burial and cremation, from which the term patus in fact comes. The role of individual families and descent groups in this is relatively small, the brunt of the cost and labour of the elaborate ritual being shared: cremation in particular is arranged collectively after an appropriate number of deaths and may provide the occasion for the public demonstration of the dominance of ward ties over those of kinship. Each caste cremates according to the proper rules within the cremation ground, but the event is organized and carried out by the banjar patus as a whole. Besides this, the ward being a unit of government may be required to apply, or act upon, orders from the administration. Finally it acts as a work association for any purpose agreed by the group, from holding theatre performances to acting as contractor on public building projects organized by the government. This is generally to obtain funds for its own varied ends, from purchasing orchestras to loaning credit to members, which may be augmented by its discretionary powers of taxation of members. The difference between wards in Tengahpadang is primarily in the frequency and enthusiasm with which they engage in this last.

The ward also has important judicial and legislative powers. It is the group which is formally required to solemnize marriage unions (in the person of one of the headmen) and recognize divorce. It is also the court at which local disputes, whether concerned with ward matters in a narrow sense or not, are heard and judged; although the parties have the right of appeal if the issue is not exclusively a matter of ward customary law. Where it is, the group may take upon itself formidable powers by which to enforce its decisions. These take the form of an escalating scale of sanctions, the more extreme of which meet with disapproval from the government, although this is a point at which the views of state and village clash directly.[4] Most penalties are initially fines ((de)dosa(an)) failure to pay which results in seizure of property and its auction to pay the amount by this time commonly doubled. To take goods forcibly for legitimate debts (ngerampas) is approved by the police and courts, provided it is in strict accordance with the local law (awig-awig) of the group in question. For general non-cooperation, members of the ward are punished by the withdrawal of exchange relations in varying degrees from simply being sent to coventry and excluded from food and market exchanges, to being sealed up in their compounds - all being known as nyepèkang, suspending relations. Traditionally the ward could also order banishment (mesélong) which was an effective sentence of death. Now that this is a lesser punishment (the offender simply moves elsewhere), they may take capital punishment upon themselves despite disapproval from the authorities.

Apart from hearing disputes on general matters such as inheritance the ward is mainly concerned with implementing its own laws. These are enshrined in a body of customary law, known as the awig-awig banjar (normally not specifying whether patus or désa), which may either be written or transmitted orally. These are by no means standard and each ward in the settlement has its own quite distinctive body, corresponding however in its general tenor with those of the customary village as a whole, although this latter tends to be of limited importance in daily matters. Wards may also decide to change their regulations. The present code in Pisangkaja concludes with the statement: "All the regulations in this book may change or be changed as necessary.", a formulation which corresponds

well with the earlier comments on the inherent mutability of adat. The present body of law, written out in a school exercise book kept by the village sub-section head, was taken according to the senior villagers more or less wholesale in 1966 from the village of Pujung to the north; the original having been burned in 1965 in a fire which destroyed the house of the then headman. It is generally agreed that it was adopted because it was systematic and covered a wide range of topics. These include matters of theft, damage by animals to buildings and persons, sexual offences. For convenience, the awig-awig banjar is translated in its entirety in Appendix 2, which gives some idea of the inclusiveness of local ward law. Even this is deceptive, however, for it is rare for all rules to be written. Great emphasis is laid upon precedent, cases from up to fifty years previous being introduced where necessary. This has several important consequences. There may be disagreement between the ruling in statutes and according to remembered precedent. Different past cases may also be cited for their potential bearing on a matter. Not only does this introduce a great measure of negotiability into the process of adjudication; but it also means that a knowledge of formalized law alone is not adequate as a basis for judgement. This system puts a premium upon knowledge of past disputes and indeed history, and on skill in argument.

Formal control of the ward lies in an assembly of all the heads of households, whether compound-owners or not, so that the ward is formally run by the community-in-council. This congregates in a special meeting-place, for which most wards build a special pavilion (the balé banjar). That of Pisangkaja is sited in the main square towards the north, the ritually purer side. Each has its own selected, ritually auspicious date according to the Javanese-Balinese calendar of 210 days, by which it meets every 35 days, or more often where necessary.[5] Although absence from meetings is an offence, the fine is small (Rp. 5) and attendance is usually of the order of 50-90%, except where important matters are to be discussed. An adult proxy, sometimes of specified sex if certain types of work have to be performed, may substitute for the household head on most occasions. Non-members of the ward are forbidden to vote or speak, and may not even be present except by special invitation. For this reason, most of the case material will be from Pisangkaja of which I was a member. Individual

rights include entitlement to vote at all elections of officials, contribution to public debate, participation in judicial hearings and a share in any proceeds allocated by the meeting. The corresponding obligations are fairly onerous. Members must provide taxes and labour in whatever quantity is decided by the assembly and must submit to all collective decisions. In Pisangkaja, unless one is the heir and included in the household of one's parents, men are obliged to become full independent members of the assembly on the first meeting after the annual purification of village land (Nyepi) which follows their marriage. Heirs to compounds are required to join (tedun ke banjar) regardless of their sexual or marital status. In theory, this is presented as optional - a member is invited up to three times to join - but if he fails is permanently expelled or suffers other punishment (such as kesepèkang, being sent to coventry). In sharp contrast to voluntary associations, ward membership is seen as a heavy, often unpleasant, but equally unavoidable burden. Despite this wards in Tengahpadang are remarkably solidary groups and as the villagers themselves expressed it: "A banjar is like a family. It has its good and its bad, but above all one cannot escape it."

The routine administration of the ward is undertaken by officials elected, or appointed if there is no opposition, for a term usually of five years; but their continuity in office is subject to the assembly. The two main offices are the government headman (klian dinas) who is the formal representative of the ward (it will be recalled that klian is literally: elder, and dinas is the Indonesian for government service), and the customary village sub-section head (klian désa who is chief of the banjar désa, comprising the heads of official compounds, kerama désa). Officially the former of these is the head of the ward. The emphasis on the ward as a customary group as opposed to a unit of government is reflected in the tendency for the klian désa in Pisangkaja to be regarded as the senior, by virtue of his supposed knowledge of adat, in all matters which are not strictly governmental. Both headmen are generally selected from among the better speakers in the ward, as their offices require the convening of meetings and the initiation of much of the debate. While they carry out much of the daily administration, they are answerable to the assembly for all their official actions and in practice their authority is not only

carefully circumscribed, but liable to minute scrutiny for suspected favouritism in documenting offences or for financial irregularities. As Geertz described it headmen are "more servants of the bandjar than its masters" (1959a: 995). As we shall see, they are often not their own masters either.

Apart from being one of the most important corporate groups within village society, and the one which approximates the idea of community in Tengahpadang, the ward is also part of the state administration. To recap, after the loss of independence by the princes, there were successive changes in the formal structure of authority. At the time of fieldwork, the whole island comprised one province (propinsi) of the Government of Indonesia. The former kingdoms had become local administrative centres or districts (kebupatèn) with branches of national ministries, political party offices and the lowest level of national representative councils (Déwan Perwakilan Rakyat), under an elected official with fairly extensive powers (the bupati), in Gianyar often a member of one of the two dynastic families. Each district was divided more or less along pre-existing lines into sub-districts (kecamatan), administrative villages (perbekelan) and wards. Each is under a representative official, of which only the sub-district officer is a permanent member of the civil service and a government appointee. The ward is then the lowest rung in the administrative hierarchy. The administrative village in Tengahpadang, under a locally elected official (the perbekel), comprised several wards (see Chapters 2 and 3), including some hamlets beyond the settlement itself. Although this grouping was often originally arbitrary, with the development of political parties and its function as a channel of government funds, it has increased in importance as a potential political arena and the office of head is a valuable prize.[6] Typically, the rules for election were somewhat unclear; it not being certain whether it should be by general acclaim, by members' votes, or whether the ward should be the unit of voting. This last prevailed against some opposition in 1972 when the courts finally lost their hold on this office to a relatively senior, but low caste, local government official. This is the highest position over which villagers have any influence in selection and to which a few notables aspire.

The structure of this bureaucracy and its method of functioning

affect local political arenas and the relationships between villagers and officials. Most local decisions are made independently by particular wards, while general executive and policy matters fall within the sphere of the district authorities, the ministries and courts. Relatively little formal authority is vested in the sub-district officer or the administrative village head, who tend to be reduced to the position of intermediaries or arbitrators in disputes. It will be recalled from Case 1 (Chapter 2) that the sub-district officer had to rely largely on his skill in manipulating traditional custom to enforce his rulings in the absence of effective powers; while the wards are quite capable of challenging the somewhat uncertain authority of the administrative village head (Case 4, Chapter 2). The administrative system further serves principally, as in so many countries, to transmit government regulations, instructions and information through descending levels of the bureaucracy. The official machinery for referring local problems and disputes for settlement by higher authorities is neither notably efficient nor adequate. The result is a fairly familiar 'administrative vacuum' (for more detailed discussion on this, see Weingrod 1968), where the manpower is not available to fill the place traditionally occupied by the web of ties between senior and cadet lines of aristocratic families, and the relationships of patronage between courts and peasant villagers. This has had far-reaching consequences as we shall see.

At first sight then the ward appears to be a simple democratically constituted corporate group of rather wider scope than some of the others examined. On closer inspection, however, it appears that there are problems in this neat model. The principles of incorporation of the ward are notably vague and the division of authority between it and other territorial groups sufficiently ill-defined that the head of one type of group (the banjar désa) may be the effective leader of a different type (the banjar patus). More seriously the supposedly consolidated legal codes do not work as simply as might appear, nor are they always applied under the circumstances which might be anticipated. Equally, wards may in fact alter their constitutions and principles of incorporation; the assembly may largely ignore, or even abuse, its own elected officials but not take steps to remove them from office. Behind these different events lies a further process of decision-making which is only partly comprehensible in terms of the formal procedures, and involves

a complex relationship between the public expression of agreed social values and the diverse, and indeed divergent, interests of the members. In order to understand the conduct of public affairs, and the fluctuating political relationships which underlie it, it is necessary to see the ward as part of a more complex field of social relationships. These are only partly directed towards the ward, but affect it greatly. It is against this background of fluid political negotiation that public decision-making takes place and events are interpreted and ordered in village society.

The Nature of Patronage:

Besides their incorporation within the ward, villagers are engaged in other exchanges with one another, many of which have been examined in previous chapters. Among the most important are those which concern not only agricultural produce and labour, but also help and advice. These allow a measure of choice, but are generally concurrent with, or phrased in terms of, existing social relationships of some kind. The evaluation placed on these may vary, however, according to the context. In so far as ties are expressed by reference to established connexions, they may carry the values associated with those particular relations; as they also involve the exchange of items of different value, they are asymmetrical and may connote a degree of social inequality. I shall refer to this here as domestic patronage, bearing in mind the appropriately ambiguous reference which Paine (1971) has pointed out that this has. In other matters villagers may require assistance which is far harder to obtain, particularly in intercession with local authorities within and beyond the village, where individual interests may be in direct competition to those of others. The minority of villagers who are in a position to offer support in such situations tend to occupy a special place, as the perceived scarcity of what they have to provide leads such exchanges to be widely characterized by the marked inequality of the parties. So these relationships tend to be open to divergent interpretations. While they are often concomitant with relatively egalitarian village ties, they may also be construed in terms of quite different models. From the point of view of

the dominant partner in particular this may be seen as a hierarchical tie of patronage, similar to the classic institutionalized relationship between a court and tenant farmers or servants, of which a substantial proportion of such links are indeed composed. While this may be accepted by many villagers, alternative representations of this relationship are possible. Another interpretation, as we shall see, is perhaps most clearly expressed by public speakers. Also for different reasons,from the point of view of the central government, such ties may be seen as outside the framework of proper social roles. There is a further feature. With the change in administrative and political arenas the origin of resources used in these exchanges is increasingly outside local society altogether. So in the course of their activities patrons are engaged in imposing one interpretation on exchanges in which they are to some extent simply middlemen. This is partly counter-balanced by other aspects of their roles, especially the part they play in politics within the ward.

As we have seen the villagers of Pisangkaja are involved in a wide range of relationships both by virtue of their mutual membership of a variety of corporate groups and such informal but recognized ties as neighbourhood and friendship. Out of this whole web, it is general for each household to have someone in particular to whom they can turn for help. This is not an entirely casual relationship. The ties are sufficiently stable, often lasting for decades, that villagers could usually name those for almost all the members of the ward. The distribution of these is given for each household in Table 9:1, together with the closest relationship by which they are connected. In most instances this corresponds to the relationship given by households themselves, except where there were no strong pre-existing ties. Where this was so, the connexion was usually phrased as being one of friend (timpal), neighbour (pisaga) or nyama, the complex term meaning something like relative discussed in Chapter 7. It is of interest that such ties were universally couched in terms of socially valued relationships other than simple ward membership. In a minority of cases there was more than one person to whom a family turned, usually for different things. This has been noted in the table accordingly.

The types of social relationship which are used, or in terms of

Table 9:1 Organization of Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership of Households in Pisangkaja: 1972.

		Domestic Patronage			Factional Membership			
No:	Name:	Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
NE1	Cok. Putera	Cok. Suyasa	Ubud	eZH	Cok. Putera	patron	-	
NE2	Cok. Jangji	Cok. Putera	NE1	lineage	Cok. Putera	client	d	
	Cok. Putu	Cok. Putera	NE1	lineage	Cok. Putera	client	d	
	Cok.A.Lanus	Cok. Putera	NE1	lineage	Cok. Putera	client	d	
	Cok.A.Nama	(Cok. Putera)	(NE1)	(lineage)	Cok.A.Nama	patron	-	Increasing independence as derives influence as subak head
	Cok. Oka	Cok;A.Nama	NE2	yB	Cok.A.Nama	client	d	
	Cok. Ngurah	Cok. Putera	NE1	lineage	Cok. Putera	client	d	
NE3	Kacir Siangan	Kt. Mara	NW7	FM2HS	J.M.Dalem	orator	i	
	Tiles	Kt. Mara	NW7	FM2HS	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
	Tempil	Kt. Mara	NW7	WM2HS	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
NE4	Dw.Md.Gempol	Dw.Md.Nombong	SE13	yB	Dw.Md.Nombong	client	d	
NE5	Kénak	Kacir	NE3	pure	J.M.Dalem	client	i	ex-PKI youth ties and neighbour
NE6	Togog	(unknown)	-	-	-	-	-	Lives in Singaraja, presumed ties there
	Tènda	?	Beng		-	-	-	Connexions in natal village Beng
NE7	Ni Repun	Tay Hap Lèong	Kintamani	S	-	-	-	Aged widow
	Ni Mariani	Tiam Tai	Gianyar	FyB	-	-	-	
NE8	Dada	J.M.Désa	SW3	lineage	Kt.Gendul	client	i	Also servant of NE1
NE9	A.A.Anom	A.A.A.Oka	NE10	MF2WS	Cok.A.Nama	client	i	
NE10	A.A.R.Jasa	A.A.A.Oka	NE10	F2WS	Cok.A.Nama	client	i	
	A.A.A.Oka	Cok.A.Nama	NE2	DH	Cok.A.Nama	client	d	Double patronage; also to father's natal family (as nyentana)
		?	Padang-tegal	family of F				
NE11	Karda Sampun	?	Tengah-padang	natal family	Cok. Putera	client	d	

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 2.

		Domestic Patronage			Factional Membership			
No:	Name:	Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
NE12	Lanis	Karda	NE11	lineage	Cok. Putera	client	i	
NE13	Kara	Cekeg	SE21	WF	Dw.Md.Nombong	client	d	Different domestic patron and faction
NE14	Ni Kari	Selepeg	Gagah	lover	-	-	-	Widow
NE15	Badra	? Geranjam	Tegal Sukawati	yB -	Badra	patron	- -	Natal family Shadow-play teacher
NE16	Gampil Gerondong Gelèder	Badra Badra	NE15 NE15	FBDH FFBDH	Badra Badra	client client	d d	
NE17	Surung	Baruk	Gagah	lineage	J.M.Dalem	client	d	Different domestic patron and faction
NE18	Kingsan	J.M.Dalem	SE17	WFBSS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
NE19	Pica	Baruk	Gagah	lineage	Badra	client	d	Different domestic patron and faction
NE20	Kampih	Kingsan	NE18	FyB	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
NE21	Sukèn	Ds.Ny.Batil	SE10	WZ	Cok.A.Nama	client	i	
NE22	Jambul	Kt.Gendul Sujana	NW10 NE23	none neighbour	Dw.Md.Nombong	client	i	domestic patron political patron
NE23	Sujana	Dw.Pt.Sandat	Triwangsa	political party	Dw.Md.Nombong	orator	d	
NE24	Serandig	Munjuk	Gagah	none	-	-	-	
NE25	Yasa	Kt. Mara	NW7	none	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
NE26	Ngèmbon Kedeng	Dw.Ny.Gempil Lasiya	NW3 NW4	none none	Lasiya	client	d	domestic patron political patron

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 3.

No:	Name:	Domestic Patronage Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Factional Membership Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
NW1	Runtig	Lasiya	NW4	FyBS	Lasiya	orator	d	
NW2	Dw.Kt.Gampil	Dw.Md.Touris	Manuaba	eB				Domestic patron
		Sujana	NE23	none	Dw.Md.Nombong	orator	d	Political patron
NW3	Dw.Md.Lanis	?	Kinta-mani	natal family	Cok. Putera	orator	d	Different domestic and political patrons
NW4	Lasiya	Subratha	SE3	profess-ional ties	Lasiya	patron	-	
NW5	Laba	J.M.Dalem	SE17	WyB	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
NW6	Tonik	-	-	-	Tunjung	client	d	Tonik and J.Geriya
	Mupu	Tunjung	NW9	none	Tunjung	client	d	have no domestic
	Kacir Sèngat	Tunjung	NW9	none	Tunjung	orator	d	patron, a state known
	J. Geriya	-	-	-	Tunjung	client	d	as gabeng
NW7	Kt. Mara	Cokorda Gedé	Tengah-padang	trad. client	J.M.Dalem	orator	d	Different domestic and political patron
	Teken	Kt. Mara	NW7	yB	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
	Kembar	Kt. Mara	NW7	yB	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
NW8	Surata	Tunjung	NW9	neighbour	Tunjung	client	d	Lineage ties to NW9
	Lonid	Tunjung	NW9	neighbour	Tunjung	client	d	but not to Tunjung
	Gampil	Gedot	NW11	WF	Kt. Gendul	client	i	
	Ni Kripit	Tunjung	NW9	neighbour	Tunjung	client	d	
NW9	Mejul	Tunjung	NW9	DH	Tunjung	client	d	
	Rebit	Tunjung	NW9	ZH	Tunjung	client	d	
	(Tunjung)	?	?	profess-ional ties	Tunjung	patron	-	Exact source of patron age unknown as from Bulèlèng
NW10	Kt. Gendul	?	?	(secret) court ties	Kt. Gendul	patron	-	Source kept private Trading ties
		Cok. Suyasa	Ubud					
	Gelis	Kt. Gendul	NW10	yB	Kt. Gendul	client	d	
	Keredek	Kt. Gendul	NW10	FyB	Kt. Gendul	orator	d	

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 4.

No:	Name:	Domestic Patronage Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Factional Membership Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
NW11	Gangsar	Kt. Gendul	NW10	lineage	Kt. Gendul	client	d	Gangsar is domestic patron in process of moving factional allegiance to J.M.Dalem
NW12	Dugdug	Kt. Gendul	NW10	lineage	Kt. Gendul	client	d	
	Belet	Kt. Gendul	NW10	lineage	Kt. Gendul	client		
NW13	Ni Lungid	D.M.Désa	SW3	FeBS	Kt. Gendul	client	i	
SW1	Tangèn	D.M.Désa	SW3	lineage	Kt. Gendul	client	i	
SW2	Tarik	D.M.Désa	SW3	neighbour	Kt. Gendul	client	i	Also close ties to J.M.Dalem by marriage
	Kenyung	D.M.Désa	SW3	neighbour	Kt. Gendul	client	i	
SW3	D.M.Désa	Kt. Gendul	NW10	WyB	Kt. Gendul	client	d	May act as orator, but in role as priest
SW4	Degdeg Mangku	Camat	Tengah-padang	none	-	(orator)	-	Marginal orator, made head of Br.désa in 1971; attached himself to sub-district head
	Terima	Degdeg Mangku	SW4	F	-	-	-	
SW5	A.A.Putu	A.A.Gerudug	Kinta-mani	F½yB	-	-	-	Widow of leading PKI orator and headman
SW6	Rubik	Kt. Gendul	NW10	tenant/ worker	Kt. Gendul	client	d	
	Keca	Kacir	NE3	none	Kt. Gendul	client	d	Different domestic and factional patrons: in process of changing
SW7	Kartana	Ni Jambul/ Kacir	NE3	FeZ/ FeZS	J.M.Dalem	client	i	Made government headman in 1971
	Ni Polokan	Ni Jambul/ Kacir	NE3	FyZ/ FyZS	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
SW8	Neka	Kt. Gendul	NW10	WyB	Kt. Gendul	client	d	
	Kencan	Kt. Gendul	NW10	MyB	Kt. Gendul	client	d	
	Mukun	Kt. Gendul	NW10	MyB	Kt. Gendul	orator	d	

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 5.

		Domestic Patronage			Factional Membership			
No:	Name:	Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
SW9	Pukel	Neka	SW8	FyB	Kt. Gendul	client	i	
	Mongoh	Neka	SW8	FyB	Kt. Gendul	client	i	
SW10	Munjuk	Lembut	SW11	WeB	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
	Dugdug	Munjuk	SW10	yB	J.M.Dalem	client	i	
	Digdig	-	-	-	-	-	-	Gabeng (see NW6)
SW11	Lembut	J.M.Dalem	SE17	W1HS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
SW12	Selem	Tagel	SE1	WyB	Tagel	client	d	
	Tomblos	Tagel	SE1	FFBSWB	Tagel	client	d	
SW13	Ni Muklen	Arka	Tegal	natal neighbour	-	-	-	
SW14	Bidel	Karda	NE11	none	Cok. Putera	client	i	
	Dayuh	Karda	NE11	none	Cok. Putera	client	i	
	Sayub	Karda	NE11	none	Cok. Putera	client	i	
SE1	Sama	Tagel	(SE1)	S	Tagel	client	d	I Tagel absent on
	Balik	Tagel	(SE1)	eB	Tagel	orator	d	official posting
	Lipet	Tagel	(SE1)	eB	Tagel	client	d	
SE2	Pudet	J.M.Dalem	SE17	eBSS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	Two domestic patrons
		Kt. Mara	NW7	eBDH				
SE3	Subratha	Gusti P. Cawi	Bulèlèng	eZH	Subratha	patron	-	
	Dungka	Subratha	SE3	yB	Subratha	client	d	
	Ni Doneng	Subratha	SE3	HyB	Subratha	client	d	
	Bawa	Subratha	SE3	FyB	Subratha	client	d	
SE4	A.A.Darma	A.A.Oka	Kinta-	½yB	-	-	-	Absent in Sanur
	A.A.A.Plasa	A.A.Oka	mani	½eB	-	-	-	Very old
	J. Jempiring	Cucul	Br. Tengah	lover	-	-	-	widow of A.A.Ngurah leading PKI orator
SE5	Sampun	Kt. Gendul	NW10	yZH	Kt. Gendul	client	d	

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 6.

		Domestic Patronage			Factional Membership			
No:	Name:	Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
SE6	Delep	Tonik	NW6	yB	Tunjung	client	i	
	Keper	Pica	SW7	MMeZS	-	-	-	Also has close ties to Gangsar (NW11) as tenant to him.
SE7	Dw.Md.Tagel	Dw.Kt.Geriya	SE9	eZH	-	-	-	Dw.Kt.Geriya has connexions in Peliatan in his family but is not head of a faction.
	Dw.Ny.Laba	Dw.Kt.Geriya	SE9	eZH	-	-	-	
SE8	Ni Tambun	Cua Cim Bee	Gianyar	S	-	-	-	
SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya	Dw.Md.Parsa	Peliatan	lineage	-	-	-	see SE7
SE10	A.A.A.Jasa	A.A.A.Oka	NE10	½yB	Cok.A.Nama	client	i	
SE11	Dw.Pt.Pandé	Dw.Wy.Kelila	NW24	MeB	J.M.Dalem	orator	i	Dw.Pt.Kuat (his son) is an orator
SE12	Rugrug	J.M.Dalem	SE17	FyBSS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
	Séro	J.M.Dalem	SE17	FyBSS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
	Sorog	J.M.Dalem	SE17	FySS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
	Suradnya	J.M.Dalem	SE17	FFyBSS	J.M.Dalem	client	d	
SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	Dw.Pt.Sandat	Tri-wangsa	DH	Dw.Md.Nombong	patron	-	
SE14	Sandi	Dw.Md.Nombong	SE13	neighbour	Dw.Md.Nombong	client	d	
SE15	Ni Kintil	Tonik	NW6	yB	Tunjung	client	i	
SE16	Kontèng	Dw.Pt.Batur	Tri-wangsa	landlord	-	-	-	
	Gading	Lilin	Tengah-padang	WyB	-	-	-	
SE17	J.M.Dalem	Kt.Mara ?	NW7 ?	FeZH (secret)	J.M.Dalem	patron	-	Apparent secret source of patronage probably in Gianyar.
SE18	Pageh	Kt.Mara	NW7	clan	J.M.Dalem	client	i	Actually quarrels with J.M.Dalem himself

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 7.

No:	Name:	Domestic Patronage Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Factional Membership Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	Dw.Md.Nombong	SE13	FFyBS	Dw.Md.Nombong	orator	d	Dw.Md.Doblé has increasingly fluid ties to different patrons
SE20	Rantun	Subratha	SE3	WMFyBS	Subratha	client	d	
	Kaling	Subratha	SE3	MMFyBS	Subratha	orator	d	
SE21	Cekeg	Gampil	NW8	WyB	Kt.Gendul	client	i	In process of shifting allegiance (see NW11)
SE22	Dungki	Tagek	SE1	WeZH	Tagel	client	d	
SE23	Tedun	Kt.Gendul	NW10	yZH	Kt.Gendul	client	d	ex-headman
SE24	Silir	Tagen	NW1	none	-	-	-	
	Jontol	Tomblos	Gentong	none	-	-	-	
SE25	Cekeg Mileh	Kenek	Gagah	yB	-	-	-	
SE26	Dw.Ny.Geriya	Dw.Kt.Geriya	SE9	yB	-	-	-	
NW14	Ni_Ngambet_	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
NW15	Ni_Sinah_	Kolak	Gagah	F	-	-	-	
NW16	Keted	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	orator	d	
NW17	A.A.Putera_	A.A.Anom	Tengah-padang	H	-	-	-	
NW18	Md. Susila_	Cik Wah	Denpasar	unknown	-	-	-	
	Md. Gina	Md. Susila	NW18	DH	-	-	-	
NW19	Ni_Antrog	Togog	NE6	S	-	-	-	
NW20	Reca_	Kt.Gendul	NW10	WMyB	Kt.Gendul	client	d	

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 8.

No:	Name:	Domestic Patronage Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Factional Membership Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
NW21	Kisid	Badra	NE15	FyBDH	Badra	client	d	
NW22	Nampa	Gedot	NW11	F	Kt.Gendul	client	i	In process of shifting allegiance (see NW11)
NW23	Dugligan	Kt.Gendul	NW10	none	Kt.Gendul	orator	d	
NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila	-	-	-	-	-	-	He seeks advice and help from members of his clan in Seronggo
	Dw.Ny.Kelila	-	-	-	-	-	-	
NW25	Geningan	Kt.Gendul	NW10	WyB	Kt.Gendul	client	d	
	Racik	Kt.Gendul	NW10	MyB	Kt.Gendul	client	d	
NW26	Dayuh	Cema	Siklod	yB	-	-	-	
NW28	Nyèmbèng	Sahuddin	Tengah-padang	none	-	-	-	Patron is local police man
SW15	Gomboh	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
SW16	Sukri	Tangsi	Gagah	yB	-	-	-	Ex-headman
SW17	Darna	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
SW18	Ni Dehen	Sukri	SW16	HeBS	-	-	-	
SW19	Karda	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
SW20	Dani	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
SW21	Gomboh	Badra	NE15	WF	Badra	client	d	
SW22	Kemplung	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
SW23	Sadiya	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	

Table 9:1 Domestic Patronage and Factional Membership Sheet 9.

No:	Name:	Domestic Patronage Patron:	Place:	Rel'n:	Factional Membership Head:	Role:	Tie:	Comments:
SW24	Longsog	Cok.A.Badung	Tri-wangsa	landlord	-	-	-	
SW25	Bakta	Cok. Putera	NE1	prince	Cok. Putera	client	d	
SW26	Kembar	Kt.Mara	NW7	yB	J.M.Dalem	client	i	

Code:

No. = compound number
Name = personal name or title (for high castes)
Patron = person who is recognized as helping in domestic matters as patron
Place = place of origin of patron (ward in Pisangkaja, settlement if elsewhere)
Rel'n = relationship of the patron to the client
Head = head of faction, if any
Role = role of person in the faction as patron, orator or client. Here orators are included under the factions of those patrons whom they most often supported in 1971-2.
Tie: d = direct tie from client to factional head, either from domestic patronage or otherwise
i = indirect tie of client to factional head through one or more domestic patrons

Kinship ties are in standard notation. Where it is known the seniority in sibling sets is given, as this may be revealing, because this is often to, or through, juniors who are generally heirs among commoners but not among high castes (Chapter 7).

which choices are expressed, are of some interest and merit brief examination. The approximate distribution of these is laid out in Table 9:2, which is ordered to show the proportion which are encompassed within recognized and approved pre-existing links. By far the largest general category of ties invoked is that of kinship which accounts for 114 (or 68.2%) of the total of 167. Of this relations between agnates (66) account for nearly 40%; with affines following as the next most popular category with close on 30% (or 48 cases) of all ties. (There are also two instances of widows depending upon men with whom their union has not been formalized publicly.) This is interesting because it shows the reverse of the prevailing pattern in work, where affines formed a particularly important group. It must be recalled, however, that not only is a substantial proportion of agnatic links within the compound, but also many of them are between compounds also linked by neighbourhood and marriage as well. It will also emerge later in the chapter that in explicitly political ties the preference is reversed. The remaining categories are relatively small. Only 8 ties were based on immediate neighbourhood, which is here restricted to adjacent compounds (pengapit), as the broader designation of neighbour (pisaga) is used loosely here. Tenancy or traditional ties to courts forms a small, but significant proportion of ties, 14 or 8.4%, most of which are between the prince in Pisangkaja and his retainers. A further 11% of villagers have no close connexion with the person to whom they turn for help other than common membership of the ward, or even other compounds within the settlement. Three households are of special interest, not only because they seek no help on a regular basis, but also because they are singled out terminologically as gabeng which may mean something like incomplete, or even infertile - a suggestive appellation in the light of the almost ubiquitous existence of more or less recognized ties. These categories account for 95% of all relationships, the remainder consisting of professional colleagues or the unknown ties of marginal villagers. The only other category of importance, connexions which are secret or through political party membership, will be discussed below.

A brief glance at the detailed distribution of ties in Table 9:1 brings out certain further features. Not all the villagers to whom households turn are necessarily male. For instance, the compound from which the government headman came (SW7), has relied for advice and assistance for as long as can

Table 9:2 Approximate Distribution of Ties in Domestic Patronage

(This is based upon the material in Table 9:1)

Relation:	No.		%	Cumulative %
Agnate	63	66	39.5%	39.5%
Clan	3			
Affine		48	28.7%	68.2%
Neighbour (Pengapit)*		8	4.8%	73.0%
Lover		2	1.2%	74.2%
Court	12	14	8.4%	82.6%
Landlord	2			
Same ward or settlement		18	10.8%	93.4%
None (Gabeng)		3	1.8%	95.2%
Professional	2	5	3.0%	98.2%
Political Party	1			
Secret**	2			
Unknown		3	1.8%	100.0%
Total:		167	100.0%	100.0%

* This category is restricted to persons from adjacent compounds (see text)

** This applies to the political patrons with the largest followings in factional size within the ward. Their source of influence is thought to be in Gianyar, but no one knows where. The significance of this is discussed in the text.

be remembered on a woman, Ni Jambul (NE3), although as she grows old her place is gradually being taken by her son, I Kacir, who is a truck driver with broad experience and a recognized public speaker. Where compounds contain more than one household, these commonly rely upon the same person for assistance, but there is a minority which are split, such as the Cokorda in NE2, where Cokorda Alit Nama is emerging as a focus of attention in his own right. More serious divisions occur in compounds like NW8, where I Gampil goes entirely his own way. This normally signals fairly severe strains within the family, as some members reject the general source of support; and such differences are commonly reflected in broader political opposition. Assistance is not always sought within the same ward and men may look to outsiders. Families like those of I Surung (NE 17) or I Pica (NE19) have ties to I Baruk, a member of the same ancestor shrine and the previous head of the irrigation association, who is also a neighbour in the next ward. In other instances poor households may have economic ties to one family, commonly receiving food in return for casual help around the house, but turn to another for help in political matters, as do I Jambul (NE22) or I Ngèmbon (NE26). At the opposite pole, the most politically active men, such as Kt. Mara (NW7), Kt. Gendul (NW10) or the Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE17) may have more complex sources of support, some of which are not divulged publicly. So, while almost every household has some source of help, generally local, there is extensive variation in the choices of relationship through which this is arranged and the form which it may take.

So far little has been said, deliberately, about the content of the exchanges, or about the way in which the relationship between the parties is represented. The former may vary greatly in its nature, frequency and direction and with it depends in part its evaluation by those involved. There are two main types of item for which villagers may look to others. The first was discussed in some detail in Chapter 5, and consists in help in obtaining livelihood, whether through organized tenancies, the gift of food or staple commodities in return for labour, or occasionally work of some other kind. Apart from this it is not uncommon to turn to such providers in times of emergency, when supplies run out or illness and death strike. There are

other benefits of a less tangible kind which are perhaps equally, or more, important. The sheer complexity of Balinese society, the plethora of rules to be observed and difficulties which may be encountered, pose problems for ordinary villagers who are relatively unversed in the technicalities of their own social system. Problems may be practical, ranging from decisions about buying or selling land or major capital assets, to serious quarrels within the family. Almost equally often villagers may need advice on religious matters - from the procedure should part of a shrine wall collapse to inquiry about propitious days to undertake work or travel. Apart from this, by the very bureaucratic nature of village corporations, peasants often require advice on dealing with regulations, let alone in handling problems with the government and its agents, ranging from taxation to the need for licences. In all these, villagers tend to turn to those who they perceive, rightly or wrongly, as having more knowledge and capability. The return is very varied, ranging from full-time labour on fields and in the house, to polite deference or grateful acknowledgement, depending upon the content of the exchange and the existing social relations between the parties.

While the temper of such exchange relationships of help, advice or economic assistance tends towards the egalitarian in its formal expression, there are several factors which counter this and lead to asymmetry implying a measure of inequality. It will have been noticed that many of the exchanges involve the gift of knowledge and expertise on the part of one side, in return for labour. These elements are differently graded in terms of indigenous classification of their relative refinement and so value. There is also a feeling that the former are scarce; a view which seems to stem as much from cultural expectations of the availability of knowledge as it does from its accessibility in any instance. Ignorance is widely thought to be a general condition,[7] for which reason among others villagers are inclined to turn to categories of men who are believed to possess privileged access to knowledge of religion, customary law or the governmental bureaucracy. This may be seen in the breakdown of the statuses occupied by such sought-after men. Over a third of the total were the occupants of traditional offices, of prince, priest or heads of major corporations; while a further 17% were persons

Table 9:3 Approximate Distribution of Status of Domestic Patrons.

(based on material in Table 9:1)

Status:	No.	%.
Traditional Office:*	61	36.5%
Government Official:	29	17.4%
Ordinary Villager:	69	41.3%
Unknown:	8	4.8%
Total:	167	100%

* This includes heads of major corporations, temple priests and senior members of traditional courts.

employed in some capacity by the government, from administrative officials to policemen. Apart from this the two temple priests in the ward occupied a special position as their advice was asked daily by some villager on ritual matters whether directly or, more often, through his customary source of help. This sense that the values exchanged in the relationship are of different worth gives it a bias and tends to lead to the direction and content of exchanges being determined by the partner who is perceived to possess the scarcer, or more refined, assets. For this reason, it is convenient to refer to this relationship as one of patronage (see Paine 1971), directed towards domestic issues. While the asymmetry may be clearly marked in some instances, in others it is less apparent and potentially open to conflicting interpretations, as with the priests who despite their knowledge and ritual purity perform regular services for villagers and may indeed be dependent upon them for a substantial proportion of their livelihood.

Beyond this system of domestic assistance, there are other sets of ties which tend further to affect its nature. Domestic patronage provides

the framework within which many daily concerns may be organized; but there are matters for which it is quite inadequate. There are many situations in which ward members are involved in wider social arenas, or in conflicts which cannot be resolved by domestic patrons. Litigation is frequent, usually over inheritance problems or land boundary disputes and find their way to district courts. Contact with the administration and government agencies is necessary in the course of tax payments, agricultural loans, drawing up land deeds or tenancy agreements (this last is more theoretical but villagers are given warning in government directives about failing to do so), permits for cockfights, entertainments and so forth. In addition, Bali has been subjected to some thirty years of violence and political instability, so protection to person and property are viewed as being almost essential, even at the village level. In this the situation has not changed greatly in some ways from the pre-conquest period, the parallel being significant, as I shall try to show presently. One of the consequences of the lack of authority in the connexions between the ward and the district is that official channels are often slow and ineffective, so that a system of informal contacts has grown up, or been extended, between villages and higher political arenas. With the decline of the courts, this is focused increasingly on the minority of villagers who have personal ties in the central administration and with political parties.[8] Patronage in this form is viewed as so essential that as a contemporary cliché put it: "nowadays, there is no man who does not have a patron."

