After Anthropology?

a view from too near

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Introduction

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This paper marked the moment that I realized that I had finally overstepped the mark. My colleagues in the Anthropology Department at SOAS had been laudably patient and forgiving of my persistent questioning what it was that we thought we were doing. On the occasion of this seminar, instead of the usual lively discussion and argument, reminiscent of a pit of full of well-fed fairly friendly bears, there was silence.

Two considerations led me to what seems to have been taken as a full-frontal assault on Anthropology. The first was ethnographic; the second was theoretical. Returning in 1988 to the remote research village in Bali where I had worked since 1970, a quiet, but marked, change had taken place. Peasant farmers and their families went about their daily business as usual, but sitting with them in coffee stalls, they would ask questions about life in the West in which they had previously evinced not the faintest interest. At night, novelly, the streets and stalls were virtually deserted as people flocked around television sets. Development programmes and tourism had a certain impact on the local economy; but television was transforming how Balinese villagers understood themselves and their place in the world. Anthropological theories and concepts proved of precious little help or indeed relevance. Cultural and Media Studies were at least asking questions that made sense of the ethnographic materials, although, like Anthropology, they too seemed hell-bent on strangulating themselves on the concept of Culture.

An English newspaper headline, probably apocryphal, 'Heavy fog in Channel—Continent cut off' summed up a second source of perplexity. How on earth did my anthropological colleagues manage to ignore or inoculate themselves against the erudite and thought-provoking debates going on under the soubriquet of Post-structuralism? The sanguine scenario is that their fields of inquiry were so fertile that they were preoccupied making hay while the sun shone. A more cynical reading would be that British exceptionalism (or insularity, if you prefer) deployed a barrage of rhetorical devices for belittling and so excusing engagement with the arguments: a sort of anticipatory intellectual Brexit. Subtler responses varied from selective misinterpretation (lampooned by Descombes 1987) to uncritical inversion into its own antithesis perfected by the Americans (Cusset 2008). However, with little effort or fact-contorting, the writings, most obviously of Foucault, but also of Baudrillard and Deleuze, enabled me to ask new kinds of questions about what was happening in Bali that were undreamed of in conventional academic philosophies. Saying as much proved unpalatable.

All sorts of issues run through academic thinking that rarely surface into explicit debate. Three are germane because I presupposed them in the talk. They are: Rationalism *versus* Empiricism or Pragmatism; Normal Science and its shortcomings; and systematicity as against indeterminacy or undecidability. Where you feel it congenial to place yourself between these poles hinges not just on the problem in hand, but also on personal disposition.

In Anthropology, perhaps the most obvious exemplification of Rationalism was Structuralism, pithily encapsulated by Lévi-Strauss as *The view from Afar* (1992). System and structure are more apparent if you stand back so that overall patterns become discernible. The empirical alternative is to build up generalizations from singular observations of facts (Chalmers 1999: 1-37). Towards which you tend is partly a matter of academic

predisposition, partly motivating purposes and interests. The former reveal regularities and matrices; the latter detail (what Geertz called 'thick description', 1973). There is a third possibility: pragmatism. Social arrangements are not immutable natural objects, but the outcome of practices, be they cogitating, legislating, tinkering or whatever. A critical pragmatic approach therefore analyzes the practices through which structures and facts are articulated by participants on the one hand and by their analysts on the other.

A further issue is how disciplinary debates and models (what Kuhn designated paradigms, 1970, 1977) proceed through 'normal science'.[1] I do not wish here to characterize or enumerate what anthropologists have considered their paradigms, but inquire how far they have accepted prevailing presuppositions (which includes playing with them) as against subjecting them to rigorous critical questioning and, if found wanting, rejecting them outright.[2] I am interested the latter as an under-estimated intellectual endeavour.

Temperamentally, some people find equanimity through discerning coherence and order behind what at times seem random events. Others are more at ease with the confusion, ambiguity and undecidability that close examination of context and practice tends to accentuate. With over eight years of intensive fieldwork in Indonesia, which way I lean is obvious. Is this all about grand theoretical overviews as against footling fact-grubbing? I would argue that careful critical interrogation of people's daily doings divulges presuppositions at work of far broader theoretical significance. The difference reflects the oppugnant visions of Structuralists and Post-structuralists like Foucault or Deleuze.

The view from too near reveals not just warts and all, but how structures come about, are disputed and used to bash others over the head with. It is not that structure disappears, but it is hedged about with so many *caveat*s and exceptions that it is often an act of blind faith to pick your preferred structure out of the many, and often more obvious, alternatives.[3] Matters get worse. Quite what status does structure have? Like many anthropological concepts, it is borrowed from the natural sciences. It is neither an object, nor an unquestionable positivity. A key part of human thinking is someone representing something *as* something for some purpose which, if it matters, somebody else usually contests. I was struck less by the surfeit of exceptions to every rule than by how busy people were on a daily basis discussing, arguing and disputing all manner of things, including the 'structure' of their own 'society'. In the language of Cultural Studies, social life or culture is a site of struggle consisted in no small part in people and groups articulating, counter-articulating and disarticulating one another. That the ordinary and quotidian famously eludes attempts at totalizing (de Certeau 1984; Lefebvre 1991, 2002, 2002b, 2005; Roberts 2006) is a poor excuse for ignoring actuality by retreating to neat imaginaries.

1 Scholars such as Rorty have argued that the human sciences are 'pre-paradigmatic' (1979: 352) to which Flyvberg (2001: 31-2) has given a thoughtful riposte.

2 Phrased that way, Lévi-Strauss's idiosyncratic adaptation of structural linguistics is less a paradigmatic rupture, let alone revolution, than a development. As Dutch scholars have long pointed out, they had a lively school of structuralism half a century before Lévi-Strauss 'discovered' it (e.g. van Ossenbruggen 1918).

3 A fine example is in Barnes's *Kédang* (1974) where, as I recall, the ideal marriage that was key to the systematic replication of structure throughout society was found on only 4% of cases. The more you dig, the less likely the story becomes. In Bali, according to the Geertzes (1975) patrilateral parallel cousin marriage (father's brother's daughter), whether real or classificatory is preferred. Further, Boon argued at length that it is actually sacred (1977: 132-4). In the village that I researched the incidence never exceeded 2% (1991: 47-50). Worse still for lovers of neat cultural systems, Balinese have no word for, or concept of, the sacred. We start to appreciate why the view from afar looks distinctly rosier.