In village society then there are a number of men with "power to dispense favours" (Mayer 1967: 168), who have access to desired goods and, increasingly, services outside the local community. Essentially they are seen as controlling scarce and valued resources, especially political protection and assistance in difficult dealings, notably with local and district authorities. This is often supplemented by the gift of material benefits, the form of which may range from relatively generous remuneration for agricultural or other work (discussed in Chapter 5), to the provision of credit through voluntary associations (referred to in Chapter 6). In return, they are able to dispose of the labour and support of their followers in varying degree according to the extent and multiplicity of the exchanges in which they are engaged. In this system the ward plays an important

part. In view of its extensive authority, it is not only the group which is most often involved in affecting villagers' interests, but also influence over its decisions constitute a valuable prize. Support is achieved through the backing, or votes, of followers being mobilized in the assembly. For the leader this offers a measure of control over decision-making and the allocation of resources in the ward; and followers obtain the necessary representation with officialdom and protection within and beyond the local community. While these sets of ties do not derive ultimately from exchanges confined solely to the ward, it is here that they tend to assume their most organized expression.

In order to understand the position of these central figures, it is useful to look for a moment at the changes in the assets transacted and in the forms of their evaluation. Exchanges are widely phrased in the idiom of traditional patronage between princes and peasant farmers and indeed these ties still form an important element. This arrangement seems to have been based largely on the provision of political or legal protection and help in need, in return for labour, political support and deference. These ends appear to have been largely retained, but the means to their achievement has altered radically, as the political system itself has changed. Princes, or patrons, no longer have complete control over the assets which circulate, nor are these exchanges constitutive of the new political structure, which is based upon completely different principles. The organization of protection in the past seems to have depended upon the control of the military and judicial apparatus. This has been taken over by the national government and influence upon it is through new means. The skill of patrons lies largely in their ability to tap this in various ways - mainly through contacts in the bureaucracy and by affiliation to political parties. There are several consequences of these changes. First, as we shall see below, it has led to a shift in the types of men who become patrons and in their qualifications. Second, as the sources of patronly influence lie increasingly in a different system this may have unanticipated, sometimes disastrous, repercussions as in the aftermath to the abortive coup in 1965. Finally, whatever the position in the pre-colonial period, the exchanges between patrons and clients are open to alternative interpretations. To the villagers this appears largely as an extension or

continuation of traditional personal methods of dealing with those in authority; to the administration it is liable to be represented as nepotism or corruption (Bailey 1969: 144-55; Caplan 1971), however much it is influenced in daily life by the traditional model. So while the idiom in terms of which villagers evaluate exchanges appears to show some continuity, the structure within which the resources flow and the assets themselves have changed greatly. Further the various participants may place radically different interpretations on the exchanges which are taking place.

The pattern of patronage in Pisangkaja seems to have changed with these trends substantially over time. It is difficult to obtain precise details for the period long before the Second World War. It appears that the ward was largely under the aegis of the court (NE1), while particular individuals maintained ties to other aristocratic families, such as Kt. Mara to the Cokorda of Tengahpadang, and the family of I Sujana (NE23) to the kings of Gianyar. Domestic patronage appears to have been much as now, to powerful local figures especially officials and priests. With the decline of the courts in Tengahpadang generally from about 1945, the position has become far more complex, as commoners have emerged in part to take the place of the aristocrats. During this period the influence of the Cokorda in Pisangkaja seems to have shrunk from dominance of the ward (and in no small part its neighbour to the north, Gagah) and ties to share-croppers of its estates dispersed across northern Gianyar, to a smaller clientèle based upon locally resident hereditary servants and tenant farmers. The other share-croppers now at least have weak ties only with the court, a reflection in part of the growing importance of the ward as a political arena, and the depreciating assets of such local small aristocratic branch families.

The proliferation of forms and sources of patronage, which began and partly furthered the decline of the courts, is of some interest. The present distribution of recognized patrons is given in Table 9:4, which follows villagers' discriminations into major and minor, based partly upon the size of following, but also upon the status of the patron and the effectiveness of his representation. Among the first of the commoners to emerge was Kt. Gendul, the son of a wealthy in-marrying man and himself head of

the customary village. The subsequent emergence of powerful patrons has been linked more with the growth of national political parties.

Table 9:4 Categories of Patron in Pisangkaja: 1972

Category:	Distribution of Patrons in Pisangkaja:	Major	Minor	Compound No.
Traditional Office-Holder	Local Aristocracy	1	1(a)	NE1, NE2
	Désa Official	1		NW10
	Irrigation Official		1(a)	NE2
	Ritual Practitioner	1(b)	1*	SE17, NE15
Government Servant	Police (resident)		2	NW4, NW9
	Police (posted elsewhere)		2	SE1, SE3
Political Party Agent	Mixed	2(b)		SE13, SE17

This table is based upon the roles, or occupations, of patrons and so the totals do not refer to the number of persons who are patrons, but to the roles they occupy. The letters indicate where a single individual has two relevant positions:

a. Cokorda Alit Nama (NE2) is both a member of the aristocracy and an irrigation association official.

b. the Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE17) is both a temple priest and has close contacts with the government (non-political) party GOLKAR.

* I Badra (NE15) has been included under this category because he is a purified (mewinten) shadow-puppeteer, dalang, and so has an important ritual role (see Hooykaas 1973c; Hobart, A, 1979).

During the 1950s these came to have a substantial impact upon the sources of patronage when their influence was spreading not only through the villages, but also the administration itself. Following a recruiting drive Anak Agung Ngurah (SE4) became a particularly active member of the communist party; while Déwa Md. Nombong came to assume the position of agent for the nationalist party in Pisangkaja by virtue of his close ties with his daughter's husband (see Table 9:1), who was a leading member in the settlement. The

parties offered access of important new sources of influence in return for these members acting as agents in recruiting support. Although these men came to be the most powerful patrons of their time, they were also part of an organization which ultimately was separate from traditional Balinese society and their fortunes depended largely upon events in national political arenas, as became so tragically evident in 1965.

Perhaps the most interesting example of the emergence of a political patron is that of one of the traditional priests in Pisangkaja. These men occupy an increasingly complex and difficult position. On the one hand, they are generally influential domestic patrons and their advice on ritual matters is widely sought by villagers; on the other they may be dependent upon their clientèle for a substantial proportion of their livelihoods in the performance of ceremonies. Further, their tenure of office, and so access to temple ricelands, is dependent upon the group or congregation associated with the temple. In the past this seems to have been largely a formality, but with the increasing authority of the wards this is no longer so and appointments have become the focus of political competition. This tends to lead to the somewhat contrary state of affairs that, while priests are placed in a position of patronage and their incumbency in office is open to political influence, they are supposed by virtue of their office to remain entirely separate from such matters. The extent to which this is observed varies greatly. As a poor man, the Jèro Mangku Dalem relies more than most upon his office for subsistence. He is further closely connected by ties of kinship with the families from which the leading communists came. So when these were killed and the nationalist party became dominant, he was placed under great pressure to organize opposition within the ward. He has balanced these considerations by becoming a leading member of the new government movement (GOLKAR) the platform of which is the integration of society and the avoidance of political party divisions, but which is understood by villagers as in effect similar to a political party. To this are notionally also affiliated government officials who form the majority of the smaller patrons. Lacking broad support within the ward, these tend to be domestic patrons with official connexions by virtue of their positions. While political parties or national organizations provide powerful sources of influence their workings are

largely beyond the control, or indeed often comprehension, of villagers and as we shall see they are liable to extensive reinterpretation in village society.

In spite of their increasingly diverse origins, patrons in Pisangkaja exhibit many features in common. The majority come from rich families, or those which hold traditional office in the community. Major patrons also tend to have come from families which have experienced substantial change in economic fortunes (Table 3:6). Their kinship networks are generally extensive and not confined to the settlement, but form part of well-developed sets of relationships in other villages and particularly in towns through which they are able to exert influence. This is reinforced by a marked tendency towards exogamy, particularly in contrast to the other important group of villagers, orators. This is summed up in Table 9:5. Two-thirds of the marriages of patrons were outside the ward, and effectively half were contracted outside the settlement altogether. All the major patrons possess

Table 9:5 The Marriages by Locality of Political Patrons and Orators in the Ward of Pisangkaja.

Role:	Ward Endogamy	Settlement Endogamy	Settlement Exogamy	Total
Patrons	5	3	7	15
Orators	15	2	3	20

ties with officials or families of influence at the district level. Ascribed factors such as inherited networks or wealth, increasingly with its corollary of education, tend to be the necessary, but not always sufficient, conditions of successful patronage.

There are other aspects of the roles commonly assumed by patrons which are of importance not so much in the course of tapping possible sources of assets, as in the presentation of their activities within the community. It will be recalled that in Chapter 5 we saw how the redistribution of wealth within the ward from the more affluent to the poorer families, enabled rich, or politically active, figures to present themselves as moral men, at the

same time as engaging in asymmetrical exchanges by which they ensured the subordination of those with whom they had labour relations. In a somewhat similar fashion it was argued in Chapter 6 that politically active men, especially patrons or those aspiring to patronage, were the most common heads of voluntary associations, by which not only could they strengthen their relations with dependents and possibly weaken ties to other leaders through the provision of credit, but also they benefitted from the popularity of such institutions, despite a certain ambivalence in their moral evaluation. The concern with reputation emerges in a different form in the pattern of their marriages, which are examined in Table 9:6. It will be noticed that of the relevant unions 9 (or 64%) were of the ideal type based on agreement of all parties, in marked contrast to the other main group of political figures

Table 9:6 The Form of Marriage Agreement Among Political Patrons and Orators in the Ward of Pisangkaja.

Form of Marriage:	Patrons:	%.	Orators:	%.
Agreement (mepadik)	9	64.3%	5	25.0%
Elopement (melaib)	1*	7.1%	12	60.0%
Capture (melegandang)	3	21.4%	1**	5.0%
Mock Capture (ngambis)	-	-	1	5.0%
Arranged (atepang rerama)	1	7.1%	1	5.0%
Totals:	14*	99.9%	20	100.0%

* this refers to an approved early marriage of Déwa Md. Nombong (SE13) with a low caste girl, which by the rules is formally elopement, but met with agreement. In order to avoid confusion, this union has been omitted from consideration here.

** there was an attempted marriage by capture by I Sujana (NE23) which failed and was not consummated. It is excluded here.

where such unions were in a minority. The only other significant category was, interestingly, marriage by capture, the form which most strongly demonstrates a lack of concern for the exchange relations proper between affines and potentially a political challenge. The men contracting such unions were two major and one minor patron. Both Kt. Gendul and the Jèro Mangku Dalem have taken women in capture, but significantly in both cases they have also formed other unions of the ideal kind. Only I Subratha stands out by his capture. It would seem then that patrons adhere disproportionately to the ideal (whether measured against orators (Table 9:6) or the population as a whole (Table 7:9)), but in a minority of cases have claimed, or demonstrated, conspicuously their power by indulging in marriage by capture; but if so modulated by more cautious approved unions.

This concern with reputation has other facets which affect the stability of patron-client relations. Although political patrons are engaged in transactions outside the framework of approved village relations, these are phrased largely in terms of existing ties, or the more general formulae noted for domestic patronage. While it is accepted that such ties may change, there is a sufficient expectation that the respective parties should fill their obligations that switching one's patron incurs a certain opprobrium, or perhaps engenders a degree of suspicion, except where a patron manifestly fails his followers. This is one of the main factors encouraging the relative stability of clientèles, in that the allegiance and loyalty of clients is regarded as appropriate and the relationship may be judged by the quasi-ethical standards of traditional patrimonial ties. Similar but often stronger conditions prevail in the ties between domestic patrons and clients. This raises then the question of the relationship between these two forms, or levels, of patronage and how change of personnel comes about. As Table 9:1 should make clear political patrons not only have their own often extensive domestic clientèle, commonly mobilized to factional ends, but also they serve as patrons to other domestic patrons, as the resources they command are perceived to be of scarcer origin. In a minority of cases villagers may turn to different political patrons from those to whom their domestic patrons have ties. The effect of this is generally to weaken the former tie if both are from the same ward, the conflict of loyalties increasing the further apart the patrons politically.

So a household like that of I Keca (SW6) is in some ways neutralized, but not in villagers' views to the point that its allegiance is necessarily in doubt, as domestic patronage is not always political. This does, however, provide one of the culturally recognized means of changing political patrons. More common perhaps is a shift of allegiance by which a domestic patron changes his superior. It is interesting that such ostensibly transactional ties have sufficient social recognition that changes often take years, during which appropriate exchanges are built up, or existing ties reinforced.

This is an appropriate moment to consider the question of the precise function of these political figures and their representation in village society, because the relationship between these is complex. In the ties with followers, it is they who are thought to dispense favours (Mayer 1967: 168) and decide, or even stimulate demand for, the values which circulate (Paine 1971: 14-19). In this sense they are patrons. Yet Boissevain has argued that unless such men control the resources themselves, this is an inappropriate label. Where they have "strategic contacts with other people who control such resources directly" (1974: 147), they are better described as brokers. In some ways this is a definitional wrangle, but in others it is a distinction which throws light upon their activities. As the political system has changed, access to vital resources has become increasingly indirect. This is partly mitigated by their immediate involvement in local ward politics, which appears as the direct control of events. There are other aspects to this, however. As Paine has noted brokers require to maintain the distance between clients and their sources (1974: 24-5), which is attained in part by the secrecy in which the latter are shrouded (see Table 9:2 and 9:1 in the entries for Kt. Gendul and Jèro Mangku Dalem). He makes the further point that "a broker is interested in sustaining a level of <u>value differences</u> between his clients, not in eliminating them" (1974: 24 his italics). In so far as this involves political party membership, it may tend to break these down. As we shall see, in fact the differences in values are largely maintained by a quite separate role, that of orator, which functions effectively not as the cultural broker described by Geertz for the <u>kiyayi</u> of Java, but as a blocker (cf. Geertz 1960a).

These accounts tend at points to stress the analyst's view of the relationship at the expense of its indigenous representation. In Bali, these may take

more than one form. Such 'patrons' are widely referred to as kantih, the outrigger which enables a boat to remain stable. The term is used equally of domestic and political figures and carries certain connotations of mutual dependence. The latter role is often designated in a different idiom, for such men are spoken of as guru, a term which it will be recalled is used for fathers, teachers and princes, or as Siwa, the spiritual master of his followers and used of a high priest. (The emphasis upon instruction is interesting in view of the importance of advice-giving in such relations discussed above.) The superiority of the guru is expressed vividly in the relationship between the two as he is said to nèngtèng jambotné to hold (his followers) up by the hair. It is also important to distinguish between the observer's analysis as to the sources of a person's assets and the representation of this in the relationships in question. While such men may be increasingly placed in the position of brokers, this is not generally evident to their followers. The secrecy of their own patronage assumes a new significance in this perspective. Followers are carefully kept in the dark as to how their leaders achieve their results and it is interesting that however well I knew these men the sources to which they went were never disclosed.[9] So there are various interpretations of the relationships between powerful villagers and their followers, and the activities of the former should perhaps be seen in terms of their attempts to impose their definition of their roles as patrons upon their clients.

This raises a more general point about the importance of indigenous models in the organization of political relationships. Earlier I noted that the resources controlled by patrons were perceived to be scarce and political protection to be essential. This is worth brief reflection. Such ideas have a broader cultural application and seem to reflect a more general view of the world held by peasant villagers. A concern with protection and safety from forces thought to be uncontrollable pervades religion and provides the explicit purpose of much ritual. Not only are the gods to whom these are directed known as Batara, a term which means protector (Hooykaas, personal communication), but the rites are intended to bring about a state which might otherwise appear somewhat unusual, that is safety (selamet), the absence of disturbance and danger, epitomized in the acceptance of holy water which

is thought to convey this, almost as if it were a substance (cf. Chapter 8). It might reasonably be asked to what extent the need for protection is not so much a product of the way the world is, especially in a rational bureaucratic administration, as the consequence of a world-view which ensures its apparent necessity by virtue of the particularity of its response.[10]

The Assembly and the Role of Orators:

Balinese villagers are engaged in complex forms of exchange with one another which form part of a field of patronage extending beyond the community. Apart from these transactions, the same persons are involved in relationships based on incorporation within the ward (on this distinction, see Paine 1976). The most important forms in which this is manifest are occasions of communal activity and above all the regular meetings of the ward as an assembly in which matters of public interest are discussed and decisions taken. As Smith has argued the characteristics of corporate groups include not only formal and definitional features (identity, presumed perpetuity, closure and membership), but processual ones by which they are enabled to function (1974b: 94). These are autonomy within a given sphere, exclusive common affairs, set procedures and organization by which business may be conducted. The emphasis which the Balinese lay upon these in the conduct of corporate affairs is not fortuitous; for it is only in ordering exchanges by reference to these that the activities of groups are distinguishable from the other transactions of their members. Within the ward, as other corporations, villagers stand as jural equals both in their obligations and in their rights to participate in decisions, the concern for collective interests being expressed in the preference for consensus in the determination of public matters. The complexity of the constitution and rules of procedure, which include observance of special forms of language, and the intricacy of customary law, based both on statute and precedent, by which this independence is safeguarded has the somewhat paradoxical consequence that only a minority of villagers fully understand these or, better, are equipped to argue about what these should be. This takes the form of statements in ideal terms by which they both reinforce the distinctiveness of corporate deliberations and

attempt to gain widespread support for decisions. Such orators possess great influence, but are restrained in its exercise. This is not simply the product of interference by patrons, but in the highly public nature of their roles such that the more successfully they promote democratic ideals, the more they contravene them.

In previous chapters we have seen that the villagers of Pisangkaja are divided by substantial differences in wealth, by membership of a variety of descent groups which are ranked within a formal caste hierarchy, by inclusion in different voluntary associations and, as discussed above, by allegiance to different domestic and political patrons. These relationships are formally irrelevant however to the conduct of affairs within the ward. This is enshrined generally in Bali, as Geertz has pointed out, in an explicit rule of procedure to the effect that "whenever a group formed on the basis of one principle of affiliation is allocated a given social function, no other principle of affiliation may receive any recognition whatsoever." (1959a: 1005). As we have had reason to see, this may be theoretical but it remains nonetheless a core ideal in the conduct of corporate activities. In the ward assembly all members are formally equal, regardless of their other social roles. This is symbolized publicly in the rules of seating in public meetings by which distinctions of head height according to caste are set aside and villagers sit at the same level - a conscious and explicit statement of the formal legal equality of members of the ward. Ideally resolutions are reached by consensus between fellow villagers in which event they are held to be 'strong' and ritually pure (suci).[11] In practice, however, other considerations affect the form in which these ideals are observed. Decisions are presented as if reached by general agreement, whereas the underlying processes are more complex and unanimity tends to be the form in which decisions are couched after debate rather than the means by which they are taken. Similarly, closer inspection shows that even the seating arrangements make subtle allowances for differences. The headmen and senior members of the local court (NE1 and NE2) are usually allocated a special place to the north, the purer direction, in the meeting-house (the balé banjar, itself appropriately on the northern side of the central square in Pisangkaja: see Map 4). The rest of the assembly

sit scattered in roughly concentric circles to the south. There is also a close relationship between informal spacing and participation in debates. For the innermost circle tends to consist almost entirely of public speakers, so that the physical centre of the meeting is also the focus of debate. During meetings this core normally remains seated, while other villagers join and leave the periphery quite freely. Allied spokesmen do not usually sit together, as this would constitute too explicit a statement of cooperation and further dispersed support creates the tactical illusion of widespread approval. This provides an apt illustration of how the Balinese in public meetings, in their reference to the ideal, combine its observance, delicate recognition of other factors, and its instrumental possibilities.

The separateness of the public deliberations of the community-in-council (Kuper 1971: 14) are emphasized in the formality of rules of procedure. While in theory these are common to all groups, they are the most developed, or observed, in the ward, possibly because here the danger of subversion is thought to be the greatest. The impact of rules of procedure is extensive as they affect the manner in which decisions are reached and leadership roles assumed, for convention determines the conduct of meetings, the type of issues discussed and their means of presentation. Assembly meetings are formal occasions when freedom of expression is restricted rather than open debates. Language use is strictly prescribed, speeches are addressed to the meeting (although side conversations are frequent), officials enjoy priority in debate and open conflict is forbidden. Commonly agreed etiquette, although not backed by formal penalties, further defines the appropriate form for speeches and the means of expressing disagreement.

This code of procedure is reinforced by fines and ritual sanctions, especially for breaches of order and language conventions. In Pisangkaja, the interruption of an official incurs a fine of Rp. 20, which is immediately doubled on complaint, while open argument is punished as if it were physical assault with a minimum fine of Rp. 100. The use of improper or insulting language is a serious offence which causes ritual pollution of the whole ward. This state must be annulled, ideally before further work, by an expensive purification ceremony (perascita) of the same kind used in the event of

breaches in the rules of caste purity paid by the offender. In addition, at the end of each meeting a small offering is performed by the customary village sub-section head using canén (which contains betel-chewing ingredients symbolising commensality) to remove any impurity caused by anger and to "calm feelings".[12]

The formality of Balinese social relations, especially in public, which has been commented on by a number of scholars (especially Bateson 1949; Geertz 2966a: 53-61) is especially evident in the use of language. There are two aspects to this. On the one hand, as the classification of levels is the same as that used in exchanges between castes, it relates the conduct of public meetings to a wider framework of values; on the other, in the use of a relatively elegant and formalized level, it tends to constrain freedom of expression. The different recognized speech levels in Balinese have already been discussed in Chapter 8, and the basic forms are similar. In assembly meetings, in contrast to daily life, many words in ordinary Balinese (basa biasa) are deemed inappropriate, while coarse language (basa kasar) is expressly prohibited. The proper language of meetings, even in wards with no high castes (for instance Br. Tegal), is refined language (basa alus). This is a form quite distinct from that used in ordinary discourse between commoners who comprise the majority of ward members. Although the villagers in Tengahpadang, where there is a significant population of high castes, can understand it and are obliged to speak it in the limited contexts of exchanges between castes, relatively few have the fluency required for public speeches. In addition, the vocabulary and lexical forms appropriate in such contexts have the effect of restricting the range of expression, both by virtue of their formal requirements and through fear of appearing clumsy (kébot, the term for left-handed) or making mistakes (iwang). More generally the use of special language also tends to distinguish relations in the assembly from everyday life and emphasizes the inviolability of council decisions by its ritual nature. There are certain further features of formal speech and the widespread use of ritual and moral idioms which are discussed below.

The distinction between refined and coarse is equally applicable

to the assessment of public behaviour, as refinement implies the socially ideal, and coarseness the ignorance of proper form and behaviour. To speak loudly or ostentatiously, without the correct form and language, or at excessive length are signs of coarse, and hence undesirable, qualities. Ideally, a refined person makes his contribution to public debate indirect, undemonstrative and brief, punctuated with set phrases of apology. High Balinese is particularly suited to such formulae with its paraphrasing and tendency towards obliqueness (and repetitive elaboration, which should be held in check here). So the style of debate in Balinese assemblies is distinctive - speeches are short and subdued, rarely lasting more than five minutes, and consist of a series of exchanges between rival orators until the mood of the meeting becomes clear. Angry altercations, although strongly disapproved, are not unknown but are usually delegated to junior speakers, senior orators confining themselves to criticism of the opposing argument. Emphasis is placed on calmness and refinement in public discussion and is evident in the quiet voices used and the self-abasing posture with eyes slightly downcast and hands on lap which are the ideal. Practice does not always live up to these standards; but speakers and speeches are largely evaluated by their approximation to the ideal. Pertinent comment without the correct forms tends to be glossed over by the assembly, unless it is rephrased. The unstated maxim of ward debates is that if one cannot say something well, then it is better left unsaid. The manifestation of refinement in speech is an important element in its reception, as it is more generally of a person's suitability for a major role in public affairs.[13]

The presentation of speeches also conforms, more or less, to certain ideals of form and content. In Tengahpadang, public addresses contain four main sections: mebetènin ngeraos, 'to lower one's speaking', an accepted form of self-abasement indicating the speaker's lack of knowledge or fitness to speak; nyelasang, 'explaining', a restatement of common knowledge or a repetition of universally accepted values on the subject under debate; ngèdèngang peminéh pedidi, presenting one's own thoughts, a brief statement of the current speaker's opinion; and finally nyerahang tekèn banjar, 'surrendering to the banjar', announcing that one will follow

whatever the assembly decides. The opening and concluding sections tend to be relatively fixed in intent and so less important than those between. These show an interesting logical development in what might otherwise appear as largely a formality without semantic significance. While villagers in stating ideals may attempt to propound some irrefutable case (irrefutable insofar as it is axiomatic and so indisputable in its moral assumptions), they are also commonly choosing between a range of alternatives as to the central value which they are proposing to be applicable to the issue under debate. From this certain subsidiary propositions follow, normally enshrined in the third section. It is not so much that Balinese speeches lack propositional content (cf. Bloch 1974; 1975a), as that they represent a vital process of negotiation as to the hierarchy of values appropriate in any instance. The significance of this discussion of alternative interpretations, and the essential fluidity of the hierarchy of values perceived by the Balinese is, I suggest, central to public debate and social change in Bali and will be discussed towards the end of this chapter and in the one following.

This process is fairly clear in assembly meetings where different points of view are propounded by being articulated with proposed cardinal values. It is primarily in this way that argumentation is possible in a situation where freedom of discourse is constrained. For, in the assembly, open conflict is censured and in most cases disagreement must be expressed indirectly. Reference to personal or sectional interests at the expense of the community, or to overtly divisive issues, is strongly disapproved. As a result, individual and factional concerns tend to be phrased in general terms, ostensibly for the benefit of the ward as a whole, so that conflict between interests is expressed in the guise of different social policies, or alternative solutions to common problems, rather than in terms of individual advantage or rivalry. It is a marked feature of assembly debates that the issue discussed is only partly relevant to the total problem, or problems, and unless this is understood much of what is said at meetings appears either irrelevant or meaningless. Debates are often conducted at more than one level in which manifest and latent issues are simultaneously involved and most matters which concern conflict or personal advantage remain unmentioned.

This can perhaps best be illustrated by a simple example from a speech at an assembly meeting in Pisangkaja. The problem concerned the proximity of major ritual events by coincidence of the two different calendars, the solar-lunar Hindu Balinese year with the permutational Javanese-Balinese year of 210 days (see Goris 1960a). The regular holiday of Galungan according to the latter calendar was due to occur at about the same time as the festival in the village temple (Pura Dés̀a) Table 3:17). The performance of this is taken in turns by groups of wards - on this occasion Pisangkaja and Gagah jointly. The organization of the festival is under the control of the head of the customary village (the bendésa, Kt. Gendul NW10) and any special problems should be referred to the officiating high priest (pedanda). The matter was taken up in a routine meeting by Kt. Mara (NW7) as follows:

Case 12: The debate about the coincidence of religious festivals:

> The speaker apologised for taking up the time of the assembly with a matter which was not important. However, in eight weeks' time the désa temple festival would occur which would require the ward to work for two weeks in preparation. According to his calculations, which might well be incorrect, Galungan would occur at the same time. This would then mean a heavy work load on each household, and worse, because it was shortly before harvest the contributions to both rituals simultaneously would strain individual resources. While far be it from him to suggest a solution to the meeting, would it be possible to change the date of the temple festival until after the harvest? Perhaps other members also felt that the matter should be referred to the bendésa and the pedanda? He apologised for raising the issue and wished to concur with the decision of the ward.
>
> There was general consensus that difficulty would arise and a resolution was adopted to pass the matter to the attention of the bendésa.

It is worth examining this briefly both for its tactical import and for the broader issue of the positing of alternative frameworks of values.

This speech is perhaps as important for what was left unsaid, or the conclusions which would follow from concurrence, as for its content. This incidentally approximates the ideal, except in the omission of any reference

to general values. This was in part because it was not a matter for contention; but also as we shall see because the critical value being implied was not publicly acceptable. The speaker knew that the dates did not in fact coincide (having carefully checked beforehand), but were nevertheless close and that concern about this had been expressed privately in the coffee stalls in the main square. His reference to the 'facts' of the situation were important to the argument. Kt. Mara is himself a compound owner (kerama désa) on whom most of the burden of the expenses and labour would fall. As an expert in traditional law he knew perfectly well, although apparently most of the audience did not, that the date of the temple festival was quite unchangeable. His covert intention, according to various sources (including Kt. Mara's private confession afterwards) was to creat a situation in which the ward would have to use part of its capital to underwrite the costs of the ceremony. As the group performing the rite was properly the village sub-section, they were entitled to use their own funds, but these were far smaller than those held by the full ward (see Table 3:7) and the intention was to tap the latter, which is why the matter was raised in a full ward assembly, not a smaller meeting of compound heads, that is the somewhat unclear boundary between the two was deliberately transgressed.
In due course the village head reported back that the dates were immutable and the assembly, having acknowledged that the personal outlay would be excessive, had little option but to use its own capital to assist the compound heads. By establishing agreement on one problem, the speaker was in the longer term proposing an alternative and far less publicly acceptable solution to another.

There are more general issues of cultural values underlying this. Normally calendars maintain a reasonable order in the timing of festivals (but see Hobart 1978b: 66-80), but the different systems occasionally overlap awkwardly. At such moments the strain on human resources becomes great. The paradigmatic assumption that gods are superior to men (which might be represented as: gods > men) was indirectly called into question by virtue of the difficulties caused in complying with the derivative injunction that the interests of gods therefore come before

those of men.[14] Kt. Mara was in effect proposing that, where the interests of men were seriously inconvenienced, the interests of gods - that is in having their temple festivals or birthdays (piodalan) - should be modified. This implies a more general proposition to the effect that (at least in some contexts) men are superior to gods (men > gods). Kt. Mara was able to propose an alternative because of the logical confusion and empirical difficulties in obeying conflicting instructions created by the first assumption. In this case the other formulation was not acceptable and was rejected by the high priest. This brief illustration does, however, make the case that under the seeming simplicity of public speeches there may be room for positing alternative frame-works of interpretation about apparently unquestionable issues.

This is a simple example, but it should be clear that just to formulate arguments in this idiom requires a certain skill and experience. So in the concluding part of this section, I would like to turn briefly to the problem of who participates most in debates and whether there are any characteristics which distinguish those active in public meetings. According to the ward constitution, all householders are equally entitled to contribute to debates, but the majority rarely if ever participate actively for a number of reasons. First, a significant proportion of members know little of the current affairs in the community and attend meetings because it is required. Second, speakers must effectively possess not only a knowledge of assembly law and custom, but also precedent from past meetings. Third, the rules of procedure and language, as well as the use of indirect means of presenting issues, limit the number of qualified speakers. Finally, and this is perhaps peculiarly Balinese, speakers are expected not to experience lek (shame or 'stage-fright'[15] in public) and to have an mua tebel (literally: a thick face, to feel shame rarely - an ambiguous attribute but necessary in a leader). Spokesmen in meetings who do not possess some or all of these characteristics are liable to ridicule and other diffuse social sanctions.

So, while in principle anyone may address a meeting, several factors tend to restrict the number of major participants and debate in ward assemblies, in Tengahpadang at least, is conducted almost exclusively by about 10% of the members. Villagers with the appropriate requirements are designated as juru raos or tukang munyiang, a speech-specialist or orator. This role is

generally recognised in local society and orators comprise an informal élite within the ward with high prestige and extensive influence in the assembly and community.

In Tengahpadang orators are usually adult men[16] aged from thirty to sixty with reputations for their knowledge of law and persuasiveness as speakers. Balinese evaluate an orator's role somewhat differently saying they should be brave, refined, speak sweetly and be able to captivate an audience. They do not belong to any formal group and learn through a highly informal relationship with an experienced orator from whom they acquire the rudiments of technique. Before actual meetings, orators and their assistants engage in private consultation, or meadungan, to coordinate roles and give advice on tactics, and this constitutes the main form of teaching.[17] It should be noted, however, that in Pisangkaja not everyone who speaks in a meeting is necessarily a recognized speaker. Not infrequently ordinary villagers will interject with questions or complaints, which are then commonly taken up by a speaker and rephrased. More important there are persons who are able to speak well but for one reason or another do not do so regularly; equally there are those who are required to participate, but lack the expertise. In the former category fall most of the patrons who tend, as we shall see, to avoid assembly meetings, and other men who by inclination or the expectation of their roles may say relatively little (for instance priests, like the Jèro Mangku Désa SW3). More often men may be voted into public office (see below) without adequate skills. This was the fate of the ward headman elected in 1971, I Kartana (SW7), who was widely mimicked for his brusque introduction of a topic without the proper preamble and for adding Indonesian words to his Balinese.[18]

The activities of orators are by no means confined to their participation in public debates and their general reputations bear strongly on the extent to which they are heeded in meetings. They play active roles in other social situations apart from in the assembly, for example, at meetings of irrigation associations, descent groups and voluntary organisations. Their assistance is requested for most marriage negotiations and informal dispute settlements and they

are conspicuous on public occasions. In indigenous terms the role of orator is seen as that of an adept in local law, a protagonist of the traditional values of the community and a protector of its interests from interference by the government, ward factions and political parties. Orators uphold approved village ideals and, in a sense, they are 'ideal villagers', but, as Balinese social values do not constitute a logically consistent system, with contrasting stress on group equality and merit, the position of orator is necessarily ambiguous.

This ambivalence can be seen on the one hand in the prestige of orators and on the other in the frequency with which their dominant roles involve them in conflict and puwik. Puwik is the total suspension of relations between two persons which often endures for years following an unresolved dispute. While puwik is widely regarded with disapproval, it may also be manipulated to reinforce a name as a 'big man'. The prestige of orators in the community rests in large part on their credibility and performance in the assembly. Meetings, therefore, not only provide the opportunities for orators to influence decision-making, but are the focus for fights for prestige as well, in which real and potentially permanent changes may be made in an orator's social reputation.

In Pisangkaja at least, the life histories and circumstances of orators show features which distinguish them particularly from that other category of leaders, patrons. This suggests that such factors largely beyond individual control as the extent of personal networks may play a part in determining the kind of leadership roles assumed by villagers, particularly as many patrons were competent speakers, and most orators were influential domestic patrons (see Table 9:1), in part of course because of the direct representation they could offer in the ward assembly. The outstanding differences are included in Table 9:7 which lists the main attributes of leaders. Whereas patrons were invariably heirs to compounds (karang désa), orators might be either heirs or not although there is a tendency for senior ones to be so more often than junior. By ward standards they are generally fairly poor men, the mean size of agricultural holdings being only 0.145 ha. for orators, compared with the overall mean of 0.40 ha. and 1.246 ha. for

Table 9:7 Personal Features of Recognized Orators and Political Patrons in Pisangkaja: 1972.

No:	Name:	Age: (1972)	Marriage: Loc:	Marriage: Type:	Educ:	Land Owned: Rice	Land Owned: Dry	Land Owned: All	Occupation:
Major Patrons:									
NE1	Cok. Putera	28	ed	e	13	6.05	1.75	6.925	Landlord Shopkeeper
NW10	Kt. Gendul	50	ed ib	c a	3	1.22	.10	1.27	Farmer Entre-preneur
SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	56	ed ib	(e)* a	-	.37	.09	.415	Driver
SE17	J.M.Dalèm	33	ib eb	c a	6	-	.15	.075	Priest Farmer
Minor Patrons:									
NE2	Cok.A.Nama	34	ib	a	6	-	-	-	Tenant Farmer
NE15	Badra	47	eb	a	3	1.53	1.03	2.045	Farmer Shadow-Puppeteer
NW4	Lasiya	42	eb ed ib	a a f	3	.41	.12	.47	Policeman Farmer
NW9	Tunjung	29	ed	a	10	-	-	-	Policeman
SE1	Tagel	±32	ed	a	?	-	-	-	Policeman
SE3	Subratha	47	ed	c	10+	.905	.71	1.26	Policeman
Major Orators:									
NE23	Sujana	40	eb	e	3	-	-	-	Rice merchant
NW3	Dw.Md.Lanus	27	ed	a	6	.49	.365	.67	Farmer
NW7	Kt. Mara	54	ib ib	c f	-	.29	.09	.335	Farmer
SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	36	ib	e	3	-	.14	.07	Tenant farmer

Table 9:7 Features of Orators and Patrons Sheet 2.

No:	Name:	Age: (1972)	Marriage: Loc:	Marriage: Type:	Educ:	Land Owned: Rice:	Land Owned: Dry:	Land Owned: All:	Occupation:
Minor Orators:									
NE3	Kacir Siangan	35	eb ed ib ib	e e e m.c.	6	.36	.03	.375	Driver
NW1	Runtig	32	-	-	6	-	.34	.17	Marginal
NW2	Dw.Kt.Gampil	39	-	-	6	-	.21	.105	Gambler Rice porter
NW6	Kacir Sengat	32	ib	e	3	-	-	-	Rice merchant
NW10	Keredek	28	ib	a	6	-	-	-	Farmer on family land
NW16	Keted	42	ib	a	-	-	-**	-	Tenant farmer
NW23	Dugligan	45	ib	a	-	.34	.48	.58	Farmer
SW8	Mukun	30	ib	e	3	-	-	-	Stall-keeper
SW10	Gomboh	37	ib	e	6	-	-	-	Marginal
SE1	Balik	29	ib ed	e e	5	-	-	-	Marginal
SE11	Dw.Pt.Kuat	20	ib	e	4	-	.04	.02	Marginal
SE20	Kaling	28	ib ib	a e	6	-	-	-	Farmer on family land

Notes:
Age: = this is approximate, but accurate to within one or two years
Loc: = location of marriage:- ib = intra-banjar
eb = extra-banjar, but within settlement
ed = extra-désa (settlement)

Type: = form of arrangement:- a = generally agreed
e = elopement
c = capture
m.c= mock capture
f = forced/arranged by parents

Educ. = number of years of formal education (- usually means illiterate)

Land Owned: measured in proportions of a hectare
All: refers to the composite figure of all riceland + half the dry fields

* this marriage is excluded as was agreed, but formally an elopement and occurred when the man was not living in Tengahpadang.
** nominally he owns 0.05 ha. but his house stands on this.

patrons (if Cokorda Putera is omitted this drops to .615 ha, an understatement as it excludes the incomes of government officials). As Table 9:7 shows a fair proportion of orators have economically marginal positions, notably among the lesser one's.[19] This is not reflected directly in their political leanings which vary widely. As none is particularly wealthy, in contrast to patrons, it does mean however that they represent in person as well as platform the plight of ordinary villagers. Differences of economic position is also reflected in slight discrepancies in the length of education, which is on average six years for patrons and four for orators.[20] Their kinship networks are far more circumscribed than those of patrons, reinforced by a strong tendency towards endogamy. As Table 9:5 indicates 75% of marriages by orators are within the ward, far higher than the mean; the obverse of this of course is that they have more affines living within the local community. Oratorship would seem then in general to provide a means of political achievement where the absence of wealth or extensive networks restricts opportunities in other arenas.