The paper makes too many arguments to summarize here. Briefly, I started with a number of criticisms of Social and Cultural Anthropology, many of which others have made before or since. Then I reflected on whether the flagship method of ethnography is all it is cracked up to be. This was not ground-clearing for the triumphal entry of Cultural and Media Studies. The latter in particular is a veritable *salmigondis* of theories, methods, approaches and politics. All the disciplines (if indeed they be) more or less explicitly or covertly totalize and reify their objects of study—be it culture, media or whatever—without postulating which their *raison d'être* would be questionable. So I proposed two moves: pragmatist and theoretical. What happens if we rephrase these totalized and reified concepts as practices? And what, if anything, do post-structuralist writers have to say about these questions? I found, and still find, juxtaposing these two orders of questions opens up potentialities that I had not occurred to me before. It might seem as if I were flying off in diametrically opposite directions at once—highly empirical and highly theoretical. Positing that false dichotomy arises out of sheer intellectual laziness. The final section, *the view from too near* in my title, dived into a detailed examination of practice, here media practice, that few scholars bothered—or still now bother—with. It was television viewers (in this instance) commenting on the circumstances of their own engagement with a subtlety that left academic discussion about ordinary people's agency and subjectivity looking as gauche, clunking and threadbare as it is.

Where does that leave me? I suppose the question is how far disciplines like Anthropology are churches which tolerate heretics or expect genuflection. After thirty-five years I still like to think I am, and think like, an anthropologist albeit perhaps errant or even defrocked. Others might doubt my exculpations. As Samuel Pepys wrote in a different context, am I acting 'as if man should shit in his hat and then clap it on his own head'?[4] I leave the reader to decide.

Mark Hobart 29th. February 2020

[4] Pepys *Diary* (7th. October 1660).

Among Britain's last exports were the Quatermass films about alien forms of life which, finding life unsustainable at home, roved the universe in search of lusher pastures—inevitably Earth. After wreaking gruesome havoc in the end, of course, they fail. The anthropological turn to cultural and Media Studies reminds me of the benighted aliens. But is it conquest or flight?

Anthropologists have always been great predators. Now the enterprise has been publicly blessed by the veneered patriarch of American anthropologists, Clifford Geertz (1991), there seems to be a surreptitious, if not yet wholesale, emigration under flags of convenience. Cultural and Media Studies are among the latest. The drawback is that anthropologists were superbly adapted to their previous habitat, and habitus. It is no coincidence that the paradigm subject of anthropology is kinship, an imaginary social institution found mainly in remote places outside history and practice among people who were passive subjects of the anthropologists' writing.

For all anthropologists' self-positioning as superior forms of intellectual life uniquely qualified to opine on that great solvent, culture (McGrane 1989: 117-129), I doubt how well equipped we are to cope with new worlds, or ever were the old ones. For reasons it is best not to delve into, anthropologists of impeccable credentials who try to address what they imagine to be the contemporary world fall prey to a peculiar affliction, a loss of intellectual sphincter control, known as Appaduraitis after a celebrated sufferer (e.g. Appadurai 1990). The symptoms include acute tautology, chronic catachresis and postmodern glossolalia. A therapist has described the condition as follows.

> The important signs are the withdrawal from the real world, replacing it with '*a systematic act of the manipulation of signs*' 'which has no longer anything to do (beyond a certain point) with the satisfaction of needs, nor with the reality principle'. It is 'a systematic and *total idealist practice*', which 'extends to all manifestations of history, communication and culture... founded on a *lack* that is irrepressible.

The patients' actions exemplify what they imagine to be true of what they study. The quotation however is from Baudrillard's definition of contemporary consumption (1988a: 22-25). That it should fit like a glove tells us much about postmodernist practice.

Modernity in Bali

The contemporary world is rather hard to ignore if you work, as I do, in a place like Bali.[5] The island which epitomized the 'traditional'[6] is arguably being catapulted direct into the global system and post- or hyper-modernity. Or rather, it might be if it were clear what the postmodern is (apart from rather desperate irony, pastiche and general aimlessness), how postmodernity is compatible with globalization and what either has to do with postmodernism. I do not propose to waste time on the issue. No one I know of admits to being postmodernist: it is what others are. Instead I offer instead two quotes. The first is from Jean Baudrillard, the supposed 'high priest of postmodernism', who dismisses it as

> an expression, a word which people use but which explains nothing... Postmodernism would seem to mean that one was 'modernist' and that after modernism there was still something. Thus one is still caught in a linear meaning of things. For me postmodernism would be

[5] The once-remote mountain village where I worked in Bali is now laid with fibre-optic cable and far more 'modern' in that respect than my house in Hampstead.

[6] 'Balinese culture is in many ways less like our own than any other which has yet been recorded' (Bateson & Mead 1942: xvi).

> something of a regression, a retroversion of history...to do with being resigned (1993: 21-22).

Likewise Ien Ang remarked of globalization that it

> was part of a short-lived rhetoric which coincided with a precise historical moment, marked by the equally short lived fantasy of 'the new world order' dreamed up by the then US President Bush around the years of 1989-1991... By the mid-1990s, however, this moment seems to be well and truly over. We now live in a *post*-globalized world (1994: 325).

Regression and fantasy are, I suggest, central to anthropology in the guise of nostalgia.

The argument against anthropology

This paper is not yet another Jeremiad about the end of anthropology-as-we-know-it. For something to die, it must be alive, rather than in a persistent vegetative state. I hasten to add that intellectual atrophy does not entail the end of a discipline. On the contrary, public acceptability requires anachronism, redundancy, mindless intellectual manoeuvres and much professional grunting. Economics, for instance, rests upon pre-Darwinian assumptions; and psychology upon a dichotomy of individual and society (a dichotomy the vacuity of which, recursively, threatens anthropology and sociology). Anthropology will doubtless remain useful on the fringes as a corrective to a crass Eurocentrism, which paradoxically form the conditions of ethnology-as-the-study-of-cultural-difference itself. As I gather not everyone accepts that anthropology is in a bad way as a serious intellectual practice, rather than just a job, I shall elaborate briefly.

Let us start with what anthropologists themselves say. Recently the Association of Social Anthropologists held a big Decennial meeting aimed at convincing the world of the continued vitality and distinctiveness of anthropology. (Wittering on about what is distinctive about your discipline is an obvious symptom of callow essentialism.) I quote the editors' blurb in the latest Routledge catalogue. First, Wendy James: 'anthropology should guard its own heritage'. Danny Miller however is less sanguine. His collection is aimed at 'demonstrating the continued relevance of anthropology in the contemporary world', a preoccupation which makes no sense unless someone had seriously questioned it. Finally, Henrietta Moore lets the cat out of the bag: 'anthropology is no longer a singular discipline, but rather a blend of practices engaged in a wide variety of social contexts'. There is no longer any discipline to guard or relevance to demonstrate. Concern over the health of anthropology is not my lone conceit. When did you last read an interesting article in *American Anthropology* or *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*?

Liam Hudson once remarked to this seminar that the core of any intellectual discipline never produces any original ideas. (These are created at the periphery.) It is about guarding the sacred flame of knowledge, a point which Maurice Bloch unintentionally exemplified (1974) in arguing that authoritative enunciation is about content-free illocutionary force. Such enunciations are unsituated and unrestricted by any subject position: which is precisely what anthropologists complain about other disciplines.

So what went wrong? Is it that anthropology is a reprocessing industry? Our main theoretical ideas come from elsewhere, usually France, occasionally Germany. Anyone who has read Hacking's *The taming of chance* (1990) or Erlich's *Russian formalism* may wonder

what more reachable gods like Durkheim or Lévi-Strauss contributed.[7] Is it that our object of study—society, structure, culture—is transcendental? We only know it exists through signs (hence semiotics) or epiphanies, which we claim to perceive dimly hovering behind actions, words, events.

What, in fact, is the object of anthropological study? In the first place, is not the dichotomy of subject (the anthropologist) and object (here, other people) curiously dated, even pre-Heideggerian?[8] That 'the concept of society is theoretically obsolete' (Strathern *et al.* 1990) has been retired to a matter for debate in Manchester. 'Structure' proved an attribute of theory not of the world. The main contender is 'culture', the better critiques of which leave me rather frightened as to what we have been doing to people all these years (e.g. Fabian 1983, 1991; Herbert 1991; McGrane 1989). Anyway culture is so protean that everyone seems to claim an interest in it: sociologists, historians, specialists of language, literature, art or theatre, even the odd less encephalopathic political scientist, as well indeed as the people we work with. One distinctive feature is the disciplinary practices centred about particular hegemonic texts and constitutive debates by which we train—as in topiary—the minds of acolytes, a horticultural image of knowledge I have discussed elsewhere. In other words, what marks off anthropological practices is the extent to which they involve ancestor worship, a retrospective projection they have imputed to others for a century.

Anthropology is, to adapt an expression from Lévi-Strauss, *en clé de mort*. Johannes Fabian remarked that

> contrary to its popular image, cultural anthropology has been a science, not of emergence, but of disappearance. Culture, inasmuch as it served as anthropology's guiding concept, has always been an idea *post factum*, a notion oriented towards the past (to 'custom' and 'tradition'), descriptive of a state of affairs (and often a status quo), a nostalgic idea at best (when it mixed the study of exotic societies with regret) and a reactionary ideologeme at worst (when it was used optimistically to explain away as 'variation' what in many cases was the result of discrimination and violence) (1991: 91, 193).

As the world about them transforms, anthropologists seem increasingly to turn to the past. Witness the spate of recent monographs about colonialism-as-culture (Dirks 1992; Thomas 1994).[9] Echoing Baudrillard, Fabian remarked:

> knowledge can be known, our dominant tradition seems to feel, only through *re*-presentation and *re*-production, through sign-systems, models, law-relations (1991: 191)

So, is it surprising that most anthropology is terminally dull. It gyrates moth-like and nostalgic about the concerns which brought it into being: the irrationality of the Other, the jural depiction of society for administrative purposes and, latterly, the proctology of post-colonial economic development? I am frequently struck by the irrelevance of anthropological

7 If structuralism were anthropology's High Noon, it was by a sleight of hand which claimed to use a theory of language to explicate strange narrative which had been taken from a theory of narrative in the first place.

8 Our 'data' have always been less given or even 'constructed' as imagined (*imaginata*). Quite how the world gets in the way remains a mystery. You might expect that, as the world changes, so should how we set about understanding it. Instead we have at once terminal drift masquerading as eclecticism and a dogmatic assertion of our specialness. This last is perhaps most subtly defended by reference to the situated nature of our studies, our specificity. With the brain death of the centre, this leaves us divagating on some specific rim.

9 When Herzfeld resorts to 'exploring the symbolic roots of Western democracy' (his subtitle, 1993) using such rusty—oops 'trusty'—archaisms as ritual and symbol, not just as object but as interpretant, we are pelting hell for leather backwards.

categories for engaging with what Balinese say and do, their hopes, fears and worries, and how they organize their lives.

It took an Oxford anthropologist of course, Wendy James, to make the point. They appreciate the grip of the past. Anthropology is Heritage Studies. We are firmly in John Major's world of country maids bicycling through the mist to cricket matches and pints of ale in rural inns, BBC costume dramas and culture as object-to-be-displayed-beside-the-fireplace. There is something languid—and middle-class—about anthropology: the convenient meanderings of fieldwork which is our *rite de passage* and culture or whatever as a slowly-changing, multi-faceted object which requires leisurely perusal. A good myth takes days to tell, a good ritual weeks to perform. Is it surprising anthropology has often been situated somewhere between relatively vibrant linguistics (language unfolds slowly) on the one hand and material culture and finally archaeology on the other (where life has stopped altogether)? Not for them the instantaneity of the glance, the image, the moment; nor even the rapid, open, contradictory uncertainty of dialogue, argument, encounter. Even disputes, famously, are slowed to the measured passing of generations. Culture, axiomatically, must be whole. I would expect anthropologists to turn their backs firmly on the media: it all happens too fast and is fractured, incompletable.

What does seem distinctive, indeed constitutive, of anthropology is ethnographic fieldwork by participant-observation. But we are in deep trouble again immediately. Anthropologists' investigative method depended upon a conjunction of a naturalist epistemology (facts are given, there to be collected and subsequently owned) and the peculiar conditions epitomized by colonial government under which the inquiring ethnographer had the right to poke her nose into other peoples' lives and write about them without let, hindrance or consideration of the consequences for those described. We are deeply scopophiliac. (Were someone to snoop into my life as I did in my first fieldwork into Balinese villagers' lives, I would feel inclined to serve an injunction on the anthropologist to prevent her coming near my house, still less write about me without my having the right to check the published account for accuracy, defamation etc.) Visas and permission for much research is no longer forthcoming in many countries. The conditions of funding for research students' fieldwork (upon which hump anthropologists traditionally lived for a lifetime) have drastically altered the whole enterprise. The strain is often intolerable on students who must somehow square new styles of theorizing and writing with new research conditions in a much shorter time.