The dominance of orators in public debate is, however, only part of their activities. More than patrons they bring their entire social reputations with them into meetings, however skilled they are with words. They tend to show an awareness of this in their behaviour which has some interesting features, as it provides opportunity for developing individual, even idosyncratic, characteristics.[21] Most are sociable and spend much time in local coffee-stalls, where they also have the chance of sensing public moods or private concerns. They are widely noted for their portrayal of themselves as ordinary villagers, as egalitarian and often implicitly inimical to the forms of hierarchy which permeate Balinese society more generally. Above all however orators are marked out from other men for being brave (bani), occasionally to excess (tulah), as in I Kebet's seduction of a married woman from the local princely family. This may be in their risks of physical hazards - Kacir Siangan (NE3) and Déwa Pt. Kuat (SE11) tend to court danger to the point that the latter's name includes the Indonesian term kuat, strong (occasionally brave), for his complete disregard for life and limb - or any other form, especially the refusal to be cowed under any circumstances. This absence of the feeling of lek also has negative connotations, for it means not just fear in public, but also respect for

others. This is evident in their marriage preferences where they deviate from the norm in their tendency to elope with other villagers' daughters and to be polygynous, more often serially than simultaneously.[22] This is possibly connected with ideals of romantic (or perhaps better sexual) liaisons noted by Boon (1977: 121-4). With the exception of one marriage by Kt. Mara (discussed in Case 9, Chapter 7) they tend to avoid marriage by capture with its inegalitarian implications. In many ways, orators tend to be quite distinct from other villagers.

Both despite this, and because of it, the political influence of orators is limited in various ways. Although they are commonly domestic patrons, they do not normally establish large and stable followings, for their effectiveness is restricted to the ward. The highly public nature of their roles places constraints on their personal domination, for they are always susceptible to attack by their rivals. In some ways they are like fighting-cocks, living in public limelight and sharing many of the same attributes. In a recent application of the idea of 'deep play' to Bali, Geertz has pointed to the ways in which the Balinese cock-fight may take on distinctive characteristics, in the complete commitment to violent, but symbolic, encounters (Geertz 1973b). One might add perhaps that such confrontations may involve villagers themselves directly and in certain respects the clash of orators may be seen as deep play <u>par excellence</u>;[23] for in Tengahpadang at least it has proved to be a particularly dangerous part to assume, cut short as it has often been by violence or death. The role itself shows an interesting internal contradiction. For while orators tend to be ordinary villagers by birth and profession, the more successful they are in proclaiming this, the more they tend to deviate from the ideals they propound. So they come to stand for the epitome of proper men and at the same time its denial. So the strict rules of procedure in Balinese public assemblies tends to lead to the emergence of an élite set of villagers who are particularly adept in the requisite knowledge and skills and exercise great influence over the course of debates. The extent of their power is limited, however, by village ideas of egalitarianism, or democracy, which apply to public speakers especially in view of the visibility of their actions, and by the pervasion of the ward by wider sets of relationships which may be

mobilized for political ends.

Political Relationships and Arenas:

In the first part of this chapter we have seen how the members of the ward tend to be organized according to ties of patronage into discrete clientèles; and further, how these are prevented from playing any direct part in local politics by the constitutional rules of the assembly which also encourages the emergence of a different type of leader whose existence depends upon maintaining this separation. In this section I would like to examine how this affects the pattern of political activity and the kinds of relationship through which it is organized. Clientèles based upon political, rather than just domestic, patronage provide sources of support for leaders in the process of influencing decision-making. This raises the question of how far the interests of members concur, and also the degree to which the structure of relationships permits consolidation. Factions tend to be heterogeneous in the characteristics of their members; the social values represented in the persons of their leaders being more distinctive. The internal structure of factions may play a part in their mobilization, but this tends to change over time. For several reasons faction leaders are able to command support over a wide range of issues. These grounds include the value to followers of patronage, domestic and political; the complexity of villagers' interests which cannot be reduced to matters of social class alone; and finally the capacity of orators in representing sectional interests in general, often moral, terms by which they consolidate members and simultaneously attract support from non-aligned villagers. So patrons depend upon orators for representation of factional interests in suitable form, such that factions may be seen as having dual leadership at any time. The stability of such alliances, as well as the relative influence on policy, varies according to mutual interests, the multiplicity of ties and the size of the orator's following. This relationship also tends to be evaluated differently by the two types of leader. This model is useful in accounting for the pattern of political action in Bali, where private negotiation and

public discussion emerge as two aspects of a single process. So there tend to be two separate, but interdependent, arenas of political action in Balinese wards which reflect an organized difference of functions.

The definition of the types of grouping involved in local political activity raises interesting problems, both in terms of indigenous and observer's views. We have seen that these tend to be organized on the basis of patronage, such that primary ties are commonly to domestic patrons but in a minority of cases these may differ according to the sphere of activity. For a majority of clients this appears to be their main frame of reference; the political élite estimating that perhaps less than a quarter of households understood the complexity of the structure of such groupings or their mode of political action. (It was not possible to check this view without serious alteration to the political process itself.) When these clientèles are mobilized in pursuit of definite goals they are notable for their structure which differs significantly from that of corporate groups. Here ties are dyadic, recruited according to diverse principles and mostly focused on a leader or élite, who initiate much of the action potentially across a broad range of fields. In all these respects these clientèles when organized for action come close to recent definitions of factions as network-based groupings of diverse composition (Firth 1957; Nicholas 1965). They are distinct from political parties, to which they may have a nominal affiliation, in not being organized by definite rules, recruited according to shared interests or competing in a specialized political field (following Bujra's useful continuum between 'faction' and 'party' 1973: 134ff.). They differ from common descriptions of factions however in that the basic units, which tend to be composed of a domestic patron and following, in being relatively stable over time. These features raise a variety of questions about the composition, organization and articulation of interests in such heterogeneous groupings to which I would like to turn.

It is useful first, however, to make a broader observation on the implications of factional, or dispersed dyadic, ties for collective action. A group like the ward in which each member in theory has an equal voice is sufficiently large and diversified as to raise problems in the ability of any individual alone to affect decision-making. The ward corresponds to

what Olsen (1965: 50-1) has referred to as a 'latent group', or at best an 'intermediate group', that is one where the influence of a single person's decision as to the provision of collective goods is sufficiently limited that by itself it is inadequate to affect the outcome. Balinese groups, however, are notably active despite their size, but closer inspection reveals that they have selective incentives, in the form of sanctions and rewards, to ensure the sharing of costs in communal enterprises. There is another aspect to this. There is not always agreement as to what particular collective goods should be sought out of the possible range, nor exactly how they are to be attained. The organization of factions within the ward provides a means by which individuals are capable of ensuring, or affecting, the outcome of decisions. It should be noted that this need not in fact be the case; such activity works if persons believe or act as if it is. In this lies a set of considerations which help to prevent the emergence over a long period of a single monolithic clientèle. The larger the factions, the fewer they are in number and so the more the influence of the leader or leaders over the course of proceedings. Against this, the larger the following of a single man, the less he is likely to respond to the demands of any particular follower. The way in which he represents his actions is discussed below. This pattern is not so developed in the other groups in Tengahpadang for several reasons. First, their resources and authority is generally too little to be worth the commitment to competition. Second, resources may well not be negotiable or convertible. Third, in groups like the irrigation association, the nature of demand and supply of resources (here water) atomize members and inhibit factionalism, which is not the case in the ward.

The recruitment of factions in Pisangkaja (and from the evidence which I have been able to obtain, in all the other wards too) is according to a fairly wide range of different criteria. Obviously all villagers are members of a single ward, but they differ in the features by which they express factional allegiance. As we saw in Table 9:1, this is often directed primarily towards a domestic patron, but there are occasions when contact is made directly or otherwise with the political patron through whom such

groupings are articulated. The variety of ties to this leader are equally, if not more, diverse as they are not infrequently of a second order, that is through an intermediary, the domestic patron. The distribution of ties to factional leaders is given in Table 9:8. This shows several points of interest.

Table 9:8 Distribution of Ties to Patrons in Factions in Pisangkaja 1972.

	MAJOR FACTIONS					
	A.	B.	C.	D.		
Tie:	J.M.Dalem	Cok.P.	Kt. G.	Dw.Md.N.	Total	%
Descent:*	5	-	5	3	13	16.5%
Wider descent	1	4	2	-	7	8.9%
Affine:	12	-	14	-	26	32.9%
Tenant:	-	9	-	-	9	11.4%
No tie:	7	6	6	5	24	30.4%
Total:	25	19	27	8	79	100.1%

	MINOR FACTIONS							
	I Tun-jung	Cok. Alit	I Tag-el	I Bad-ra	I Sub-ratha	I Las-iya	Total	%
Descent:	-	1	3	-	5	1	10	27.0%
Affine:	5	4	3	6	-	-	18	48.6%
No tie:	6	1	-	-	-	2	9	24.3%
Total	11	6	6	6	5	3	37	99.9%

* for strict comparability with Hobart 1975 Table 2, I have restricted descent to second collaterals. In the subsequent diagrams, however, I have preferred the measure of common lineage which now seems more apt.

J.M. Dalem = Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE17)
Cok.P. = Cokorda Putera (NE1)
Kt.G. = Kt. Gendul (NW10)
Dw.Md.N. = Déwa Md. Nombong (SE13)

Among the major factions there tends to be a wider range of ties and a higher proportion of links which are not between kin (41.8% as against 24.3%). About one in three ties in the four big factions is of extremely remote kinship, neighbourhood or purely political and about one in four for the smaller factions, where domestic patronage and political effectively coincide. By contrast to domestic patronage where more clients were related by descent in some form (39.5%) than affinity (28.7%), ties to political patrons show a bias the other way (37.9% are affines overall; as against descent at 25.9%; it will be recalled from Chapter 7 that the range of descent and affinal ties is far broader than those mobilized, so these are not the total number), partly because domestic patrons tend to be linked to political patrons by marriage partly as domestic and political patronage may differ. It should be clear, however, that factional membership shows no more a tendency towards homogeneity of types of tie than does domestic patronage.

The distribution of descent group ties, and so caste status, is similarly diverse, as might indeed be expected in view of the varying principles of recruitment. For convenience, it is useful to examine the major factions more closely. Minor factions, as their name suggests, play a minor role being mostly collections of kin or neighbours. In Table 9:9 the descent group affiliation of the members of the four main factions is laid out. This demonstrates a number of tendencies. There is no clear correlation of a particular descent group with any faction although those headed by a leading member of the Cokorda, Pulosari and Dauh (as in fact also Pradéwa, but also of the Jati sub-caste) have substantial, if not the largest, proportion of their clientèle from their own clans. In only one faction, that of Kt. Gendul (NW10) does this constitute more than half the total, and this is only 40% of the population of Pulosari in the ward. Descent does, however, to a degree constitute one conceptual plane of factional division which may be potentially activated. (Its significance is further weakened by the lack of correspondence between the descent group ties of patrons and orators. In only a quarter of instances did these belong even to the same title group in major factions.) Perhaps more striking is the tendency for factional membership to be constrained by recognition of caste. While three of the four major factions (but only

one of the minor) cut across the divisions of caste categories, there is only one household in the whole ward where the leader is of lower caste than the client. Perhaps significantly this is of a very poor low ranking Satriya, Déwa Pt. Kuat (the faction head being a ritually purified priest). For this reason, high caste groups like the Anak Agung tend to turn towards lesser patrons but of higher caste, such as Cokorda Alit Nama (NE2), if they do not follow a major patron. So descent group and caste have bearing in different ways upon factional membership, but cannot be said to constitute major principles of recruitment, to the exclusion of other considerations.

Table 9:9 Distribution of Descent Group Membership by Faction in Pisangkaja 1972.

Descent Group	Factions: A. J.M.Dalem		B. Cok. P.		C. Kt. G.		D. Dw.Md.N.		Total:	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Cokorda	-		5	25%	-		-		5	6.0%
Pradéwa Jati	-		1	5%	-		4	44.4%	5	6.0%
Pradéwa Seronggo	1	3.8%	-		-		-		1	1.2%
Bendésa	-		2	10%	-		-		2	2.4%
Gèlgèl	-		5	25%	-		-		5	6.0%
Kayu Selem	1	3.8%	-		-		-		1	1.2%
Pulosari	8	30.8%	5	25%	18	64.3%	2	22.2%	33	39.8%
Dauh	12	46.2%	1	5%	7	25.0%	-		20	24.1%
Cameng	4	15.4%	-		1	3.6%	2	22.2%	7	8.4%
Batuan	-		-		-		1	11.1%	1	1.2%
None	-		1	5%	2	7.1%	-		3	3.6%
Total:*	26	100%	20	100%	28	100%	9	99.9%	83	99.9%

* these figures are increased for each faction by one (and so the total by four) as unlike Table 9:8 which was based upon ties to the leader, these include him as he too is a member of a descent group.

If the recultment to factions cannot be accounted for simply by common descent group or caste, no more can it be explained simply by reference to wealth. This is not to say that such factors have no bearing on support for a patron, but rather that different clients tend to have different balances of interests, some of a nature altogether separate from those so far mentioned. This may be seen by a glance at Table 9:10 in which the relative prosperity of the members of major factions is examined. As in a few instances villagers hold sizeable areas of dry fields, this has been based not on a simple computation of riceland, but extends to include dry fields,

Table 9:10 Distribution of Wealth of Members in Major Factions in Pisangkaja 1972.

	Factions:									
	A.		B.		C.		D.			
	J.M.Dalem		Cok. P.		Kt. G.		Dw.Md.N.		Total:	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Poor .00-.20ha	13	50.0%	11	55%	8	28.6%	8	88.9%	40	48.2%
Subsistence .21-.50ha	6	23.1%	3	25%	7	25.0%	1	11.1%	17	20.5%
Comfortable .51-1.00ha	5	19.2%	3	25%	6	21.4%	-	-	14	16.9%
Wealthy 1.01+ha	2	7.7%	3	25%	7	25.0%	-	-	12	14.5%
Totals:	26	100%	20	100%	28	100%	9	100%	83	100.1%

Note: Wealth is calculated here on the basis of the composite index where dry fields are included at half the value of riceland. The categories are taken from Chapter 5, footnote 18.

By the use of contingency tables it is possible to check whether the difference in wealth is statistically significant.
X^2 = 13.6514 at 9^o freedom. This is <u>not</u> significant at 10%.

as elsewhere calculated at half the value of rice terraces, which is an approximate but adequate guide. It will be immediately obvious that all the factions bar the smallest, that of Dẽwa Md. Nombong, now seriously depleted, span the range of relative wealth from poverty, of those with less than 0.20 hectares of land, to those who may reasonably be called wealthy by village standards with more than a hectare. Within this, there are however certain differences. While Faction D, consists overwhelmingly of poor or landless men, the others show more subtle variety. Faction A, headed by the priest of the temple of the dead, the Jèro Mangku Dalem, is composed of a substantial proportion of poor villagers (50%) but many of these are tenant farmers including the leader himself (but on the relatively secure temple fields). The faction also contains almost as large a proportion (42.3%) of subsistence or comfortable farmers. The most equally constituted faction is C, under the leadership of the customary village head Kt. Gendul, with almost identical proportions of each category of wealth. This contains therefore a large number of relatively affluent farmers and so is not representative of the community as a whole (cf. Graph 5:16, which shows that Faction A is closer to the distribution of land as a whole). The last faction, B, headed by the prince, Cokorda Putera, is somewhat different as it consists almost equally of tenant farmers (see Table 9:8) and a combination of lineage members and richer villagers. More detailed statistical examination of the differences between factional wealth shows that this is not significant, although it must be noted that this does not imply that there is no difference at all. So the main factions are also not constituted primarily on the basis of economic differences.

This heterogeneity of factions has certain interesting features for a consideration of their political orientation and the representation of the interests of members. The major factions have been coded according to their broader, if largely putative, affiliation to national political parties. The details of this are discussed in Table 9:11, which also provides an overview of the economic standing of members, especially the political patron and the orator with whom he was most closely associated in the period between 1971 and early 1972 during which the ward was studied most intensively. The Geertzes have argued that during the 1950s, the choice of

Table 9:11 The Distribution of Factions in Banjar Pisangkaja in 1971-2.

	Major Factions				Minor Factions
	GOLKAR	←	→	P.N.I.	
	Faction A	Faction B	Faction C	Faction D	All Factions
Patron:	Golkar agent	Local prince	Bendésa	P.N.I. agent	(see Table 9:4)
Senior orator:	Peasant farmer	Peasant farmer	Landless labourer	Rice merchant	Mainly landless labourers
Wealth of patron:*	0.075	6.925	1.27	0.415	0.57
Wealth of senior orator:	0.335	0.67	0	0	0.04
Wealth of clients (mean):	0.36	0.35	0.61	0.05	0.24
Proportion of households in faction:	16.25%	12.5%	17.5%	5.6%	25.6%
Distribution of households with normal factional alignments:**	29.4% (1)	16.3% (2)	21.9% (3)	5.6%	

Banjar households in major factions:	83	51.9%
Banjar households in minor factions:	41	25.6% (4)
Unaligned households :***	36	22.5%

* Wealth is calculated here in hectares of agricultural land. For simplicity dry land is given half the value of irrigated, a fairly accurate correspondence with their relative market price.

** This was the most frequent factional alignment during 1971-2.

*** Households with no fixed factional affilliations or with extra-banjar patronage.

Numbers refer to the alliance of minor factions:
(1) Tunjung: Tagel & Lasiya
(2) Subratua
(3) Badra
(4) The minor faction led by Cokorda Alit Nama has no fixed alignment.

political parties by factions was partly arbitrary (Geertz 1959b; Geertz, H. 1959). A somewhat similar picture emerges in the early 1970s, for local factional allegiances were largely unrelated in Pisangkaja to national differences between the two main parties, the nationalists (P.N.I.) and government group (COLKAR). The factions claiming nationalist leanings included the richest and poorest while the GOLKAR supporters were markedly diverse. It will also be apparent that there is no simple correlation between the economic position of the patron of a faction and the orator on whom he relied most. The membership of factions therefore seems to be based upon a range of criteria, such that they do not have any clear constituent principle nor permanent political orientation.

In order to understand the mode of operation of factions in Pisangkaja, it is useful therefore to look a little more closely at their other features, in particular the relationships in terms of which they are organized and the structure of the groupings themselves. For the four major factions, these are delineated in Diagram 9:1, which lays out the main ties recognized by the participants themselves, and in terms of which they understand their immediate relations to one another. This is essentially a diagrammatic representation of the relationships listed in Table 9:1, but as it bears a certain resemblance to the sort of models developed in the course of 'network analysis', it may be appropriate to say a word about how these diagrams differ. In the last decades increasing attention has been paid to the analysis of social systems in terms of the observed relationships between actors, based upon the exchanges in which they actually engage with one another. This has sometimes been viewed as a methodological and theoretical advance on 'traditional' approaches (Boissevain 1968; 1974), although this has been questioned on different grounds which need not be discussed in detail here (Cohen, A. 1974: 40-1; Mitchell 1973). Such approaches have, however, proved interesting and useful in describing the constraints affecting the actors in small informal groupings like factions, and predicting the modes of action and lines of cleavage which are liable to occur (see for instance Mayer 1966; Kapferer 1969 and Thoden van Velsen 1973). There are, however, problems in its simple adaptation to the description of factions in communities like Pisangkaja where 'everyone knows everybody' (Barnes

Diagram 9:1 The Structure of Ties within Major Factions.

Faction A: Jèro Mangku Dalem:
Orators: Kt. Mara
Kt. Kacir
Dw. Pt. Kuat



Faction B: Cokorda Putera:
Orators: Dw. Md. Lanus
I Keted
Dw. Md. Doblé

Diagram 9:1. Sheet 2.



Faction C: Kt. Gendul:
Orators: I Dugligan
I Keredek
I Mukun
(J. M. Désa)

Diagram 9:1. Sheet 3.



Faction D: Déwa Md. Nombong: Diagram 9:1. Sheet 4.

Orators: Ny. Sujana
Dw. Kt. Gampil
I Gomboh
Dw. Md. Doblé



1 = descent (lineage)
2 = clan only
3 = affinity
4 = neighbour
5 = no special tie
6 = tenant farmer
7 = friend (timpal, here usually with a political connotation)

——— = recognized or stated tie
←→ ←→ = quarrell (puwik)
( ) = land holdings (composite index to nearest 1/100th ha.)
(A),(B) etc. = factional allegiance of opponents.

1969: 75) and the pattern of exchanges becomes impossibly complex. There is a further problem in the epistemological status of the linkages or interactions between participants. This is often represented as being in some way an objective analysis of 'actual' links between individuals such that they seek to maximize or protect their 'investments' in transactions with others (see for example Kapferer 1969: 240-4). It is sometimes overlooked that this tends to presuppose the actors' recognition of such ties, or exchanges, for it is hard to see how they can be effective unless they are consciously formulated by at least some of the participants, and understood as being valuable. So in the diagrammatic replication of factional structure I have followed the description of their ties given by villagers, both as these are the relationships in terms of which they state their ties and as the computation of all the exchanges is both technically impossible and theoretically of questionable value. The model of factional structure is therefore not that employed in formal 'network analysis', but describes rather the relationships in terms of which villagers see themselves as linked in factions and through which they channel their exchanges.

There are certain points of general interest in the structure of factions. These are based largely on ties which are selected from a far larger pool available, whether based on descent, affinity, neighbourhood or simple convenience and so offer villagers a wide range of choice. It will be clear that for the most part they are also made up of sets of domestic patrons and their followers, the former being allied with political patrons, and the latter typically being only indirectly in contact with these. The degree of reticulation of ties between followers varies, but as we shall see it is questionable if the degree of this determines the behaviour of the patron to any great extent. It will also be apparent that competition in other fields may be expressed in terms of factional difference. The two priests, who compete to some degree for clients belong to distinct factions, as do the two main rice merchants (Ny. Sujana in Faction D and I Kacir Sèngat in the minor faction of I Tunjung, normally allied to Faction A). There are also particular relations of conflict between individuals (puwik) the most important of which in the context of factional ties are included in Diagram 9:1. It is possible to argue that these are a critical factor in determining factional membership. There are problems with this view however.

First some of these disputes stem from, rather than decide, factional membership. Second these may occur between members of a single grouping, as in the avoidance between Kt. Mara and .Sorog' in Faction A, or even between Pageh and the head of Faction A himself. This is possible as he is the domestic client of Kt. Mara and so not directly linked to the Jèro Mangku Dalem, an arrangement which bears out the argument about the basic units of factional membership. Finally it will be noticed that a high proportion of important lines of dispute involve orators as was suggested in the previous section. So factional ties reflect the links between villagers in a complex manner.

There are however certain apparent differences between the structure of the various groupings which are relevant to their operation. Faction A is notably dispersed in that a sizeable proportion of members are only connected to the patron through intervening ties, which may number as many as three (that is it extends to include 'third order' relationships, cf. Barnes 1969: 58-61). Equally important, the senior orator, Kt. Mara, has almost as many clients as the patron himself. The high incidence of affinal ties, noted in Table 9:8, can be seen to provide many of the critical links between members. In contrast, Faction B led by the prince consists of villagers who are connected to him for the most part direct through ties of tenancy or descent, each of the two sets attaining a relatively high degree of internal reticulation. The head of the other large faction, C, unlike the priest, stands closer to the centre of the network of ties, although an important contingent are connected to him only through second-order links through the village temple priest, the Jèro Mangku Désa. The effect of marriage within the coterie of wealthy villagers can be seen in the importance of affinity. While several members are related to Kt. Gendul by descent, this was proving friable towards the end of fieldwork, as I Gangsar was in the process of moving to join Faction A, together with his domestic clients - a shift which suggests that neither wealth nor descent are dominating principles, as Gangsar is not only the richest member of a faction of fairly comfortable farmers, but three of the four members of his set are Pulosari. Finally, Faction D is again a grouping based upon second-order ties with Ny. Sujana having followers of his own and also a direct tie to the nationalist party agent in Br. Triwangsa. This faction consists largely of the Pradéwa Jati in Pisangkaja, with the exception of Déwa Md. Lanus whose

family have been involved in conflict with the others for over 20 years. It is also distinguished by the high proportion of purely political ties between members, a product of the period before 1965 when it was the focus of opposition to the then-dominant communist coalition. This brief survey is relevant to an understanding of political processes in three obvious ways. It helps to account for some otherwise puzzling features of recent political action; it makes clearer how factions can organize to ends which appear in conflict with the interests of members; and it throws light on the relationship between patrons and orators.

In the period following the abortive coup in 1965, Faction D in an alliance with Faction C is said to have been politically dominant, as the arch opponents of the ousted communists, and to have controlled the important local political offices (Table 3:8). The members of D in particular provided a close-knit group which was accused systematically of turning public decisions and funds to their advantage. This would fit both with the relatively short paths between the leaders and followers and the general poverty of the members. With the gradual emergence of Faction A around the priest of the death temple and Kt. Mara (both of whom had close, multiple ties to deceased members of the old dominant faction, but were not involved themselves) support was gathered, at least during the later stages when I was in the field, not by reference to any clear plan, but by public and private proclamation of general concern for the welfare of villagers as a whole. Mayer in his study of the use of network ties in Indian election (1966: 110ff.) noted the difference in the length of paths between leaders and terminal members of campaign groupings, and also the degree of diffuseness or specificity in election pledges. This appears to have a bearing on events in Pisangkaja. The faction with short paths was highly coordinated and capable of pushing through specific plans despite its numerical weakness; whereas the more tentacular structure of Faction A, coupled with the diversity of economic interests of its members, seems to have led to more diffuse promises to improve cooperation and general welfare.

There is another aspect to the trail of events by which this faction swept to a handsome victory in local elections for ward officials in 1971.[24] Thoden van Velsen has recently distinguished two types of political grouping:

the interest coalition referred to above as a faction, and the levelling coalition, which is a looser conglomeration of persons, commonly without a leader aimed at the destruction of a particular enemy (1973). He sees these as alternative forms of political grouping. It is difficult to speak in detail about periods when fieldwork was not in progress, but these two types of coalition appeared to form part of a cycle of political activity between 1970 and 1972. Faction A was far less integrated at the beginning of this period and gained momentum and support by attacking the purported excesses of Faction D. In this way, by mid-1971 the majority of ordinary villagers subscribed to the movement openly, or tacitly if they were formally committed to other factions (hence the concern with a secret ballot). With success however, Faction A is progressively growing more organized and hierarchical, as the patron has increased leverage due to his dominance. So from a loosely-knit set of domestic patrons and unattached supporters, this coalition is coming to achieve a far more ordered structure, with shorter paths as clients seek to attach themselves directly to the priest. Whether this will lead to a new levelling coalition remains to be seen. By way of suggestive evidence though, it seems likely that the original loss of the court's control over the ward was at the hands of such a levelling movement.

While it will be remembered that factions as a whole do not appear to have any clearly articulated economic interests, examination of their structure suggests that this is not necessarily true of the core members at its centre. There is a tendency for closely linked men at the hub of factions to have similar economic circumstances, or other interests in common, such as status in Faction B. Although these relationships have a strong transactional tinge, Parkin (1976: esp. 166-71) has pointed out that ostensibly 'rational' decisions at one level may nonetheless have wider symbolic implications at a higher one. It is possible to sketch a tentative model of the positions which these cores would appear to occupy in the constellation of village social values. The various potential lines of division between factions in political, and ostensibly transactionally motivated, conflicts would then appear to have a wider symbolic level. The scheme of these is laid out in Diagram 9:2, which suggests that factional cores tend to represent relatively clear sets of opposed values at any one time.[25] Cokorda Putera is a traditional patrimonial lord

Diagram 9:2 Economic and Social Values Identifiable with Factional Leadership in Pisangkaja.
(The reference to the three types of purity is from Chapter 8. These are based on bounded categories (esp. land), caste and universal criteria of evaluation; see also Chapter 10.)



with extensive estates, whose position depends upon a theory of social divisions based upon the recognition of differences in innate purity. Kt. Gendul and his close associates are mostly low caste wealthy farmers whose main form of investment is land. These are also distinguished by containing the head and priest of the customary village (dĕsa) focused upon the bounded territory of the village land, which is particularly susceptible to impurity from extraneous sources (see Chapter 10). These two factional cores derive their position largely from the value attributed to traditional ideas of caste and land in contrast to the other factions. The Jĕro Mangku Dalem and his close supporters are mainly subsistence farmers with reputations for upholding the rights of smaller villagers and evaluating men by their demonstrated behaviour rather than ascribed characteristics. Finally, Dĕwa Md. Nombong has been a highly successful truck driver who has bought land; while his senior orator, Ny. Sujana,has been the most adventurous villager in trying out new forms of enterprise (from chicken farms to less viable ventures). In general, they have been noted for their concern with secular forms of modernization. This is both in contrast to the other major factions and to the minor patrons who have made their way within the emerging Indonesian bureaucracy. It should be noted that this is a speculative model of possible cultural values which cores tend to represent in their social roles but which patrons do not consciously aspire to emulate, in so far as I have been able to establish. They may be quite explicit in their self-representation as concerned only with narrow and ad hoc goals (a tendency which itself appears culturally moulded for it will be recalled that the distinction between transaction and morality is by definition relational). Nonetheless, not only would they be consistently following self-interest in adopting positions which justify their respective claims to status or over resources, but as we shall see there is some evidence that their political stances may be linked to alternative interpretations of situations and ideas according to their own position within the system.

This raises the more immediate question of the extent to which factions are capable of organizing themselves for support of a particular goal, where they appear to be divided as a whole by differences in caste, descent and wealth. That they do tend so to organize will become apparent in the case

materials to be presented shortly. There appear to be several reasons why this is possible. First, the diversity of lines of fission also mean that in different contexts members have interests in common. Second, and more important, the concerns of marginal members is quite likely to be overriden by the leader or core. This does not mean that the patronage relationships in which they are involved will therefore break down. As Heath has pointed out, choice is governed by the relative desirability and availability of alternatives (1976: 44-50). Not only are domestic patrons perceived as controlling scarce resources; but also it would be narrowly materialistic to reduce the interests of clients to economic returns alone. The recent trend in anthropological studies which has led to the emphasis on production and material resources has sometimes neglected the importance of assets of a more intangible nature, such as protection, insurance against calamities and advice, which are dispensed by patrons and less affected by particular machinations in factional conflict (on some aspects of this problem see Friedman 1971). There is a third reason of some importance, which will be developed further in the last part of the chapter. This is the capacity of orators to phrase factional or sectional concerns in terms of more generally persuasive ideas, not infrequently with a moral tone, or stressing the general interest against the specific. It will be noted from Table 9:11 that only half the households in Pisangkaja (and a similar proportion in the other wards) belong to major factions and, even if minor groupings are included, there remains about a quarter of more or less permanently unaligned villagers. In phrasing issues in broader terms, orators may be aiming to kill several birds with one stone. They may be translating the goal of a particular section into a form acceptable to those who are adversely affected, gaining support from other factions and simultaneously trying to sway the marginal members of the assembly. In many ways, orators play an important part in the running of factions and the representation of patrons' interests to their own clients. It is to this relationship and its implications for the organization of political activity that I would like to turn in the last part of this section.

In order to understand the relationship of orators and patrons it is useful to recall first the formal constraints which operate within the ward. Patrons act as the leaders of factions which, as sets of households, are involved in intermittent competition for influence in the assembly. This is

rarely overt, for the nature of patrons' assets and relationships serve as a constraint on the open exercise of factional power. Wards prohibit the mobilization of factional or other relationships through the rule that in public proceedings no other principle of group affiliation is acknowledged. The assembly remains in many senses an autonomous decision-making council, independent of the government, political parties and local factions and these rights are jealously guarded, particularly by orators whose influence depends upon the maintenance of these distinctions. Patrons who attempt to utilize factions openly in the assembly are vulnerable to criticism and denunciation in no uncertain terms by orators. In practice, patrons are conspicuously absent from most meetings and when they attend they ostentatiously avoid involvement in factional issues. Consequently, although patrons head political groupings in the ward, these never achieve explicit recognition. During the entire period of my fieldwork, at no time were factions or political parties mentioned in assembly debates. So factions exist mainly as organized groupings in informal negotiation and as potential blocs of support in the assembly. As decisions may only be ratified in the assembly, factions require representation in meetings and the assistance of orators is essential. Informal relations between specific factions and orators provide the former with legitimized means of expression in public and reciprocally furnish the latter with backing and political protection which may be important in view of their exposed position. Such alliances are common and result, in effect, in a system of dual leadership of factions where political problems are discussed jointly between patron and orator and strategies devised (mepitungan). These ties require closer examination.

Political alliances between orators and patrons occur within a complex field of social values. Such relationships are subject to great tension as they depend upon the recognition of the congruence of interests between individual patrons and orators, while as leaders they are in direct competition for control over decision-making. Apart from this general concern however, cooperation between rival orators is infrequent and their relationships are often marked by profound emnity. Further, orators do not derive their authority from factional support and close association with a patron's interests may prove detrimental to an orator's public credibility. This

problem is in part resolved through the remarkable facility orators possess in rephrasing partisan concerns in general terms, so that factional differences are seen as alternative social policies. Alliances, however temporary are a political necessity for patrons but not for orators. So it is the former who are more concerned to develop their exchange with the latter. The success with which this meets varies. As Diagram 9:1 shows Cokorda Putera is assured of support from I Keted who is dependent upon him for livelihood, whereas the other two orators are less easily controlled. Kt. Gendul is in a similar position as his mainstay is I Keredek who, although not a recognized senior orator (a term used here to designate the accepted dominant speakers) is dependent upon the family for farmland. I Dugligan and I Mukun again are more elusive, although as the former grows richer his interests coincide with the patron's. The other two major factions show a rather different position; for in both the patrons are dependent upon the two most powerful orators in the village for a substantial proportion of their following. The relationship is further complicated by typically alternative evaluations of its nature by the two roles involved. Patrons tend to treat orators as clients, or if they are powerful engage in exchanges to bring this about (see Paine's reference to directed (generalized) reciprocity, 1971: 17); whereas orators tend to shrug off the pressures put upon them and deny any specific obligations to patrons. The tensions within the relationship are not just those of competing interests but also of different views of the social world as seen by skilled manipulators of ties and exchanges as against individualists who rely on, and indeed glory in, their wits.

Case 13: An orator's change of mind:

In February 1972, Tengahpadang was to elect a new administrative village head, each ward casting a single vote, after prior debate in the assembly. In Pisangkaja the patron and senior orator of faction A. had agreed to support one candidate M. On the day of the assembly meeting, another candidate N. came to see the orator and persuaded him to provide his support and the orator changed sides and informed his assistants. In the meantime, patron A happened to be out of the settlement and knew nothing of this. In the meeting, Kt. Mara argued for his new choice and the faction, presuming a change of plans, followed him and candidate N was selected in the end. When the Jèro Mangku Dalem returned that night he was angry at the result and an argument ensued with his orators which continued for several days.

In this instance the alliance did not dissolve though. For as the Jèro Mangku Dalem admitted in private the loss of Kt. Mara, who was probably the best speaker in the whole ward and also a domestic patron responsible for no small part of the faction's numbers, would have deprived him of support and representation. Orators tend to behave independently even where they are offered greater rewards or their position is weaker. Déwa Md. Doblé became a partner with Cokorda Putera in a small lime business in 1972, by which the latter seems to have attempted to tie him down, but with notable lack of success, as he still maintained some ties to Faction D (see Diagram 9:1).

So the structure of local decision-making groups tends to favour the development of an élite comprising two distinct types of leader with separable functions, and dominant in complementary political fields. This raises the question as to the necessary exclusiveness of the two roles. The evidence from Tengahpadang shows that villagers may try to embrace both roles but are rarely, if ever, successful. The problems were brought home forcefully to one orator who recently aspired to such a position. Ny. Sujana attempted to become a political patron after 1965 (by way of his connections with Déwa Pt. Sandat, see Diagram 9:1) but discovered that his presence at public meetings made him far too easy a target for opposing orators who could enquire openly into his various dealings. It has taken several years and all his oratorical skill to mitigate the effects this had on his reputation. So, in almost all instances the roles of patron and orator were occupied by different incumbents and tended to remain discrete, for two principal reasons. First the opportunities for leadership are relation to ascribed circumstances: patrons usually inherited wealth or extensive social networks; whereas orators possessed mainly local ties and achieved their positions through merit in public debate. Second the modus operandi of patrons relies on the use of extra-legal channels of influence and the maintenance of anonymity, which are incompatible with the assumption of highly public roles, subject to scrutiny by rivals. In Tengahpadang the two roles generally remain separate and indeed opposed in practice and conceptually.

This distinction is directly relevant to the study of local political processes, in particular to the form of debate and decision-making.

In Pisangkaja and the other ward councils in Tengahpadang, the rules of procedure for reaching decisions in the assembly, whether legislative, executive or judicial, are essentially similar. After prior announcement a formal meeting is called in which issues (usul) are mooted by the headmen or speakers, without previous notice, and debated until the evident majority view is adopted. Compromise solutions or ambiguous decisions (cf. Kuper 1971: 21-3) are relatively infrequent as the implicit defeat of opposing factions is one of the main aims of assembly conflict. Decisions ratified by the assembly are normally irrevocable, binding and enforced by sanctions. In contrast to most procedural rules, those for establishing what constitutes a valid decision are imprecise. In contrast to most procedural rules, those for establishing what constitutes a valid decision are imprecise. In elections the outcome is determined by ballot and if overt opposition remains after debate the same means can, in theory, be used, although no one could recall a case of a defeated party requesting a formal vote.

In practice, during the course of debate, the predominating view in the assembly rapidly becomes obvious, after which open opposition is relatively uncommon and ineffective and is said to kena iyaban, 'to be overwhelmed'. Dissenting individuals or minority groups are considered as threats to communal solidarity and are open to accusations of deliberately fostering schism. The leaders of splinter groups, or factions, by being seen to support a lost argument lose face and are publicly humiliated.

There are alternative processes for reaching decisions which reveal the complementary relationship of leadership roles. Where the community is equally divided over an issue, it is fought out in the formal assembly arena, in which orators compete to sway the meeting with arguments designed to gain backing from unaligned households and divide opponents' support. Contrarily, other disputes are worked out in the informal arena where successful lobbying enables factions to form temporary coalitions by which one side obtains a majority of committed support and can predetermine the outcome in the assembly.[26] While patrons' interests lie in minimizing risks in the assembly by prearranging settlements, in many cases the urgency of the problem or the neutrality of factions makes this impossible. In spite of private negotiation between patrons, the results of a debate are never

entirely predictable, as much hinges on the skill and performance of orators.

The importance of coalition formation and the relation between informal political manoeuvres and assembly proceedings is particularly clear in local elections. The following example is taken of the change in leadership in one of the wards in Tengahpadang.

Case 14: The election of headmen in Br. Siklod.

> In Br. Siklod, the headmen's period of office was over and as the community was divided an election was agreed upon. Four factions of approximately equal size existed and each informally proposed its own candidate. Two of the factions proposed a coalition in which the candidate of one would be put forward as government headman and the other as customary village sub-section head. The remaining major and minor factions failed to reach agreement so, rather than let their candidates lose in a vote, they withdrew. As a result, at the next assembly meeting there were only two applicants for the posts and they were then approved apparently by consensus.

In this example, the overt unanimity in the selection of officials did not reflect the underlying political differences between factions and disguised the existence of an effective majority vote in the informal arena. The abandonment of the election and the ostensible appointment of the headmen were the consequences of informal political processes and pose the question of whether appointment or election necessarily are fundamentally different mechanisms in the selection of office-holders.

Assembly debates demonstrate a corresponding relationship between arenas and the role of orators. In meetings manifest issues alone are openly discussed, the latent implications being understood by the speakers, if not all the congregation. These features are evident in the following case, which also illustrates some of the earlier points about assembly procedure and speech form.

Case 15: The decision about collective harvesting in Br. Pisangkaja:

> Wards have the right to harvest communally rice land owned by their members and exact a tax for the treasury. This system had operated in Pisangkaja for two seasons but had been subject to abuse. The headmen were suspected of granting preference to faction C members who are mostly landowners, of helping their friends evade the tax and of misappropriating the funds.[27] An assembly meeting was

scheduled for shortly before harvest when faction A proposed a coalition with D and some minor factions to stop communal harvesting. Faction D had always opposed the system as it contained landless men who, under other arrangements could earn high wages as reapers. Both patron and orators of faction A also wished to limit the size of the treasury to prevent misuse of funds by the klian. Faction B remained neutral as they were mainly tenant farmers of the patron, while faction C was in favour of continuing. The outcome was uncertain so the issue was debated out by the orators, in the meeting.

Kt. Mara apologized for mentioning the matter but in the past the ward had performed harvesting. As the crop was now ripe what was the intention of members? There was a brief pause and he added that he had heard that the system was being abused and quoted the case of a high-caste man who had refused to let the banjar reap his rice, claiming it was still green and next day had paid labourers a lower rate to cut it. (The man referred to was the client of an opposed minor patron.) The orator concluded that he did not know what the meeting wished to decide but he would, of course, agree with it. Dw. Pt. Kuat (SE11) seated on the opposite side of the meeting then said that he did not want to raise the matter, but rumours were being spread privately that many members' fields had been in part left, forcing them to work at the end of the day. Such rumours were bad and should be brought out into the open. Incidentally, had any members had this most unfortunate experience? There were murmurs of assent.

The village sub-section head spoke (as orator for faction C) and said that while it was not up to him to decide on behalf of the meeting, with the capital from past harvests, it had been possible to restore several public buildings, which he proceeded to list, and the ward now had large sums to lend to its members. Co-operative work made the ward like a single family. How could they be united if they did not work together? However, in this matter he would be guided entirely by the assembly. One of the orators of faction C then added that he did not wish to comment further on what the headmen had already said but was it not better to work for the community than for money? And worse, would not much of this be paid to labourers from other villages instead of contributing to the welfare of Pisangkaja? Ny. Sujana promptly countered this by saying that although it was not a serious consideration in view of the importance of the issue to the community, many members owned no riceland and harvesting prevented them from continuing with their livelihoods and caused everyone excessive work (arguments against communal work are always popular). Such interests, though, were obviously subordinate to the needs of the ward. There were a number of further contributions, some of which were, unfortunately, not audible or too fast to record. The heads sensing that the majority clearly opposed the system

> form the loud mutters among the lesser households, asked if it were agreed that harvesting should be stopped. To this there was a low chorus of 'Inggih" (Yes, in high Balinese). So he announced the system ended and members free to decide their own arrangements.

In this case, apart from the problem of communal harvesting, several other issues were extrinsically involved. In a small community, such as the ward, with its interlocking economic interests and multiplex social relations a decision on one issue inevitably has complex repercussions. The cessation of harvesting provided opportunities for wage-labour for the poorer households and stopped the highly profitable exchange by merchants of food and coffee in return for padi. (Traditionally when the ward harvests local foodsellers receive heavy remuneration for services. The reasons for stopping this are part of the dispute discussed in Case 21 .) The decision also withdrew the headmen's access to favours of harvesting preference and tax avoidance which they were using to attract clients, while keeping treasury funds low prevented further misappropriation.

There are other aspects of this last case, which merits brief consideration. It refers to the general policy of particular factions and its presentation. Faction A, in order to gain wide support tended to cast its argument in general moral terms, likely to gain approval particularly from those who had suffered in any way under the old system. Although they had, in fact, initiated the arrangement a year earlier in the course of building up communal funds, subsistence farmers have less surplus than their wealthier counterparts, who have greater reserves which may be used in the enhancing of reputation in being seen to support communal projects. As long as the larger farmers could be reasonably assured of labour when they required it, communal harvesting had certain advantages in their not having to search for labour at a time of heavy demand, despite its slightly greater cost. The position of Faction D has already been noted. In this example then the material interests of the participants are fairly clearly reflected in their arguments, as is the mode of presentation. Faction D being closer linked and more homogeneous could present its position in terms of a fairly concrete proposal, or plan (Parkin 1975: 115-9); whereas the two factions with longer paths from centre to periphery and greater diversity of interests

appealed far more strongly to generalized moral arguments as to what was good for the community or members in general (cf. Parkin's reference to Bailey's idea of 'ideology' 1975: 115-9 and 132-6). There seems then to be some degree of connexion between the structure and composition of factions and the type of appeal they are likely to make to their followers, through the agency of orators.

It would appear then that there are two separate, but inter-related, field of political action, or arenas (cf. Bailey 1963: 224-6), at the local level - a distinction which is both analytical and perceived by at least some Balinese. The ward assembly constitutes the formal political arena in which members are ideally equal and decisions are reached in meetings after open debate between orators. Outside the council exists an informal arena where factional interests are expressed and patrons try to manipulate or anticipate the outcome of debate. There are significant differences between these two fields. The formal arena is characterized by symmetrical ties between co-villagers; meetings are governed by set rules of procedure and conducted in public where matters of communal, in this context ward, interest are discussed and decision-making follows socially approved methods. In contrast, the informal arena is epitomized by asymmetrical ties between patrons and clients; informal and usually secret meetings are held in which patrons negotiate private agreements to personal or factional advantage and attempt to circumvent the assembly. I would suggest, therefore, that in the ward two opposed political arenas coexist, each with discrete patterns of relationships and divergent modes of political action.

While it is possible that this is all that needs saying, the apparent clarity of the opposition between these arenas prompts a speculative footnote. It may be argued that the distinction is an unproblematic one produced purely by the jural structure of Balinese village groups, or alternatively the working out of exchanges based upon transaction as against incorporation or moral considerations. There seem to be two main difficulties of such positions. First, the systematic nature of the semantic inversions between arenas suggests that behaviour is governed by principles which are logically related (see also Gellner 1974b: 67-77, on the extent to which all behaviour is

ultimately guided by maxims or principles).[28] Second, the concepts of transaction and morality, or altruism and negotiability, are themselves mutually interdependent for their meaning and are relational terms (see the brief discussion above, also Grant 1955 on 'polar concepts' and Paine 1974: 11 on a similar distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value), which attain significance by their difference from, and opposition to, one another. This issue is also connected with potentially different models of the world and its nature, typically associated with orators and patrons. To the former, the political field is bounded . where men have status as unique moral objects, subordinate however to the greater good of the collectivity; where the rules of the assembly are constitutive (in that they decide what shall be the case, Searle 1971), and the amount of good obtained depends upon the actions of men, and is variable - that is a "positive-sum game". To the latter, the political field is clearly not bounded (the parallel with bounded and key taxonomies is intended);[29] men differ in their value and may be accumulated numerically to further support for non-collective, partisan ends; where rules are regulative and restrict possibilities, and the quantity of resources is limited, in so far as one man's gain is another's loss. Between the ordered world of orators in which appeal is to the imagination and the fluid realm of possibility of the patron where exchanges themselves become the snare there would appear to be substantial differences which might merit more detailed exploration.

Oratory and Creativity:

In the last pages of this chapter I would like to turn to reconsider an issue to which a certain amount of attention has been given recently. This is the question of the place of symbolism and moral language in politics. There is a very common tendency to assume that negotiation about tangible resources constitutes in some sense 'real' politics; in contrast to the use of symbolic, or moral, statements which represent, more or less accurately, what is going on and so serve to articulate or obfuscate (that is 'mystify') the direction of these interests. In this section I would like to review briefly some of the main arguments and to suggest that it may be profitable to re-examine the view that what is important in politics can be reduced to

material assets, let alone interests; and also the position that symbols and moral evaluations are somehow less open to negotiation or question. This may be seen from a brief scrutiny of the activity of orators in Pisangkaja. It emerges that the apparently fixed, customary values attached to institutions or events are as much the product of oratorical actions as their constraints and that speakers have a varying degree of control over the ascription of meaning. This extends not only to the translation, or blocking, of values from other arenas discussed in the last section, but also to the interpretation to be placed on events and actions within local experience. This raises the question of the degree of freedom, and creativity, which men have, and the form it takes. On many topics there are more or less accepted views, or alternative possibilities; although an examination of case materials suggests that these may be challenged more often than would appear from the cultural representation of unbroken continuity (on an example of this, see Geertz 1959a: 1007-8). Less frequently, however, existing ideas or institutions may be reconsidered by stress upon previously marginal or unconnected concepts or evaluations, which may reasonably be argued to constitute innovation, or creativity.

One of the striking features discussed briefly in the previous section is the use of moral idioms by orators in public speeches. This may take one of a wide number of forms, as was noted at the end of Chapter 6, for the appeal to morality may be simply to accepted social values, the interests of the community rather than its members, or to some categorical imperative. It was also clear that in emphasizing the independence of the assembly from factional interference and what ought to be the case, orators were acting in part to protect their own niche and position from subversion. There are other aspects to this, however. As Parkin has argued in a recent paper (1975) the extent to which public speeches make direct reference to courses of action and specific plans depends upon consensus; whereas the more the internal differentiation of the audience the greater the tendency to couch speeches in symbolic language with a wide range of potential meanings. In part this continuum also parallels the division of what is the case and what ought to be, that is the distinction between description of a state of affairs and its evaluation. As we have seen this argument may be applied to Balinese

council meetings. The more the audience is likely to be divided among itself the more general and exhortatory the speeches. This is used by rival orators not only to obtain support from unaligned households and to attempt to appeal to the followers of rival factions, but also to provide an interpretation of policy to heal divisions, or perhaps more often disguise them not only from outsiders, but also the members themselves. Reference to moral aspects of issues converts them from the narrow frame of personal interests to the broader one of collective concerns, or absolute and unquestionable assumptions.

In the same work, Bloch provides a very interesting argument for the limiting case of the formalization of public speaking in which the range of alternatives is effectively eliminated, so that argument is prevented and public address becomes essentially the means for reaffirming traditional authority (1975a). He points out that if alternative utterances are proscribed then language loses its propositional force (1975a: 22-25), but suggests, following Austin (1962), that it gains thereby in 'illocutionary force' designed to influence people. This is useful in that it explains the function of public address, or monologue, in certain contexts in Bali. There are, however, two problems which are worth brief consideration. This argument applies most forcefully in the limiting case where no alternative is permitted, which is hardly so in public debate in Bali, unlike the Merina to whom Bloch refers, so that certain differences in the semantic properties of debates might be expected. There is the further difficulty that Austin has tended in retrospect to appear somewhat cryptic especially on what exactly 'illocutionary force' is; and there has been extensive philosophical discussion about this (see for instance, Cohen, L.J. 1964; Strawson 1950 1964; Searle 1965 (reprinted 1971); 1968; 1969). The result of this has been that in more recent formulations illocutionary acts (of speech) are seen as containing propositional acts (Searle 1968: 420-4). Put simplistically, that is they do not embody different kinds of meaning; but a given proposition may be uttered in various ways to do different things. So a proposition may be asserted, questioned, commanded, challenged and so forth, this latter constituting the mode of instrumenting a proposition and its illocutionary force, at least according to Searle who is perhaps the most eloquent disciple of Austin. Bloch's

reference to the illocutionary force of utterances could then be re-expressed as asserting particular propositions, without freedom of counter-assertion. The point of all this is that it draws attention back to the central place of propositions in discourse, no matter what the mode of their expression.[30]

This provides an interesting way of examining the activities of orators and suggests that there may be extensive play in the range of propositions which may be brought to bear in any instance. This may be seen in a very simple form in the way in which orators translate messages from outside the formal arena of the assembly into the appropriate form. To return to Case 15 above, it might be argued that what the patron of faction A had in mind could be rendered simplistically by the proposition: 'The headmen have been corrupt' (with the illocutionary force of assertion); but what the orators stated were a variety of propositions to the effect that 'Communal harvesting has led to injustices', the latter being an acceptable public statement, the former not. Earlier in this thesis I suggested (Chapter 2 and subsequently) that events and actions are liable to interpretation in different frameworks and in Chapter 2, material was presented to show how coherent propositions in the Indonesian government's frame of reference were liable to re-evaluation locally. The role of orators may be seen in Case 4 in Chapter 2, where the ward assembly of Pisangkaja decided not to pay more money for civil defence uniforms until the head of the administrative village came to account for himself. There was a double translation: from an Indonesian to a village model; and from a party political to a village one. The former might rather primitively be expressed as the proposition: 'An administrative superior has authority over his subordinates in official matters'. To the ward members this read something like: 'Beneficiaries of assembly funds are accountable to the assembly'. In the latter a similar public assertion was made by the orators linked to factions of GOLKAR orientation in a rephrasing of the proposition that 'A senior member of the nationalist party (the administrative village head) has been misappropriating funds'. Although these are rather trivial examples, it should be adequate to make the point that orators may be involved in blocking arguments from other arenas and systematically reinterpret these in terms of orators in bali of reference. Two features are worth noting. First, orators in Bali appear in many ways to have the reverse function of the religious kiyayi in

Java who act as cultural brokers (Geertz 1960a) and help in fact to keep cultural systems apart. Second, however trivial the examples, it is possible and useful to express oratorical deliberations in the more formal language of propositions and different forms of illocutionary force, although the range of these latter appears relatively restricted.

With this in mind I would like briefly to review two cases discussed earlier in the chapter to consider the extent to which these involve a degree of freedom of interpretation - put more formally that, of a given matter, different propositions about it may be asserted, claimed, questioned, promised and so forth. In Case 12, Kt. Mara asked whether the date of the temple festival could be changed because calendars clashed. It has already been suggested that the underlying propositions about the superiority of gods to men was being challenged by a reverse formulation. This was unacceptable - its adoption would have had shattering effects on Balinese culture if carried through systematically - but achieved its narrower aim which was not publicly presentable. In the example of the debate about harvesting, Case 15, there were several different points of view, all of them fairly standardized alternatives which may be used to evaluate different situations. These dwelt on such familiar themes as: working together consolidates the group, or provides capital for projects for the public good; as against: collective activities should not benefit selective individuals, or they should not further deprive already unfortunate categories of villager. In the first case, an unacceptable new proposition was rejected but was effective in another sphere; in the second, the alternative assessments of the consequences of communal harvesting evoked relatively familiar evaluations of the implications of a recognized action.[31]

The role of orators is not always so humdrum nor pre-determined. There are other occasions on which public speakers are able successfully to challenge the dominant interpretation by proposing another. For reasons which will emerge it is convenient to postpone the consideration of two instances of this until the following chapter. There is one case which illustrates something of this procedure. Although the events which took place were not within the assembly itself, they directly concern not only the activities of an orator but appear to have had powerful repercussions,

to judge in part from the fact that a fairly generally agreed account of events was still a matter for talk thirty years later.

Case 16: The case of the orator's underpants.

> At about the start of the Second World War (1939 - see Table 3:8), a new headman was proposed by the court in Pisangkaja and backed not only by the administrative village head, but also by most high castes in the ward especially the Anak Agung of whom he was a member. He was duly elected unopposed (cf. the discussion following Case 14 above). The latter part of his tenure of office coincided with the Japanese occupation and a period of great material hardship. Among the products in short supply was cloth for garments. Access to this was by licences distributed from the village head to government headmen. Anak Agung Pageh (SE4) gave these only to those who supported him in office, namely the court and high castes and a few rich commoners; the rest of the village had to resort to bark-cloth, which the Balinese are not particularly skilled at producing, while the few fortunates are said to have more than ample for their needs.
>
> Among the villagers who were particularly angry about this was Kt. Mara (NW7) who found wearing underpants of barkcloth very irritating in more senses than one. Most villagers, it was said, were not brave enough to mention the matter. However, several notable speakers (Kt. Mara (NW7); I Kebet (NW8); I Kerug (SW7) and Kt. Séré (SE12),mooted the matter in the assembly, but to no avail. So Kt. Mara went to see an old friend of his who was a clerk in the sub-district office in Tengahpadang. This latter wrote him a licence for 15 metres of cloth to be obtained in the settlement of Ubud some way to the south. Without informing anyone Kt. Mara went off to collect this and asked for three lengths in different colours. Later that afternoon a strange figure was seen entering the ward by the road leading from the south which brought people rushing out to see the spectacle as Kt. Mara walked slowly up the street to the central square festooned in the cloth which was swathed round him and trailing on the ground behind. The headman was furious apparently not only because the cloth had not been obtained through him, but because it was felt as a challenge to his authority. He died shortly after by which time feeling in the ward was so polarized, mostly on Kt. Mara's side, that the assembly proposed its own candidate(I Kingsan)NE18,against the wishes of the court, who was forced to bow to the strength of the opposition.

The symbolism of Kt. Mara's activities are worth brief mention, as they show an elegant judgement and a singular creativity in the way traditional values were posed in a new configuration. This was not simply a direct challenge to the headman by failing to acknowledge his authority in issuing

licences, it had other elements. First, the choice of three colours appears to have been a deliberate reference to the high castes, triwangsa or triwarna (three peoples or three colours). In allowing these to trail on the ground, thereby making them doubly polluted (no longer sukla because worn by a commoner and dirty (daki) because covered in dust) he was degrading the position of the high castes homonymically. In bedecking himself with the full 15 metres of cloth, Kt. Mara was also pointing publicly to the way in which a few families had hogged the allowance of cloth for the whole ward; a further implication being that as they were high caste, they were acting in defiance of their caste duty (darma) to redistribute surplus not accumulate. In so doing, it was felt that they thereby lost the right to respect and subservience. To judge from the laughter that recollection of the scene evoked at the time of fieldwork, it seems that the ridicule of the behaviour of the aristocrats was not lost on anyone. Obviously there were several themes running through the performance, but perhaps the most immediate was the challenge to the accepted proposition that the court and high castes were superior to villagers. This could be argued to have been countered by the vivid symbolization of their failure to uphold their proper duty and so their loss of the right to rule. More simply it can be seen as a pictorial assertion that the high castes were self-interested and so not suitable to direct the interests of others in the ward. Whatever the precise interpretations to which these events gave rise, they were effective in providing a public alternative interpretation to the monopoly of the aristocracy which was rapidly adopted widely within the ward.

It is appropriate to end with a brief reference to a last example, as this bears out several points made earlier in the chapter. In particular, it showed the existence of an élite within the village and identified the major patrons publicly. More significantly, it supports my assertion earlier that groups like the ward should not be seen as in some way as permanent unchanging entities, nor as institutions about which there is general agreement as to exactly what their existence signifies or entails. The case is so long and intricate that a full discussion must await another occasion and only the barest outline will be given here. It concerns the decision of the ward assembly of Pisangkaja to rewrite its own constitution, during which it

became apparent that the grounds of recruitment and the basic principles of incorporation of the group were unclear.

Case 17: The decision to change the constitution of Pisangkaja:

> In August 1971, after the village elections had returned Faction A's supporters to office and seen the defeat of Faction D, the ward was due to gather to clear public roads of grass and to tailor the banks. No indication had been given that anything unusual was astir, except that the three patrons of the biggest factions were present in the square and Déwa Md. Nombong and Ny. Sujana conspicuously absent. The meeting eventually started and the seating differed radically from the normal, in that the senior orators and patrons sat as a solid phalanx towards the north stretching around to form an inner circle, from which the government headman was excluded, but the klian désa not. The major leaders then spoke in turn, each one carefully elaborating and recapitulating at length what the others had said. The point they made was that the constitution of the ward should be changed to lighten the burden upon those who owned no rights over compounds, by freeing them from obligations, while those with property would bear a heavier burden. The effect of this was to split the ward to some extent along the lines of compound owners (kerama désa) and non-heirs (pengempian), with some of the minor orators speaking for the latter. It was decided to refer the matter to a consultative committee to avoid taking up unnecessary valuable time of the ward as a whole. The members of the committee consisted in effect exclusively of the élite of the ward. The subsequent meeting produced a great deal of confusion, already evident at the first, as to what the categories of villagers previously recognized (kerama désa and pengempian) signified; what was to be the status of owners of field huts (pondok) and whether it mattered if these owned riceland or not; what constituted the basic obligations of all banjar members; whether the exempted categories were in fact members of the ward any longer, could speak at meetings, borrow from the treasury and so forth. It is interesting to note that while the meeting appeared to have decided on at least some of these issues and declared itself satisfied, there was almost universal disagreement as to exactly what had been agreed. During the remaining year of fieldwork the precise position remained suitably vague and was reinterpreted in a different way as circumstances made it convenient to different interests or as different considerations of the welfare of the landless seemed important.

Even in truncated form the case raises issues which are related to some of the wider themes of the thesis. There are also points which have a bearing on the present chapter and are worth noting first. The meeting in effect broke with the established custom that all ward members are equal. The presence of the assembled orators and patrons (the latter, it will be recalled are normally

inconspicuous on such occasions), even if in their guise as traditional officials, was a quiet but distinct concession that there was an élite in the ward. This was made clear by their sitting as a solid body spatially set apart from other villagers and by their overt support for one another in the face of opposition from the rest. (It also provided me with useful confirmation of my observation of their roles from the study of informal exchanges.) In the choice of members of the select committee the separation between a self-acknowledged élite and the ward came close to formal recognition. These features set the meeting apart from the ordinary train of factional competition and pointed to the existence of a further potential cleavage within the ward between those who were heirs to compounds (extending as the meeting continued to include owners of field huts) and those who were not. This came close intentionally to the distinction between farmers and landless villagers. Further, the effect of the proceedings was, if anything, to strengthen this division and to make the ordinary ward members more marginal. A corollary of this was that the difference between the two banjar was reduced. While the effect of the proposal would have been to weaken the position of non-heirs (and this may indeed have been a covert intention), there was definite concern about the fate of landless villagers. However, in trying to adjust the rules of membership, the ward discovered itself faced with complex jural and conceptual repercussions of the decision.

The meeting to consider the ward's constitution reveals a number of broader themes. First, it points to the possibility of transformation of corporate groups which is articulated by reference to the concept of adat. During the discussion which followed the meeting objections were raised about specific aspects of the proposal, but there seem to have been no baulking at the idea of radically rewriting the constitution as such. It is not only particular rules which may be reformulated but the principles of incorporation themselves. This touches upon the second issue of the relationship between formal principles underlying groups and indigenous ideas. The meeting was called to discuss a simple change in the grounds of recruitment to the ward. By tinkering with one principle, however, the villagers discovered that this involved wider problems of the range of affairs, the sphere of competence, internal organization and so forth. The decision to allow members freedom / raised questions not only about the territorial nature

of the ward (in what sense were people within the ward's domain under its authority, protection etc. ?) but also introduced a conflict of rights between those of individuals to leave in order to obtain a living, and to retain some sort of place within the group. The proposal had the further effect of transforming what the villagers saw as the fundamental principle of local corporations, namely the legal equality of their members. Instead, as a result of the change proposed, the group would be internally ranked on the basis of attributes unconnected with the ward as such. In considering the principle of recruitment, the villagers became involved in a far wider discussion of the definition and evaluation of a range of cultural concepts which could be linked in a variety of different ways, depending upon the emphasis to be placed upon the equality of the group, the sphere of competence of the ward, the unequal access to land and so forth. Following the simple proposal to change a rule, there was interminable discussion in the village about what the implications of this were, with different sides interpreting the possible significance differently. Although the meeting was intended to clarify the position of poor villagers, the issues were not resolved and the various parties came away in the end with divergent ideas as to what the decisions implied. The import of these was still being negotiated when I left the field. In the case of Kt. Mara's purchase of cloth, he was challenging the accepted proposition of the dominance of the traditional aristocracy and ward leadership; in the suggested change of ward rules a whole range of cultural values were called into question and what was being proposed was open to a host of alternative interpretations. The implications of this were so complex that in the end the matter was dropped.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I have tried to examine some of the main processes in Balinese local politics. It was suggested that exchanges between villagers involve items which are differentially evaluated such that they tend to lead to asymmetrical relationships. Locally these tend to be focused on assistance

between households; but neither these nor corporate group ties are adequate to handle some of the contingencies which may arise and . influence, however indirect, over the authorities which impinge in various ways upon villagers is considered invaluable. The question was raised, though, of the extent to which the need for help and protection was the product of a self-fulfilling prophecy stemming from villagers' views of the nature of the world and authority. The patronage to which such exchanges gave rise has led in Tengahpadang to the emergence of leaders with sizeable and stable followings. These are not able directly to control the course of decisions in local councils which have become increasingly powerful according to most accounts. The constitution and rules of procedure, as usually understood or represented in public, prevent the mobilization of factions explicitly, while the complexity of law and style encourage the emergence of an élite of villagers who are skilled in public speaking. Their positions only rest in part upon these capacities, for their ability to gain support also depends upon their personal reputations. These are achieved largely through the conspicuous demonstration of bravery, independence from outside influence and adherence to traditional village values (this last being interpretable in different ways). So the process of decision-making at the local level takes place in two distinct, but related, political arenas which are concerned with gathering support through patronage and alliances, and the public presentation of alternative policies. This is achieved in most instances through the use of factions led informally by patrons and represented publicly by orators. Alliances between these, however, tends to be unstable or at least tense, both because the leaders are in competition for power and because the two roles tend to be articulated systematically with different models of proper behaviour and the nature and exploitation of resources. Much anthropological writing on politics has tended to stress what Bailey has termed the pragmatic aspects (1969: 4) at the expense of the public discussion, more or less explicitly, of more general problems of values. It emerged that it was instructive to analyse debate in terms of alternative propositions or concepts by which villagers order in different ways the world about them, so that politics is as much the discussion of meaning as the transaction of tangible resources, a theme which will be concluded in the next chapter.

Footnotes Chapter 9

1. The terminology is deliberately identical to that used earlier to distinguish the values given in exchanges from the circumstances of the arrangement, where the exchange is a means to an end. In this context the difference parallels Paine's useful distinction (1974: 11-15) of intrinsic value, which is culturally given and part of the system of meanings, from extrinsic value, which is negotiated according to the circumstances (see also Blau 1964). The wider implications of this are clearly realized by Paine who couches the distinction in terms of both means and ends and the difference of 'ought' and 'want' (1974: 11).

2. These are the Pancasila, the five basic principles: Ketuhanan, belief in God; Kebangsaan, national consciousness; Perikemanusiaan, humanism; Keadilan, justice; Démokrasi, sovereignty of the people (Echols and Shadily 1961). The broadness of these concepts is such that it allows judges leeway in dealing with problematic village decisions which find their way into the courts. It will be noticed that there is a familiar ring about this ability to place multiple interpretations upon core concepts.

3. Many of the smaller hamlets tend to have leading families whose control over the ward is such as to minimize overt dispute over influence. Several low caste villages of this type seemed to have a kind of 'big man' on the lines of the aristocracy in the larger settlements and in many cases these seem to have retained their influence and with it a corresponding diminuition of overt division of opinion. The position in towns would appear to be somewhat different (Boon 1974), where a different set of factors tend to operate, or in rapidly urbanizing villages where the ward may become simply a unit of government administration with few prizes of worth. As several recent authors have noted, competition in Bali seems to be expressed, or be expressible, in different groups depending upon local circumstances. There is no reason this must be confined to, or be dominant in, the ward. It is always difficult to give reasons for the absence of a feature, but some of the factors underlying the absence of factionalism in irrigation associations have been suggested in Hobart 1978b: 76-81. The matter is also discussed below.

4. In a village a few kilometres from Tengahpadang, during the time of my fieldwork, a man stood up in a meeting and insulted the gathering by saying that the members were stupid (according to report). He was knocked out and by chance a policeman was passing on his way to take up duty. He ordered them to leave the man while reinforcements were fetched, only to find on return that the man was lying in the graveyard executed by an agricultural hoe stuck through his neck and so pinned to his own grave. Insulting the ward is a very serious offence and the assembly is said to have taken a decision upon the matter and accepted collective responsibility. The whole ward was therefore taken to court, found guilty, and took turns to go to prison as there was not room for them all there at once. It is at such points that the different models of the government and the village may come into conflict and be irreconcilable.

5. In Pisangkaja the banjar patus meets on a combination of the seven and five day weeks as do most groups (Goris 1960a), their particular combination being Buda-kli(w)on. The banjar dĕsa meets as necessary which is usually more seldom.

6. The situation has changed since fieldwork (1970-2) as the government has set about limiting the activities of political parties in part in an effort to stop their more fractious effects. What consequences this has had must await more detailed study, although Boon 1974 has suggested that this has led to the politicization of descent groups and the emergence of caste as a basis for political organization in Tabanan.

7. Villagers, on being asked questions (whether by me or each other) would quite often claim ignorance even about simple matters on which they were quite clear, especially if they were asked in the presence of people who were supposed to know more. A more detailed study of Balinese ideas about knowledge might well prove instructive.

8. It is said by several informants that, when the communist party came to Tengahpadang to recruit members, in the big speech given by a senior member he stressed that those who joined would be ensured preferential treatment by the party through its capacity to intervene on their behalf in law suits and administrative decisions. This somewhat blatant and logistically impossible offer (if everyone joined, preference would be impossible) is said to have been instrumental in encouraging villagers in Pisangkaja to join. Such statements are of course ex post facto and I cannot vouch for their accuracy at the time. The fact that they are brought up a decade later is however interesting.

9. Patrons would usually disappear quietly on the morning bus to Gianyar (the prince on his motor-bicycle) almost unnoticed and dismiss it if asked where they had been.

10. This self-fulfilling prophecy would then be part of the process by which the evaluation using indigenous models comes to transform relationships articulated in theory in terms of a different set of ideas.

11. This reference to resolutions being 'strong' is interesting as it does not refer simply to the chances of such decisions being carried out in practice. The sanctions available ensure this. It also raises questions about the range of uses of the term pure, suci (see Chapter 8.).

12. There is a certain parallel between Balinese treatment of persons and groups. It will be recalled that men should be calm, that is show darma (in sense 3, Chapter 8) despite their inner tumult. Meetings should be likewise, and there appear to be similarities in the classification of exchanges. At times, as Bateson 1949 has noted, groups may be treated in an explicitly anthropomorphic fashion, which raises interesting questions about the level at which society is represented in natural symbols (Douglas 1970b).

13. On the relationship between refinement and authority in Java, see Anderson 1972: 42-3. As in Bali the ideal is that the order of the king is not a command, but a quiet request.

14. This is intended in something like the sense of paradigm proposed by Ardener (1971; 1978). Ardener does not here discuss the possibility of alternative paradigms; although it would appear that these may be multiple (see Introduction), and which is adopted may depend upon the factors which affect the framework of interpretation. In general, however, the propositions which I am discussing are those which involve recognized and terminologically explicit cultural concepts. These tend, as we have seen, to have a wide range of meanings sometimes of logically different orders, and so there may be a diversity of propositions connecting them. In Ardener's sense a paradigm would presumably have to be expressed in abstract, formal terms, although I am not entirely clear what status these must have - whether they are a construct of the observer or are implicit within indigenous propositions. It would also appear that these might themselves be of different levels of abstractions; certainly if there are potentially alternative paradigms on a subject - let us say the causes of misfortune - then presumably there are meta-paradigms. My notion of frameworks of interpretation in contrast is more ethnographic, as it refers to the more or less observable ways in which meanings of concepts, and so particular propositions from the range of those possible, are picked out explicitly in the course of debate, or are evident from behaviour (as in the different ways in which kinship may be understood). These are conditioned by the general position of the participants within the society (so the reference to village, courtly and government frameworks in Chapter 2), by their interests at the time (as in Case 12 under discussion) and possibly other considerations. They do, however, tend to be distinguished by the assumption of certain key values, or concepts, the rest of the 'system' (the system itself being a product in part of implications of the concepts and also of the actors' aims) being viewed by reference to these. We shall see examples of how land and labour come to appear critical in the way institutions are interpreted in the following chapter. The idea is intentionally somewhat open-textured in order to accomodate the range of intentional or unintentional cognitive operations of the persons involved.

15. Geertz (1966a: 58) translates lek as "stage-fright". This neatly illustrates some of the uses of lek, especially in public behaviour, but the word in Balinese has several implications. For example, lek is frequently used to mean respect. There are also more complex aspects to the term, for not to feel this is comparable with being asocial. I have heard it said that the persons who should feel the most lek are those most highly placed, such as the king himself. The term has complicated referents which require more study.

16. No instance was encountered of a woman being acknowledged as an orator in the assembly in Tengahpadang at the time of my fieldwork; although households may be represented by women in the assembly. It is said, however, that women are not prevented from being orators and that the flair for oratory of the Dauh in Pisangkaja extended to Ni Kripit NW8 but I did not have a chance to see her speaking as by then she was a very old lady. Her abilities have been recorded earlier

in this thesis in Case 10, Chapter 7. The number of Dauh who were good orators, and Pulosari who were wealthy farmers is interesting. While there was no clear correlation, the two groups and their respective attributes were juxtaposed as a cultural opposition in local thought.

17. Orators maintain an elaborate mystique of performance. For example, they evaluate emotional states in meetings in terms of facial features. It is said that they seek to appear calm, tama, so their faces have clear expressions (bingar sebeng), while discomfitting their rivals so that they become angry and red-faced (barak biying), ashamed (lek) with faces as black as earth (buka tanahé) or pale, or even frightened so that their eyes withdraw (becong) and cannot speak - the ultimate misfortune for an orator.

18. Such faults led to cruel ridicule outside the assembly, especially in the coffee-stalls where experienced orators would product wickedly funny caricatures of inadequate speakers. If mockery is a sanction on deviation then it throws some light on the ideals. A speaker imported for a political party campaign in 1971 addressed a gathering of villagers on the playing-field to which many people turned up, if for no other reason than that diversions from the routine of life are not as common as all that. He addressed his throng in a very high-flown and dramatic oration starting by honouring all those present in turn with a formula repeated in descending order for each rank of official and villager, in Indonesian. It ran "pada para . . . yang saya hormati ! " (the blank space being filled by the appropriate office) "to all . . . whom I pay respect ! " Half an hour after the occasion had broken up, I discovered the villagers in open convulsions of laughter (unusual under the circumstances) in the square in Pisangkaja where an orator (I Kacir Siangan NE3) was standing in front of the meeting-house, haranguing the regulars of the stalls with his chest thrown out, waving his arms and bellowing the same formula which he applied serially to all pigs, cows, ducks, and finally a particularly scrofulous dog (cicing gudig) which crossed his path. This made the point of the violation of local standards by its length, repetition, bombast and so forth.