Participant-observation always was a rather arcane idea. It is not so much that observation belongs to naturalistic scientism. It is that the visual metaphor of knowing creates a world of relatively stable states. The image is also inadequate. When you see something in the field, you usually have to go and ask someone what it is that you have just seen. We ask questions. The problem is how to get from shifting, intensely situated polylogues and dialogues to the timeless monologues of the professionals. And 'participation' the less said the better. If, as I have, you have ever heard people laughing over your attempts, you need to be irredeemably narcissistic, disingenuous or plain knavish to use the expression with a straight face.

For anthropologists to sustain the fantasy of culture as whole, slow, appreciable, they have to ensure their incompetence in the vernacular. David Pocock once remarked that when you met an anthropologist who told you that after a year or two he spoke the language fluently, you had met a bloody liar. If you cannot understand people speaking to one another under any circumstance, as virtually no non-native speaker can, then you are restricted to a

degree to question and answer with all its well rehearsed limitations and misdirections. When I once asked why on successive fieldtrips I received different answers to the same questions, my Balinese colleagues told me that I wouldn't have understood the reply earlier on. People gear down information to the ignorance of the anthropologist. So we tend to focus on keywords and occasions that our pre-formed theories tell us are paradigmatic, not on the complexities of translating or figuring how to address daily contingencies. We shy away from an erotics of events, surfaces, practices, to re-imagine an Ur-hermeneutic depth with a transcendental object mediated by obscure entities like 'symbols', 'rituals' and institutions (Sontag 1961). It is like hunting by getting someone to tie down your buffalo for you first. The stuffed head on the wall, like copies of the monograph in Waterstones, tells no tales.

Anthropology presupposes the possibility of complete, or at least adequate, communication between people despite differences of language, interests and lived worlds. Linguistic incompetence apart, this model assumes a conduit metaphor of language, a version of the Euro-American fantasy of the frictionless machine or, as Erica Jong put it less politely, the zipless fuck. The implications of speech acts requiring work are too threatening to sustain, of their being dialogic, situated, momentary, fragmented, partly contingent between people who resemble less sovereign egos but are non-unitary and often contradictory or unclear. It makes descriptions and generalizations appear what they are: unsituated, ahistorical assertions. Grounding communication in correspondence to the world has proven theoretically unsustainable. (Gellner has noted that it merely introduces a third language, 1970. Goodman has criticized the representationism on which it depends, 1968. Quine has argued the irreducibility of alternative translational manuals, 1953, 1960.) Equally if we define communication by shared subjectivity, we can never show it to be the case without circularity. (Not assuming shared experience or humanity is the only way to argue it.) Finally,

> communication is too slow... In the to-and-fro of communication, the instantaneity of looking, light and seduction is already lost (Baudrillard 1990: 8-10).

Communication, in short, is problematic.

So what is it exactly we think we are doing? What is the constitutive and justificatory intellectual activity of ethnography? Is it, for instance, knowledge or understanding? For all the purported differences between the two, they raise similar problems. Both are centred on, and so privilege, the ethnographer and her knowledge/understanding. Critical understanding in anthropology involves however at least four kinds of relationships and processes: the ethnographer's understanding of the people she works with, their understanding of her, their understanding of one another, and anthropologists' understanding of one another's work. While the first appears to preoccupy us, I would suggest that it is as often as not a guise for displacement or projection.[10]

Understanding has been much trumpeted as a corrective to naturalist objectification. Intersubjectivity, our belated recognition of the humanity of our interlocutors, is as La Rochefoucauld remarked, the homage paid by vice to virtue. They are granted subjectivity on our terms (for a start we don't speak the language well enough for it to be otherwise). Subjectivity is a recent historically and culturally particular mishmash of political status, theories of substance, philosophical presuppositions, linguistic requirement melded by positivistic phenomenology into a Husserlean grotesque which periodically haunts human

[10] A review of major writers on Bali alone should make the point, which has been echoed from a quite different quarter by Alan Campbell in *Getting to know Waiwai* (1995).

sciences' departments. As a Balinese friend remarked this summer: 'I am not a subject. I am a simulacrum.' (And if that doesn't hurt, it ought to.) Understanding casts the ethnographer as grammatical 'I', the professional reader or community in the second person, *while 'pronouns and verb forms in the third person mark an Other outside the dialogue*' altogether (Fabian 1983: 85, italics in the original). As McGrane put it: 'anthropology never *listened* to the voices of 'alien cultures', it never *learned* from them, rather it studied them; in fact studying them...has been the modern *method* of *not* listening, of avoiding listening, to them (1989: 127, italics in the original).[11] As understanding is arguably the modern mode of domination, is it odd that it is the constitutive practice of anthropology?[12]

Perhaps then we should focus instead on what anthropologists do, which is describing and interpreting. Unfortunately, describing presupposes interpreting. Interpreting in turn involves understanding. Suppose we pretend for the moment it doesn't. As Ricoeur has noted, interpreting is a matter not of verification but of validation (1976: 75-79). There is however no way of judging the validity of an interpretation that is not recursively defined by the interpretive method itself. Circularity rules. As an interpretive endeavour, anthropology is breathtakingly tautologous. A necessary anthropological practice is over-interpreting. We are trained to understand what we shall encounter during ethnography before we ever get there, that is to pre-interpret, and afterwards how to write up fieldwork, defend positions, deal with criticism—in short, post-interpret. The quality of ethnography may, cynically, be judged by the degree to which it contravenes the null hypothesis, which states that 'no act of interpretation takes place dialogically (or dialectically) between an anthropologist and the people she works with.'