19. There is a marginal difference between these figures and those quoted in Hobart 1975: 79. This is for two reasons. First, it was discovered that some land-holdings had been listed in the government records under the wrong ward (the total discrepancy was less than 1 hectare). Second all holdings were included to the nearest full number and 1/1000ths hectare ignored. In order to correspond with the more detailed figures given in Chapter 5, these have therefore been recomputed.

20. There is one respect in which Pisangkaja was not typical at the time of fieldwork. In other wards school-teachers figure among accepted orators. This was also so in Pisangkaja prior to 1965.

21. For instance Kt. Mara's range of unusual hats and preference for working ricefields alone (a deliberate statement of his relative poverty and also rejection of what he saw as the patronly subversion of the labour exchange system); I Sujana's excellent singing voice, used to advantage (it is high pitched, manis (literally: sweet) an approved quality);

I Kacir Siangan's appetite for sleep and food (from which he came to be nicknamed Kumbangkarna after the epic hero), when he would conspicuously eat two or three meals at a sitting. Much village reminiscing is about past feats of orators and the great days of I Kebet and I Rangin.

22. This extended to I Kebet and I Rangin who between them in a short space went through ten marriages, none being by capture and almost all by elopement. Even Kt. Mara's may best be seen as a challenge to accepted village authorities by picking, atypically for this type of union, on a family far more powerful than his.

23. This theme of dramatic encounter seems to be a pervasive theme in Balinese society, whether in the shadow-play or in the confrontation of Rangda and Barong, so widely known outside the island (Belo 1949 of an original account). It would be interesting perhaps to consider what light these may shed upon the contexts in which 'deep play' is found. The link with contexts where complementary opposition is found, as in the Balinese interpretations of Indian epics, suggests intriguing connotations of the theme.

24. The elections themselves were marked by intrigue on a grand scale, but the votes finally cast were as follows:

I Kartana (SW7)	68	(+15 votes claimed missing because times were changed deliberately by Faction D.)	Put up by Faction A.
I Degdeg Mangku (SW4)	63	(an independent more acceptable to Factions C and D by virtue of his kin ties to Kt. Gendul and J. M. Désa)	Put himself up.

Degdeg Mangku's position is slightly anomalous as he proposed himself and plays a somewhat unconventional role in village affairs, being a not incompetent speaker, but somewhat erratic and unreliable. Once the candidates from the other factions had been eliminated - on the grounds that they were not kerama désa, it being decided that all must be, despite it being the banjar patus (another instance of an unclear rule being defined according to the situation) - he gained support from mixed sources. As he was an active member of GOLKAR, he was viewed as being of the same persuasion in at least some sense and was chosen as klian désa. In fact, as a result, he came to have more influence than the klian dinas, I Kartana, especially as he was not the puppet of a faction. It was even agreed after the elections that Faction A had probably made a tactical mistake somewhere.

25. The cores which were evident to judge from the closeness of their ties in daily life and frequency of meetings were:

Faction A: Jèro Mangku Dalem: .40+ha (including his temple land)
Kt. Mara: .335ha
Laba: .48ha
Kacir Siangan: .38ha

Faction B: This appeared to centre on the status concerns of the Cokorda , but also included affluent entrepreneurs such as Karda NE11, and Bidel SW14.

Faction C: Kt. Gendul: 1.27ha.
Jèro Mangku Désa: 1.13ha.
Neka: 1.27ha.
Geningan: 1.70ha.
Tedun: 1.89ha.
(Previously Gangsar 2.58ha, who was however in the process of shifting allegiance).

Faction D: This is somewhat different as all are poor except the patron.

26. The description of factions given to me was sometimes cast in the idiom of an army with generals (patrons), specially skilled fighters (orators) and a largely irrelevant mass of supporters (clients). This bears some relationship to some reports of Balinese military organization: see Boon's translation of a section from van den Broek 1835 in Boon 1977: 28-9. The relative importance of patrons and orators in this account tends to reflect the fact that this was closer to the patrons' view. A measure of their relative evaluation may be gained from the following discussion which was artificial, but informative. As the Balinese had used the idea of an army, I asked a gathering of villagers comprised almost exclusively of patrons and orators with a small number of clients who were clearly knowledgeable about the activities of factions, how great a value they would put on the roles in formal and informal arenas. The results are artificial in that, while they had no difficulty in understanding or formulating replies, it was not something which they said they had ever thought about in quite that way. After some discussion they reached the following:

	Formal Arena:	Informal Arena
Patrons:	0	5
Orators:	5	1
Clients:	½	0

More illuminating than these numerical values (which may be added together to give factional strengths - something which the patrons rapidly did!) is the debate which took place. It was generally felt that besides the roles of orators and patrons, there were other leading figures: on inquiry it turned out that these were domestic patrons or core members of the group "to whom clients (ruang) turned for guidance" and so were commonly patrons and orators as well. The leaders agreed rapidly as to the marginal significance of clients,

especially as concerned their demands (unless I am mistaken somewhat to the chagrin and concern of those present). They also agreed on the value of a patron, most interestingly as we can see from some of the case material, that they have no control at all in the assembly. On the value of orators, however, there was dispute. The orators felt that they were worth more on balance than even a patron in the informal arena. The most common figure given was 10 by orators, rising to 20 for Kt. Mara (or Sujana in previous times, as I Kebet and I Rangin). Against this it was pointed out that only one orator was really effective in any faction in the assembly, as multiple representation came closer to echoing than serious contribution. The study of politics from as close to an "emic" view as is achievable might prove very interesting and I suspect might question some of the assumptions of common rationality which tend to creep in.

27. Both headmen, the klian dinas in particular, were elected with the backing of Faction A (the problems of the other headman have been discussed at greater length in footnote 24 already). Their change of position is partly due to the independent influence available to headman, but also may reflect the caprice and desire to avoid permanent ties noted for orators, to which category headmen by skill or simply position tend to be assimilated in public meetings. This was the cause of some no little mortification to the members of Faction A, but little could be done about it as this would have displayed inconstancy on their part if they voted their own candidate out of office.

28. The symbolic nature of factionalism requires more investigation. Apart from the use of images of traditional armies, it is more than a little curious that in every single ward in Tengahpadang there were four major factions recognized. Other factions were treated as being minor. This numerical division happens to fit closely with the widespread Balinese classificatory scheme of five parts: four peripheral segments, or elements, and a centre (with what this would be identified I have not unfortunately enquired - perhaps the assembly itself).

29. It may be worth noting that the ward as a corporate group and factions as informal network-based groupings come close to fitting the contrasted ways in which bounded (hierarchic) and key (polythetic) taxonomies would represent a single population. An examination of Needham 1975: 355, will show that his table of a 'polytypic grouping' (drawn from Simpson 1961) fits Balinese informal groupings, such as agricultural work groups over time recruited from a finite population, almost perfectly. This is reproduced for interest with the social referents in place of Simpson's biological scheme:

Individuals:	1	2	3	4	5	6
Attributes:	a	a	b	a	a	b
	b	b	c	e	e	f
	c	d	d	f	g	g
		I			II	

Quasi-group
(Mayer 1966)

30. Searle 1968: 421 manages to find marginal cases which do not correspond to the formula: F(p), where the range of possible values for F will determine the range of illocutionary forces, and the p is a variable over the infinite range of possible propositions. The exceptions concern referring, as opposed to propositional, expressions such as "Hurrah for Manchester United" (in Searle's example) which take the form F(n), where n is replaceable by any referring expression.

31. It is quite possible these propositions could be formulated with greater clarity. My concern here, however, is given an idea of how the theory of speech acts may be applied to the analysis of debates. A proposition is normally true or false and is that which is (or could be) asserted to be the case (Mitchell 1962: 13). As Hare points out there is no necessity for logic, or syllogistic argument, to be confined to the indicative, however, and he discusses some of the conditions for the truth or falsity of imperative syllogisms, as part of the application of logic to morality, in Hare 1952: 17-31 especially.

Chapter 10. Spirit-Mediumship and the Negotiation of Meaning.

Introduction:

If politics consists in part of the public debate on cultural values, religion may equally be turned to political ends. This is not intended as unnecessary contrariness: it stems from the ambiguity of means and ends. The pursuit of goals dictated, or approved, by religious belief or dogma may constitute an activity in its own right; but granted the flexibility and cumulative character of exchanges, they may come to be seen as means to other ends. Just as a concern with narrow tactical advantage is set within a framework of culturally recognized meaning, so also the deliberation of religious values may have practical consequences for the actors and for the distribution of resources within society. It is widely recognized that religious beliefs and symbols play an important part in defining social relationships and also the nature of, and access to, the sources of intrinsic value. Less attention is often given, however, to how they do this. To conclude this study of a Balinese village and its field of social relations, I would like to turn to a brief consideration of how the meaning of religious beliefs comes to be interpreted and to suggest that the qualities of apparent permanence and immutability with which these are invested may disguise the degree to which these are open to negotiation between the members of a society, and the putative hierarchy between them differently understood.

In this chapter then I would like to look briefly at some of the processes involved in what the Balinese view as their religion. In contrast to other fields it sometimes appears as if beliefs of this order are marked by their unambiguity and singularity. I shall suggest that this does not necessarily prevent them from having meaning for, or imposing it upon, the participants. More important, however, choice tends to enter in under several guises as ideas and institutions are open to alternative interpretation, and so to both symbolic and transactional ends. Not only does the variety of texts and the plethora of different religious specialists who may be consulted allow a degree of freedom of choice; but also there are areas in which choice is explicitly endorsed or even encouraged.

Where predetermination of the appropriate action is difficult the Balinese have recourse to forms of divination, including spirit-possession - a possibility which is metaphysically founded in Balinese ideas of the nature of the world, and of knowledge. Close inspection shows that two different processes tend to be encompassed in religious deliberations. There is the routine activity of mediums in ordering experience by reference to preordained categories of meaning over which they have little control, except in the long-term statistical shift of preferences (Firth 1964: 225-56). This specification points to the existence of another more profound process in which the categories themselves are open to negotiation.[1] While spirit-mediums may be permitted a measure of creativity (cf. Firth 1973: 207-40), the more important the subject, whether in terms of its religious or practical consequences, the greater the tendency for the negotiation of interpretations, and so the options between which mediums decide, to be transferred for discussion among the religious and political élite. While the superiority of the gods is universally agreed, in the course of formulating the nature of the problem, villagers are involved in the process of interpretation, such that from the world of possible meanings it is humans who tend to define the categories which are presented to deities, through the agency of their potentially corruptible spokesmen, as narrowly determined alternatives. So in some ways the relationship is reversed. Whatever the immediate impetus such negotiation tends to have consequences which are both pragmatic and semantic. More generally I hope that the argument in this chapter will justify the view that religion, or symbolism, is not an unchanging field but allows of extensive interpretation and transformation.

It is not without reason, however, that anthropologists have noted the perduring nature of religious symbolism and belief. Particularly to the participants, religion often appears as that which is culturally given and indisputable. The functions of such dogma, or even its simple reaffirmation, in supporting the social order and the position of élites has been widely noted (see for instance the different views of Bloch 1974; Cohen, A. 1969a; Douglas 1975: 276-316; Parkin 1972). It is worth remarking, however, that for anthropologists the study of religion has increasingly become coterminous with the analysis of culture (Geertz, 1966b) or classification (Douglas 1966, 1975; Lévi-Strauss 1962, 1966). So there are grounds for arguing that it is

no longer appropriate to single out a chapter to deal with religion; and in this thesis what might broadly be termed religious values have entered into the discussion of almost every aspect of Balinese society, including economics and the nature of power. From another point of view however, to the Balinese themselves it forms an indigenous category, agama - often in the form agama tirta, the religion of holy water, or especially in contrast to the beliefs of other peoples, agama hindu darma - but one which is liable to characteristic divergences in the scope of its referents. This leaves the problem of why religion, explicit or implicit, or symbolism should be regarded as in some way more permanent and unchanging than other aspects of social behaviour. I would suggest that it is in the apparent immutability of cultural concepts, and their real continuity, that the complex realm of cultural possibility is represented as a relatively stable, and determinate, 'system' to the actors. In Bali at least, the observable variation in time and place is itself encompassed culturally in the notion of adat, or the various manifestations of the ultimate silence (sepi), which represent the universe as transforming in an ordered, if not largely predetermined, fashion.

Even if these beliefs are portrayed as an organized, indisputable system, this implies neither that they are necessarily coherent nor that they lack meaning. Although this is beside the main theme of this chapter, it is instructive to touch for a moment on these issues, as they have bearing upon my more general argument that cultural concepts may embody, or be connected by, ideas which may be phrased in terms of discernible propositions and may have cognitive significance. Elsewhere I have tried to suggest that Balinese classification of the world and the cycle of agricultural rites may serve to uphold certain underlying, and contrasted, social principles. The details of the arguments need not concern us here: it is sufficient to note their bare outlines. It was suggested that Balinese spatial coordinates depended upon natural processes, such that water was identified with ritual purity (that is in the second sense given in Chapter 8, significantly that upon which ideas of caste principally rest) with the effect that a cultural association is represented as part of the natural order, and substantive (Hobart 1978a). So caste, which is a manifestation of this purity, appears as natural. In contrast, in agricultural

ceremonies the theme of offerings and prayers is that success is dependent upon the will of the gods, with the consequence that the inadequacies of the structure of the irrigation association, particularly the effect of democratic decision-making in inducing under-investment, provide a convenient alternative explanation to that of the shortcomings ot the constitution of the group itself (Hobart 1978b). While one set of religious beliefs implies the unquestionable nature of hierarchy; another defends, by the proposal of superordinate ideas of causation, the democratic basis of corporate groups.

The extent of the validity of the arguments in question is not, however, the main issue in the present context. If they have any relevance whatsoever, they do suggest that indigenous religious institutions may embody contrary, or contradictory, ideas.[2] In so far as these tend to take the form of implicit assumptions, they may take on the attributes of unquestionability which have been argued to be a feature of 'closed' systems of thought (Evans-Pritchard 1937; Horton 1967; Horton and Finnegan 1973). This does not necessarily imply that such assumptions are not subject to alternative interpretations; for as the concepts upon which they rely may possess several, not always consistent, meanings, they may be understood in different ways, should they become the object of attention. What is immediately more interesting is that both these sets of beliefs appear to involve logically connected propositions. In the first, to the assumption that men differ in their purity is added the idea that this is somehow natural, so that the differences are not contingent but necessary. While this might appear to involve to the analyst a false proposition - namely that purity is a natural quality or substance - as we have seen, this is not necessarily so in popular use, or conceivably in indigenous metaphysics. In the second, the observed incidence of the failure of crops is combined with a proposition about the power, or responsibility, of gods over human activities to produce the view that this misfortune is due to the gods. The weak point in this argument, at first sight, is that some but not all misfortune would appear to be brought about by supernatural forces; men bear a substantial measure of responsibility. This casts the theory of multiple causation (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 63-83) in a slightly different light as the mystical efficacy of deities tends to transform 'some misfortune' into 'all significant misfortune',

so that the formulation does not appear as inconsistent as it might otherwise.[3] In so far as these arguments are latent in belief, or statement, they would appear to be asserted in a certain sense.[4] It is therefore possible to represent religious beliefs of this order as being propositions which are asserted or assumed, and as much open to investigation and commentary by analyst's as any other cultural statements.

Mediumship and Divination:

In the main part of this chapter, however, I wish to turn to a slightly different problem. This is not so much the extent to which implicit cultural assumptions may be treated in terms of formal propositions with recognizable illocutionary force; but how far religious beliefs are open to alternative interpretation by the participants and the ways in which the relevant concepts lend themselves to differential evaluation, whether this is represented formally in terms of propositions with differing illocutionary force or not. In particular, I would like to look at those contexts which, for whatever reason, offer a highly developed degree of choice in the evaluation of events and actions. In Balinese society, there is singled out a variety of religious practitioners whose task consists mainly in the divination of the causes of misfortune, or the appropriate course of human action or choice, most commonly by reference to esoteric manuscripts or by acting as the intermediaries between gods and men in transmitting the advice of the former. Their position in society, and so their relevance here, is enhanced by the preference for referring major decisions about a suitably imprecisely defined range of topics to legitimation according to traditional texts, or to the direct approval of the deities. So, in this section, I would like to start by examining the role of mediums and diviners in Tengahpadang, the scope of their routine activities and the process of classification which this involves.

In order to understand the significance of divination and mediumship in Balinese society, it is useful to consider first the place which these hold in Balinese thought. It is not enough to assume the existence of these institutionalized modes of ordering experience and then simply recount

their function; for it would be unwise to infer their necessity from their occurrence. Mediumship and divination are in many ways implied by Balinese ideas of metaphysics and epistemology, which show extensive Hindu influence in some of their features.[5] Although there are a variety of texts dealing with cosmogony and the creation of the island of Bali (see Hooykaas, C. 1974b; also Mershon 1971: 29-33 on a model given by a high priest), it is also thought that human knowledge is limited and finite. So, in a sense by definition, the models proposed by men are necessarily incomplete; a view which extends quite widely in Tengahpadang to the evaluation of traditional texts. While these may contain reference to the source of revelation, such as the deified culture heroes who brought Hinduism to Bali, they tend to be diverse in their transcription and the accounts which they provide. This proliferation of sources is a major problem in religious and philological studies of Balinese literature; but it was encompassed by the village religious specialists in Tengahpadang, and by the high priests whom they consulted, by what might be seen as a theory of epistemological relativism which is directly relevant to an understanding of the place occupied by forms of divination.

It is popularly thought that there is a hierarchy of forms of existence in the world. This is conceived as ranging from inanimate objects, through plants, animals, the various castes of men to the ascending ranks of deities. What lies beyond this is the subject of different views; although by virtue of their lowly position villagers were most tentative on the matter. To the extent that it was possible to articulate the views, these might provisionally be represented as there being ultimately some sort of shadowy silence (sepi). It would appear that this was thought of as in a state of continuous transformation, such that it comes very close to local ideas about the nature of adat. On another aspect of this, villagers were far clearer. This was that the ranked forms of existence also constituted a hierarchy of knowledge. In this the immaterial, and so subtler (alus) nature of the spirit-world, places such beings closer to, and so more able to apprehend, reality than can humans who are deceived by the illusion of form (maya).[6] It follows from this that the gods have a vision which is superior, or at least different, so that their advice tends to be correspondingly apposite. It should be stressed, however, that this

cannot simply be sub sumed as an aspect of ritual authority; for men are by no means obliged to follow divine pronouncements, albeit at their own risk. Men are commonly said to nunas ica, to ask for gifts, here in the form of information, but as we shall see they may equally turn the tables and matur piuning, offer knowledge or inform, a refined formula which may in fact connote a statement to the gods of what men intend to do. The relationship between men and gods may, in fact, be more complex than is suggested by the dominant ideas of complete subordination and deference of the former. This emerges in one way in the view that the gods themselves are limited in their knowledge; or even by their pseudo-human appetites which are commonly represented in the form of buta. These last may variously be viewed as demons, the material elements of the world (Mershon 1970), the servants of the gods, or their gross (kasar) aspects. Significantly, however, the term is the same as that for blindness, so that it is possible that there is a connexion between Balinese ideas on ontology and epistemology.[7]

Two points in this cosmological outline are of immediate interest. First, it suggests a possible explanation for the difference between the activities of divination from traditional sources and spirit-mediumship. The organization of propitious activities in space and time, as well as the interpretation of certain natural occurrences which are held to be mystically significant - from the striking of lightning to the nesting of hornets - is achieved with the aid of a large body of more or less consistent and exoteric treatises. There are however unusual events, new circumstances or situations in which definition of this kind is not possible. In this instance, it is not uncommon to find that, in the absence of textual sources, inquiry is by direct consultation. Under other circumstances, as in healing, the two forms may coexist, the choice being determined by a balance of personal preference, availability and the reputation of the practitioners. This scheme also provides a gloss on native ideas of legitimacy. These, it will be recalled, are often expressed by reference to the idea of that which is proper or fitting (patut) especially within adat. This is not conceived of as static, but rather varying according to time and place. Institutions in Balinese society then do not necessarily enjoy an immutable status: and mediumship is a source, or a channel for the expression, of potentially new ideas. This transformational aspect of adat also has the

consequence that alternative interpretations of existing institutions are possible, for with a changing context custom may come to be reviewed in a new light.

Traditional knowledge in Bali forms a vast field of both oral and written sources. Not only are there a wide variety of forms of priest with specialized activities; but there are also a large number of different types of diviner, medium or medical practitioner who may be expert in one or more subjects. These figures are generally known as balian, a term which may be qualified by reference to a particular speciality or to a kind of expertise; so there may be balian apun, specialists in setting bones and techniques of massage, and balian wisada or tetakson, according to whether they rely upon traditional texts or the entry of spirit-beings for their knowledge. These cover between them a broad range of subjects and use almost equally diverse techniques (a good account of the forms is given in Weck 1937: 10-37), so that it is difficult to include them under a single comparable category in English. They have in common, however, the interpretation and regulation of events and actions in terms of a variously understood order within the world. So they may be used for consultation on appropriate actions of all kinds and perhaps more often for the analysis of misfortune or illness which is usually explained in terms of failure to observe cultural rules (on their own part or that of others, as in witch attack). While they apply a more or less all-embracing body of knowledge in theory, the number and variety of specialists found in any particular area is usually far more limited. The balian who live in Tengahpadang are given in Table 10:1; and the different forms of speciality summed up in Table 10:2. This does not necessarily imply that villagers use only these. In fact the opposite may be the case as familiarity tends to breed scepticism of any particular individual's abilities. This list does, however, encompass the range of types of specialists upon whose services villagers regularly call.

It will be clear from an examination of Table 10:1, in conjunction with 10:2, that balian in this area tend to fall into one of two types. There are those who are expert at dealing with birth and death, events which are too ritually polluting (of different kinds it will be recalled: kumel and sebel respectively) to be engaged in by temple priests (pemangku). The birth specialist (balian manakan) acts as midwife, but also conducts the ceremonies up to three months,

Table 10: 1 The Various Kinds of Balian Found in Tengahpadang.

Name:	Ward:	Title:	Specialty:	Comments:
Pan Baruk	Gagah	Balian Manakan	Childbirth and its rites	Large clientèle from settlement and beyond
I Nyèmbèng	Pisang-kaja	Balian	1) general illness 2) tetanaman (buried mystical objects to cause illness)	Gradually building a reputation
(I Renta	Pisang-kaja	Balian	Sickness of all kinds	NW27/SW6 now dead Said to be very sakti; died in battle with witches)
Tèh Tiam Ting	Tengah-padang	Balian	1) insanity 2) witchcraft cure	Chinese, able but thought to prolong illness for own gain
Md. Gari	Tengah-padang	Balian Apun	1) broken limbs 2) massage	
I Bakta	Tengah-padang	Balian Ngubadin Kusta	Skin illnesses	Specializes in skin diseases only
Gusti Kt. Siman	Tri-wangsa	Balian	Sickness	Not an important specialist
I Ngagen	Tegal	Balian Apun	1) bone setting 2) massage	
Nang Konèran	Tegal	Balian Manakan Balian Bangké	1) childbirth and its rites 2) burial and its rites	Suspected of being a specialist in pengiwa, bad magic, which he admits to
Nang Malèn	Tegal	(Balian Manakan) Balian Dasaran	(Childbirth) Spirit-medium for temple	(No longer practices this) Became the official medium for Pura Duur Bingin (Table 3:17) in about 1964.
Ni Payas	Tegal	Balian Dasaran	Spirit-medium for general purposes illness and otherwise	Medium for gods from Pura Duur Bingin. Best known balian in village, but not thought to be very pure (yet?)
Jèro Mangku Geriya (Rana)	Tengah	Balian (Wisada) Balian Apun	1) illness and consultation on a wide range of problems 2) broken limbs	Balian who was chosen to become temple priest. Has some knowledge of texts

Table 10:1 Kinds of Balian in Tengahpadang.

Name:	Ward:	Title:	Specialty:	Comments:
I Kelinyat	Siklod	Balian Bangké	Burial and its rites	So widely used, he is known as "mangku bangké", the corpse priest
I Sundul	Siklod	Balian Apun	1) broken limbs 2) massage	
(Gusti Pekak	Klusa	Balian		Now dead, but held to be very sakti and widely consulted by the villagers of Tengahpadang)

Table 10:2 Distribution of Balian Found in Tengahpadang.
(based on material presented in Table 10:1)

Title:	Translation:	Number:	Comments:
Balian Wisada (Usada)	Traditional textual specialist	1	
Balian Dasaran (Tetakson)	Spirit-Medium	2	
Balian Apun	Orthopaedic medical specialist	4	
Balian Manakan	Midwife and specialist in birth rites	2	Both male
Balian Bangké	Undertaker and expert in burial rites	2	
Balian	Specialists in diseases and magic or countering witchcraft	4	
Balian Ngubadin Kusta	Skin specialist	1	

when the mother and child are freed of pollution according to belief in Tengahpadang (this varies somewhat in length in different parts of the island). The balian bangké in contrast has no medical function, but is responsible for the highly polluting task of washing and preparing the body of burial and conducting the correct services. The expertise for these may be combined in a single person; and they also have in common the association with periods of transition, from which it is not unusual to find that they acquire reputations as adepts in magic (pengiwa). This may also be true of other types of expert of which there are several. Some, such as the balian apun, may be skilled medical specialists; others may use less apparent talents in combating disease. My concern here is not however with Balinese medical practice as such, but rather with divination and mediumship, which form perhaps the two most highly esteemed specialties in village society in the region round Tengahpadang. Those who are literate in traditional textual sources are generally known as balian wisada (or usada), the particular treatises on which they rely varying somewhat. Many specialists may lay claim to relying upon such texts, but there was only one man in Tengahpadang who was thought to have any real skill in this at the time of my fieldwork. As his knowledge was thought to be relatively limited, in important matters villagers might turn to recognized experts. The most respected of these was a high caste man from the settlement of Payangan, some eight kilometres to the west, who featured prominently in an important matter of divination in Pisangkaja, discussed below in Case 21.

The other type of specialist, far more prominent in popular imagination, is that of spirit-medium. This role is commonly connected with trance, or dissociation, during which the person is thought to become the intermediary between a god or spirit and the human audience. Bali has sometimes been described in the literature as a haven for ecstatic practices (see especially Belo 1960; also 1949), a cultural option which Boon has noted (1977: 229, fn. 4) is the inverse of ideals of refinement, which are strong in Tengahpadang.[8] It is perhaps therefore not entirely surprising that trance occupies a small place in daily, or even religious, experience there. In contrast to the mass dissociation found in some of the villages near the provincial capital during

temple ceremonies, trance in any form is uncommon in Tengahpadang.[9] Therefore, rather than describe its many manifestations, I shall content myself with a brief outline of forms of communion with supernatural forces in the one location. These are of three main types. There is straight involuntary possession (kepanggluh) properly during temple festivals, when a person dissociates and the experience is expressed in terms of being entered or controlled by a superhuman agency. More commonly there is recognized, regular mediumship, which may emerge from the first (by way of the routinization of symptoms into culturally approved channels). This is, however, terminologically distinct. In this controlled spirit-contact, the person is said to nadi, literally to become or to assume being, it would seem here to imply on a different level. (The root of the word is dadi, which has been suggested as the etymological origin of the term for a clan, dadiya). This is an approved social role generally designated as balian tapakan or balian tetakson. These modifiers are significant: tapak is to enter, or to be impressed upon by something; the other name is said to be linked to taksu, a widely found term meaning to be a witness (it is also the name of one of the offering-houses in the domestic ancestor shrine and in temples). These people are also popularly referred to as dasaran, which is closely related to pendasar, the clowns in theatre who translate the Old Javanese in theory used by their high caste masters to the audience. Correspondingly the role is seen as intermediaries between men and gods. While these various states of dissociation may be symptomatically similar, and may loosely be termed shamanism or trance; to the Balinese the roles and their functions are quite distinct or even opposed (on the difference between physiological states and cultural categories, see Lewis 1971: 37-65; on mediumship Firth 1964). To ignore these distinctions is to overlook much of their significance for the participants and to extract them from their normal, if variably interpretable, contexts of meaning. So I shall follow the Balinese in seeing these figures primarily as mediums between gods and men, rather than as being possessed or masters of spirits. The final type of communion, of a sort, is by direct contact with, or tapping of, sources of power, (ke)sakti(an) - a popular activity for both witches and balian, but one which need not concern us here.

The immediately relevant category are the balian tetakson or dasaran.

These may be recruited from either sex and any caste, but tend to be of lower status than diviners; for dissociation and the violent behaviour not uncommonly associated with it may be held to be demeaning. There are two criteria of selection which are commonly found. On the one hand, it is a popular role for hermaphrodites and sexually interstitial persons; on the other many mediums have a history of mental disturbance which is channelled and controlled socially through their role. By the regular provision of sound advice, they gradually acquire reputations which are dependent however to a degree upon continued public approval of their performance and decisions (see Garbett 1969 on the constraints imposed upon mediums in their pronouncements by their audience). In theory, the authenticity of trance states should be tested by the application of a burning brand to the cheek or hand on each occasion. This is rarely used in the routine inquiry of mediums acting as medical practitioners, but is more common where someone becomes entranced during a temple ceremony or other occasion outside the routine. The validity of statements made in the absence of such tests, however, adds yet another dimension to the argument and interpretation of purportedly divine pronouncements. Tactical considerations enter here: one may try to brand potentially antagonistic mediums; but not those who are likely to be friendly. This may be shown by a simple illustration:

Case 18. The authenticity of trance in the Pura Geriya, Pisangkaja:

> There are two priests belonging to the Pura Geriya, somewhat unusually. The junior is a balian (see Table 10:1); the other is not. During a temple festival this latter fell into trance and began to talk about local politics. The priest of the western temple of the dead (SE17) happened to be nearby at the time. In order to test whether the state was genuine he called for a burning coconut husk in a loud voice. At this the entranced man shuddered and promptly returned to consciousness. The two men were closely affiliated to rival political parties.

This is not necessarily to suggest that such actions are purely strategic in conception. Later the same priest fell into trance again and dissociated so successfully that he failed to recover and had to be admitted to the island's mental hospital.

While mediumship during temple festivals is rare in Tengahpadang,

it is a routine matter in healing. Besides the ordinary medical balian, mediums may also act as consultants in regular clinics and resemble, as in some ways they are, the local equivalent of village doctors. Of the two mediums in Tengahpadang, one (Ni Payas) has this as a full-time occupation, which proves quite lucrative as apart from the regular offering which has cash value they may make special demands on behalf of the deities who appear. Mediums in Tengahpadang expect to receive incense and a pack of cigarettes, which has a cash value of about Rp. 60-65; in contrast, balian wisada are given payment in the region of Rp. 200 or more, which is some measure of the difference in the esteem in which they are held. The reasons for consultation are usually ill-health or mental disturbance, and a variety of odd matters from family tension to theft, although this last is rare as the success rate is low! The frequency with which different types of case are brought to the medium are referred to below in Table 10:3. Belief in the system is protected by a whole series of familiar secondary elaborations: multiple, or new, causes, failure to follow advice, and so forth. Serious illnesses may nowadays be referred to medical doctors. Two features may be worth noting: local mediums are widely treated with scepticism and rarely used, while the equal failure rate of distant ones is disguised by poor communications. Such short-comings are attributed to the lack of knowledge of the god invoked. The Balinese have an elegant solution to the problem of doubt, which is to incorporate it. It is held that men differ innately in their spiritual temperament: some are by nature cool, others hot. The former can see witches and commonly believe in mediums; those who are hot do not. In this way, belief and scepticism coexist within a single cultural framework, such that the latter does not pose a direct danger for the former.

Mediums serve then to divine and classify the causes of daily misfortune and, on occasions, of public ones as well. It is to the importance of this classificatory role that I would like to turn for a moment. For on closer inspection it would appear that there may be certain significant differences between the routine diagnosis of illness or misfortune as opposed to the general public pronouncements which mediums may make less frequently. The former is concerned mainly with the process of allocating individual objects or events, in a broad sense, to given classes

according to the existence of recognizable properties or attributes which these are held to possess. In this, the implicit propositions by which the association of properties with particular categories is made, is largely taken for granted. There may however be alternative sets of possibilities, so that in the act of choice mediums may more or less unwittingly lead to the shift from one interpretation (and so proposition) to another. The process by which this may operate has been noted by Firth (1964: 252) in his discussion of the increasing incidence of the spirit presentations of the husband's lineage rather than the woman's own among female mediums. He points to the shift in emphasis from lineage to marital ties as the principles behind this. There is, however, another level at which change may operate, which is in the direct, and more radical, shift between principles of association, or the underlying propositions through which the identification of properties occurs. In the remainder of this section I would like therefore to look briefly at the routine activities of mediums in order to highlight the differences between these processes.

In Tengahpadang there are two regular balian tetakson, or dasaran as they are more widely called. Both are attached to Pura Duur Bingin, a temple celebrated for the magnificence of its carving and for the efficacy of its deities, of whom there are several, or one known simply as Batara Duur Bingin, depending upon the occasion. One of these is an ex-balian manakan, Nang Malèn, who is the official temple medium and not frequently consulted. The second is a woman, originally from north Bali, who married a local man and has become the vehicle for a whole series of deities which she represents as associated with the temple. This woman, Ni Payas, is a practising healer, but is considered neither very pure nor always genuine, particularly by the villagers from the western two wards, and much of her clientèle is drawn, as with most mediums, from outside the settlement. The division of opinion about her within Tengahpadang is linked to the general political party attachments of both the ward in which she lives and of her husband. These are towards the nationalists rather than the government group (GOLKAR) which has assumed dominance in Pisangkaja and Gagah, as we noted in the last chapter. It will emerge that this affiliation may not be entirely irrelevant to events which transpired during the course of my fieldwork.

Only the woman, Ni Payas, holds a regular clinic on ritually auspicious dates, when she receives anywhere from two to twelve patients. She is paid in offerings (canang pengraos and canang sari) containing money and rice to the value of between Rp. 45-65, to which is added a further Rp. 60-5 in incense and cigarettes. So she may receive anywhere between Rp. 210 and Rp. 1,560 on a working day, which occur with varying frequency. It is a not-unlucrative activity. Almost all her patients came because they are ill or have domestic problems. Of the 66 cases recorded, only two were for theft or similar matters. The cures consist in the use of various traditional medicines, the performance of ceremonies at ancestral shrines, or occasionally special advice on how to deal with witch attacks. The central activity of the medium is in determining the cause of illness or misfortune. I would therefore like to examine briefly the extent to which she is bound to follow an already established classificatory framework in her diagnosis, or how far she has freedom in her interpretation of symptoms, or in proposing new causes altogether.

The results of diagnosis appear to be far from arbitrary, or based upon whim, but follow a definite pattern. Patients said to be suffering from ancestral displeasure had as their complaints: feeling weak, faint or were suffering from headaches or domestic tensions. By contrast, feeling hot and stomach trouble were explained as wind entering the body (upas angin). On the other hand, feeling cold, illness in the feet (as opposed to the head), breathing problems, stabbing pains, waking in fear at night and emotional disturbance were always stated to be induced by witches. In general, the greater the number of symptoms, the closer the source of attack. Where patients complained of symptoms of two different kinds, most often two alternative diagnoses were given; or if this consisted of symptoms associated with witchcraft and ancestors, it was held that ancestors had weakened the patient who was then vulnerable to attack from witches. The frequency with which these various diagnoses were given are listed in Table 10:3.

In this system, Ni Payas adheres closely to folk beliefs about illness in Tengahpadang. According to these certain illnesses are typically associated with ancestors, namely headaches, general weakness and jaundice (of which no apparent case was brought during study). There are other mild internal

Table 10:3 The Diagnoses of Causes of Illness and Advice by Ni Payas.

Cause:	No. of Cases:	%
Ancestors:	4	6.0%
Ancestors leading to witch attack:	17	25.5%
Unpropitious birthday leading to witch attack:	8	12.0%
Witchcraft:	19	28.5%
Other causes (mainly wind entering):	16	24.0%
Theft:	2	3.0%
Total:	66	99.0%

sicknesses which may be brought about by the same agents, as may wounds or accidents due to falls. In other instances, such as cholera or blindness, the affliction may be brought on by ancestors or other agencies, here the goddess Durga and the effects of actions (karma pala) in previous incarnations. This is of some importance. It is widely thought that illnesses caused by ancestors are relatively mild, in keeping with their generally benevolent role; yet according to other accounts they may bring about severe injuries, cholera (which is generally fatal) and blindness. On occasions, a single set of symptoms may be explained by reference to rival classifications of the cause. So, while disease is connected at one level with semantic oppositions such as head: body(except liver) :: ancestors : witches, they may also be ordered by reference to others like: mild : severe illness :: ancestors : witches. It will be apparent that underlying these associations of symbolic classifications, there are latent propositions, such as: the purity of the organ attacked is correlated with the purity of the attacker - for the first formulation above; or that the severity of illness is governed by the prevailing disposition of the agent responsible - for the second. This is important, for it suggests that symbolic associations, or the identification of particular properties by which items are classified, are not necessary part of some immutable scheme of semantic opposition; but may be differently evaluated according to broader sets of alternative connexions, behind which

may be perceived latent propositions. This makes the activities of mediums clearer; for they are involved essentially in the allocation of items of the experienced world into pre-existing, but potentially alternatively defined, classes. To the extent that they favour one scheme rather than another, they may eventually bring about a shift in the dominant classification, should there be one, in the manner proposed by Firth.

A similar process is found in one of the other important activities of spirit-mediums. This is the selection of suitable incumbents for the office of temple priest. Here the medium is asked not to choose into which of a number of categories an item fits; but rather which of a number of possible items fits into a particular category. In the selection, criteria of suitability may range from caste (especially for state or descent group temples), to education or descent from the previous incumbent. Underlying these are similarly various propositions as to what constitutes suitability; such that mediums are indirectly involved in a consideration of the principles involved in selection. Typically, however, they do not question the categories given, or the identification of properties by which a class member is chosen, except indirectly through the cumulative effect of their decisions over time. So, it would seem that in their routine activities the choice presented to mediums is that of deciding between categories in a system where the relevant properties are given, although possibly in non-coterminous ways, for membership of pre-determined classes.

The Negotiation of Meaning:

In a recent article, entitled "The Management of Meaning: on the Phenomenology of Political Transactions." Cohen and Comaroff (1976) argue that: "the management of meaning must be regarded as a fundamental property of political interaction, to be explicated through adequate consideration of the phenomenological realities of situations, insofar as these are ascertainable." (1976: 88). This somewhat polysyllabic formulation would appear to propose a far broader idea of the implications of the freedom of choice in classification than that which I have so far shown. An inspection of their argument, however, suggests a discrepancy between their programme and their conclusions, which

is highly informative. In fact what they seem to mean is that in certain situations actors may have the choice between two options as to how to categorize the relationships in which they are involved. This becomes clear from their example of Tswana endogamous royal marriages. Here due to the multiplicity of ties, collaterals, in the role of wife-givers, may define themselves or be defined by others as patrilineally linked and so competitors for office; they may opt instead to see themselves as matrilateral kin and so non-combative supporters. Put simply in this way, the management of meaning may be said to be involved in a restricted sense. For it consists in the choice between a number of pre-defined classes to which individuals may be allocated. They make no reference to the freedom to adapt the categories; so the operation looks remarkably similar, as I would suggest that it in fact is, to the activities of Balinese spirit-mediums. The difficulty of this is that it can hardly be said to constitute the management or negotiation of meaning in any particularly exciting sense; for it follows in the structure of choice the model developed by Firth some time before.

If the problem is phrased in these rather harsh and uncompromising terms, it enables a distinction which previously was obscured to emerge more clearly. It suggests that there are at least two levels at which freedom of choice may operate. First there is the existence of an option between pre-existing categories, which may be taken as given in any particular instance, although these may be modified by the results of successive options. Second, there may be change in the definition, or interpretation of the categories themselves. Between these two there would also appear to be a difference in the kind of framework involved.[10] The former consists of the process of classification. Here particulars are being singled out for the possession of certain properties, or attributes, which enable them to be classified within one of a number of categories - I shall omit here a detailed consideration of the consequences of these being polythetic classes, rather than bounded ones (Needham 1975), for at this level its prime relevance would be in whether there were one or more modes of classification. The latter operation, however, would appear to bear as much upon the determination of meaning as upon classification in its narrow sense. For the concern here is with the interpretation of, and choice between, the propositions which underlie classificatory

discriminations, or more simply put, the principles behind culturally recognized differences. Clearly, by virtue of chosing between alternative principles, the categories which depend upon these will also be modified, so that option in meaning is likely to affect taxonomy. So far, however, I have merely suggested that such a process is possible. In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to examine some of the ethnographic evidence suggesting that it does occur and to consider some of the implications of this.

In the period leading up to 1971 and the General Election, the government party GOLKAR was rapidly gaining ground over the nationalists. Two of the most active members belonged to an unusual temple called Pura Dalem Tut Keetut (Table 3:17), about which there were various legends. With the success of the party in the elections, these men and their followers decided to further their political interests by formalizing themselves and gaining public recognition through forming a temple association. As the temple was run down and neglected by its old congregation, it was an ideal vehicle. The temple needed an officiant however, and conveniently the son of the old priest, long since dead, belonged to the same party. He began to study under the priest of the western temple of the dead, the Jèro Mangku Dalem (SE17) who, it will be recalled from Chapter 9, was a powerful political patron and leading party member. The head of the customary village, Kt. Gendul (NW10) pointed out, however, that the young man could not assume office without the proper invocation at the temple. It was agreed that Ni Payas, who was the most prominent local medium, would go there and act as the intermediary for the god of the temple to proclaim his choice of officiant, should he so wish. On the appointed day, however, things began to go wrong in a highly instructive fashion, which is worth recounting:

Case 19: The low spirit in the temple:

> By the early afternoon, a large congregation had packed the temple to overflowing. The offerings were all laid out in the shrines and a mat was placed in front of the main one for the woman to purify herself, pray and if all went well, to go into trance. For a long time, however, there was no sign of her. Then, suddenly, she rushed into the temple wide-eyed and distraught fell on her face, writhed in the dust and crawled

on all fours to eat an offering to the butas (elements, low spirits, see Chapter 5) placed on the ground. Following this she stood up, abusing the entire audience in obscene Balinese, rattled off the confirmation of the priest and gave two contradictory dates for the temple festival. She then came out of trance.

In the meantime, the congregation was simply too stunned to react and simply sat in amazement, while she was helped by the heads of the customary and administrative villages who had flanked her throughout. The occasion broke up in confusion.

What had happened, it was said, is that Ni Payas had been sitting in the village headman's house for some time. Eventually, she had set off for the temple when she had suddenly been possessed by a buta, or low spirit, which accounted for her dramatic entry and her coarse and degrading behaviour. The organizers were deeply shocked and dismayed, for this meant that rather than a high god entering the medium, the details had been given by a vile and despised spirit, which tainted the whole business. There was lengthy talk which continued throughout the night about asking a new medium and discounting the original possession. In the end, it was decided though to let the matter rest and hope that it would be forgotten in due course.

This is a curious case, which took the villagers as much by surprise as it did me. Slightly closer inspection shows a number of interesting features. First, the temple was essentially about to become the means for furthering the legitimacy of a government political clique; second, Ni Payas came from a strongly nationalist ward and was married to a party member; third, both the head of the administrative village and the customary community were elected at the time of nationalist party domination of local politics and she was accompanied to the temple by party members who surrounded her throughout; finally the outcome of the afternoon was the intense discomfiture and public shame of the proposed new temple congregation and its degradation by association with a foul, or at least lowly, spirit.

All this suggests an interpretation, which is in fact the one reached by the villagers themselves. The nationalists were strongly opposed to their bitter rivals obtaining control of one of the oldest and most respected temples in the village but their recent political defeat in the elections made a direct challenge unwise, as they lacked the support, and such an attempt might have been used against them with effect. Nor would it have been possible to suggest an alternative, and more amenable, candidate for the priesthood where the nominee was both eminently qualified and further the sole heir of the previous

incumbent. While neither I, nor most of the villagers, could establish with certainty that the possession was planned beforehand, both the circumstances surrounding it, and the locally unprecedented intrusion of a low spirit make it highly likely. Whether by design or not, within the constraints which applied, the trance was (quite literally) a wild success for the political opposition. While the medium had little choice in her selection of the candidate, she did so in a highly inventive fashion, which cast doubt on the whole proceedings, smeared the incumbent and temporarily negated the effect of the government party's ploy.

This case is worth further brief consideration. In its outline, it appears to be a simple example of routine classification: the medium had little choice as to the appropriate properties of the incumbent and was further constrained by an admirably suitable prospective candidate. Yet, clearly she managed to do far more than this, and gave the whole event a quite different meaning - a most unsavoury one to the victims - from that normally associated with a relatively straightforward matter. I have suggested in earlier chapters that the links between cultural concepts are many-stranded and may be represented in different terms, or from various perspectives. Something of this is evident here. Temples differ in the status which is accorded them, as do their congregations and officiants: so the main village temples, for instance, rank higher than do minor ones within the same community; although there may always be competition between them, expressed in the wealth or magnificence of the temple, or myths of superior origin or subsequent history. This is commonly expressed in terms of the status of the god of the temple. This may be rendered roughly by saying that the status of the congregation and its priest is a function of the status of the god. This proposition is not normally at issue in the routine matter of deciding upon a suitable occupant of the priesthood; but the medium demonstrated great inventiveness in bringing this latent principle to the fore. By becoming possessed by a low spirit, she was implying the low status of all those directly involved in the temple.[11] The point was rubbed home by her grovelling on the floor of the temple itself. Such spirits must be fed and propitiated outside the temple (in the jaban pura) to avoid pollution of the inner areas. Her writhing possessed in the central court, vividly portrayed the pollution of the whole. Not only

does this satisfactorily explain certain details which might otherwise be puzzling; but it also points to the extent to which mediums may rise above their ordinary role and show creativity. It may be recalled from Case 3 (in Chapter 2) that the same medium proposed that the sub-district officer's child would be of unusual purity and in so doing suggested the elision of a modern bureaucratic role with the highly traditional one of royal ruler. The activities of spirit-mediums are not, therefore, confined to classification in a narrow sense, but may offer scope for proposing new meanings.

Some of these features may be seen more clearly perhaps in the next case, in which an instance of purportedly involuntary mediumship led directly to change, in that the definition of the principles governing the ownership of temples and their lands were successfully questioned on one occasion. This started a major local political controversy, which suggests once again that decisions tend to have both instrumental and semantic repercussions. Although the events took place before I arrived in the field, the participants were all agreed on the salient features, if not the interpretation, so that it is possible to reconstruct sufficient of the outlines of the dispute as to suggest some interesting elements.

Case 20: The trance of the political party agent's wife:

> In the period immediately before the coup of 1965, as mentioned, the nationalists were dominant in the five eastern wards of Tengahpadang. In one of these, there was the superbly carved and famous temple of Duur Bingin, which controlled a hectare of exceptionally fertile riceland, and an estate of productive coconut palms. It was owned by a small descent group of only 30 families, most of whom were not nationalist.
>
> One night, while passing the temple on her way back from visiting friends, a woman, Ni Luh Natar, fell into trance alone on the road. The god spoke to her directly and stated that the temple had not been purified for a long time and he wished for the largest possible rite, Malik Sumpah to be performed. He also wanted at least two hundred families to participate in order to bear the burden. She then came out of trance and returned home to tell her husband.
>
> The administrative village head was duly informed, and after discussion it was decided that, as thirty families could neither pay for the huge outlay, nor as the god had specified at least two hundred, could the descent group manage this alone.

The five ward government headmen gained the agreement of their councils to organize the ceremony, while the remaining two to the west refused to participate, but each sent a large offering instead. The ceremony was duly held by the five eastern wards.

Afterwards a meeting was called, at which these five argued that as they had been obliged to perform the whole ceremony and had invested their labour and contributions, the temple now belonged to them. The petition of the descent group to have their ancestral home returned was overruled by a large majority (300 to 30). As a result, the temple has been controlled by these wards to this day. As the ousted descent group leaders point out, however, the funds from the temple and the rice and coconut crops over the years have never been accounted for.

A certain amount of additional information may be useful at this stage. Most of the descent group were not nationalists, although the temple was sited in a nationalist ward at that time. Ni Natar was not only not a recognized medium, but had never been possessed in her life up till then. Her trance was without witnesses and was not authenticated by any test. Nor more importantly, was she in a state of ritual purity at the time; for mediums normally undergo rites prior to being entered, so that the deity will not be polluted. It further so happens that her husband was the nationalist party agent in that ward and, by a curious coincidence, the village party caucus were having a private meeting in his home during the entire evening.

Of more interest in the present context than the political and personal motives of the leading participants, or even than the cleavage between wards on party lines, is the way in which the trance was interpreted, so as to raise the whole issue of the basis of ownership, which is on what the subsequent debate hung. After the ceremony had been performed, who had rights over the temple, and on what grounds? The possession, or rather its interpretation, served to question the foundations on which traditional concepts of ownership had rested, by proposing a completely new possible definition of the situation, which was a re-evaluation of accepted categories in three respects. First, it queried the rights of the congregation to run their own temple affairs, by suggesting that the wishes of the god, who presumably has rights in his own seat, conflicted with those of his worshippers. Second, by proposing that the village as a whole should conduct the ceremony, it juxtaposed the greater

interests of the collectivity with those of narrow descent. Finally, in so doing, it raised the issue of whether rights in property should be based upon a system of closed transmission by virtue of descent, or should be calculated in terms of the value of labour. This last was the critical question, for it implied a radically different ground for rights in property, supported by appeal to the superior claims of the god to those of his mere followers, and the overriding claims of the community as a whole to those of any particular segment, behind which, of course, lay the numerical superiority which is the necessary condition for such confrontations. It was on the basis of the publicly paraded arguments that it was proposed to abandon the traditional category of worshippers and to create an entirely new one, according to a new principle of classification where rights were defined by labour and contributions, not by hereditary title.[12] This case also bears out a point mentioned at the start of this section, namely that a question of meaning at one level reflects a question of classification at another. Here we can see that a traditional category of worship group has been abandoned entirely and one based on entirely new principles set up in its place. This corresponds with a switch from the proposition that rights in the temple were transmitted by virtue of descent to one that they were dependent upon participation, or contribution, variously defined.

This suggests that such negotiations may involve the consideration of the relative weight to be given to possible alternative values. That this may be so can be seen in the following series of events, which took place not long after the elections of new headmen in Pisangkaja in 1971. It is also an instructive example in that the formal function of deciding between alternatives which had been most effectively pre-determined was not left to a medium, but a very respected balian wisada was called in from Payangan. The effect of this was, as intended, to furnish the decision with an aura of great legitimacy. The reasons that this was necessary should become apparent after a brief outline of events (for an account which stresses the factional balance within the assembly in Pisangkaja, see Hobart 1975):

Case 21: The shrine and the widow's coffee-stall:

Jèro (Jem)piring (SE21) had been the wife of Anak Agung Ngurah (SE4), who had been a leading member of the communist party. On his death in 1965, she promptly took up with Ny. Sujana (NE23) who had been his political opponent. Following the decline of the nationalist party in Pisangkaja and the political star of her lover, Jèro Piring once again shifted her allegiance and took his new political opponent, the man who became head of the administrative village in 1972, in his place. By this time she was the owner of a very smart coffee-stall in the main square (Map 4), under the banyan tree on village land, where her lover would come quite openly to visit her, although he was from another ward. On a number of grounds he was very unpopular; while her behaviour was widely regarded as offensive. Although such a liaison is technically in breach of ward regulations, it was felt inappropriate to apply them in view of the status of the man. Feelings however simmered.

On a different front, there was a sense in Pisangkaja that the welfare of the group and its members had suffered in previous years, both politically in the events between 1955 and 1971, and in the gradually increasing poverty of the villagers. It was felt that something should be done. Following his rise in the village elections, the priest of the western temple of the dead (SE17) had the idea that the erection of a shrine in the ward might be appropriate, especially as there was none in the appropriate places in the centre. By the rules of geomantic siting in which he was reasonably learned, it was clear that the two best sites were behind the ward meeting-house, or directly under the banyan tree. He also observed that the group's granary by the meeting-house was also not in the ideal spot which was also underneath the same tree. This was accordingly moved without fuss to a new position just on the south-west corner with the road leading to the south. This meant that if the shrine were to go in the best location, given the new arrangement, this could only be on the site of the coffee-stall owned by Jèro Piring; for very careful measurements had been made as to the appropriate distances.

It was therefore decided to call in a balian wisada and it was agreed in a meeting that as there had been a series of misfortunes, it should be remedied by building a shrine, ideally under the tree, with the implication that this would resolve any supernatural causes of the unfortunate events. The balian came on an agreed date and viewed the site, which by now contained the granary in its new position, thereby effectively eliminating choice. He admitted to inquiry from orators that the best position was indeed where the stall stood; but seeing that the building stood there, he requested that no personal loss result from the erection of a shrine. He pointed out that it would be possible for this to be put behind the meeting-place where they sat; but agreed that this was an inferior site spiritually. The orators,

> ignoring his injunction, immediately pressed for a resolution to be adopted to the effect that the shrine be constructed under the tree. This was passed and the woman was ordered to demolish her stall. This was a very expensive structure, built of brick and concrete, unlike most of the wooden or mud-wall structures which surrounded it, and represented Jèro Piring's sole capital. The orators were unanimous and effusive in expressing their regrets at her loss, but they stressed that the spiritual welfare of the community was at stake. She was obliged not only to destroy her home and stall, but as it stood on public land, to pay for the demolition. The shrine was duly erected. She rebuilt her stall some little way to the west at heavy cost which was met by her lover. It was then proposed that a small ornamental pond should be dug beside the shrine, on the lines of that in the sub-district office compound. This was also carried out, led by Déwa Pt. Kuat (SE 11). This approached within two paces or so of the entrance to the stall, so that not only customers but the owner and her lover had to be very careful, especially at night, not to step straight into the pond.

Some of the more narrowly political aspects of this train of events have been discussed elsewhere (1975: 90-1). At one level, there was a strong sense that justice was due to each member of the pair singly and its representation in morally appropriate form about a different, but practically related, issue provided the pragmatic goal of the operation. It is difficult to judge how great the value placed upon the manifest aims were.[13]

The case is, however, interesting as it shows not only the relationship which may emerge between the persons who structure the categories of choice and the one who is vested with the formal ritual authority to take the decision; but also for the juxtaposition and consideration of different values and their consequences. It should be clear that the diviner had been manoeuvred into a difficult position from which it was almost impossible to escape, as the choices had been carefully defined. The issue is more interesting for its clear presentation of alternative values and the question of which ranked higher. The proposition brought to the attention of the diviner was that collective interests required a shrine to be built. This was countered with the view that the welfare of individuals should not be made to suffer. Behind this lay the problem of which was more important: the interests of the community as a whole, or those of one of its members. Depending upon which of these was regarded as outweighing the other, the shrine could,

and would, be sited in different places. So this case suggests that in the negotiation of the relevance of alternative propositions, it is not simply the meaning to be placed on events, or a plan of action to be proposed; it is also a question of deciding what is the hierarchy of values. This is sometimes represented as if there was such a hierarchy and that the relationship between values within the system were known, or potentially knowable (Bailey 1973: 1-15). In Tengahpadang, at least, it would be truer to say that the question of which value is to be regarded as key in any instance is open to negotiation among the participants involved. Further, it may be suggested that it is possible that whether the values are indeed ranked, and so whether there is a hierarchy at all, may be one of the issues to be decided in discussion.

As the tactical considerations in this case tend to loom large and eclipse its more subtle aspects, I would like to introduce a final example in which not only is the discussion of the hierarchy of values clear, but also the tendency of the major protagonists to adopt different core values. As a result, they tended to view the issue and its implications in different terms. More immediately, it provides a striking illustration of how far creativity may be taken away from mediums, and the extent to which they may be in conflict with an élite of villagers for control over classification; so that the negotiation of meaning is disguised behind the dramatic public performance of spirit-possession. In order to understand this case, it is necessary to know a little about Balinese beliefs concerning the birth of twins of opposite sex (for a full account see Belo 1935, reprinted in Belo 1970; even this important set of ideas is open to alternative interpretation, see Hobart 1974a). This is thought to be a very serious anomalous occurrence in any event, as only animals should have multiple births. It is held to be particularly serious if the children differ in sex, in which case they are also argued to have broken an additional rule by having committed pre-natal intercourse. There is a further problem, which incidentally raises a question about Douglas' correlation of a society's attitude to outsiders and to anomalies (Douglas 1975: 276-318). For the Balinese maintain that, for high castes especially Satriya, who are greatly concerned with the maintenance of purity and the status implications of

marriage, the birth of twins is a wonderful occasion heralding great good fortune. Whereas for the less endogamous and boundary-conscious low castes this is a misfortune on an unparalleled scale. (There remains the problem that these sexually immature twins are thought to have violated boundaries by committing incest.) In traditional ideas, if twins are born to commoners, the whole village is polluted for 42 days and the house, or even possessions of the offending household in some versions, must be destroyed and they are outcast to the graveyard, unwashed and wearing their soiled clothes. Properly they should only be readmitted to the community on payment of the great rites necessary to cleanse the whole territory encompassed by the traditional village lands. This emphasis on the purity of the land, regardless of the cost in human terms is of central significance to the following case, where twins of opposite sex were born to a couple living in Pisangkaja, I Tarik and his wife (SW2):

Case 22: The birth of twins of opposite sex to a commoner:

I Tarik's wife became seriously ill during pregnancy, as her stomach grew enormous and the unusual step was taken of sending her to hospital, where she duly gave birth to twins of opposite sex. In the village, the issue was immediately raised as to what ritual action was necessary. The two main protagonists, who both had kin links to the family, were the priest of the village temple (Pura Désa), which is the focus of the pure village lands. He was a big landowner and a leading conservative. The other was the priest of the western temple of the dead, the Jèro Mangku Dalem. As a poor man, he tended to identify more with the humble villagers, while his education inclined him to more progressive religious views than his colleague. (The positions adopted are linked to the values noted in Diagram 9:2).

The village priest went initially to see Kt. Gendul as customary village head and also the administrative village leader, who decided to call an informal meeting of all the priests, ward heads and other notables. So, the political élite of the settlement were gathered, divided by party allegiance, but united over and above the ordinary villagers. The village priest argued for the full performance of the traditional rites, but paid for by the customary village as a whole. The young priest questioned first whether the village had been polluted if the birth occurred elsewhere, then pointed out that the government had decreed this no longer to be an offence after consultation with leading high priests, so who were they as ignorant villagers to dispute the wisdom of their superiors? The latter view eventually prevailed and the

meeting resolved to make small offerings only on this occasion and to confirm the change in the custom by informing the deities.

For this, it was arranged that they would consult Nang Malèn, the official medium. For the occasion, the meeting turned up as a body, while the medium was more or less visibly quivering from fear. He went into trance and was addressed about the change, to which, in his first words, he, or rather the god, gave assent. The young priest then immediately ordered him to be carried away and brought out of trance before he could add anything further.

This example substantiates, I hope, the points which I mentioned earlier. The role of the medium was, on this occasion, not merely closely restricted, but he was treated with undignified distain. Not only was he left out of the proceedings until a clear decision had been reached, but his authority was circumscribed to the point that he was bodily removed to prevent him exercising any independence. The real decisions were taken after negotiation within the established élite, in private, although subsèquently this was publicly represented as the instruction of the god, on direct consultation.

It is instructive to look at both the classificatory and broader propositional implications of this discussion. One of the most polluting acts known to Balinese society was simply removed from the category of impure events (of which it had been previously one of the central class members) and placed instead together with ordinary birth, which is temporarily and relatively mildly polluting. The traditional response to the birth of twins depends upon caste status: such unnatural anomalies are as good for high castes as they are bad for low. This was counterposed to a new principle which laid stress not so much on the differences between men due to caste, but on their similarity in the face of the universal process of birth. According to the first argument, men are naturally different and so is the consequence of anomalous occurrences for them. The second proposes a different evaluation of nature in which it is precisely their identity and equal vulnerability in natural terms that is the key. There is another striking difference. The village priest was emphasizing the superior value of land over human welfare; whereas his younger opponent reversed the hierarchy and argued that the concerns of individual humans, regardless of their status, were more important than the state of the land. Indeed he

proposed that in future the value placed on land be reduced to the point that it would not be affected. This touches on an interesting ambiguity in the concept of the désa adat and its basis of incorporation which was noted in Chapter 3. This is whether it is to be viewed as setting apart, and so sacralizing in Durkheimian terms, the category of landowners and heirs to compounds; or whether it is a universal congregation of worship. There were also more narrowly political aspects to the confrontation, in that while I Tarik was the domestic client of the village priest, he was a close affine of the Jèro Mangku Dalem and so he became involved in a struggle for supremacy between the two. In their negotiation over the rules, the participants were acting within the framework of alternative sets of values found in Balinese culture. While the nature of the issues for one priest turned upon the value of land and the need for its purity to be guarded; for the other the notion of purity itself was evaluative and the behaviour of men judged more by universalistic moral standards than the infringement of class boundaries. There was a further opposition. For the younger priest was arguing less directly for the rejection of different rules for different castes and so indirectly challenging one of the bases of caste difference. (The relation between these positions is given in Diagram 9:2; the priest was arguing for purity in sense 3 against sense 1 (in Chapter 7), but quietly encompassing the theory of caste differences, i.e. sense 2.) Although part of the argument was conducted with reference to new national democratic values, it is questionable whether traditional village concepts were not at least as much involved.

This case illustrates several of the features which have been mentioned at various stages in this chapter. The choice offered to the medium was preconstrained by decisions taken in an informal arena beforehand. It also showed recognition of the potential creativity of mediums in the concern to prevent Nang Malèn from making any further comments on the matter. It also brought out the potential antagonism, not here between orators and patrons, but between the established élite and the chosen intermediaries between gods and men who have, in theory, a licensed position. This case also points to the relationship between the process of classification of events on the one hand and the underlying propositions and their logical relationship on the other. It should be apparent that part

of the difference hinged upon different ideas as to what purity was. Equally there may be more than one opposed pair of propositions which are under dispute in any instance. Here there seems also to have been an opposition between the interests of the collectivity and those of an unfortunate individual. To the extent that the participants are striving for intellectual consistency, however, one might expect there to be coherence in the different positions. This would appear to be so, as one side stressed a view of purity which accounted for the superior interests of land and the group of landowners. The other adopted an evaluative moral stance which denied the relevance of land as such altogether, but pointed to the criteria of conscious human conduct and the impropriety of punishing a person for events beyond his immediate control. Not only was the hierarchy of values, as to which propositions might reasonably claim priority, at issue, but also the protagonists were propounding different views based upon the more or less systematic interpretation of circumstances in the light of their own dominant values. So the concepts of caste, purity, land and the status of humans were all open to different evaluations.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I set out to argue that the existence of two dimensions in human activity has the effect that choice has both pragmatic and semantic significance. The argument that the absence of such choice eliminates the possibility of propositional discourse, or at least assertions, was questioned. Religion in Bali seemed capable of being expressed in terms of consistent propositions;[14] while the restriction layin the illocutionary force which could be used. For the existing social order there are convenient contexts in which it is reduced to assertion and so is hard to question. It also emerged that in certain fields, the possibility of choice was recognized, although the degree to which this was permitted did not necessarily determine where it occurred. For the form taken by choice was commonly the option between pre-existing categories, rather than in the formulation of the categories themselves. It was suggested that the routine activities of diviners and mediums is commonly of this kind, and it is in this sense that the management of meaning, suggested in some arguments, is intended. This raised further questions, both about the

existence of processes in society through which the categories were structured, and also about the relationship between classification and meaning. It was proposed that choice of the first kind is between ostensibly determinate categories. Inspection, however, showed that these were rarely as consistent and unique as would seem. It further indicated that underlying these were latent propositions by which particular features of the world were selected for attention. This pointed to the existence of a higher level of choice, in the ways in which the members of a society may link cultural concepts by means of a variety of propositions, so that meaning is negotiated between them in the course of the evaluation of alternatives. This may involve the recognition of potential superiority of some values over other, while the existence of such a hierarchy may be open to discussion. Finally it was suggested that the types of interpretation adopted by individuals may reflect the more or less consistent use of certain core concepts.

Chapter 10. Footnotes.

1. The semantic possibilities of ecstatic communication have been noted briefly by Crick. Essentially he criticizes most authors on this subject for being crudely functional, in particular Lewis for writing a work on the subject without examining "conceptual distinctions, cultural categories and linguistic complexities" (1976: 6) which he sees as the ignored side of the study. Unfortunately, Crick's argument does not develop at times beyond the programmatic and my aim here is to give some flesh to the bones. The rejection of all that went before may also be a little ill-advised if it is the case as I have suggested that social action generally tends to have an instrumental as well as semantic component.

2. These terms are intended in the sense commonly given them, as I understand it, in classical logic (Cohen, P.S. 1975 has pointed this out; see also Mitchell 1962: 24-36). The alternative formulations are given as it may be held that either the propositions may take the form: 'all x...' or 'some x...'. It should be added that if both formulations are 'some x', then the difference is one of subcontraries. I would suggest that the ambiguity of expression is itself significant in formulating assumptions of this kind.

3. Unfortunately I am no logician, so that the formal presentation of the argument may be incorrect. It would seem to me at first sight, however, that these may be rephrased in terms of syllogisms, which may bring out the points of weakness.

I. Ritual purity:

Men differ in their ritual purity,
Purity is a natural quality/substance,
∴ Men differ in their natural qualities/substance.

At a cultural level this raises the problem that not all purity is necessarily a natural quality or substance, but may be seen as evaluated.
To the observer the difficulty might appear to be that purity is not a natural entity or property at all.

II. Responsibility for Human Actions.

All human activities depend for success upon the gods,
Agriculture is a human activity,
∴ Agriculture depends for success upon the gods.

This may be represented in a different form:

The gods are responsible for the failure of human endeavour,
Agriculture is a human endeavour,
∴ The gods are responsible for the failure of agriculture.

> While the first formulation may be technically correct, the nature of the dependence is open. In the second version this is clearer as it fails to spell out whether the failure of some or of all human endeavour is the responsibility of the gods.

The importance of indigenous cultural formulations of the nature of purity, and of multiple causation, then emerge with significance.

4. They have therefore the structure F(p) for the illocutionary force of a proposition discussed in footnote 29, in Chapter 9.

5. The importance of metaphysics in the study of societies has often been overshadowed by a concern with religion. Part of the great value of the works of Evans-Pritchard and some of his students seems to me to lie in their recognition of this. A more detailed study of metaphysical ideas is intended as the theme of future fieldwork in Bali.

6. There is an alternative possibility which is worth further investigation. This is a more relative view of the world in which each form of existence has a distinctive epistemology. A model on something like these lines may be discerned in Becker (n.d.) on the Javanese shadow-play. However, a potentially radical argument is weakened by a tendency to use the term epistemology as a simple synonym for world view, or outlook of a group occupying a particular position in a social structure. Quite what a system of plural epistemology would imply in this context perhaps needs more careful thought; but the extent of Hindu and Buddhist philosophical influence on Balinese thought is such as not to rule out an interesting potential field of study.

7. This may also be implied by a further association. The other main class of demonic being is that of kala. This is the usual term for time.

8. The relatively smaller impact which mediums seem to have in Tengahpadang on the negotiation of meaning may perhaps be connected with the coarse display put on in states of dissociation. I would not, however, like to put too much stress on this without further inquiry in the field.

9. My impression from a brief survey of different parts of the island is that trance is far less general than is sometimes supposed. Its spectacular nature may contribute to its conspicuousness where it occurs. Certainly my villagers regarded the forms of possession in Pujung or Cemenggaon, where they seem to be more frequent as most odd which runs rather counter to the view that this is a state more natural in the presence than the absence. Given the nature of Balinese cosmology, however, it is certainly an obvious option.

10. I am particularly grateful to Dr. R.H. Barnes for drawing my attention to the need to distinguish between the general process of classification and the negotiation of meaning with which it is closely associated. I have suggested here that not only do symbolic classifications commonly, or indeed generally, depend upon underl ying propositions of an implicit kind; but also that on close inspection even the most clear-cut identifications tend to have alternatives. Dr. Barnes in a personal communication has pointed to what he sees as the fundamental

classification in a society such as Bali in forms like the distinction between east and west, or mountain and sea. As he observes, these are regarded by the Balinese as basic and determine the orientation of much social life, especially in overtly religious activities like temple siting (Tan 1966; Hobart 1978a). He makes the important point that the re-orientation of temples would indeed be a fundamental shift in Balinese categories.

This is a useful example for further examination. First, there is a general theoretical point. Earlier in this chapter I have suggested that the connexion between directions and ritual purity (which underlies, by agreement, the orientation of temples) is related to the proposition that purity is not merely a cultural construct, but a natural property or substance, evident in the order of the world. So it may be argued that the link between temple orientation and the classification of space may be expressed in propositional terms. Second, there is an ethnographic point about the actual orientation of temples. At the eastern end of the island, the pure directions are counterposed, for the axis of east and west and that of towards the mountain and towards the sea overlap such that the purer pole in each is in a different direction. The Balinese must therefore choose which has primacy. More seriously, not all temples are in fact oriented according to the ideal directions of towards the source of water or towards the east, which is the dominant model. In an interesting article, James (1973) has argued that geomantic concerns may provide an alternative framework for the orientation of temples in series. In his account, some of the temples are not facing in the direction of the path of water or to the east. It remains to consider the full range of principles underlying geomantic ideas, but these suggest that even the most basic classifications may have alternatives.

11. This may be represented in more formal terms:

> The status of the temple god determines the status of the congregation,
> The status of the god is low,
> ∴ The status of the congregation is low.

12. It is interesting to note that this innovation was suggested by the relatively right-wing nationalists (although one must take care in identifying Indonesian political parties, as they operate in the villages in Bali, along traditional political continua) in face of protests from the communists! Recourse to these culturally alternative possibilities is not generally indulged in ad hoc, without reference to the wider logical implications. One reason that more fuss was not made by the two wards, according to some informants, was that the nationalists had stolen their thunder, by assuming a platform which the communists could not easily deny.

13. I would now be inclined to review my earlier opinion that it was questionable whether the manifest issue involved greatly affected the participants (1975: 91). At that time my concerns were somewhat different and the present argument about the inherent ambiguity of means and ends was still inchoate. It may just be chance that the faction most active in prosecuting the case was the one led by a priest with a definite concern about the preservation

of rules of purity (infringed - but in which sense (1 or 3) - by extra-marital intercourse) and morality; while those least in favour were the faction of the emergent and aspiring commoners (Faction C, headed by the bendésa), for Jèro Piring was the most innovative stall-keeper and had invested her capital in a rational manner. Against this Faction D was antagonistic to her and their core could also be represented as innovative (Diagram 9:2). Here personal and party political factors may not have been irrelevant.

14. In this account I have made one large assumption. This is that Balinese society recognizes implicitly processes sufficiently akin to standard logic that the type of linking of propositions which I have attempted here makes sense in some form. Not to assume such a position, according to certain views, would be a far more radical, even impossible, venture (Lukes 1970; Hollis 1970). As there is no reason in principle why it is not possible to engage in more careful research in Bali on the form of reasoning recognized as proper, or alternatively intelligible, I would prefer to postpone judgement on the large and often muddled questions about 'rationality' (see the contributions in Wilson 1970; Cooper 1975; Salmon 1978). The Balinese have historical links with a culture with its own developed tradition of reflective inquiry into logic. It will be interesting to see what effect such philosophical considerations have at the village level, if any. In the meantime, however, there is little alternative but to assume the recognition of processes by which propositions are connected in a logical manner.

Chapter 11 Conclusion

This thesis has had three aims. These were: to present a detailed ethnographic record of a southern Balinese village and its field of social relations; to examine the arguments of previous scholars in the area in the light of this material; and to consider the implications which this might have for anthropological theory. In the course of the thesis I have presented ethnographic material on the villagers from the ward of a settlement in the traditional kingdom of Gianyar. Balinese social groupings do not overlap in a simple fashion and the relationship between the membership of different groups and regions was examined in some detail. This suggested that ties tend to convolute locally especially among ordinary peasant villagers. The jural separation of different corporations was accompanies, however, by a complex network of informal exchange relations, by which assets and ties could be mobilized in different arenas. The difference between these levels of social action and their connexion were examined at length. In particular I have attempted to explore the ways in which these are linked to the different forms of interpretation of their social institutions available to the participants. It was suggested that there may be problems in attempting to understand Balinese society in terms of a simple model of its formal characteristics. Examination showed that the principles underlying groups and institutions were open to evaluation in different ways. Part of the thesis was therefore concerned with the discussion of some of the central concepts and the complex and multiple relationships between them, which provide a source of continuity but also allow change as these are variously understood by the actors in different contexts. In the course of examining the ways in which this worked, it became apparent that wider problems of meaning, logic, conceptual categories and indigenous metaphysics were involved. These lie beyond the scope of the present work which may be seen as the prolegomenon to a more detailed study of Balinese culture.

Appendix 1.

Awig-Awig Subak Langkih.

Reporting

1. Whosoever, being any one of the pekasèh (irrigation association section heads) after coming from the dam (near Pujung), must report to the klian pekasèh (association head).

Regulations (Palakerta).

1. I, all the members of Subak Langkih:
   Keraman
   Telunayah
   Umadalem
   Langkih
   Gagah (Sukabayu)
   I am very happy to make a set of awig-awig or palakerta for the rice fields. This is valid as of the day of Anggara-Pon in the week of Menail (11.3.69; see Goris 1960a).
   Whosoever being a member of the subak infringes the regulations or the palakerta, as described below, must suffer fine or payment.
   If a person who incures a fine does not pay and does not intend to pay this fine, I, the members of the subak will expropriate the padi of the person who has incurred the fine in a quantity commensurate with the size of the fine. If this is not granted, I, the members of the subak will close the supply of water to the fields of this person.

Offences and Fines (Indik Dedosan wiyadin gegendan).