The more you think about it, the more implausible the anthropological venture appears. Epistemologically it rattles between an unholy *différance* of an ever more *recherché* naturalism and a Eurocentric 'intersubjective understanding', both inscribing the superiority of the knowing subject. Ontologically, it detaches an object, transcendental, cryogenized, imaginary.[13] Presuppositionally, it flirts with tautology. Modally, it is regressive, nostalgic. Methodologically it is both scopophiliac and projective. Politically it thrived under colonialism and has missed the clement climate since. Practically funds and traditional research venues are dwindling. For all their attempts to do otherwise, morally anthropologists land up apologists, more often instruments, of an epistemological imperialism. And, to add insult to injury, anthropological writings are mostly stiflingly boring, ill-written and self-congratulatory: in short, they are worthy. (*Je reviens* by Worth should be the official perfume.) Apart from that I suppose anthropology is in no worse state than any other human science.

11 I have serious reservations about the use of 'voice' here (for reasons, see Hobart 1990), but I agree with McGrane's general drift.

12 If the idea of knowledge is fraught, the idea of understanding verges on the incoherent. Is it a faculty, practice or relationship? Is it grounded in personal experience, dialogic, or dialectical? Is it implicated in the philosophy of the subject, and so historically and culturally specific? Do we indeed understand a person, what they say, cultural products such as texts or what? And who does the understanding in the absence of a unitary, centred subject? Wittgenstein (1958) appreciated the incoherence of the notion of understanding long ago: but then we have Gellner (1973) to thank for our understanding of Wittgenstein's irrelevance.

13 This is no worse than some other disciplines. When anthropologists treat the ensuing *débacle* as a sign of sophistication, I begin to worry.

After Anthropology

Are the alternatives much better? That brand of cultural studies which Geertz identified as the preordained future of Anthropology has effectively dispensed with anything but gestural ethnography. (Like the perfect dry martini, you wave a herme(neu)tically sealed anecdote or two over the gin of literary fabrication.) Another version stems from the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies and at least has a clear critical, if at times Spartist, theoretical position. It interests me more because it has informed some of the more interesting Media Studies work and has changed the intellectual agenda in the social sciences in Britain, apart from sleepy backwaters like Anthropology. (One distinguished anthropologist asked me the other day what Cultural Studies was.) Whatever their merits, both brands involve presuppositions which are sufficiently culturally and historically specific as simply to end up reinscribing the rest of the world as burlesques of Euro-American bourgeoisies. Against that, the better media and Cultural Studies scholars make most anthropologists look the theoretical illiterates they usually are.

What interests me more is Media Studies: an egregious miscegenation of scientific communication studies, literary criticism, Cultural Studies and sociology, compounded by reifying the idea of a medium into an object of study and calling it a text. So grotesque a beast needs either strangling at birth or treasuring for its sheer ungainliness and improbability. Ugly and unlikely it may be, but there is much for it to study. Insofar as I am yet clear about the reasons, Media Studies interests me for three reasons among others. It raises intriguing philosophical problems. Ethnographically I was obliged to pay attention to it, whatever my predilections. And I find the subject enjoyable. Also Media Studies specialists, like John Hartley, avoid the hypocrisy of anthropologists who pussyfoot about 'intervention', 'advocacy' and so forth by arguing for 'intervention analysis' (1992: 5-9). There is no imaginary neutral position.

Theoretically, the human sciences remain largely caught in a dichotomy between either naturalist explanations of facts by recourse to causes or laws, or hermeneutic interpretations of texts or actions by recourse to meaning or representations.[14] Both fall flat on their faces when applied to the media. An example is the futile debate about whether violence on television causes violent behaviour. Conversely hermeneutic disquisitions upon such matters as the meaning of the diegetical complexity and ideological openness of soap operas to women are possible only because analysts entirely ignore the existence of audiences or construct putative ones. Media Studies, and with it much of the human sciences (not least Anthropology), grinds to a horrible halt before the inscrutability, indeed unknowability, of the reader, television viewer, audience, spectator, patient or bystander. As you might expect, audiences are preconceived in dichotomous terms. In the dominant model producers and production determine meanings, which are mysteriously injected direct into viewers' minds (the hypodermic model). The loyal opposition imagines each viewer as a sovereign ego, a pullulating consciousness engaged in infinite play, atavistic, liberatory, emancipatory at will (the romantic model, Morley 1992: 45-46, 173-75). Even when Media Studies specialists finally noticed the absence, they did not know how or where to look. They are still, in Ien Ang's words, 'desperately seeking the audience' (1991).

[14] Anthropologists retain a touching loyalty to naive realism (see Collingwood 1940: 34-38). No one, for instance, ever got shot by power. The problem, by contrast, is how to escape the circularity of representationism.

Media Studies, recursively, casts ironic light on just how agent-focused Anthropology is. Spectators, viewers, people remain a dark, mysterious mass beyond our gaze. What should be worrying for anthropologists is that these are the people we work with. As intellectuals, we tend to relate to other, local, intellectuals. I suspect that we cannot engage except trivially with the vast majority of the people we encounter in fieldwork (or back home). At least Media Studies specialists have addressed the question you would have thought anthropologists worried about, namely how to bridge the gulf between the 'ologist and members of the mass. (The main options are psychoanalytical identification (mainly Lacanian), a more voluntaristic 'implication-extrication' and a hierarchizing assumption that audiences are the-same-but-simpler than the analyst or producer.) In any case the masses remain safely construed by the élite and policed into a tolerable, indeed requisite, level of disruptiveness.

Anthropological preoccupations with culture become more evident. Culture is safe; whereas the masses are downright dangerous and to be avoided. In the Balinese example foreign academics have colluded with a partly imagined Balinese élite to represent the masses generically as a backdrop—to kings, to structure, to ideas. They are substance upon which, gerundively, form must be imposed, upon which Mind must work.

In an analysis deeply disturbing to most human scientific thinking, Baudrillard has questioned our representations of the masses and linked this directly to the mass media. Starting with opinion polls, he argues that the question of whether, or how, mass media 'influence' mass audiences is inarticulate, because it conflates

> two heterogeneous systems whose data cannot be transferred from one to the other. An operational system which is statistical, information-based, and simulational is projected onto a traditional values system, onto a system of representation, will, and opinion. This collage, this collusion between the two, gives rise to an indefinite and useless polemic... There is and there always will be major difficulties in analyzing the media and the whole sphere of information through the traditional categories of the philosophy of the subject: will, representation, choice, liberty, deliberation, knowledge and desire. For it is quite obvious that they are absolutely contradicted by the media; that the subject is absolutely alienated in its sovereignty (1988b: 209, 214).