1. If at a pemaruan agung (main dividing block),
   a. If water is stolen at night by ngempetin (closing one of the channels) Rp. 200
   b. If water is stolen by making a hole in, or below the dividing block of a pemaruan at night Rp. 200
   c. If water is stolen by day by closing one of the channels of the pemaruan Rp. 100
   d. If water is stolen by day by making a hole in, or below the dividing block of the pemaruan Rp. 100

2. If, from a daanan alit (a side-channel)
   a. If water is stolen by night by closing it Rp. 50
   b. If water is stolen by nguwusan, making a hole Rp. 50
   c. If water is stolen by day by closing it Rp. 25
   d. If water is stolen by day by making a hole Rp. 25

3.	If a telabah (main channel) is destroyed by day or night	Rp. 500
	If a hole is made in a telabah by day or night	Rp. 500
	If a hole is made in a jelinjingan (smaller channel?)	Rp. 250
	If a hole is made in the bank of a neighbour's field	Rp. 250
4.	If earth is taken from a payal (bank between two channels) using any instrument whether for the purpose of stealing water or otherwise	Rp. 100
	If earth is taken from a pundukan (bank of ricefield) whether for the purpose of stealing water or otherwise	Rp. 100
5.	If one carries a light in order to search for lindung(eels) before padi is planted in the fields	Rp. 250
	If traps for eels are fitted in the fields at night after rice has been transplanted	Rp. 250
	If one looks for certain kinds of animal (snails etc: keraca, susul or kakul) by day after transplanting	Rp. 25
	If one catches eels by day if padi has been transplanted (by digging to get to their holes)	Rp. 50
	If one catches eels after harvest to the extent that banks are damaged	Rp. 100
	If one steals kaper (a fish) from another's fields	Rp. 500
6.	If one steals any type of dry crop of any sort from the fields of a member (or if an outsider steals this)	Rp. 100
	If one has a cow which is free and eats grass in the rice fields, or if one has a cow which one takes to the fields to nangon (pasture)	Rp. 100
7.	If the roofing of a kubu (hut or lean-to for shelter) is stolen	Rp. 250
	If the fencing round a seed-plot is stolen	Rp. 100
	If a sanggah limas (small thatched shrine) is stolen	Rp. 250
	If a sanggah duwasa (low simple shrine) is stolen	Rp. 250
	If a pènjor mekukung (type of flag used in rites is stolen	Rp. 50
8.	If ducks are taken to the fields before the irrigation section head has given notice granting permission, even if the nyungsung ceremony (see Hobart 1978b) has been performed or if there are merana (pests) this is forbidden and is fined at the rate per head of:	Rp. 25
	If ducklings are taken to the fields the fine is the same (i.e. under the same conditions)	Rp. 25
9.	If it is the day of Nyepi (annual purification and silence) it is forbidden to go to the rice fields with the exception of persons having an official duty, that is the pekaseh (irrigation section head) and telik (guards). If this is not followed a fine is imposed of	Rp. 100

If it is the day of Nyepi and ducks are taken to the fields even if it is during a period when ducks are allowed in the fields, this is fined at the rate of Rp. 25 for each duck.

10. Concerning cutting grass in the land of a neighbour, this is fined Rp. 100.
If one requests this then the request should be reported to the owner of that grass

11. It is not permitted to go to the rice fields at night. Persons who disobey are liable to be fined Rp. 50 (This applies in practice only during periods of water shortage.)

12. If one is not a subak member one is not permitted to redirect subak water nor to steal it. The fine for doing this is Rp. 50.

13. Those who own pondok (field huts), those who possess cattle in those field huts or other domestic animals are permitted to go to the fields at night but must carry a sign of a lamp (a bobok, bamboo tube filled with paraffin - this means that they can be seen and their presence is legitimate). If a person goes to the fields with neither a bobok or sundih (torch of dried grass) then he is liable to a fine if this is nine o'clock in the evening.

14. If one nyorokin (cleans the banks of fields) this may not be done using steel (this means in fact bamboo knives or sickles are permitted as they cannot be used to slice earth off and so reduce the size of others holdings or increase one's own). Those who do not do this are fined Rp. 500
If one ngampadin (cleans the banks with a madik, another form of knife) then only grass may be taken and it is forbidden to damage the bank of a family member (i.e. subak member - the use of the term family is worth noting)

15. If there is any member whatsoever of the subak who steals measuring blocks or any part he is liable to a fine of Rp. 100

16. If a person steals a fence of dry crops (in fact any fence in the rice fields) he is liable to a fine of Rp. 100

There follow certain minor variations dealing with fines in special section of the association and listing mainly fines for stealing from particularly important channels.

Note on Translation:

This list of regulations has been transcribed and translated as closely as possible to the Balinese original. For this reason some of the English may appear stilted, but this is so to the Balinese too. The same layout has been kept exactly, so the reader will note the switch from numbered sub-sections in rules 1-2, but their omission thereafter. Also from section 10 on the fines are included in the text. All parentheses are mine.

Appendix 2: The Ward Regulations for Br. Pisangkaja.

Regulations (Palakerta)

1. If a person steals any good, then this thief is fined, according to the size of the value of the good which has been stolen.

   If (a person) destroys (possessions) he is fined a half of the value of the goods damaged, and must return the capital (original).

2. If a person picks up any good (left lying around) in the region of Pisangkaja the man who collects this must report to the klian; he obtains one fifth of the cost of the goods which have been picked up. If this is not done within three days and someone else reports or remembers the goods mentioned; the man who picks up the goods is fined according to (Regulation) 1.

Domestic Animals (Wewalungan).

1. If a person sets free an animal to the point that it destroys the crops of another person, the animal is fined.
   If this occurs during the day the fine is Rp. 5.
   If this occurs at night the fine is Rp. 10.
   The proceeds of this fine are divided in two, half goes to the person (official) responsible, half to the banjar. The original must also be returned.

2. If an animal is freed and someone enquires about the animal and the official responsible does not succeed in catching the animal alone, then the banjar, on the striking of the slit gong (kulkul) must go and assist. The fine is Rp. 10 for this (for failing to turn up).

3. If an animal is free and eats the crops of another person (timpal literally: a friend) the fine is Rp. 5 during the daytime, Rp. 10 at night. The original must be returned reckoned in cash.

4. After the animal which has been running free is caught, if it has a rope attached must be tied at the edge of the road and is given a sign (sawèn); the person who catches the animal must report to the klian, if more than half a day elapses after this, the catcher is fined twice the normal fine. (This refers to the official responsible.)

5. If a person deliberately sets an animal free which belongs to another person, and he is observed, the person who frees the above mentioned animal is fined Rp. 15. Whether during the day or at night. If this reaches the point where crops are consumed or destroyed, the person who frees the animal must pay back the damage by a return of the original reckoned in cash.

6. If a person meets an animal which is free and is eating crops and does not catch the beast and is followed by another person who catches the animal and reports the matter to the klian: the person who fails to stop and the owner are both fined the same.

7. If an animal eats any crops and the owner of the crops arrives and chases the animal to the point of danger or death (danger refers here to injury) he has to pay a fine of Rp. 100 and he must pay the cost of the dead animal to the owner but he has the right to the dead animal's carcase; if the animal is wounded by the owner of the crops or injures itself then this person must pay a fine of Rp. 100 to the banjar and must pay the cost of medicine.

8. If a person catches an animal, finally the event is examined and it is found that the accusation is false (no crops have been damaged) the fine for the false accuser is double. (i.e. Rp. 20. instead of Rp. 10.)

9. If a person deliberately ties an animal in the area of his own crops and another animal which is free comes and eats there as well, the second animal is not fined. If a person ties or leads an animal to graze where a prohibition on grazing has been introduced, he incurs a fine of Rp. 5.

Buildings (Wewangunan).

1. If a person throws an object at a house or another construction, the thrower is fined Rp. 50, and must pay the costs of the repair of damage thus caused, in cash; in addition he must pay offerings (banten) (here follow names of offerings);
tebasan perascita
tebasan durmangala } (merascita bebangunan;
sorohan cenik
and the payment to the person who must perform the ceremony.

If this affects an ancestor shrine (sanggah or meradjan), he must pay the following:
pekliyangan
pengulapan
dapetan and tebasan perascita*
this is adequate.

If this affects a temple (pura)
bèbèk belang kalung
siap pancawarna
and after that
banten pengulapan, according to size (status) of the temple.

2. If a person sets a house, ancestor shrine or temple on fire or any other construction the person in question is fined Rp. 100 and must recompense the damage in cash; he further incurs banten perascita.

Humans (Manusa).

1. If a person strikes another with any weapon or object whether a friend or not, the aggressor is fined:
if neither swelling ensues nor blood is spilt - 50 Rp.
if swelling ensues - 100 Rp.
if blood flows - 100 Rp.
He must also pay the costs of medicine and the victim is entitled to bring the matter to the attention of the local authorities. In the event of death, the matter is also handed over the authorities.

2. If a person swears (uses basa kasar), the person is liable to a fine of Rp. 25, and must pay a perascita to the person offended in accordance with the high or low status of that person. If this is not a person who has been consecrated, i.e. a priest (mewinten) this may be penglukatan and the offering sorohan canik is adequate.

   If this is a person who has been consecrated, the banten pawintenan (i.e. full repurification) are adequate.

3. If there is a person who places an undesireable object: such as poison, magical devices (gunas) faeces and any other. If a person suffers damage from these, and is accused with adequate evidence, he can be fined Rp. 100. and must enquire with the victim (if the victim wants to institute proceedings in law).

4. If a person pins up or sends anonymous letters in the territory of Pisangkaja, the person who did so, is liable to be fined Rp. 100. If the contents of the letter are polluting (cemer), for example, obscene language, this is increased to include banten perascita, consisting of a perascita alit.

5. If a person catches a snare (sungga) which has been placed without a warning sign the fine is Rp. 250. and must pay the costs of medicine advised by the medical practitioner, and may also incur government law.

6. If a person changes the position of a sign (indicating a snare) without being instructed by the owner, the person responsible must pay a fine of Rp. 25. And if a person then catches a snare, the offender is liable to a further Rp. 25. All costs of medicine and any further legal proceedings fall not on the owner but on the person who moved the sign.

7. If a person is accused of any offence and doesn't confess, he must make an oath, the place being decided by the accuser, but the offerings are paid for by the accuser. But if there are other forms of evidence, the accused is not permitted to swear an oath (sumpah) but incurs the fine in Regulation 1, above.

Matters Involving Women (Maisteri-isterian).

1. If a person takes a woman by force to marry her and the woman does not agree, the marriage is annulled and the man who carries out the capture (melegandang) is fined Rp. 500. (It will be noted that this rule has never been enforced even in the form prior to that of the present regulations, see Chapter 7 for a discussion).

2. If a person (outsider) takes a woman by force to marry her, when the woman is married to a member of the banjar of Pisangkala (provided that she doesn't agree) he is liable to a fine of Rp. 750. If a person from a banjar other than Pisangkaja wishes to enter the state of separation before marriage, see Chapter 7, (ngerorod) here, and to spend the night, the head of the household must report to the klian. If this rule is not observed the host incurs a fine of Rp. 250.

3. If a person has devorced and then remarries the divorced spouse, the male incurs a fine of Rp. 100 (unless both partners have remarried in the interval - possibly linked to ideas of avoiding reversal discussed).

4. If a person elopes with a married person, he must pay a fine of Rp. 1000. If the spouse of the married woman still feels offended, he may report the matter to the government for further proceedings.

5. If an unmarried girl becomes pregnant and she names a man as her lover (and the genitor of the child) the man so named must marry the girl, but if the male does not admit his role, the girl must take an oath and pay the offerings. But if the male is prepared to take an oath that he has not had sexual relations with the girl, she is liable (if she accuses him) of paying a fine of Rp. 100, but the male must pay for the offerings. On the day fixed for the oath-taking, if one of two parties fails to turn up, the offender must pay a fine equal to the cost of the offerings. (This is not a joint oath, but the person who is not taking the oath must appear as a witness.)

6. If there is no male to complete the marriage ritual with a pregnant girl she is not permitted to enter a temple and after the birth of her child, both are forbidden to enter a temple until she has obtained a husband.

7. If there is an unmarried girl who is pregnant, she must perform the ceremony of caru manca sata consisting of a bèbèk belangkalung, this form of caru is sufficient and should be performed in the Pura Puseh. The ceremony must be carried out in the fashion for a small malik sumpah (see Chapter 10, case 20) and at the time she must perform the ceremony of pejati (this is part of the marriage rite to ancestors) to the Batara ring Puseh because she is in a state of leteh. If she has performed this ceremony she is free to enter a temple.

Land and Duties of Household Heads (Tanah, Ayah).

1. If a household head dies and leaves a child who is not yet of age to perform the duties of ayah (member of any group, here the ward But cf. rule 2), the child is ketapuk (provided with temporary dispensation from certain forms of labour and expenses) until he is of age to become a member (at about 18 years of age.)

2. If the deceased household head is a compound owner (ajah désa) and his wife is still alive, or vice versa, they become nèkèl (a special status with reduced duties in the ceremonies).

3. If a person dies and leaves a wife or husband, but owns no land (i.e. is not a compound owner) the remaining spouse is entitled to stop their membership of the banjar and be considered as part of another household (kekuwub).

4. If a compound owner is old and has no offspring, he must adopt a child from the closest male kin available.

5. If a compound owner has a child or children, but only females, the female must inherit the compound as if a male (meawak purus - to have a body with a penis).

6. If a person joins the banjar, stops and wishes to become a member again (without sufficient reason) he is liable to a fine of Rp. 100. If a person requests help from the banjar, for example moving buildings, communal work, he must pay only Rp. 25.

7. If a person must go to work for the banjar he is allowed to be an absentee if he is ill, making roofing for a house, has a ceremony at his house, has to go to a traditional paramedical expert (dasaran), is finding ingredients for medicine; he then pays half of the normal fine.

8. If there are fixed contributions to the banjar consisting of one of several categories of tools, or other forms of goods, they must be reported to the klian so that the goods can be labelled as belonging to the person in question. If there is no note with a name because there has been no report made, the fine is Rp. 10. If any object disappears which has been reported in the temple or elsewhere, the banjar must return the equivalent of the missing item. (This covers communal work where tools, trays etc. may be mislaid etc.)

9. If a person is a legitimate absentee (mepuangkid) because he is caring for an ill person he is not permitted this reason for longer than a day; if he is he incurs a double fine of the normal rate for absenteeism without reason. (i.e. if the normal fine is Rp. 10, he incurs Rp. 20).

10. If a person provides a false reason for legitimate absenteeism, he incurs double the full rate for absence.

11. If there is a banjar meeting it is forbidden to bring any work of one's own there, if a person does bring work, he is fined as if he were absent without reason.

12. If an official of the banjar is speaking and is interrupted by persons talking about other matters he is liable to a fine of Rp. 10. This is doubled if the offender starts to object and doesn't wish to pay. If a person fails to pay any official fine, he is liable to instant confiscation of goods to pay that fine.

13. Any citizen of the state of Indonesia, whose letters of introduction are good may be permitted to become a member of the banjar (but does not have the right to insist on this) and must follow the banjar regulations and the orders of the officials.

14. On the question of contributions, if they are past the date for collection the offender is liable to seizure of his goods (ngerampas).

In the Event of Death (Rikalaning ana wong pejah).

1. If someone dies and there is not yet a propitious day, the corpse must be buried on the day of death (in fact, may be). The person who has the right of ownership of the courtyard and the immediate neighbours (pengapit, who incur pollution Chapter 8) may not strike the slit gongs (kulkul to inform of the death), may not sing kekawin, when there is a suitable day they are permitted to inform the banjar (they are required to in fact), to strike the kulkul and the burial ceremony must be performed. (At the time of burial on an unpropitious day only immediate neighbours may bring milled rice to the house of the dead, in accordance with adat. The others must wait on the propitious day.)

2. Again, if at the time of death there is a festival (literally: work, kariya) in one of village temples (kahyangan) such as an odalan or penyimpenan Batara, if work has begun on cake preparation, (i.e. the ceremony is really under way), it is not permitted (whether a propitious day or not) to perform a proper burial (the corpse is buried with minimal rites).

3. If a priest of village temple dies, he may not be buried.

4. When the territory (unspecified - understood as banjar) is polluted (sebel) it is not permitted to enter the Pura Puseh (here village temple in fact) with the exception of a temple priest (here Pura Désa and Pura Dalem) because the priest of a customary village temple does not incur impurity as a result of the death of another person. (It will be recalled from Chapter 8 that temple priests must be secluded from death).

5. If a person from another désa (i.e. not the (banjar) désa of Pisangkaja and Gagah) requests to be buried in the graveyard of Pisangkaja, he may be buried here, but pays a cost of burial of Rp. 100.

6. If a person buries a corpse on a day before a propitious time is announced, a ceremony must be provided and offered to the Meraja Patih shrine overlooking graveyard and must include a daksina and ajuman putih kuning.

7. When a propitious day occurs for burial, offerings must be presented to Batara Dalem, to the centre of the great graveyard (Meraja Patih) also to Batara Pretiwi (the earth, here place of burial) in order to safeguard the corpse. The offerings are a sucị, a daksina and kélanan dampulan (given to the meraja Patih, the other offerings are not mentioned). This does not fix the time (for cremation). The offerings used are peleb (not returnable: but the possession of the death specialist - balian bangké, see Chapter 10).

8. If a person is impure (sebel) due to a death in his house, even if the period for impurity is finished, if the ceremony of nyaha Brahma has not been held, he is not allowed to enter a temple. If he ignores these rules, he is liable to a fine of the ceremony of pesapuhan manca sata (which should read pesapuhan panca kelud, sweeping or purifying the five directions) He is permitted to enter the outer court of a temple.

Household Boundaries (Bebaledan).

1. If a person wishes to plant close to the borders of his compound, the plants may not be higher than two metres and distant from the border-line by at least a metre. This rule applies to any sort of plant or tree with the exception of coconut trees. (This applies if close to a house in another compound.)
If not close to a building, either a house or an ancestor shrine, for example if planted in the teba or tegal, garden land or dry fields, the planting may be according to the wishes of the planter. If the trees or crops exceed the limits of the boundary that which stretches over may be taken freely by anyone and a string used (to measure the exact position of the boundary and the plants which are involved). If the planter feels offended at the loss, he is liable to a fine for obstruction (pelanggaran).
Either dry fields or compounds which are fenced are liable to the rule that the fence to the North of the property belongs to the person who owns the land to the South.

Forced Purchase of Pigs or Calves (kekeran numas cèleng mwang godèl)

1. If any member of the banjar owns a pig which is subject to forced purchase the price must be fixed by the banjar in accordance with that usual (market price) and an additional sum, 'the price of affection'. If this is not suitable to the owner, the purchase will still be made on a basis of weight and the 'price of affection' will not be paid. (This is a small additional amount for the loss of the animal.)

2. If a pig is slightly ill, the full price must be paid by the banjar (i.e. if the group purchases an animal which unknown to them is ill).

3. If a calf is to be purchased there must be a receipt of purchase. (If a man has just bought a calf and still has the receipt it is exempt from a compulsory purchase order, but see below.)

4. If there is another calf (other than the one mentioned above, which has just been purchased) the other must be taken at a price equivalent to the market value of the beast if for slaughter with the additional 'price for affection' of Rp. 100.

5. If there is no other calf than one which has just been bought that calf must be subject to forced sale at the same price as that written in the contract of purchase and with an additional Rp. 100 for affection.

6. Whosoever is the subject of a forced sale (as owner of the animal) if he does not cooperate with the above explanation is liable to a fine of Rp. 100. If he does not pay, he must be liable to seizure of goods.

Additional Regulations Included Afterwards.

1. If there is a man and a woman who have sexual relations, to the point that this is generally known (and proven) then they should perform a ceremony as soon as possible (of marriage). If this does not occur, it is not permitted for them to enter a temple for such persons are impure.

2. If a person does not do guard duty (when it is his turn), he incurs a fine of Rp. $2\frac{1}{2}$.
If a person does not do guard duty three times, he is fined Rp. 10.
Refusal or Obstruction of any sort is fined Rp. 25.
If a person fails to do guard duty three times or more, the banjar is not liable to account for actions taken by the government, the offender must take responsibility himself.

3. Members of HANZIP (civil defense, see Chapter 2, case 4), are entitled to the proceeds of each harvest of 50 kg. of padi from the members of the banjar of Pisangkaja.

The kelian of the Banjar of Pisangkaja

All the regulations in this book may change or be changed as necessary.

The kulkul is struck once in the case of death. (Incorrect: this should read 'three times'.) As a sign that a death has occured.

* perascita is the name of a purificatory offering of which there is a range varying in contents, value and so forth according to its intended function. Sometimes the exact form is specified (e.g. Rule 2 (for humans) where it is small, unless for a high caste person where Rule 4 (for humans) takes precedence) or unspecified as in Rule 2 (for humans) where this looks clear but not only largely omits high castes, but allows a very varying interpretation if penglukatan, lustration, to remove impurity. The use of apparently clear terms hides extensive form for different interpretation.

General Note on Translation:

As with the translation of the irrigation association regulations, I have tried to minimize the extent of editing, even at times at the cost of a certain grammaticality. The form of the rules may be directly relevant to their interpretation by orators who are capable of making hair-splitting differences in the reading of these. Even so, in order to make them intelligible to the reader, I have been obliged to introduce a greater precision than that found in the original. Balinese terms are retained at certain points - for instance banjar- in order to point to the extent to which the elision of the two local corporations the ward (banjar patus) and the customary village sub-section (banjar desa) is embodied in the rules. A similar problem arises with reference to the officials elected by these groups. As Balinese does not necessarily distinguish singular and plural, it is in fact not possible to tell if one or both headmen are being referred to. The formulation of these rules leaves admirable scope for variable interpretation. The parentheses are mine

APPENDIX 3: SOURCES OF FIXED AND PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL IN BR. PISANGKAJA.

	No:	Name:	1972 h.	s.	g. (value)	a.	c. (no.)	1949 sawah (ha.)	tegal	1972 sawah (ha.)	tegal	Change sawah (ha.)	tegal
	NE1	Cok. Putera	5	5	3	e	23	11.25	3.18	6.05	1.75	-5.2	-1.43
	NE2	Cok. Jangji	-	3	1	-	2	.59	-	.41	-	-.18	-
P		Cok. Putu	z	2	1	a	-	-	-	.59	-	+.59	-
		Cok.A.Lanus	z	-	1	a	-	.67	.23	.295	.23	-.375	-
		Cok.A.Nama	y	3	1	a	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Cok. Oka	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
P		Cok. Ngurah	y	-	1	e	42	-	.515	.155	.515	+.155	-
	NE3	Degdeg †	3	3	2	c	10	.36	.03	.36	.03	-	-
		Tiles	x	-	-	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Tempil	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE4	Dw.Md.Gempol	2	3	2	a	3	-	.03	-	.03	-	-
P	NE5	Kénak	1	1	1	a	-	-	-	.31	-	+.31	-
P	NE6	Togog	1	3	2	-	53	-	-	.305	.04	+.305	+.04
		Tènda	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	NE7	Ni Kt.Repun	1	2	3	a	6	-	.06	.35	.06	+.35	-
		Ni Mariani	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE8	Dada	3	3	3	d	14	.46	.33	.46	.33	-	-
	NE9	A.A.Anom	2	3	3	a	12	.51	.13	.51	.13	-	-
	NE10	A.A.R.Jasa	2	3	3	a	7	.585	.25	.585	.25	-	-
		A.A.Oka	y	-	-	a	-	.235	-	.235	-	-	-
	NE11	Karda	3	4	3	a	13	.41	.105	.68	.105	+.27	-
	NE12	Lanis	3	4	3	d	27	.795	1.755	.795	1.755	-	-
I	NE13	Kara	1	2	3	c	10	-	-	.10	.11	+.10	+.11
	NE14	Ni Kari	2	4	2	a	5	.665	.29	.665	.18	-	-.11
	NE15	Badra	4	4	4	e	43	1.38	1.03	1.53	1.03	+.15	-
	NE16	Gampil	2	2	4	3	23	.35	.28	.35	.28	-	-
I		Gerondong	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.18	.115	+.18	+.115
		Gelèdèr	x	-	-	d	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE17	Surung	3	3	1	a	23	.55	.285	.55	.285	-	-
	NE18	Kingsan	4	4	4	b	21	.88	.695	.85	.695	-.03	-
	NE19	Pica	2	3	2	c	15	.37	.105	.37	.105	-	-
	NE20	Kampih	2	3	3	d	8	.34	.18	.34	.18	-	-
P	NE21	Sukèn	2	2	1	a	3	-	-	.155	-	+.155	-
	NE22	Jambul	1	3	3	a	6	.575	.96	-	.24	-.575	-.72
	NE23	Sujana	3	2	1	b	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NE24	Serandig	3	4	3	a	8	1.105	.24	.405	.24	-.70	-
	NE25	Yasa	2	3	3	e	11	.555	.58	.37	.48±	-.185	-.10±
I	NE26	Ngembon	2	1	2	d	1	-	-	.185	.10±	+.185	-.10±
		Kedeng	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

APPENDIX 3: SOURCES OF CAPITAL - Sheet 2.

	No:	Name:	1972 h.	s.	g.	a.	c. (no.)	1949 sawah (ha.)	1949 tegal (ha.)	1972 sawah (ha.)	1972 tegal (ha.)	Change sawah (ha.)	Change tegal (ha.)
	NW1	Tagen	3	3	4	a	11	-	.245	-	.34	-	+.095
	NW2	Dw.Kt.Gempul	3	3	4	a	10	-	.21	-	.21	-	-
	NW3	Dw.Ny.Gempil	4	3	4	c	9	.21	.365	.49	.365	+.28	-
	NW4	Lasiya	4	5	4	a	5	.41	.215	.41	.12	-	-.095
	NW5	Laba	3	4	4	d	12	.395	.16	.395	.16	-	-
	NW6	Tonik	2	3	3	-	23	.24	.50	.24	.28	-	-.22
		Mupu	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Kacir	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Jèro Geriya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW7	Mara	3	3	3	b	16	.29	.09	.29	.09	-	-
		Teken	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Kembar	y	-	-	b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW8	Surata	4	4	3	-	5	.80	.505	.56	.355	-.24	-.15
I		Lonid	x	-	-	d	-	-	-	.19	-	+.19	-
P/I		Gampil	x	-	-	b	9	-	-	.40	.15	+.40	+.15
		Ni Kelepon	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	NW9	Mejul	3	3	3	b	9	-	.075	.45	.15	+.45	+.075
		Rebit	x	-	-	b	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW10	Gendul	5	4	3	b	5	2.07	.10	1.22	.10	-.85	-
P/I		Gelis	z	-	-	a	13	-	.45	.46	.45	+.45	-
		Keredek	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW11	Gangsar	5	5	3	e	25	1.305	1.69	1.73	1.69	+.425	-
	NW12	Dugdug	3	3	3	a	5	.36	.08	.36	.08	-	-
		Belet	x	-	-	d	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW13	Ni Lungid	3	3	2	d	4	.22	.075	.22	.075	-	-
	SW1	Tangèn	2	3	3	c	7	.32	.10	.32	.10	-	-
	SW2	Tarik	3	5	4	e	22	.64	1.32	.64	1.32	-	-
		Kenyung	x	1	2	c	3	-	.10	-	.10	-	-
	SW3	J.M.Désa	5	5	3	c	18	.525	.24	.79	.675	+.265	+.435
	SW4	Degdeg Mangku	5	-	1	e	4	.52	.435	.75	-	+.23	-.435
		Terima	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW5	(Ni)A.A.Putu	1	3	1	a	3	-	.04	-	.04	-	-
	SW6	Rubik	1	1	2	b	12	.37	-	.37	-	-	-
		Ni Cenok	-	1	-	b	18	-	1.56	-	1.56	-	-
	SW7	Kartana	3	3	3	e	23	.435	.395	.435	.395	-	-
		Ni Polokan	x	1	2	d	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW8	Neka	4	5	3	a	17	.845	.76	.81	.92	-.035	+.16
		Kencan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Mukun	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

APPENDIX 3: SOURCES OF CAPITAL - Sheet 3.

	No:	Name:	1972 h.	s.	g.	a.	c. (value) (no.)	1949 sawah (ha.)	tegal (ha.)	1972 sawah (ha.)	tegal (ha.)	Change sawah (ha.)	tegal (ha.)
C	SW9	Pukel	2	2	3	b	11	-	.685	.135	.28	+.135	-.405
		Mongoh	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW10	Munjuk	2	4	3	b	20	.96	.61	.81∓	.51	-.15∓	-.10
I		Digdig	y	-	-	b	4	-	-	.15∓	.10	+.15∓	+.10
		Dugdug	y	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SW11	Lembut	3	3	3	d	21	-	.165	-	.165	-	-
	SW12	Selem	3	4	2	e	10	.38	.24	.38	.20	-	-.04
		Tomblos	x	-	-	d	7	.18	-	.18	-	-	-
	SW13	Ni Muklen	1	1	2	a	4	-	-	-	.04	-	+.04
	SW14	Bidel	5	5	3	e	25	.53	.17	1.38	.17	+.85	-
I		Dayuh	x	-	-	a	3	-	-	.17	-	+.17	-
		Sayub	x	-	-	e	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE1	Sama	3	4	3	a	12	.65	.12	.65	.34	-	+.22
		Balik	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Lipet	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE2	Pudet	3	3	3	d	17	.57	.62	.57	.62	-	-
	SE3	Suberatha	5	4	3	-	28	.645	.71	.905	.71	+.26	-
		I Dungka	y	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Ni Doneng	-	-	-	a	9	-	-	-	.16	-	+.16
		Bawa	x	-	-	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE4	A.A.Darma	2	3	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
		A.A.A.Plasa	-	-	-	-	-	-	.125	-	.125	-	-
		Jèro Jempiring	z	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE5	Tagen	3	3	3	2	43	.22	.325	.575	.52	+.355	+.195
	SE6	Delep	2	3	2	a	8	.32	.03	.32	.03	-	-
		Keper	x	-	-	c	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE7	Dw.Md.Tagel	1	1	3	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Dw.Ny.Laba	-	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE8	Ni Tambun	1	1	2	a	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya	3	2(5)	3	e	11	1.075	.99	.845	.99	-.23	-
	SE10	A.A.A.Jasa	2	2	2	b	6	-	.07	-	.07	-	-
	SE11	Dw.Pt.Pandé	1	1	2	a	3	-	.04	-	.04	-	-
	SE12	Rugrug	3	3	1	c	4	-	.015	-	.015	-	-
		Séro	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Sorog	y	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Suradnya	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	3	3	1	b	18	-	-	.37	.09	+.37	+.09
	SE14	Sandi	1	2	2	a	8	-	.15	-	.06	-	-.09
	SE15	Ni Kintil	2	2	3	-	20	-	.15	-	.15	-	-

APPENDIX 3: SOURCES OF CAPITAL - Sheet 4.

	No:	Name:	1972 h.	s.	g. (value)	a.	c. (no.)	1949 sawah (ha.)	tegal	1972 sawah (ha.)	tegal	Change sawah (ha.)	tegal
	SE16	Kontèng	2	2	2	d	9	.11	.17	.11	.17	-	-
		Gading	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE17	J.M.Dalem Kauh	3	3	3	a	12	.285	.15	-	.15	-.285	-
	SE18	Pageh	1	1	2	-	9	.67	.285	.67	.285	-	-
	SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	3	3	3	c	4	-	.14	-	.14	-	-
	SE20	Rantun	4	3	3	d	32	.85	.12	1.21	.12	+.36	-
		Kaling	x	-	-	e	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE21	Cekeg	3	5	3	d	9	.20	.51	.52	.51	+.32	-
	SE22	Dungki	2	4	2	b	3	.39	.22	.39	.22	-	-
	SE23	Tedun	3	3	2	b	16	1.16	.75	1.515	.75	+.355	-
	SE24	Silir	3	3	1	a	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Jontol	x	-	-	a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE25	Cekeg	2	2	1	b	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	SE26	Dw.Ny.Geriya	3	3	2	c	26	.57	.045	.57	.045	-	-
	NW14	Ni_Ngambet_	4	4	1	a	5	-	-	-	.05±	-	+.05±
	NW15	Ni_Sinah_	4	2	1	a	1	-	-	-	.05±	-	+.05±
	NW16	Keted	3	3	1	c	-	-	-	-	.05±	-	+.05±
	NW17	A.A.Putera_	2	1	1	a	-	5.06	-	.475	.10	-4.585	+.10
	NW18	Md.Sila	2	2	1	e	-	-	-	-	.10	-	+.10
		Md. Gina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW19	Ni_Antrog*	2	2	4	a	?	-	.46	-	.715	-	+.255
	NW20	Reca_	2	1	2	e	9	-	-	-	.20	-	+.20
	NW21	Kisid	1	1	3	c	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	NW22	Nampa	3	3	3	d	2	-	-	.26	-	+.26	-
	NW23	Dugligan_	3	3	4	a	47	.34	.48	.34	.48	-	-
	NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila_	2	2	3	e	17	.60±	.295	1.05	.295	+.45	-
		Dw.Ny.Kelila	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW25	Geningan_	4	4	4	e	33	.72	.54	1.425	.54	+.705	-
		Racik	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NW26	Dayuh	2	2	4	c	63	-	.42	-	.42	-	-
C	NW28	Nyèmbèng_	2	3	4	c	34	-	1.315	.825	.49	+.825	-.825
	SW15	Gomboh_Runti_	2	2	3	b	16	-	-	-	.12	-	+.12
	SW16	Sukri	3	3	4	e	18	.565	.77	.81	.77	+.245	-
	SW17	Darna	2	2	3	e	11	-	-	-	.215	-	+.215
	SW18	Ni_Dehen_	1	1	4	d	17	.105	-	.105	.40	-	+.40
	SW19	Karda	3	3	3	c	18	-	-	-	.35	-	+.35
	SW20	Dani_	3	3	4	e	15	-	-	-	.35	-	+.35
	SW21	Gomboh_Suti	1	1	1	b	-	-	-	-	.06±	-	+.06±

APPENDIX 3: SOURCES OF CAPITAL - Sheet 5.

No:	Name:	1972 h.	s.	g. (value)	a.	c. (no.)	1949 sawah tegal (ha.)		1972 sawah tegal (ha.)		Change sawah tegal (ha.)	
SW22	Kemplung	2	2	1	c	25	-	-	-	.275	-	+.275
SW23	Sadiya	2	3	1	a	3	-	-	-	.075	-	+.075
SW24	Longsog	2	3	1	c	-	-	-	-	.075	-	+.075
SW25	Bakta	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	.07	-	+.07
SW26	Kembar Lèkok	2	3	2	a	6	.295	.15	.295	.15	-	-

Code:
- h. = compound buildings and houses
- s. = shrines to ancestors
- g. = garden-land within compound
- a. = domestic animals
- c. = coconut trees
- P = purchased land (for previously landless households only
- I = inherited land see Table 5:4, for compilation)
- P/I = some land purchased, other land inherited
- \+ = approximate area, but not yet officially surveyed
- () = for Dw.Kt. Geriya's shrines, the figure in the column refers to his compound shrine, but he also has a large merajan beside it, which is a very expensive construction indeed.
- * = for some reason, Ni Antrog is omitted from my records for coconut holdings. These are fairly extensive + 30 (?).
- † = the figures for garden land for NE1, 2, 3 and 4 is approximate as they were originally surveyed together as part of the court This is the area entered in the records, but close measurement showed deviation. The correct figure for NE3 for instance is given in footnote 11. in this chapter, at 0.07 ha. not 0.03.

Calculation of Value from Table for Capital:

For: buildings (not pengempian)
shrines
gardens

- 1 = Rp. 25,000 or less
- 2 = Rp. 25-50,000
- 3 = Rp. 50-100,000
- 4 = Rp. 100-200,000
- 5 = Rp. 200,000 or more

For animals:

- a = Rp. 5,000 or less
- b = Rp. 5-10,000
- c = Rp. 10-15,000
- d = Rp. 15-20,000
- e = Rp. 20,000 or more

For: pengempian huts in compounds:

- x = Rp. 10,000 or less
- y = Rp. 10-25,000
- z = Rp. 25-50,000

For: riceland in 1970 of good quality:
Rp. 6,000 per ara (1/100th. hectare).
As the quality varies this is the ceiling figure.

APPENDIX 4. SHARE-CROPPING AGREEMENTS AND HARVEST YIELDS IN PISANGKAJA: 1971-2.
(this includes pawning (ngadéang and melaisin)where this involves tenancy)

Origin:	Landlord:	Yield: (Nett)	Origin:	Tenant:	Yield: (Nett)	Relationship:	Owns Land:	Terms of Contract:
NE1	Cok. Putera	360	NE2	Cok. A. Nama	180	Lineage	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	640	NW16	Keted	320	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	320	SW15	Gomboh Runti	160	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	870	SW17	Darna	440	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	420	SW19	Karda	210	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	1000	SW20	Dani	500	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	460	SW22	Kemplung	230	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	460	SW23	Sadiya	230	Servant	x	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	330	Manuaba	?	?	Servant	?	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	290	Manuaba	?	?	Servant	?	nelon
NE1	Cok. Putera	520	Manuaba	?	?	Servant	?	nelon
NE2	Cok. Putu	240	NE2	Cok. Oka	240	B.	x	nandu
NE2	Cok. A. Lanus	480	NE2	*Cok. A. Nama	240	½B	x	nelon
NE5	Togog	740	SE6	Keper	370	-	x	nelon
NE7	Ni Repun	410	SE12	Rugrug	240	ZS	x	nelon (clean:all costs to landlord)
NE11	Karda	400	SW2	Kenyung	40	Worker	x	Open: tenant asks padi when needed
NE15	Badra	-	NW21	Kisid	-	FBS	x	Open: as above but land varies each time
NE18	Kingsan	520	NE16	Gerondong	200	DH	m	nelon

APPENDIX 4. SHARE-CROPPING AGREEMENTS: Sheet 2.

Origin:	Landlord:	Yield: (Nett)	Origin:	Tenant:	Yield: (Nett)	Relationship:	Owns Land:	Terms of Contract:
NW6	Tonik	390	SW2	*Kenyung	190	-	x	Worked by pawnee on nelon for pawner
NW11	Gangsar	680	SE6	*Keper	340	-	x	nelon
NW17	A.A. Putera	440	Ten-gahP.	Lawas	220	Servant	?	nelon
NW23	Dugligan	280	SW11	Tiles	140	ZS	x	nelon
NW23	Dugligan	300	NW9	Mejul	150	WFB	✓	nelon where tenant on own pawned land
NW24	Dw.Wy. Kelila	750	NW7	Teken	250	-	x	ngempat
NW25	Geningan	-	NW20	Reca	1110	WZS/DH	x	works field in return for general help
SW14	Bidel	340	SW14	Sayub	340	B	x	nandu
SW14	Bidel	540	SW14	Merta	270	BS	m	nelon
SE1	Sama	120	SE1	Lipet	240	S	x	2/3rds to tenant on father's land
SE3	Subratha	350	SE3	Dungka	180	B	x	nelon
SE3	Subratha	280	SE3	Tedun	170	B	x	nelon (clean)
SE3	Subratha	280	SE3	Bawa	130	BS	x	nelon
SE18	Pageh	430	Tegal	Lemek	220	Matrikin	?	nandu
SE18	Pageh	170	Kelabang Moding	Lusuh	170	Matrikin	?	nandu
Gagah	Lanus	-	NW9	Rebit	-	Matrikin	x	only began in mid-1972
Tengah Padang	Tagen	420	NW26	Dayuh	430	-	x	nandu
"	Undis	-	SE7	Racem	-	-	x	nandu on land kepel-aisin. Began mid-1972

APPENDIX 4. SHARE-CROPPING AGREEMENTS: Sheet 3.