Instead we are confronted with a world in which people—we, as momentary members of the mass—are offered 'a massive *devolution*...of desire, of choice, of responsibility... a massive de-volition' (1988b: 215). In place of the repressive, involuntary unconscious of psycho-analysis, Baudrillard suggests an alternative unconscious characterized by an

> ironic power of nonparticipation, of nondesire, of nonknowledge, of silence... Our unconscious would not then consist of drives, of *pulsions* whose destiny is sad repression; it would not be repressed at all; it would be made of this joyful *expulsion* of all the encumbering superstructures of being and of will (1988b: 217).

Whatever his defects—and he is as Eurocentric as the rest—Baudrillard's critical analysis wreaks as much havoc on much-cherished presuppositions of anthropological studies of Bali as it does Media Studies. We have not the faintest clue what the mass have to say, because our representations are overwhelmingly pre- and over-interpreted for us, both by the Balinese we pre-select and ourselves. There is a serious disjuncture between statistical, semiotic or simulational analyses and the hermeneutical, moral philosophy of the subject assumed in most anthropological writing. Nor is this the wacky ravings of some trendy Frenchard: the American pragmatist philosophers make much the same arguments. Baudrillard does not—fortunately—offer a systematic alternative, which would on his account now be historically a

category mistake and impossible. However, as a critical commentator on the media, on the presuppositions (about production, representation, the unconscious) which underpin most human scientific thinking, he would be foolish to ignore.

My interest in Media Studies is not quite straightforward. Precisely because of its Eurocentrism, producer-focus, unsituatedness and theoretical top-heaviness, it asks for a firm empirical hand. Conversely, anthropological nostalgia, self-satisfaction and philosophical naïveté, and sheer ignorance invites a hard kick up the fundament. Cultural or Media Studies as they stand are hardly the promised land. As a cautionary note, let me cite, Stefan Collini who gave

> three recipes for doing cultural studies. First recipe. Begin a career as a scholar of English Literature. Become dissatisfied. Seek to study wider range of contemporary and 'relevant' texts, and extend notion of 'text' to cover media, performance, ritual. Campaign to get this activity accepted as a recognized academic subject. Set up unit to study the tabloid press or soap operas or discourse analysis. Describe resulting work as 'Cultural Studies'.
>
> Second recipe. Begin a career as an academic social scientist. Become dissatisfied. Reject misguided scientism, and pursue more phenomenological study of relations between public meanings and private experience. Campaign to get this accepted as a recognized academic subject. Set up unit to study football crowds or house-music parties or tupperware mornings. Describe resulting work as 'Cultural Studies'.
>
> Third recipe. Identify your major grievance. Campaign to get the study of this grievance accepted as a recognized academic subject. Theorize the resistance to this campaign as part of the larger analysis of the repressive operation of power in society. Set up a unit to study (mis-) representation of gays in the media or the imbrication of literary criticism in colonialist discourse or the prevalence of masculinist assumptions in assessments of career success. Describe resulting work as 'Cultural Studies' (1994: 3).

My other two reasons can be dealt with more briefly. I first became interested in television in Bali because at times I could find no one to work with. Everyone was busy watching television, which is a pre-eminently social activity. Women timed meals and children did their homework so as to be able to watch their favourite programmes; people kept up a running conversation and commentary during the broadcast and often after. As much 'culture' in Bali is now on television rather than elsewhere, all but the most die-hard traditionalist has to pay some attention.

Finally, I find some programmes enormous fun. Bali has the most active local station of state television in Indonesia producing between ten and thirty hours of broadcasts a week, much of it theatre and documentaries. Besides this there are five other terrestrial channels all showing Indonesian soaps, sit-coms, quizzes, cookery and fashion, news, religious broadcasts by the five competing world religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism) and, the favourite of Balinese audiences and myself, *sinétron*, Indonesian television films of extraordinarily wide variety. This helps me last through the American, Hong Kong and occasional Indian imports. Indonesians are not passive recipients of collective representations, as anthropologists presuppose. As audiences, they are often active; and in Bali with its history of theatre and dance—now largely transferred to television—they may well take part as actors.

Wrinkling your nose in élitist intellectual distain at the media may be a comfortable pose. It makes precious little sense when watching television and allied media practices occupy more time than almost anything else for the people you are working with. Women listen to

the radio or television while cooking or making offerings: it is surprising how many male activities—except working in rice fields (they have not yet adopted Sony Walkmen)—are compatible with electronic media. As the main means of livelihood where I live has become carving statues for the world market, you can watch and work (sanding is the time-consuming activity), as everyone does. On a different score, I would suggest more supposedly 'hard' social, political and economic processes involve the mass media more than purists are inclined to think. It is not Third World presumption which led the Indonesian régime to launch a telecommunications satellite in the 1970s. It was the realization that politics (citizenship, participation, pastoral power in Foucault's terms, 1982) in a country of such size is increasingly a matter of the media. Equally economics, which impacts on peoples' lives as development, depends on the media. Television, especially, is there to show that things are getting better and to articulate (in a Gramscian sense) change to development. Otherwise you might not know it at all. I cannot speak of Africa but, in much of Asia, to ignore mass media is to outdo the ostrich.

That elusive object (of) practice

That lengthy prolegomenon was required to clarify what it is I am trying to do in my research. Balinese are enthusiastic commentators on their own, and others', activities: that is they may be intellectuals of various sorts, if only episodically (Gramsci 1971). The elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 also resulted in the effective destruction of the intelligentsia, the effects of which are evident in the muted national and international contribution of Indonesian intellectuals. Critical analysis however, *pace* James Clifford, is more than *réportage*. The problem is how to avoid reducing our interlocutors (for want of a better word) to passive vehicles of collective representations or a substrate onto which to project our own preoccupations. I aim to make my research as dialogic and dialectical as possible: that is I try to rework my presuppositions, and so my questions, in the light of Balinese practices. It has been instructive, for instance, to juxtapose—and rethink—the pronouncements of grand theorists like Baudrillard with what Balinese villagers have to say about television (Hobart 2010).