Origin:	Landlord:	Yield: (Nett)	Origin:	Tenant:	Yield: (Nett)	Relationship:	Owns Land:	Terms of contract:
Pelian	Cok. Rai	240	SW11	Lembut	240	Servant	x	nandu; negotiation of freehold on land
Tengah-padang	Cok. A. Badung	400	SW24	Longsog	280	Servant	x	majegin: 400 kg. padi each harvest
Triwangsa	Dw.Pt.Batur	1040	SE16	Kontèng	540	Servant	m	nelon

CORPORATE GROUP SHARE-CROPPING AGREEMENTS:

Landlord:	Beneficiary: Origin:	Person:	Yield:	Tenancy: Origin:	Person:	Yield	Owns Land	Terms of contract:
Pura Désa	SW3	J.M.Désa	as for tenant	SW3	J.M.Désa	1680	✓	± 0.4 ha. for offerings and as salary
Pura Désa	NW10	Gendul	450	SW6	Rubik	230	✓	± 0.35 ha as salary of bendésa adat(nelon
Pura Désa	-	Pura Désa	350	SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	340	x	± 0.32 ha. majegin of 350 kg. per harvest
Pura Dalem Kauh	SE17	J.M.Dalem	as for tenant	SE17	J.M.Dalem	860	x	± 0.35 ha. for offerings and as salary
Pura Mascèti	SW3	J.M.Désa	as for tenant	SW3	J.M.Désa	720		± 0.35 ha. for offerings and as salary
Pura Mascèti	-	Pura Mascèti	420	NE16	Gelèdèr	220	x	± 0.32 ha. under nelon.
Pura Indra Kelila	-	Pura Indra Kelila	220	SE12	Séro	110	x	± 0.17 ha. under nelon
Pura Indra Kelila	SE12	Suradnya	as for tenant	SE12	Suradnya	220	x	± 0.12 ha. to supply offerings.
Perbekelan Tengahpadang	Tengah-padang	A.A.Oka (perbekel)	275	NW7	Kembar	610	x	majegin Rp. 7,700 p.a @ Rp. 14 per kg. padi

Code: nandu = ½:½ (first figure to tenant)
nelon = 1/3:2/3
ngempat = ¼:¾

x = no riceland of one's own
m = marginal holdings
= subsistence or more holdings of one's own

majegin = a fixed sum to the landlord, balance to the tenant
kepelaisin = form of pawning for small sums (see text)

* indicates a second tenancy of a single share-cropper

APPENDIX 4. CATEGORIES OF WORK IN RICE CULTIVATION (GEGADON 1971)
(based on work arrangements for the season June-November 1971)

1. NON-FARMING BENEFICIARIES:

Landlords:

NE1	Cok. Putera	
NE6	Togog	
NE7	Ni Repun	
NW17	A.A.Putera	
SE3	Subratha	Total: 5

Pawn Beneficiaries:

NE10	A.A.Oka	
NW6	Tonik	Total: 2

Owners Deriving No Harvest:

NE2	Cok. Jangji (controlled by Cok. Putera NE1)	
NE5	Kènak (pawned)	Total: 2

Non-Working Owners : 9

2. PEASANT FARMERS:

Owners Working their Entire Holdings:

NE2	Cok. A. Lanus	NW8	Gampil
NE2	Cok. Ngurah	NW9	Mejul
NE3	Degdeg	NW12	Dugdug
NE8	Dada	NW13	Tanggu
NE11	Karda	NW22	Nampa
NE12	Lanis	NW25	Geningan
NE13	Kara	NW28	Nyèmbèng
NE15	Badra	SW1	Tangèn
NE16	Gampil	SW2	Tarik
NE17	Surung	SW7	Kartana
NE19	Pica	SW9	Pukel
NE20	Kampih	SW13	Selem
NE21	Sukèn	SE2	Pudet
NE24	Serandig	SE5	Sampun
NE25	Yasa	SE6	Delep
NE26	Ngèmbon	SE21	Cekeg
NW3	Dw.Ny.Gempil	SE22	Dungki
NW4	Lasiya	SE23	Tedun
NW7	Mara	SE26	Dw.Ny.Geriya
NW8	Lonid		Total: 41

Owners Working More than their Personal Holdings:

NE16	Gerondong	SW14	Dayuh
NW5	Laba	SW18	Ni Dehen
NW23	Dugligan	SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong
SW3	J.M.Désa	SE16	Kontèng
SW4	Degdeg Mangku		
SW6	Rubik		Total: 11
SW10	Digdig		

Owners Working Less than their Personal Holdings:

NE2	Cok. Putu	NW10	Gelis	SW14	Bidel
NE10	A.A.Gd.Jasa	NW11	Gangsar	SW16	Sukri
NE14	Ni Kari	NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila	SE1	Sama
NE18	Kingsan	SW8	Neka	SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya*
NW8	Surata	SW10	Munjuk	SE18	Pageh
NW10	Gendul	SW12	Tomblos	SE20	Rantun Total: 18

Peasant Farmers: 70

APPENDIX 4. CATEGORIES OF WORK. Sheet 2.

LANDLESS CULTIVATORS:

Share-croppers Working Recognized Tenancies:

NE2	Cok. A. Nama	SW20	Dani
NE2	Cok. Oka	SW22	Kemplung
NE16	Gelèdèr	SW23	Sadiya
NW7	Teken	SW24	Longsog
NW7	Kembar	SE1	Lipet
NW16	Keted	SE3	Dungka
NW20	Reca	SE3	Tedun
NW26	Dayuh	SE3	Bawa
SW2	Kenyung	SE6	Keper
SW11	Lembut	SE12	Rugrug
SW14	Sayub	SE12	Séro
SW15	Gomboh	SE12	Suradnya
SW17	Darna	SE17	J.M.Dalem
SW19	Karda	SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé

Total: 28

Men Working Loose Familial Tenancies:

NW10	Keredek	SW13	Ni Muklen
SW6	Gading	SE10	A.A.A.Jasa
SW8	Mukun	SE20	Kaling
SW10	Dugdug	SE25	Cekeg

Total: 8

Men Working as Full-Time Labourers:

Labourer:	Owner:
NE3 Tiles	NE3 Degdeg
NE26 Kedeng	NE26 Ngèmbon
NW9 Rebit	NW9 Mejul
NW21 Kisid**	NE15 Badra
NW24 Dw.Ny.Kelila	NW24 Dw.Wy.Kelila
NW25 Racik	NW25 Geningan
SW4 Terima	SW4 Degdeg (also NE15 Badra (WF))
SW9 Mongoh	SW9 Pukel
SW21 Gomboh Suti	SW20 Dani (also NE15 Badra (WF))

Total: 10

* This land was leased to me to practise farming.

** Kisid normally works as a regular share-cropping tenant (see Appendix 6)

Landless Farm Workers: 46

Division of Costs in Share-Cropping (Nandu, Nelon and Ngempat).

Cost:	Balinese Term:	Payment:
Irrigation association tax on water:	pajeg carik	Landlord
Cost of guard duty if needed	upah telik	Landlord
Cost of temple festivals	mayah aci	Landlord
Irrigation association levies for investment or upkeep	mayah peturunan	Landlord
Costs of harvesting	upah mederep	Taken from gross yield before the final division between landlord & tenant
Costs of carriage of padi	belèsèngan	
Seed Allowance	upah bulih	
Labour on repairs to water channels etc.	ngayahang subak	Tenant
Fines for stealing, breach of association rules etc.	dosan subak	Tenant

(Under majegin, the tenant usually pays all the costs, but this may vary.)

APPENDIX 5. COMPUTATION OF THE AMOUNT OF LAND OWNED, LAND WORKED AND HARVEST YIELDED IN BR. PISANGKAJA (GEGADON: JUNE-NOVEMBER 1972)

No:	Name:	Land Owned:	Land Worked:	Harvest Yielded:	Productivity:	Cons. Index:
NE1	Cok. Putera	6.05	-	5656 (8565)	-	12.54
NE2	Cok. Jangji	0.41	-	-5	-	1.0
	Cok. Putu	0.59	0.29	1235	34.5	6.19
	Cok. A.Lanus	0.295	0.295	1233	24.4	3.49
	Cok. A. Nama	-	∓0.71	523	∓21.5	4.56
	Cok. Oka	-	∓0.15	264	∓39.7	1.83
	Cok. Ngurah	0.155	0.155	729	43.9	5.49
NE3	Degdeg	0.36	0.36	910	26.7	6.89
	Wy. Tiles	-	-	51	-	2.33
	Wy. Tempil	-	-	72	-	1.83
NE4	Dw. Md. Gempol	-	-	131	-	3.49
NE5	Wy. Kénak	0.31	-	96	-	3.23
NE6	Wy. Togog	0.305	-	560	-	1.83
	Md. Tenda	-	-	48	-	2.53
NE7	Ni Kt. Repun	0.35	-	409	-	0.83
	Ni Pt. Mariani	-	-	40	-	3.89
NE8	Md. Dada	0.46	0.46	1373	29.3	5.52
NE9	A.A. Anom	0.51	0.51	1542	31.8	3.49
NE10	A.A. Jasa	0.585	∓0.25	650	∓27.	3.66
	A.A.A. Oka	0.235	-	293	-	3.0
NE11	Karda	0.68	0.68	2902	39.7	5.49
NE12	Kt. Lanis	0.795	0.795	1146	15.4	5.66
NE13	Ny. Kara	0.10	0.10	278	28.8	3.99
NE14	Ni Wy. Kari	0.665	∓0.35	677	∓19.4	3.16
NE15	Ny. Badra	1.53	1.53	3781	26.3	7.32
NE16	Gampil	0.35	0.35	781	22.9	2.83
	I Gerondong	0.18	∓0.54	640	∓22.2	2.33
	I Gelèdèr	-	∓0.32	268	∓21.6	4.49
NE17	I Surung	0.55	0.55	1812	34.5	4.69

APPENDIX 5. Sheet 2.

No:	Name:	Land Owned:	Land Worked:	Harvest Yielded:	Prod-uctiv-ity:	Cons. Index:
NE18	Kt. Kingsan	0.85	∓0.49	1603	∓24.5	6.02
NE19	Pica	0.37	0.37	806	19.5	5.86
NE20	I Kampih	0.34	0.34	881	25.9	5.19
NE21	I Sukèn	0.155	0.155	456	21.7	5.49
NE22	Kt. Jambul	-	-	107	-	4.49
NE23	Ny. Sujana	-	-	56	-	4.46
NE24	Kt. Serandig	0.405	0.405	1217	29.1	6.02
NE25	Kt. Yasa	0.37	0.37	875	23.1	5.36
NE26	Wy. Ngèmbon	0.185	0.185	639	30.3	2.0
	Ny. Kedeng	-	-	49	-	2.33
NW1	Kt. Tagen	-	-	69	-	5.19
NW2	Dw. Kt. Gempul	-	-	29	-	2.83
NW3	Dw. Ny. Gempil	0.49	0.49	1382	29.8	4.99
NW4	Wy. Lasiya	0.41	0.41	744	19.5	4.33
NW5	I Laba	0.395	0.575	1703	33.4	4.49
NW6	I Tonik	0.24	-	427	-	3.83
	I Mupu	-	-	36	-	4.69
	Kacir	-	-	6	-	2.33
	Jèro Geriya	-	-	22	-	2.23
NW7	Kt. Mara	0.29	0.29	1029	35.7	3.49
	Wy. Teken	-	∓0.30	297	∓36.	1.83
	Ny. Kembar	-	0.245	706	39.2	2.66
NW8	Wy. Surata	0.56	0.27	413	14.8	2.83
	Md. Lonid	0.19	0.19	624	29.5	5.19
	Kt. Gampil	0.40	0.40	1170	30	4.23
	Ni Kelepon	-	-	67	-	1.66
NW9	Kt. Mejul	0.45	0.45	1298	37.3	6.65
	I Rebit	-	-	52	-	2.33
NW10	Kt. Gendul	1.22	∓0:92	2303	∓21.7	6.32
	Ny. Gelis	0.46	∓0.28	824	∓28.6	4.49
	I Keredek	-	∓0.48	1113	∓24.	2.33

APPENDIX 5. Sheet 3.

No:	Name:	Land Owned:	Land Worked:	Harvest Yielded:	Prod-uctiv-ity:	Cons. Index:
NW11	Ny. Gangsar	1.73	1.38	4449	29.9	7.02
NW12	Dugdug	0.36	0.36	894	24.4	5.66
	I Belet	-	-	49	-	2.33
NW13	Ni Lungid	0.22	0.22	826	36.8	4.49
SW1	I Tangèn	0.32	0.32	827	27.5	4.66
SW2	I Tarik	0.64	0.64	1361	21.3	5.99
	I Kenyung	-	0.24	296	27.8	5.89
SW3	J.M.Désa	0.79	∓0.925	3574	∓41.1	4.66
SW4	Degdeg Mangku	0.75	1.015	3318	34.5	7.19
	I Terima	-	-	87	-	2.33
SW5	A.A. Putu	-	-	37	-	4.72
SW6	I Rubik	0.37	∓0.54	795	24.2	4.66
	Ni Cenok	-	∓0.15	414	26.7	2.83
SW7	I Kartana	0.435	0.435	1023	22.1	4.66
	Ni Polokan	-	-	47	-	3.66
SW8	I Neka	0.85	0.53	1656	31.7	3.66
	I Kencan	-	-	30	-	2.86
	I Mukun	-	0.05?	131	-	2.33
SW9	I Pukel	0.135	0.135	308	20.7	1.0
	I Mongoh	-	-	47	-	2.83
SW10	I Munjuk	0.81	∓0.35	1040	∓30.	6.39
	I Dugdug	-	∓0.11	440	∓32.7	5.32
	I Digdig	0.15	∓0.50	1424	∓30.4	5.69
SW11	I Lembut	-	∓0.54	670	∓22.4	7.98
SW12	Kt. Selem	0.38	0.38	1308	33.7	4.86
	I Tomblos	0.18	∓0.08	189	∓16.9	3.66
SW13	Ni Muklen	-	∓0.10	246	∓20.	2.36
SW14	Kt. Bidel	1.38	∓1.055	3287	∓23.5	6.85
	I Dayuh	0.17	∓0.47	594	∓16.5	3.66
	I Sayub	-	∓0.325	426	∓23.4	3.49

APPENDIX 5. Sheet 4.

No.	Name:	Land Owned:	Land Worked:	Harvest Yielded:	Prod-uctiv-ity:	Cons. Index:
SE1	Wy. Sama	0.65	∓0.50	1266	∓23.6	2.83
	Ny. Lipet	-	∓0.15	299	∓26.7	3.16
	Md. Balik	-	-	89	-	2.33
SE2	Md. Pudet	0.57	0.57	1291	23.2	5.69
SE3	Kt. Suberatha	0.905	-	909	-	(5.49)
	I Dungka	-	∓0.395	231	∓14.6	3.66
	Ni Doneng	-	∓0.26	176	∓20.8	1.83
	I Bawa	-	∓0.25	201	∓18.	5.69
SE4	A.A. Darma	-	-	6	-	0.83
	A.A.A. Plasa	-	-	6	-	1.0
	J. Jempiring	-	-	44	-	3.19
SE5	Tagen Buyut	0.575	0.575	1151	18.4	5.69
SE6	I Delep	0.32	0.32	1043	32.5	4.99
	I Keper	-	0.655	764	35.4	2.66
SE7	Dw. Md. Tagel	-	-	-	-	-
	Dw. Ny. Laba	-	-	71	-	3.16
SE8	Ni Tambun	-	-	-5	-	0.83
SE9	Dw. Kt. Geriya	0.845	0.82	1254	15.1	5.19
SE10	A.A.A. Jasa	-	∓0.485	1538	∓34.6	1.83
SE11	Dw. Pt. Pandé	-	-	119	-	2.83
SE12	Kt. Rugrug	-	0.35	344	22.6	5.49
	Wy. Séro	-	∓0.17	261	∓23.5	2.83
	Ny. Sorog	-	-	-	-	4.16
	Md. Suradnya	-	∓0.12	120	∓25.8	2.33
SE13	Dw. Md. Nombong	0.37	∓0.67	1648	∓26.2	3.83
SE14	Md. Sandi	-	-	161	-	5.52
SE15	Ni Wy. Kintil	-	-	30	-	1.53
SE16	Kt. Kontèng	0.11	∓0.71	836	∓18.2	3.66
	I Gading	-	-	159	-	1.83
SE17	J. M. Dalem	-	∓0.35	900	∓26.3	5.56
SE18	Wy. Pageh	0.67	∓0.21	1061	∓24.	1.0

APPENDIX 5. Sheet 5.

No:	Name:	Land Owned:	Land Worked:	Harvest Yielded:	Prod-uctiv-ity:	Cons. Index:
SE19	Dw. Md. Doblé	-	∓0.32	451	∓24.0	4.69
SE20	Ny. Rantun	1.21	∓0.94	2059	∓23.5	4.49
	I Kaling	-	∓0.27	565	∓21.3	2.83
SE21	Cekeg Pulos	0.52	0.52	1260	24.6	4.66
SE22	Ny. Dungki	0.39	0.39	832	20.5	4.66
SE23	Tedun	1.515	1.515	2119	15.3	2.33
SE24	Md. Silir	-	-	86	-	3.86
	I Jontol	-	-	112	-	2.66
SE25	Cekeg Mileh	-	∓0.16	479	∓30.	2.83
SE26	Dw. Ny. Geriya	0.57	0.57	2242	43.2	2.83
NW14	Ni Ngambet	-	-	58	-	3.66
NW15	Ni Sinah	-	-	56	-	3.19
NW16	I Keted	-	∓0.455	411	∓24.6	6.02
NW17	A.A. Putera	0.475	-	484	-	2.83
NW18	Md. Susila	-	-	-5	-	2.49
	Md. Gina	-	-	-5	-	3.83
NW19	Ni Antrog	-	-	56	-	2.49
NW20	I Reca	-	∓0.32	1200	-	4.69
NW21	I Kisid	-	-	98	-	4.19
NW22	I Nampa	0.26	0.26	945	35.4	4.32
NW23	I Dugligan	0.34	0.575	1998	30.9	5.89
NW24	Dw. Wy. Kelila	1.05	∓0.75	3431	∓39.5	2.0
	Dw. Ny. Kelila	-	-	66	-	2.33
NW25	I Geningan	1.425	1.425	5211	39.3	3.83
	I Racik	-	-	7	-	2.33
NW26	Dayuh Kelila	-	∓0.35	531	∓27.4	3.49
NW28	I Nyèmbèng	0.825	0.825	1173	14.5	5.49
SW15	Gomboh Runti	-	∓0.24	217	∓23.3	5.06

APPENDIX 5. Sheet 6.

No:	Name:	Land Owned:	Land Worked:	Harvest Yielded:	Productivity:	Cons. Index:
SW16	I Sukri	0.81	∓0.665	1358	∓21.1	5.49
SW17	I Darna	-	∓0.56	564	∓26.3	3.66
SW18	Ni Dehen	0.105	∓0.25	573	∓22.4	0.83
SW19	Karda Langkih	-	∓0.28	319	∓26.3	4.16
SW20	I Dani	-	∓0.64	609	∓26.8	3.49
SW21	Gomboh Suti	-	-	63	-	2.83
SW22	I Kemplung	-	∓0.325	259	∓24.6	5.19
SW23	I Sadiya	-	∓0.33	295	∓24.2	3.16
SW24	I Longsog	-	0.31	342	23.7	3.66
SW25	I Bakta	-	-	63	-	1.0
SW26	Kembar Lèkok	0.295	0.295	618	19.	3.83

Notes:

1. The harvest yielded figure is for the nett amount of padi brought home after paying costs of harvesting, carriage and, if following the harvesters, the fines for infringing rules. It does not include gifts at harvest time. The weights were taken on sample sheaves for each household and err on the side of caution. This was done with the assistance of two rice merchants and a farmer, who checked the weights.
2. Productivity is calculated in terms of the gross estimated yield before deductions for harvest and carriage per unit area. The figures refer to kilograms per ara (or 100 sq.m.). Once again, these are slightly on the low side compared with tests done in the field. The reasons are that the padi becomes lighter in weight as it dries out (when the research testing was done) and that extra padi is handed out in the field and as gifts, which could not be extracted by questioning the donors. This is calculated for a gegadon cycle, but the difference in productivity between seasons is extremely low according to informants. Where the area of land has not been
3. surveyed, this is indicated as more or less, and so the corresponding productivity index.
3. The consumption index is based upon Epstein (1967; 160-1) and is calibrated as follows:

adult males	1.0
adult females	0.83
children between 10 & 14	0.83
children between 6 & 9	0.70
children between 1 & 5	0.50
children below 1 year old	-

This is concerned to measure in particular production and consumption within the village economy and excludes villagers normally living and working elsewhere.

APPENDIX 6. THE ANALYSIS OF LABOUR RECRUITMENT FOR RICE CULTIVATION IN PISANGKAJA: JANUARY - JUNE 1972.

	No.	Name	Self	House-Hold	Equal	Inv.	V.A.	Wages	ExB	ExD	Tot Unit	Tot Men	Tot Ties	Comments:
	NE1	Cok. Putera	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Estate owner does not farm
	NE2	Cok. Putu	-	8/3	-	6/5	-	8/8x2	-	-	22	16	10	Wage-labour because ill
		Cok. A. Lanus	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	
		Cok. A. Nama	5	-	1/1	11/8	-	-	-	-	13	10	4	
		Cok. Oka	3			10/9	-	3/3x1	1	8	16	13	11	Wage-labour because tailor
		Cok. Ngurah	5	2/1	-	2/2	-	-	-	-	9	4	3	
*	NE3	Degdeg	4	8/3	-	1/1	-	6/6x1	-	-	19	10	9	Orator
	NE8	Dada	5	-	2/1	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	25	11	2	
	NE9	A.A. Anom	5	-	2/2	6/3	-	-	-	-	13	6	5	
	NE10	A.A. Jasa	5	-	2/2	1/1	-	-	-	-	8	4	3	
*	NE11	Karda	2	2/1	-	4/2	-	20/16x3	1	-	28	19	4	Entrepreneur & rising patron
	NE12	Kt. Lanis	5	3/2	1/1	12/9	-	-	-	-	21	13	12	
	NE13	Ny. Kara	4	-	1/1	5/3	-	1/1x1	2	-	11	6	4	
	NE14	Ni Kari	6	-	-	11/2	-	-	2	-	17	3	2	
*	NE15	Ny. Badra	6	15/3	1/1	7/6	-	5/5x1	-	-	34	15	11	Minor patron
	NE16	Gampil	5	9/2	1/1	2/2	-	-	2	-	17	6	5	
		I Gelèdèr	5	4/1	3/3	1/1	-	-	1	-	13	9	5	
	NE17	I Surung	5	-	5/3	7/5	-	-	-	-	17	9	8	
*	NE18	Kt. Kingsan	2	2/2	-	1/1	-	10/8x2	5	-	15	10	3	Retired head-man
	NE19	Pica	4	5/1	1/1	3/2	-	-	-	-	13	5	4	

APPENDIX 6. Sheet 2.

	No.	Name:	Self	House-Hold	Equal	Inv.	V.A.	Wages	ExB	ExD	Tot Unit	Tot Men	Tot Ties	Comments:
	NE20	I Kampih	5	-	1/1	3/3	-	-	2	-	9	5	4	
	NE21	I Sukèn	5	5/1	-	2/1	-	-	-	-	12	3	2	
	NE24	Kt. Serandig	5	2/2	2/1	8/6	-	-	3	-	17	10	9	
	NE25	Kt. Yasa	5	10/2	-	2/2	-	-	-	-	17	5	4	
	NE26	Wy. Ngèmbon	1	10/2	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	3	2	
	NW3	Dw. Ny. Gampil	4	5/1	-	12/10	-	-	2	-	21	12	11	
	NW4	Wy. Lasiya	4	-	-	17/6	-	-	3	-	21	7	6	Minor patron
	NW5	I Laba	2	3/1	-	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	23	11	10	
	NW6	I Tonik	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	
	NW7	Kt. Mara	5	5/1	-	1/1	-	-	-	-	11	3	2	Orator
		Ny. Kembar	5	5/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	1	
		Wy. Teken	5	-	1/1	2/2	-	-	-	-	8	4	3	
	NW8	Md. Lonid	3	2/1	-	-	12/12x1	-	1	-	17	14	2	
*		Kt. Gampil	4	-	2/1	-	12/12x1	4/3x1	1	-	22	17	3	Orator
	NW9	Kt. Mejul	5	7/2	1/1	1/1	-	-	-	-	14	5	4	
*	NW10	Kt. Gendul	3	1/1	-	3/3	-	10/10x2	1	-	17	15	6	Patron
*		Ny. Gelis	4	1/1	-	3/3	-	3/3x1	1	-	11	7	4	
		I Keredek	3	2/1	-	1/1	-	7/6x2	-	-	13	9	4	
	NW11	Ny. Gangsar	4	5/2	4/3	4/4	-	10/10x1	-	10	27	20	10	
	NW12	Dugdug	2	12/4	-	-	12/12x1	-	1	-	26	17	5	
	NW13	Ni Lungid	5	1/1	10/8	-	-	-	-	-	16	10	9	

APPENDIX 6. Sheet 3.

	No.	Name:	Self	House-Hold	Equal	Inv.	V.A.	Wages	ExB	ExD	Tot Unit	Tot Men	Tot Ties	Comments:
	SW1	I Tangèn	5	2/2	3/2	17/11	-	-	-	-	27	16	14	
	SW2	I Tarik	5	5/1	-	2/2	-	-	-	-	12	4	3	
		I Kenyung	5	5/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	1	
*	SW3	J. M. Désa	4	4/1	3/2	9/7	-	10/7x2	-	4	34	19	18	Uses full-time worker/Orator
	SW4	Degdeg Mangku	4	13@3	1/1	7/7	-	-	2	-	25	13	12	Orator
	SW6	I Rubik	4	-	1/1	-	-	3/3x1	-	-	8	5	4	
		Ni Cenok	5	2/1	6/4	3/3	-	-	-	-	16	9	8	Gading, her son helped Rubik for 1 season
		I Gading	5	-	5/5	7/5	-	-	-	-	17	11	10	
	SW7	Kartana	3	2/1	-	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	23	11	2	Orator
*	SW8	Neka	5	9/3	5/4	13/10	-	7/5x1	-	-	39	22	17	
	SW9	Pukel	5	4/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	1	
	SW10	Munjuk	4	6/3	-	2/2	7/7x1	-	-	-	19	13	6	
		Dugdug	4	-	-	-	7/7x1	-	-	-	11	8	1	
		Digdig	4	2/1	1/1	7/5	-	-	2	-	14	8	7	
	SW11	Lembut	4	4/1	-	3/2	7/7x1	-	-	1	13	11	4	
	SW12	Selem	3	7/3	-	10/8	7/7x1	-	-	-	27	21	12	
		Tomblos	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	
	SW14	Bidel	5	11/4	-	1/1	-	-	-	-	17	6	5	Almost all household help
		Dayuh	5	2/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	2	1	
		Sayub	4	4/2	-	1/1	-	3/3x1	-	-	12	6	3	Family offer of wage labour

Appendix 6. Sheet 4.

No.	Name	Self	House-Hold	Equal	Inv.	V.A.	Wages	ExB	ExD	Tot Unit	Tot Men	Tot Ties	
SE1	Sama	4	6/2	2/1	-	-	-	-	-	12	4	3	
SE2	Pudet	4	-	1/1	-	7/7x1	-	-	-	12	9	2	
SE3	Dungka	5	4/1	3/1	2/1	-	-	-	-	14	4	3	
	Ni Doneng	-	3/1	-	2/1	-	6/3x2	-	-	11	5	3	Wage-labour as woman alone
	Bawa	5	5/1	1/1	-	-	-	-	-	11	3	2	
SE5	Tagen	5	5/1	-	1/1	-	-	-	-	11	3	2	
SE6	Delep	5	1/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	1	
	Keper	5	4/1	6/5	6/5	-	-	-	-	21	12	11	Popular tenant
SE9	Dw.Kt.Geriya	4	5/1	4/3	16/12	-	-	1	-	29	17	16	Minor patron
SE10	A.A.A.Jasa	4	-	-	1/1	-	-	-	-	5	2	1	
SE11	Dw.Pt.Pandé	3	5/1	5/3	3/3	-	-	-	-	16	8	7	Worked land of family 1 season
SE12	Rugrug	5	8/2	1/1	1/1	-	-	-	-	15	5	4	
SE13	Dw.Md.Nombong	3	5/2	2/1	-	12/12x1	3/3x1	1	-	25	19	5	Patron
SE16	Kontèng	5	6/2	1/1	-	12/12x1	-	-	-	24	16	4	
SE17	J.M.Dalem	4	-	-	17/17	7/7x1	5/3x1	2	-	33	30	21	Patron
SE18	Pageh	4	-	-	1/1	-	3/2x1	3	-	8	4	3	Wage-labour for natal kin
SE19	Dw.Md.Doblé	4	-	-	1/1	12/12x1	-	1	-	17	14	2	Orator
SE20	Rantun	4	4/1	3/1	2/2	12/12x1	-	-	-	25	17	5	
	Kaling	5	-	5/2	2/2	-	-	-	-	12	5	4	
SE21	Cekeg	4	4/1	2/2	2/1	12/12x1	-	-	-	24	17	5	
SE22	Dungki	5	3/2	3/3	3/3	-	-	1	-	14	9	8	

Appendix 6. Sheet 5.

	No.	Name.	Self	House-hold	Equal	Inv.	V.A.	Wages	ExB	ExD	Tot Unit	Tot Men	Tot Ties	Comments:
*	SE23	Tedun	3	1/1	-	2/1	-	15/13x2	-	14	21	16	3	Ex-headman Used outside hired help
	SE25	Cekeg	1	5/1	2/1	-	12/12x1	-	1	-	20	15	3	
*	SE26	Dw.Ny.Geriya	2	2/1	-	4/3	-	16/15x3	10	-	24	20	19	Used help as busy as tailor
	NW16	Keted	3	1/1	-	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	22	11	2	Orator
	NW20	Reca	5	-	4/3	8/7	-	-	-	4	17	11	10	
	NW22	Nampa	4	1/1	5/5	3/3	-	5/3x1	-	3	18	13	12	Rich family (B of Gangsar)
*	NW23	Dugligan	4	-	3/3	3/2	-	6/6x1	-	-	16	10	6	Orator
	NW24	Dw.Wy.Kelila	4	5/1	4/1	-	-	-	-	-	13	3	2	
*	NW25	Geningan	6	18/3	11/7	8/5	-	4/4x1	-	1	47	20	16	B. of J.M.Désa
	NW26	Dayuh	4	-	2/2	4/2	-	5/4x1	-	1	15	8	4	
	NW28	Nyèmbèng	5	5/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	1	
	SW15	Gomboh Runti	5	1/1	1/1	6/4	-	-	-	-	13	7	6	
	SW16	Sukri	3	3/1	-	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	24	10	2	
	SW17	Darna	3	-	-	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	21	9	1	
*	SW18	Ni Dehen	1	-	-	4/2	-	6/3x2	-	-	11	6	4	Used wagelabour as woman alone
	SW19	Karda	3	4/3	-	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	25	13	4	
	SW20	Dani	4	1/1	-	5/4	18/9x2	-	-	-	27	14	4	
	SW22	Kemplung	3	-	2/1	-	18/9x2	-	-	-	23	11	2	
	SW23	Sadiya	4	-	1/1	3/3	12/12x1	-	-	-	20	17	5	
	SW24	Longsog	5	5/1	-	1/1	-	-	-	-	11	3	2	
	SW26	Kembar	5	1/1	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	1	

APPENDIX 6 Sheet 6: CODE FOR TABLE

Headings:

Self = worked himself on this number of occasions, that is for so many stages of cultivation (for the six stages, see below).
Household= domestic labour drawn from the household of the farmer.
Equal = reciprocal labour exchange, meselisi (see text).
Inv. = invitations to work in return for a meal, ngajakang (see text).
V.A. = participant in, and use of, voluntary association. These are normally confined to the first hoeing, makal, but one also does transplanting.
Wages = use of wage labour, ngepupah (see text). Generally an index of wealth & political aspirations.
ExB = use of extra-ward (banjar) ties in other parts of the settlement. Indicates number of persons so used.
ExD = use of extra-settlement (désa) ties. Indicates number of persons
Tot Unit = the total number of units of work, consisting of one person performing one stage of cultivation multiplied by the number of people involved in all the stages.
Tot Men = the total number of different men involved during the work.
Tot Ties = the total number of different single ties used to recruit labour. This is lower than the total number of men, because for operations such as voluntary associations or wage labour, it is commonly the group as a whole which is called for voluntary associations, and often a single team leader for wage labour.
* = indicates habitual or frequent use of wage labour.

5/3 = the first figure indicates the total number of units of work obtained in this fashion; the second the total number of men who were invited in this way. The two differ because it is not uncommon to invite a single man to help with different stages. The greater the discrepancy between the first and second figures the more frequent the use of the same group of men (i.e. a quasi-group, Mayer; 1966), the more similar, the wider the spreading of ties, so that SE17 J.M.Dalem invited 17 people each only once to maximize spread.

7/7x1 = the formula is the same as for other work but the number of times a voluntary association is used is also indicated after it. For wage labour similarly the multiplication sign states for how many operations wage labour was used.

Stages of Cultivation:

The following stages are recognized:

ngabas somi = cutting old stalks to help decomposition.
m(eb)akal = first heavy hoeing.
ngelampit = harrowing the ground flat using bullocks.
mungkahin = second hoeing to ensure even and fine soil.
melasah = second harrowing to make field level.
memula = transplanting from seed-beds.

Appendix 7.

A Note on Balinese Names Used.

The thesis makes reference to a large number of Balinese villagers. The system of titles and personal names is complex and requires brief mention (see also Geertz 1966a). In daily discourse several different systems may be used and I shall confine myself to some of those general in Tengahpadang at the time of fieldwork. Whereas high caste villagers are known by titles commonly related to their descent groups, most low caste people were addressed and referred to by birth-order names (fratronyms, Lévi-Strauss 1966: 194) with or without the addition of personal names (or perhaps better autonyms, Lévi-Strauss 1966: 192). Teknonyms (Geertz & Geertz 1964) were not common; a possible reason is given in Chapter 8. Ritual practitioners and women who have married out of low castes are given special titles. The small population of Chinese, however, have mostly adopted Balinese names in addition by which they are generally known.

In order to help the reader through this maze, I shall indicate the basic features of the system which I adopt. This is to follow the villagers as closely as possible. Males and females are distinguished as I and Ni respectively, although this is less used among high castes. To avoid complication I shall use the latter invariably to distinguish women, so that its absence denotes a male. In the full form of low caste names, this is followed by a birth-order term of which there are four:

Wayan	= first-born (wayahan = elder)	Wy.	}	standard
Madé	= second-born (madya = middle)	Md.		
Nyoman	= third-born (anom = young)	Ny.		short form
K(e)tut	= fourth-born (etut = end)	Kt.		

The terms in parentheses refer to the folk-etymologies given locally. For high castes there are five terms (corresponding to the difference in the ideal number of children for each category) which are variations on this. This is followed by an autonym. So a full low caste name reads, for example:

I Ktut Tagen. = (male) + (fratronym) + (autonym)

In the thesis to simplify I use the common short form of the fratronym. and distinguish leading contemporary villagers from others by the use of these rather than the simple male indicator I, as the Balinese in this area tend to themselves. Otherwise names are kept as short as possible.

High castes present slightly different problems. For the most part these are referred to by their caste titles followed by honorifics and commonly patronyms but sometimes autonyms or even place names. So, for instance, the local prince was:

Cokorda Gedé Putera = (caste title) + (honorific) + (autonym)

The middle term means simply big, and the last child in high Balinese. Other high castes may include fratonyms. So:

Anak Agung Anom = (caste title) + (fratronym)
Déwa Madé Nombong = (caste title) + (fratronym) + (autonym)

The former has the fratronym in high Balinese, the latter in low. In Tengahpadang it will only be necessary to refer to four titles in detail. These are given below, together with the abbreviations which are used in tables and elsewhere to save space. As there is dispute as to the rank order at certain points I give these in alphabetical order:

Anak Agung	=	A.A. (Great One or Person)
Cokorda	=	Cok. (Cokor I Déwa = Foot of the God)
Déwa Gedé	=	Dw.Gd. (Great God; Gedé is the lower form of Agung)
Déwa	=	Dw. (God)

The form of titles may change. There is one important instance of this, by which the group which have the descent title of Déwa Gedé have adopted the address form of Anak Agung. As the ambiguity is significant I have had little option but to retain it. Which group is being referred to will be indicated.

Ritual specialists and certain others have special appellations. Low caste women who marry into high are known as Jèro (insider ; an honorific) with a polite autonym (such as the name of a flower). Temple priests, pemangku, are known by a similar form. This is, for example:

Jèro Mangku Dalem = (honorific) + (occupation) + (temple name)

This will be shortened in the tables and text to J.M., followed by the temple name. Other variants need not concern us here, nor the titles of high priests.

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