What, however, do I wish to study? It is Balinese media practices, in particular those to do with television-viewing. I take it that such practices only partly overlap with direct engagement in the medium (reading the newspapers, watching the box) and have as much to do with anticipating, chatting about, criticizing, understanding and so on. Such practices also include Balinese commenting on their own practices.[15]

Taking the notion of practice seriously, instead of as spray-on intellectual deodorant to mask the twin stenches of realism and idealism, requires rethinking what we do. For a start it consigns 'discourse' as a pseudonym for totalities like 'world-view' or 'culture' to suitable oblivion. It requires us to rethink simplistic presuppositions about both communication and incommensurability, about the false dichotomous metaphysics of structure *versus* agency and the relationship of our own intellectual practices to what is going on. In terms of practice, research is a messy congeries of practices, which overlap in part with what the people we

[15] 'Practice' I take to refer to certain recognized means of acting upon the world and upon humans for the purpose of producing a definite outcome. Among practices, those of particular significance deal with the making, changing or recognition of agents—complex, human, Divine—and so the unmaking of others.

work with are doing. The difficult question is how, and who, articulates these respective practices (on articulation see Gramsci 1971; Laclau 1990; Hobart 2000).

A convenient point of departure is Foucault's late study of 'modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects'. These were, first, 'the modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of sciences' such as Anthropology, the objectivizing of the subject as cultural. Second, they included 'dividing practices' through which 'the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others'—here as a member of the mass not the élite (of changing definition), a viewer not a producer, young against old, males against females. Finally there are practices by which a human being turns her- or himself into a subject (1982: 208). Foucault had in mind the particular historical conjunction of sexuality and the complex modern 'subject'. What interests me is the relationship between existing Balinese practices of self-definition as agents, beings or whatever and those emerging with mass media.

Foucault's related idea of 'pastoral power' may also be helpful, that particular conjunction of 'individualization techniques' and 'totalization procedures' (1982: 213), which, in the modern nation state, promises salvation not in the next world, but in this, in the form of health, wealth, well-being—everything which is promised by development policies which at once privilege the community and claim to benefit the individual. Television exemplifies such techniques and procedures by at once individualizing each viewer as a particular addressee and totalizing them as one among millions watching at that moment.[16]

The world according to Media Studies

Before we consider such subtleties, it is instructive to consider the extent to which Media Studies' specialists have predetermined the possible meanings of programmes, by focusing exclusively on the supposed content of the production. (If possible I would prefer not to rehash the old canard about programmes or texts 'containing' meaning, on which see Hobart 1982, 1999.) I take two examples: the news and quiz shows.

News broadcasts conventionally face a problem: how to appear immediate, present and real, while bound by the most rigid conventions of representation. The classical definition of a newsworthy event is that it should be recent, concern élite persons, be negative and be surprising (Galtung & Ruge 1973). By contrast, I would argue for Indonesia (based both on my own and Balinese observations) that only one of these criteria applies: it is about élite persons. Disasters of course happen. However the stress is on the government's swiftness and efficacy in getting matters under control. Government is all-powerful. It is, equally, all-knowing. So, surprises do not occur. It is often impossible to tell when many news items took place. They happen in a timeless world in which the President and senior ministers are everywhere meeting, greeting and visiting—just as in Orientalists' accounts of Javanese kings. The effect is instant *tableaux* of omniscient, omnipotent and eternal powers.

[16] In an interesting piece, Monteiro & Jayasankar (1994) used Foucault's work to analyze television-viewing practices in India. They fell however into the trap of assuming their own practices to be objective, that they could establish as a yardstick the true, determinate meaning of each programme and each practice.

Media Studies' writers concur that quiz shows are the rituals of late capitalism: they re-enact the workings of knowledge, power and success.[17] In this paean to success, 'luck plays a vital role in the hegemonic structure of societies that are both competitive and democratic' (Fiske 1989: 270). Do Balinese viewers—and apparently the participants—enjoy quizzes because they have signed up to the Great Capitalist Dream? The workings of luck, chance, cleverness are equally themes of literature and folk tales. One evening we were watching a clever, but arrogant, engineer suddenly fail in the final round of a show. Those watching with me immediately began to argue amongst themselves as to whether or not it was due to his *karma pala* (the consequences of his actions). Quiz shows, they concluded, were contests of *karma*, heightened moments, shorn of the encumbering detail of everyday life. It would be hard to predetermine such a conversation from the safety of the groves of academe.

And when David Morley argued three years ago that it was time to engage with the problems of ethnography, guess what work he singled out as exemplary? The interpretive methodology of Clifford Geertz in *Thick description* (1973). There is a sense of *déja vu* in seeing Media Studies specialists pull Granny's knickers out of the attic and lucubrate over the smell.

Too near?

There are many aspects of research into media practices in Indonesia which I have yet to think through. For various reasons I have started with television-viewing. The handful of scholars involved has concentrated on production and distribution. I have been doing the research in spare moments during summer vacations, when watching television is now part of daily life. Having spent years watching theatre, watching temple ceremonies, watching people in the village square, I am used to watching. Fieldwork, in many ways, is voyeurism from very close. Finally, the theoretical problems of how to approach audiences, the mass, intrigue me and involve me, because I am part of that mass.

There is a problem however with my working on media practices. I have been in Bali too long. I take television (on which my old mates appear) and the local paper too much for granted (to which I contribute occasionally, and am currently responsible for starting what is turning into a big debate about the media). I am too near to be surprised. What rarely palls though is enjoying television with Balinese and talking about it. To give you an idea of the range and scope of Balinese commentaries, here is an extract from a recorded discussion (in August 1994) with a group of people with whom I often worked, in which I was reviewing words they had used for how they engaged with television. In retrospect, my role seems too interventionist and to suit my expectations rather than reflect the commentators' concerns. There were five main participants: an old actor in his eighties ('Gung 'Kak), an ex-village headman, a rich farmer and his neighbour a landless labourer (both in their sixties) and the headman's daughter-in-law, who was in her second year at the Academy of Performing Arts. We had been discussing whether plays on television had the same impact as live theatre.

Ex-headman: If I think about it—this is about old people now, you understand. If they were watching a theatre performance in the past, I don't think it went as far as understanding very profoundly. They just watched, watched normally, just enjoyed watching.

[17] 'Quiz shows use knowledge in the way that Bourdieu argues culture operates [in his theory of cultural capital], that is, to separate out winners from losers and to ground the classification in individual or natural differences' (Fiske 1989: 266-67).

Actor:	Just happy to go along.
Ex-headman:	Enjoying watching means not really understanding it. If it is only a news programme, they know about that. They only know when viewing. Knowing is the first, knowing. Then enjoying.
Actor:	Sure.
Ex-headman:	Now, if in the play there is what's called moral advice, that fits to some degree.
Self:	If you watch MacGyver or Hunter, does that go as far as understanding or just enjoying watching?
Ex-headman:	That is only enjoying seeing MacGyver's cunning. Wow! He's really clever.
Self:	Huh.
Ex-headman:	Yes, his manner.
Self:	Is it possible to view and enjoy without understanding, or do you have to understand?
Ex-headman:	Now if it's the news, it's just that, only knowing about it. Yes, it's only knowing about it when viewing.
Self:	[*deliberately muddling the order*] Now if we look for which comes first: there is viewing and enjoying, there is feeling, there is knowing, there is understanding, there is taking seriously.
Ex-headman:	There is taking something seriously in your thoughts.
Self:	Yes. Can we now compare them, which one comes first?
Ex-headman:	It's knowing first, isn't that so 'Gung 'Kak? Knowing. What else is there 'Gung 'Kak?
Actor:	Knowing, enjoying, feeling, taking seriously.
Ex-headman:	Understanding [comes] earlier on.
Actor:	Understanding, that's a little bit less [than taking seriously] of course...
Ex-headman:	Yes, what's appropriate to be understood, that's what's good. What has real value like having moral content.
Actor:	It can be used, used as a source of guidance.
Ex-headman:	Which can be used as a source in life, which is suitable for use, which not, isn't that so, 'Gung 'Kak?
Rich Farmer:	In short, you have to watch [the play/programme] through until it's finished for example. Now then when it's over, only then can I understand the story, what ought I to use, what ought I not.

The extract encapsulates a range of themes which viewers and actors often alluded to. These included the central importance of enjoyment (something occasionally recognized in Media Studies, e.g. Dyer 1992, and almost totally lacking in Anthropology), and enjoyment as a precondition to any further engagement. They also touched on the superficiality of knowing compared to feeling as an experience; the value placed on moral content by the mature but rarely by the young; the impossibility of judgement or commentary until the event is completed. What I found interesting is the repeated recognition of degrees and kinds of involvement, which culminates in *nelebang*, reflecting, taking seriously and so potentially changing yourself. Balinese certainly recognized that television-viewing is one of many practices which changes you, but only with your active participation.

It became clear later that enjoying may also be a refusal to become more involved. You can enjoy something because no alternative ever suggested itself. As you grow older, or if more critical practices may have rubbed off on you, then enjoyment becomes a decision not to engage further. Even this sequence by itself is vapid because it is just about ideas. There

has, as yet, been no consequent action determined by a process of reflection. I suggested earlier that the practices to do with television are by no means confined to the moment of broadcast. As the farmer remarked, until a performance (or programme) is over you do not know what the plot was and therefore understand, let alone reflect upon what is of value, still less reach the point where it will affect future actions. It makes more sense to consider the responses to plays or programmes as closer to actions or mental episodes over which individual viewers learn to attain a degree of command than to states somehow imposed in Mind by the image or the text.

I have hundreds of hours of such taped commentaries, always with groups of Balinese who know one another well talking among themselves. They provide more insights and revelations into the thinking of at least a few Balinese than I could work through in a lifetime. It took twenty years before people would talk apparently easily in this way and the commentaries are in fact beguilingly impressive. My concern is not so much that I was the occasion and catalyst of such discussions, or with the issues of my position in what transpired. We all have, and may adopt, different 'subject positions' at different stages in a single conversation. Anyway the idea of ethnography as pure voyeurism is rather nasty. What concerns me more is that such conversations over the years have changed them and their understanding of their own practices as well as it has mine. Also, as I recall, although it is not easy to hear on the tape, I think at moments they were humouring me in the extract (for instance in the MacGyver passage). I am not saying this invalidates what they are saying. After all I am humouring you at this moment. It is that what people say is evidently massively more personal and situational—and in that sense easily over-interpreted—than appears in our written accounts.

As far as I can tell though, far from there being play-acting in the following exchange, it was a moment of self-understanding.

Ex-headman:	Do you know why my distinguished friends [those present were all high caste] like talking about [television]?
Self:	Yes?
Actor:	Go on, try telling us.
Ex-headman:	As for me, I think the effect on you of most TV is bad. That is why they like talking about it.
Actor:	I just felt that right in my stomach [i.e. spot on target].

In 1988 I asked people I knew what I should study to understand how Balinese reproduce themselves and their society. I was told, variously, public meetings, the work of mediums and theatre, above all the last. At some point I have worked on each of these. By 1993 my question had changed somewhat to asking what to study if I wanted to understand what was affecting ordinary people and Balinese society. I was told, again variously, television, tourism and government, but television was always the foremost among these. Maybe I should bring the full weight and majesty of post-everything theory which I shove down students' throats *à la Strasbourgeoise* to bear in deciding what is the real problem. I cannot quite summon up the intellectual arrogance to do so. I think my Balinese friends' and acquaintances' accounts as good as anything I can come up with. That perhaps is the price I pay for getting implicated in the messy world of dialogue, practices and the media, instead of the soothing soft lapping of culture against the banks of the anthropological mind. The lesson of the Quatermass films is that alien life forms cannot hack it in another world. However alien I still am, I am also too close to tell any more, or perhaps to care.

Epilogue/Epitaph

In the days since I gave the seminar, a number of colleagues, staff and research students, have come up to me and argued that, while my critique might hold for much anthropological practice, it did not apply to them. They were doing something quite different. The more intelligent version stated that the person was aware of the kinds of danger outlined, but that they had taken it into account theoretically and methodologically. This is the classical move of secondary elaboration, by which you try to hide, talk away or otherwise pretend the original problem is not there. A little reflection will show that this line of argument does not do away with the original presuppositions, but merely shuffles them around. What is more, as stated, the argument directly involves a Cartesian dichotomy of Mind (theory) and its application to the world (methodology). It is also unclear what is buried in the notion of 'theory' here.

The second kind of response was more worrying. The argument was that, if you just get on with business of writing as usual and do not explicitly address more general, or philosophical, issues, then somehow it is quite safe and intellectually solid, even admirable. Of the kind of scholarship which takes it that, if you make no explicit presuppositions, then you are not presupposing anything, Collingwood once wrote:

> in low-grade or unscientific thinking we hardly know that we are making any presuppositions at all... This theory of knowledge is called 'realism'; and 'realism' is based upon the grandest foundation a philosophy can have, namely human stupidity' (1940: 34).

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